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The being of the Journal

Sophia Journal is pleased to present the publication of the issue 27 of its collection. This issue has as its backbone the reflection on the *Ontology of Language in Education*, a complex, polysemic and attractive subject at the same time; a topic that allows us to rethink the very being of ontology, language and education as substantial elements that refer to the understanding of a unique reality: the human being understood as a subject in his being and in his being in the world.

The very being of language in education is closely linked to the being and existence of the human being to the extent that reality is a dynamic totality that integrates a set of mental constructions and real actions; a set of diverse interactions arising from the relationship between subjects and between subject-object. In this sense, ontology is presented as a mechanism for the interpretation of the purpose and meaning of the human being in relation to the other, with the social, educational, cultural contexts and with the other beings that are part of the environment, all this mediated by language as an essential element for communication.

Therefore, to speak about the *Ontology of language in education* means understanding a particularity of general ontology applied to education, which ultimately directs in a cyclical way the understanding of the subject that communicates his being, his thoughts, his emotion with the help of the tools provided by education which becomes a new form of language that promotes transformations in the subject and in the context.

To support the statement, it is necessary to resort to the reflections made by Rafael Echeverría (2005) who, when referring to the ontology of language, considers that there are “three basic postulates” (p. 20), which are presented as follows: “1. We interpret human beings as linguistic beings; 2. We interpret language as generative; 3. We interpret that human beings create themselves in language and through it” (p. 20). From this perspective, carrying out a brief analysis of the aforementioned postulates, it can be stated that:

1. The human being is interpreted as an exclusively linguistic being because, due to language, he can understand himself and others, however, it is necessary to keep in mind that although it is true, language is an im-
important part of understanding human beings, not all comes down to it, there are also other fundamental dimensions that must be valued if one starts from the criterion that the human being is a being of realities, is a being located in the world and aware of it.

In this sense, Rafael Echeverría (2005) himself recognizes that language does not exhaust the multidimensionality of the subject and that, on the contrary, there are other domains that must be considered: “the domain of the body, the domain of emotionality and the domain of language” (p. 21), these domains would allow a broader and diverse understanding of the human phenomenon and its diverse manifestations.

2. Language is interpreted as generative to the extent that the human being is able to modify what he currently possesses, when he is able to “describe what we perceive (the outside world) or” express what we think or feel (our inner world)” (Echeverría, 2005, p. 22). This approach aims to reconstruct the conception of language by abandoning the postulates of the traditional view of language. In terms of Echeverría (2005) the language generates being.

Personally, I assert that language is indeed generative and, in this sense, it is active, creative, relational and transformative, responds to a space-time context because it is linked to the human being and is, at the same time, subject to the dynamism of history and of all the human activity.

3. It is interpreted that “human beings create themselves in language and through it” (Echeverría, 2005, p. 23); aspect that implies thinking differently from what tradition thought, for which each individual is born with a certain way of being, with something permanent, innate. On the contrary, from the ontology of language it is understood that life is the place where individuals discover themselves, that the vital processes allow us to discover our being and our real essence with which we cast doubt on idea that the human has a determined, permanent and defined way of being. The human being can be constructed from language, an aspect that explains the meaning of his being in the world. In any case, with the explained above, the initial assertion that the fundamental basis of the ontology of language is the very human being in context is confirmed, the human being who is transformed, who makes history and is constantly built.

And then, what can we say about the Ontology of Language in education? What we know and what don’t know about educational language? What is the meaning of the language being in education? How to know what is the very meaning of the being of language in education? How do we interpret the ontology of language in education? What is the origin and historical meaning of ontology? What are the manifestations
of the ontology? How do we interpret ontology in general, the ontology of language and the ontology of language in education? How to understand being, truth and language in the educational process? Are human beings really linguistic beings? What are the benefits and limitations of understanding the human being as a linguistic being in education? What is the relationship between being-reason-language and educational action? These are some questions that are addressed in the pages of the ten manuscripts presented in this issue 27 of Sophia, which are organized equally in two sections: one that contains the documents referring to the central theme and another that groups the manuscripts of miscellaneous character. The different approaches and perspectives on the subject under study are presented below.

The process of reflection begins the article Historical ontology as a horizon for education, presented by the Ecuadorian philosopher Samuel Guerra Bravo, in which he considers that education was always linked to philosophy, to the question of being, to metaphysics, he asks, what has happened after the end of metaphysics? He wonders if the being has manifested in the same way in all historical spheres? The author considers that philosophy in Latin America cannot benefit from its European ‘end’, because the question of being and of entities have had specific determinations linked to metaphysics as a theoretical horizon of dominance, in that sense, in the article he proposes a decolonial vision that criticizes the traditional function of metaphysics and that thinks about the conditions of a historical ontology that brings to light the possibilities of a reconstitution of Being and Logos. According to the author, “historical ontology appears, then, as a new horizon for one’s own existence and for education.”

Traveling this path of thought, the document Ontology of language, a new device for the construction of the neoliberal subject? prepared by Héctor Marcelo Rodríguez Mancilla, Marcela Eliana Betancourt Sáez and Ana María Barrientos Rojas, in this manuscript the implications of the ontology of language and transformational learning for education and for the reproduction of the social order are analyzed. The authors consider that these formulations can be understood as a new device of neoliberal subjectivation that internalizes the notion of performance from linguistic reductionism. The article contrasts the founding premises of the ontology of language with experiences of critical learning from Chilean militant university students and with educational experiences developed by the Landless Rural Workers movement in Brazil.

