El delirio en la esquizofrenia como objeto de estudio interdisciplinario en la filosofía de la mente

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Publicado: Sep 27, 2022
Actualizado: 2022-09-27
Versiones:
2022-09-27 (4)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17163/soph.n33.2022.02
Palabras clave:
Delirio, piscosis, filosofía de la mente, fenomenología, esquizofrenia

Contenido principal del artículo

Pablo Andrés López-Silva
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7457-7724
Álvaro Eduardo Cavieres Fernández
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6016-0733

Resumen

El delirio es un fenómeno transdiagnóstico más frecuente en la esquizofrenia. Históricamente, el delirio se ha considerado la marca de la psicosis. Dada las formas en que desafía algunas de las premisas más fundamentales acerca de la naturaleza de la mente humana, durante los últimos 20 años el delirio ha atraído la atención de filósofos, psiquiatras e investigadores en ciencias cognitivas. Sin embargo, a pesar de su relevancia clínica en el diagnóstico de una serie de condiciones, el estudio del delirio aún produce diversas discusiones conceptuales y empíricas. Este artículo intenta clarificar algunos de los problemas más fundamentales que surgen del estudio interdisciplinario del delirio en el contexto de la esquizofrenia. Es importante señalar que la resolución de tales discusiones no constituye un simple ejercicio retórico, sino que permitiría, en el mejor de los casos, sentar las bases para el avance en la investigación clínica y experimental conceptualmente bien informada y, por ende, permitiría importantes avances en su tratamiento. En este sentido, el avance conceptual en el área será importante para definir la carta de navegación de la investigación empírica en el tema. Esto, porque cada teoría que intenta contar una historia explicativa completa y contextualizada del fenómeno de los delirios en la esquizofrenia debería ofrecer respuestas a los problemas que identificamos en este trabajo.

Detalles del artículo

Número
Núm. 33 (2022): (julio-diciembre 2022): Filosofía de la mente y educación
Sección
Artículos
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