The Role of Induction and Probability in the Development of Science and Philosophy
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Abstract
This paper addresses the process of consolidating the inductive method and the support provided by the development of probability to satisfy formal validation requirements. The discussion on the limitations of induction considering the prevailing deductive method in philosophy and science has a long tradition, attention is paid to key concepts of inductive methodology and its probabilistic support with ranges of occurrence that contrast with the criteria of deduction based on certainties, such as the criteria of truth or falsehood. It is argued that probabilistic induction is the mechanism that enables the increase of philosophical and scientific knowledge and prevents us from falling into absolute and often dogmatic principles. Among the main findings is that induction does not adhere to the canons of knowledge from the deductive point of view, but introduces the concept of uncertainty, thereby breaking the Aristotelian tradition prevailing until Modernity. Additionally, it is observed that probabilistic induction expands the understanding of knowledge by shifting the discussion from absolute certainty to the realm of possibilities, thus presenting a diversity of possible worlds without deviating from real data collected by the researcher.
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