In the intellectual journey of the central theme, there is the article Ontology and language: truth and meaning on the threshold of the
two cultures, by the Mexican philosopher Javier Corona Fernández. The document proposes an exploration of the existing implications between language and ontology from two different traditions: the scope of the scientific statement and the relationships between meaning and truth, according to its author, knowledge as the activity of describing a world formed by particular events; and, the historical consideration whose purpose is to understand the multiform reality in which language does not only state facts but constructs a sense of world in which human life finds the significant elements of its concrete reality.

Intellectual dynamism advances with the reflections set forth in the document Language and reference, structured by Hindu philosopher Babu Thaliath. The author maintains that, like cognition, the language in which cognition is expressed has in principle a function of synthesis, that is, a function of connecting the knowledgeable subject with the object of cognition. Language allows the human subject to have epistemic access to the object, which in its form and function constitutes the necessary referentiality of the language itself. Cognition must inevitably refer to the object of knowledge in the mode of pre-linguistic-sensory and abstract-conceptual approaches, as Kant clearly points out in his basic notion of synthetic nature and the structure of conceptual knowledge. He maintains that in the process of cognition, the subject must have epistemic access to the particular; however, conceptual cognition departs from the particular and addresses a general universal idea. The ambiguity between referential access and referential output in cognition requires a necessary supplementation of the logical abstract through pre-linguistic-sensory or aesthetic knowledge, as Alexander G. Baumgarten points out in his doctrine of sensory cognition (sensitive cognition) and of the aesthetic-logical truth.

In the reflective evolution of the proposed central theme, the manuscript Voice and excess: speculative, ethical-political and educational approaches to orality made by the researcher Pedro Bravo Reinoso is next. The document explores the voice understood as an attended component in the field of language philosophy, is supported by the theoretical apparatus of two representatives of Slovenian psychoanalysis, Slavoj Žižek and Mladen Dollar. The author intends to show that the voice is a component of communication that resists its inscription within the significant chain; argues that the voice contains in its core a component that shows the antagonistic gap of the social, which would allow to renegotiate the meanings that order the social. The manuscript presents a philosophical reflection of a dialectical nature on the phenomenon of the voice, explores speculative, ethical, political and educational aspects concerning
this phenomenon, which is intended to contribute to an understanding of orality over its instrumental aspects in communication. The structuring of the article is based on examples of the contemporary educational context, which shows how the voice breaks into education as an element of a political nature. In this dynamic of thought, within the Miscellaneous section, the article *Listening as an existential openness that allows the understanding of the other*, prepared by Colombian researcher Darwin Joaqui Robles and Ecuadorian Dorys Noemy Ortiz Granja is inscribed. The document addresses the issue of listening as the central axis of an existential opening that favors the understanding of the other. The authors reflect on language and its possibilities. The main objective of this proposal is to highlight the value that listening has to reach the understanding of the other and the construction of dialogic relationships between human beings. To do this, the authors make a descriptive journey through language and its characteristics, highlighting its two components: speech and listening as an interrelated process to understand their role in the construction of relational narratives among human beings.

Within this same section of Miscellaneous, is the manuscript: *The (re) invention of the past as a gesture of (de) compose Pedagogy*, developed by the Argentine Francisco Ramallo. The author maintains that the record of the past in education often forgets its pedagogical power, paradoxically constructing fossilized and nostalgic stories. However, the matrix crossing of narrative research and critical pedagogy calls for composing stories that invigorate and inhabit a past more sensitive and kinder with life. The text intends to disrupt the classic perspectives of the History of Education with the intention of intervening in the coloniality and the normalization of the legitimacy of ‘the’ educational story. The objective of the manuscript is to (re) invent a past - that of the Argentine baccalaureate -, based on a methodology of narrative research - which ponders both the data of the field and the reflections on what is done with them; transgressing its forms and reversing its enunciation as a way of promoting gestures that are aimed at what is called here (the composition of pedagogy).

This same guideline follows the study *Ontological Foundations of the Finnish education system as a reference to overcome problems in emerging contexts*, by Jefferson Alexander Moreno Guaicha and by the undersigned. This work arises as a result of the reflections made regarding the failure of external educational models applied in emerging contexts...
without considering the reality of the peoples themselves. The objective of the manuscript is to analyze the ontological foundations of the Finnish education system with a view to identifying the main references to overcome specific problems of the educational reality in emerging societies.

The reflexive process finds its place in the Chilean territory represented by the investigation *The concept of critical thinking according to Chilean preservice teachers*, executed by Claudio Heraldo Díaz-Larenas; Carlos Javier Ossa-Cornejo; Maritza Roxana Palma-Luengo; Nelly Gromiria Lagos-San Martin; and, Javiera Ignacia Boudon Araneda. The manuscript analyzes the concept of critical thinking according to the perspective of a group of pedagogy students from a Chilean university. The responses collected by the authors of the document were analyzed using the content analysis strategy, which allowed generating different categories.

This issue 27 of the journal concludes with the research entitled *Existential Commitment with Teaching*, developed by Graciela Flores and Luis Porta. Its authors argue that one of the main findings of an interpretive study conducted at the National University of Mar del Plata, Argentina was the existential commitment to teaching, in order to understand the ethical dimension of university education, the narratives and teaching practices of a memorable professor of Philosophy, who was chosen as an example of good teaching, are studied. The existential commitment of the teacher is present in her expressions and in her practices that are part of the ‘recognition model’. The interpretive framework addresses materials from a methodological articulation between the narrative biographical approach and ethnographic research in education.

Here ends the outline of the presentation of the contents addressed in the present publication of the journal. We invite you to reflect on the ideas, paragraphs, pages and all the manuscripts presented in this issue 27 of the journal with a view to generating new intellectual concerns that motivate research and the proposition of theories and referential philosophical postulates that seek to respond to the new needs of the subject and the context of today.

**The task of the Journal**

It is gratifying to understand that the time elapsed since the emergence of the Sophia Journal: Collection of Education of Philosophy has not been in vain, its dynamism has been supported by the favorable reception by the reader of the different geographical, cultural and intellectual con-
texts, and above all, it has been strengthened by the interesting contributions made by researchers from different continents.

The impulse experienced by the Journal has forced a series of qualitative and quantitative transformations evidenced in its profile, in the regulations, in the presentation of its content, in the structure of the editorial team, in the management and dissemination mechanisms. This is how, at present, the Scientific Council of the Journal is made up of 60 professionals, researchers, philosophers, educators and specialists in areas related to the philosophy of education. It has 11 international co-publishers and 210 reviewers who permanently contribute to a better positioning of the journal.

The geographical diversification of the professionals that make up the Editorial Board is reflected in the participation of researchers from 27 countries such as: Angola, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, United States, Spain, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Puerto Rico, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela, belonging to different continents.

In addition, throughout this process, it is vitally important to recognize the advice made by the Comunicar Group and the role played by the people who make up the Management Board of the Journal (coordination, correction and style, layout, design, OJS support and dissemination). The growth of the journal has been noticeable and is evidenced in the permanent interactivity that is carried out through the use of the different social networks and the dissemination of the knowledge that is carried out through the academic networks used for the fulfillment of this purpose.

Teamwork has allowed the Sophia: Collection of Education of Philosophy to be found today with 120 indexations distributed in selective international databases, in journal evaluation platforms, in selective directories, in selective newspaper libraries, Open Access scientific literature search engines, in editorial copyright policies and self-archiving, in bibliographic databases, in the catalog of international libraries and in scientific information systems.

On the other hand, as a mechanism for disseminating knowledge and contextual, intellectual and interdisciplinary interaction, the Sophia Journal: Collection of Philosophy of Education maintains the consortium with ten internationally renowned journals.
This editorial cannot be closed without expressing my gratitude to all those who made possible the publication of this new issue of our collection.

Floralba del Rocío Aguilar Gordón

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Abstract

Education was always linked to philosophy, to the question of ‘ser’, to metaphysics. What should we think after the end of philosophy as metaphysics’ proclaimed by Europe? The hypothesis of this work is that philosophy in Latin America can not benefit from its European’ final because the question of ‘ser’ and ‘entes’ has had specific determinations coming from metaphysics not only as ‘theory of being but as a justifying horizon of domination imposed on our region. It becomes necessary then a decolonial vision that critiques this function of metaphysics and thinks of the conditions of a historical ontology that brings to light the possibilities of a reconstitution of ‘ser’ and logos (language, reason). Historical ontology then appears as a new horizon for one’s existence and for corresponding education.

Keywords

Metaphysics, ontology, being, historicity, modernity.

Resumen

La educación siempre estuvo ligada a la filosofía, a la cuestión del ‘ser’, a la metafísica. ¿Qué debemos pensar después del ‘fin de la filosofía como metafísica’ proclamado por Europa? La hipótesis de este trabajo es que la filosofía en América Latina no puede acogerse a su ‘final’ europeo, porque la cuestión del ‘ser’ y los ‘entes’ ha tenido determinaciones específicas que provenían de la metafísica no solo como ‘teoría del ser’ sino como horizonte justificador del dominio impuesto sobre nuestra región. Se hace necesaria entonces una visión decolonial que critique esa función de la metafísica y piense las condiciones de una ontología histórica que saque a luz las posibilidades de una reconstitución del ‘ser’ y el logos (lenguaje, razón). La ontología histórica aparece entonces como nuevo horizonte para la propia existencia y para la educación correspondiente.

Palabras clave

Metafísica, ontología, ser, historicidad, modernidad.

Introduction

The subjects of Metaphysics and Ontology invites us to move to the Greek re-start of philosophy and brings us back to the present and the philosophical situations that afflict the human being. Education is one -the main, perhaps- of these situations that compromise the existence of the individual and his knowledge, action, learning, work and being human.

Metaphysics was the ‘science of being in general’ or ‘science of entity’. The concepts of ‘being’ and ‘entity’ were used interchangeably to deal with issues that had to do with ‘what is’. Even when the term ‘Ontology’ came into circulation with Christian Wolf (1679-1754), the two ‘sciences’ continued to be understood as equivalents. Heidegger (1978) introduced in the twentieth century the so-called ‘ontological difference’ to distinguish between ‘being’ and ‘entity’, a distinction that made possible the understanding of man as ‘being-there’, as a privileged manifestation of ‘being’. The history of philosophy then appeared as the history of Metaphysics that reached its culmination (final) when the experimental sciences separated and became independent of their philosophical matrix (XIX / XX centuries). After the “end of philosophy as metaphysics” (p.134), Heidegger postulated an “other beginning” that he called “Thinking”: an activity of reason that is neither metaphysical nor science and that thinks the essence or sense of being’. ‘Being’ had been ‘forgotten’ as a result of Plato and later philosophy dealing with ‘being’ and not ‘being as being’. Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology once again addressed the ‘question of being’ through an analytic of ‘being-there’ and its events (historical manifestations, events of ‘being’).

Has this trajectory of ‘being’ in Europe taken place in Latin America? Some will say “indeed”, that Latin America was incorporated into European universalism in the sixteenth century and that it is still under the effects of colonialism and coloniality. Others, those who think from a de-colonial horizon, find in that question an accumulation of difficulties that have to do precisely with the colonial vicissitudes of ‘being’ in the Latin American subcontinent. The ‘end of philosophy as metaphysics’, postulated by Heidegger, did not think the reality of the areas subject to colonialism/coloniality, in which Americans (indigenous, blacks, mestizos) were degraded from’ being ‘to’ non-being ’, that is to say, the condition of objects, instruments, quasi-human beings, barbarians without soul, without reason, without spirituality..., which had to be violently incorporated into civilization and Christianity. The Latin American history of the last five centuries has been that of this ‘being’ diminished,
depredated and depowered, a ‘being-there’ undermined, dehumanized by the gaze of the conqueror and the imposed imperial system.

The consequence of all this is that philosophy in Latin America cannot benefit from its Eurocentric ‘end’, but has to be re-defined as a discipline of thought that thinks the conditions of possibility of the re-constitution of the depredated ‘being’ and the re-habilitation of the *logos* (reason, rationality, knowledge, discourse) typical of the Latin American people. This re-constitution of ‘being’ and *logos*, as an imperative of the present, leads us to situate ourselves within a ‘historical Ontology’ that points to another ‘way to being’ and leads, unlike Europe, ‘more here’ and not ‘more there’ in the ontological horizon. It will help in this task a clear distinction between ‘Metaphysics’ (as ‘science’ that ideologically manipulated ‘being’ and ‘non-being’/ Parmenides / in their wars of expansion and colonialism) and ‘Historical Ontology’ (as a system of categories that reflects on the re-constitution and deployment of the ‘being-there’ and the *logos*).

What comes next is, therefore, a brief exposition and critique of the role played by ‘metaphysics’ in our history of the last five centuries, and an initial systematization of a ‘historical ontology’ that enables the re-constitution/re -habilitation/ iberation of Latin American ‘being’. These guidelines will show Ontology as the historical horizon necessary for understanding both our existence and our education, since this has to do, ultimately, with the ‘being-there’ that ‘we are’ and with the *logos* that let us think and think-us.

**Philosophy as “metaphysics”**

To have a philosophy, it always took a fundamental disposition and a founding event: the ‘amazement’ that things are instead of not-being, among the Greeks; the ‘madness’ of faith in a Supreme Creator of all that exists,2 in the case of the medieval thinkers; the power of reason and knowledge, in the case of European modernity. These events opened possibilities for philosophical thinking to gradually develop systems of concepts and categories that ex-pressed the way of understanding the world of those peoples and cultures: metaphysics, in the case of the Greeks; Scholasticism, in the case of the medieval people; science and technology, in the case of modern-Europeans.

The Greek metaphysics, which later expanded to Rome and Europe and was re-formulated and re-oriented by Christianity, was the one that arrived in America in the sixteenth century and which has been cultivated in Latin American academic centers. This philosophy responded to the de-
mands and needs of the Greco-European context and developed specific universalized characteristics. This philosophy included the Latin American people in their vision of the world as homunculi, animals, objects, things at hand, “less than dung from the town squares” in the condemnation of Bartolomé de las Casas (2011, p.17); that is to say, as a degradation of ‘being’ (foundation), of ‘being-there’ (man) and of logos (reason).³

The ‘being’ that the Greeks dis-covered as their foundation had evolved from pure substantiality to self-consciousness and that is why it was manifested before them as a way of being Greek, as logos, as philosophy and as culture. As ‘way of being’, it reflected the defining characteristics of the Greek people; as logos and philo-sophy. That is to say, as rationality and theory, it allowed them to ‘see’, understand and ex-pose the existing as a totality; as ‘Greek culture’, it understood everything in relation to the perfect, immutable, eternal, necessary, absolute, divine (as the supreme manifestation of the human being). In this same tradition, ‘being’ will manifest itself in European modernity as I, as self-consciousness-for-oneself, as Spirit, as Reason, as Idea, as Freedom, as democracy, and will seek to expand their culture and civilization throughout the known world.

That philosophy, for us, has been and continues to be a ‘science of being’ (Metaphysics), not so much from Heidegger who updated the question of ‘being’ in the 20th century, but from our historical experience. What does this mean? From a descriptive point of view, it means that the philosophy that prevailed in America has been the theory of being and non-being (Parmenides), of the ‘being’ (the ontological) and the ‘entities’ (the ontic)⁴, of the totality of what is, of the principles of non-contradiction and identity as supreme principle, of the system of concepts about essence and existence, about matter and form, about act and power, about predicaments or supreme genres of the existing (the substance and the accidents that affect the substance: quantity, quality, relation, place, time, manner, habit, action, passion), on the transcendental properties of being or ‘entity’ (unity, truth, goodness, beauty), about identity and difference, about the ultimate causes (material, formal, efficient, final), etc.

The vision of the world sustained in this system of categories was called ‘metaphysics’ because it was located on the plane of the purely conceptualized, categorized, for the reason that thinks and abstracts, ‘beyond’ (meta) of the sensitive domain or experimental (physis). It has also been understood as a science/theory about the ‘being of the entities’, which means that everything that exists is an entity (this tree, this
dog, this man, that mountain, etc.), that, in fact, there is a multiplicity and diversity of entities, although metaphysics is only interested in what makes them entities: their essence (tree, dog, man, mountain, etc.), and, what unifies them: their being, their existence. The ‘being’ is the most universal and radical of the concepts, it is indefinable and evident in/by itself. All entities ‘are’, ‘exist’; ‘be’, however, is not an entity, nor a thing, but that which is given or manifested in the entities. Every being is, therefore, ‘to be in action’. ‘Being’ as a foundation is one, but manifests itself in a different way in, for example, the stones, the plants, the animals, the man, the angels, God. Scholasticism will speak of levels in the dignity of ‘being’, from the lowest (which would correspond to inanimate beings) to the highest and perfect (which would correspond to God, as absolute Being, Creator and Person). In the Greek version, however, the ‘being’ is not a person, but a universal and abstract metaphysical principle, which was defined as the prime motor/God (Aristotle), converting metaphysics into onto-theological.

Given the factual presence of this philosophy understood as metaphysics, as rational, first and universal theory about ‘being’ (what is/exists) and the logos (language/discourse that reveals ‘being’), the most radical question we can ask, in relation to us, is: ‘Who are we today and what is our relationship with the logos?’ With this question we allude to the fundamentals that sustain us: the being (existence, action) and the logos (reason, rationality, language, discourse) that reveals the ‘being’. Man (‘being-there’/Dasein: Heidegger), is the only one for whom the question about being is meaningful, because in it he (gains) his own ‘being’, his own existence. No entity, nor God, escapes the question of ‘being’ (because you can ask who He is and whether or not He exists), only that He is the original identity of Being and Logos, of essence and existence. We, mere mortals, those of us who are still under colonial systems, are forced to re-think the questions of ‘being’ as a foundation, of ‘being-there’ and of logos because those are precisely the fundamental dimensions that have been concealed and distorted by the Eurocentric philosophy/metaphysics/onto-theo-logical.

The imposition and deployment of this philosophy/metaphysics in America allowed it to operate as an absolute parameter of what is and is not, as a propaedeutic of theology in the academies and of religion in the consciences, as the backbone of philosophy careers and social sciences, as a vision of the world in the minds of people, as a norm of morality and ethics in human acts, as a culture in ordinary life and in customs... This philosophy/metaphysics ordered and hierarchized everything, and
continues to do so, even if we do not realize it or it seems incredible. Its presence among us is all-inclusive (although we ignore everything about it or we do not notice its presence), it has to do with everything that ‘is’ and, therefore, with our existence (yours, mine, each one’s), with our reason and thought, with our present, with our actions, with the direction and meaning of our life, with our language, emotions and feelings.7

This Metaphysics/Scholastics modeled the new generations of creoles and mestizos in ways of being and thinking based on horizons of transcendence, eternity, absoluteness, necessity, totality, immateriality, spirituality, generating attitudes and behaviors that, in a general way, we could define as contemplative, idealistic, passive, resigned, hopeful, mystical, of recollection, of renunciation of this world, of distancing from the sensible, material, corporal, etc. In this metaphysical culture one can find the origins of certain characteristics that, as a general tendency, Latin American peoples present in ordinary life: universalists, idealists, deductivists, transcendentalists, absolutists, spiritualists, theoreticians, essentialists, hierarchizers, perfectionists, intolerant, traditionalists, conservative, rigorists, jealous, racist, sexist, gossipers, exclusivists, ostentatious, formalistic, overbearing, bureaucratic, foreignizing...

Philosophy as ‘metaphysics of domination’

In the preceding lines we have spoken of ‘philosophy as metaphysics’, and it has been understood as a system of concepts that thinks ‘being’ as a foundation: a ‘being’ (originally centered on the Greek, and, later, on the Roman, the Hispanic, the European, the North American) that through a process of abstraction was installed as a universal theoretical principle. This meta-physical ‘being’ could only be accessed by reason, rationality, logos, speech, language, discourse: the heritage of ‘rational’ human beings (white-Europeans) who had/have the logos, unlike others (indigenous, black, mestizo) who do not have it (because they are ‘irrational’ or ‘beastly’, as Columbus called the Native Americans), or borrow it (like conquered and colonized peoples), or exercise their reason -according to the conquerors- in an elementary and routine way (they are like ‘children’ who must be guided and one must ‘think for them’).

This philosophy/theory/vision about the ‘being’ of existence came to America as the mental and cultural horizon of the Spanish conquerors (even if they were illiterate) and as a system of thought and understanding of reality in the head and in the books brought for the religious who
accompanied the invaders. Philosophy used that Greco-European categorical system to theoretically justify and legitimize the invasion, conquest, colonization and acculturation of America. In that task the very essence of the Spanish/European culture re-conceptually formulated and was established as ‘civilization’, and, in doing so, or with that same series of events, modernity was inaugurated and turned Europe into a visible ‘center’ of the world, which left the original, ancestral and specific American indigenous cultures in the shadow, concealed, subjected, devalued or destroyed, seen and defined as ‘barbarism’.

Philosophy thus assumed an ideological function as a means and instrument of justification and legitimization of the Spanish invasion, of the subsequent indigenous genocide, of the destruction of religions, temples and knowledge that the aboriginal cultures had developed. Converted into a political and ideological weapon, it legitimized what happened with its word and discourse 8. In the American sixteenth century, there was therefore a ‘meeting’ or a ‘dialogue’ of cultures, there was the imposition of one (the Hispanic) on the others (the indigenous), there was invasion, domination, subjugation, violent and destroyer military subjection of the indigenous civilizations.

The reason, rationality, the *logos*, became (along with religion and other elements of culture) in qualifying parameters that served to divide human beings into ‘rational’ and ‘barbarian’, into Christians and infidels, into modern and primitives, in enlightened and uneducated, in ‘lords’ and ‘natives’, in whites and people of color. The former think with their own reason and for themselves, the latter think (if they do) the thought of the ‘rational’; the former are civilized, organized in institutions (political, social, economic, cultural), the latter live as scattered ‘beasts’, lack institutions 9, confused with nature; the former are free men, owners of themselves, citizens (they live in the *polis*), the latter are slaves, they are not masters of themselves (they belong to the master) and they exist as mere instruments, objects or animals in the service of the master; the first have ‘love for wisdom’ (philosophy) and are capable of forming abstract concepts, the second ones are pure sensible experience not ‘elevated’ to concepts; the first are moral, ethical (*ethos*), the second are immoral, full of vices and are dominated by passions (*pathos*); the first govern the republic, the second work for the republic’s subsistence; the former have been chosen to spread throughout the world the civilization and the religion of the empire (Christianity), the latter must become cultured and accept the God of their rulers; the first ones are luminous, transparent and untouched, the second ones are dark, opaque and stained...10
According to Maldonado-Torres (2007), in such a world, “ontology collapses in a Manichaeism” (p.149), in an exclusive dualism. The world worked on the basis of these opposing elements (which are opposed to each other) and contradictory (which exclude each other), one of which dominated by their ways of ‘being’, their logos, their culture, the ‘other’ marginalized (dominated, subjugated, subdued, colonized) and de-powered in their ‘being’, their thinking, their living and dying. This way of understanding and assuming the world legalized the existence of conquerors and colonizers who wielded a supposed ‘right’ over the conquered and colonized. The ‘being’ brought out its dark, colonial side, and the American went from ‘being-there’ to ‘being-there-colonized’. In this way, philosophy as ‘metaphysics’, as onto-theo-logy, culminated, since its arrival in America, in philosophy as ‘metaphysics of domination’ and has provided, over time, categories (those of being, not-being, act, power, substance, accident, matter, form, etc.) that have sustained ‘from behind’ (as a legitimating theoretical framework) colonialism, neocolonialism and coloniality.

Some characters warned and criticized this ideological function of philosophy very early on. The famous debate of Valladolid (1550-1551) between Bartolomé de las Casas and Ginés de Sepúlveda, about the legitimacy of the conquest and subjugation of the natives, exemplifies this contrast between the critical and questioning vision of de las Casas and the legitimizing vision of Sepúlveda.¹¹ However, the debate that took place in the sixteenth century did not stop the institutionalization of this philosophy, which was imposed as a study curriculum in schools (colleges and universities, which were gradually founded) and as a mental horizon of ordinary culture, not only of the natives, but also of the new generations that appeared with the miscegenation. Some religious conscious, inspired by an authentic vision of the Gospel, raised to the Spanish authorities reports or allegations denouncing the cruelty of the conquest and defending the indigenous cultures. These materials now allow the re-construction of a philosophical-critical line of thought, which emerged in what was called ‘America’¹², which continued and was re-defined at decisive moments in our political and cultural history, such as the so-called ‘independence’ ‘nineteenth century or the liberal and socialist revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In this way, the soul, the thought, the culture, the organization of society, politics, government, and, in general, all the manifestations of the system in which our ancestors lived have been linked, and still are, for good and for bad, to the Greco-Roman-Hispanic-European-North
American West. This phenomenon had and has, not only cultural connotations, but also racist and exclusivist connotations to privilege the white-European vein of the new social groups that were formed in America, while hiding, discrediting or excluding the indigenous American vein, the black one (acclimated already in America, after its import from Africa), the mestiza. These other veins of our roots have had to resist in the darkness and silence for four centuries, from the second half of the twentieth century, re-constituted as ethnic groups, cultures or social groups and carry out a gradual de-concealment, study and re-valorization, both of its ‘popular’ wisdom and its more organic or systematic manifestations.

Philosophy/metaphysics continues to be updated in the current mechanisms of power, especially the academic and communicational powers, with which it maintains its presence in all the intricacies of existence (such as being totalized over itself, as a stratified society, as life that is lived in relation to ulterior or transcendent referents), of thought (as Western-Christian reason and rationality), and of the culture of Latin American being (as a horizon of dematerialized, de-idealized and ideal-istic understanding). What to do in front of this ‘metaphysics of domination’? Re-think the ‘being’, the ‘being-there’ and the ‘logos’ from the ‘amazement’ (strangeness, scandal, outrage) before the annihilation and degradation of those our fundamental constituents. That is the answer that will also allow us to ‘legitimize’ the presence of philosophy in our reality, since ‘illegitimately’ (by imposed and ideological) has been present from the very moment that America was ‘discovered’. What is it that we should ask, analyze and criticize to avoid that ‘philosophy as metaphysics of domination’ continues to run over us in the pulpits, in the families, in the curricula and in the culture of the street, in the media and in the private enclosures of ordinary life without us realizing it?

Critique of philosophy as ‘domination metaphysics’

*The ‘end’ of philosophy as a metaphysics of domination and its ‘re-start’ as a knowledge of decolonization and subjectification*

Expressions of ordinary life such as: ‘yes or no’, ‘never again’, ‘heaven or hell’, ‘be perfect’, ‘forever and ever’, ‘must be’, ‘principles first and foremost’, ‘do it well or not at all’, all or nothing ‘’, you only live once ‘’, now or never ‘’, success or failure ‘’, with you or without you ‘…’, they show that the system of metaphysical categories has penetrated and organized
the vision of the world and manifests itself every day in the comprehen-
sions of life, culture, religion, customs. Faced with these mental and cul-
tural structures, philosophy can/must assume its critical role and ‘legiti-
mize’ its need and presence in the region by means of a deconstruction
(disarticulation, deconfiguration) of the imposed system of categories,
which allows the unveiling of the thousand and one open and hidden
ways of hiding our belonging to the ‘being’, our condition of ‘being-there’,
and our disposition of the logos: ‘Coloniality of being’ which - as we al-
ready know - manifests itself among us as dehumanization, devaluation,
disempowerment, invisibility, marginalization, exploitation, exclusion,
ethnocentrism, violation (sexual and of human rights)... A permanent
questioning (‘asking’) of the meaning, orientation and purpose of the
individual and collective existence will help to open ways from the philo-
sophical theory for a re-constitution of our ‘being’, a mental decoloniza-
tion, and a gradual address the conditions of living, thinking, working,
loving, relating, dying...

It should not be forgotten that philosophy is not only a theoretical
knowledge but also an objective situation of an educational and institu-
tional nature that, from the classrooms or from the pulpits, from the
media or from public bodies, has promoted and promote (many some-
times without proposing it expressly) the reification (invisibilization,
dehumanization) on the horizon of ‘being’. Taking into account these
antecedents, the ‘legitimation’ of philosophy, to be radical, should mean
its deconstruction and end. A sustained and critical reflection on philo-
osophy/metaphysics and its function in our context should lead to its con-
summation, sunset and end! But we must specify: the one that is driven
to its end is Eurocentric philosophy/metaphysics/ideological, imposed as
a mechanism that produces/justifies coloniality, not philosophy as a ra-
tional discourse that, correctly addressed, can/should be a logical instru-
ment (logos) of subjectification, decolonization, affirmation and truth for
those who emerge from the nothingness of being.15

Heidegger has spoken of ‘The end of philosophy and the task of
thinking’.16 In what sense has philosophy/metaphysics come to its ‘end’
in the old continent? In the sense that, after the reversal of metaphysics
by Marx (the real foundation is real and concrete matter and not the ab-
stract Being or the Absolute Spirit), philosophy exhausted its possibilities
and dissolved (it was consumed, it came to its exhaustion) in the multiple
special and specialized sciences (psychology, sociology, anthropology, lo-
gistics, semantics, cybernetics, etc.) that were born within the horizon
that philosophy opened since ancient times and that later became inde-
pendent from it. The task that still remains reserved to think at the end of philosophy as metaphysics is a thinking that is no longer metaphysics or science. What comes after this ‘end’ is a thinking that thinks ‘events of being’ that are historically configured. One of these, according to the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo (2009), corresponds to us, it is the event of the Being in the stage of democracy that according to him lives the world, and in which the Being manifests itself as collective, concrete and historical experience (instead of its metaphysical manifestation as one, unique, universal, timeless, etc.).

In Latin America and other areas marked by coloniality, the ‘end’ of philosophy as metaphysics has also another meaning. Since it has been used as a system of concepts designed to hide and devalue our belonging to ‘being’ and our condition of ‘being-there’, it is about freeing philosophy as such from those dominant structures and roles to turn it into a logos/reason/language/discourse that makes it possible to re-constitute our ‘being’ and value ourselves as beings in the world. It is in this sense that the ‘end’ of philosophy is postulated as Eurocentric metaphysics (System of concepts about ‘being’ as the ideal, essential, substantial, one and only, eternal, absolute, necessary, universal and hegemonic foundation) and its ‘re-start’ as historical ontology of the present (System of concepts about ‘being’ that has manifested and manifests itself historically in the multiple and distinct ‘events of being’ that have taken place and take place in different contexts, peoples, cultures, individuals and philosophical situations).

What logos allows us to think and formulate in concepts this emergence/liberation of our historical ‘being’, this historical ontology of ourselves and our present, this decolonization of the coloniality of ‘being’? Not the Greek logos, nor the Christian-medieval logos, nor the modern-European logos, based on the abstract (meta-physical) being as the universal foundation, one and only, but a decolonial, pluriversal and transmodern logos that makes it possible to think about ontological, epistemic, ethical and political decolonizations. It is a thought that represents a critical position with respect to the Eurocentric philosophy and that gradually organizes, from the margins of the given system, the concepts/categories corresponding to the historical being that is liberated and the achieved liberation. It is in this intellectual and deconstructive task where/when ‘philosophy’, ‘philosophers’ and ‘philosophizing’ justify their need, their presence and their theoretical/liberating work in Latin America and the South in general.
Our background in the task of disposing of the logos

Two centuries ago, more or less, the American intellectuals began to postulate the need to have a *logos* and to have a philosophy that was adjusted to the needs of the nascent American nations: it was the way of thinking about the transformation of the received philosophy. In the last century, thanks to the reflections of thinkers of our America such as Salazar Bondy or Leopoldo Zea, progress was made in this way and the existence of a philosophy of our America was debated. Today, we can already talk about various philosophical manifestations developed in the last half century: *Filosofía de la historia americana* of Leopoldo Zea (1978); *la Filosofía de la liberación* of Enrique Dussel (1996); *la Teoría y crítica del pensamiento latinoamericano* by Arturo Roig (2004); *el Filosofar desde nuestra América* by Horacio Cerutti (2000); *the baroque Ethos* of Bolívar Echeverría (2004); *la Filosofía andina* of Josef Estermann (1998); *la Filosofía intercultural* by Arturo Roig (2004); *Giro decolonial* of Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel (2007), the decolonial; etc.

In this ‘learned’ field, which is the most systematized, post-meta-physical, postcolonial, anti-imperialist, decolonial, trans-modern liberationist strategies that seek to break the circularity of hegemonic thinking with ‘weapons’ (alternative categories of thought) as the ‘exteriority’, the ‘alterity’, the ‘heterarchical thought’, the ‘a priori anthropological’, the ‘thought of the margins’, the ‘epistemologies of the south’, etc., are in full development. In particular, decolonial thinking criticizes European modernity and the Eurocentrism of philosophy imposed and exercised as a disciplinary and coercive power (without often realizing it) in the minds and consciences of the colonized. The ‘educated’ contributions, however, are not the only ones, there is also a rich history of confrontations and social resistances, whose discursive genealogy has just begun to be studied. You can already visualize (as in an x-ray) the vertebrations of the history of our critical thinking that, although at times seems to be limited to complying with the parameters of European philosophy, brings out its immeasurable elements, allowing it to be valued as what it was and is: the register of ‘other’ thoughts that openly or subtly have questioned and question the colonial, neocolonial status and the current coloniality of being, knowledge and power.

Do these evidences mean that we are already ‘more here’ of philosophy as metaphysics of domination? Does it mean that we already have the *logos* instead of borrowing it? The answer is not so easy or immediate, especially if you bear in mind that our philosophical production, made in the bosom of colonialism and coloniality, has coincided with our histori-
cal struggles to validate, not only a certain type of knowledge, but also are the very condition of subjects animated by a rational soul (as it was said in the time of the conquest of America), or capable of thinking for ourselves and having a discourse about who we are today (as we can say in this stage of globalization and exclusion). We are by definition animals that have logos (ratio, intellectus, nous, verstand), but the colonial vicissitudes have hidden our disposition of it, disqualifying and devaluing our being, knowing, believing, doing, waiting and being human.

A different ‘place of enunciation’ (locus enuntiationis) for an ‘other’ philosophy

The ‘end’ of philosophy as a metaphysics of domination opens up the possibility of thinking of an ‘other’ philosophy. The expression ‘other’ refers to a philosophy thought from a locus enuntiationis (‘place of enunciation’: historical subject from which one speaks or philosophizes) different from the subject-imperial-modern-European-North American, constituted by historical subjects, empirical, collective, of the Global South, which are currently struggling for their subjectification, decolonization, affirmation and historical realization and which, to the extent that they do, break the Eurocentric uni-versality from pluri-versal, de-colonial and trans-modern horizons. In the case of Latin America, this ‘other’ and ‘new’ philosophy has the historical function of clarifying, through academic and extra-academic practice, the categories and concepts necessary to unveil the degradation of our ‘being’, to make ourselves visible, to position ourselves as subjects, to construct ourselves (objectify ourselves) historically, to value ourselves and to really become (in everyday practice) a ‘new’ philosophical locus.

We are not alone in this task: decisive characters of our history made contributions of great usefulness/relevance. Such are the cases of: Bolivar, the Liberator, who explicitly asked who we are at the beginning of the XIXth century;18 of Juan Bautista Alberdi who proposed in 1842 the program of a philosophy that would think about the interests of the new nations that had been formed after the wars of independence;19 of Augusto Salazar Bondy who asked himself in 1968 if there is a philosophy of our America; and, of the multiple contributions of the critical philosophical thought in the last half century (mentioned above). The multiplicity and diversity of these proposals pays, from different angles, to the processes of contextualization, subjectification, knowledge and valuation of a thought that seeks to account for our reality and for ourselves.20
The pedagogy of liberation (by Paulo Freire), the theology of liberation (Gustavo Gutiérrez and others) and the literature of magical realism (Gabriel García Márquez and others), have also undermined the cultural determinations of philosophy/metaphysics from their horizons of understanding. Certainly there is still a long way to go in order to transform philosophy, from a ‘universal’ and ‘totalized’ theory about itself into a ‘pluriversal’ and ‘open’ theory, but at least there has been progress in perception and consciousness of the needs and theoretical demands of the areas that, like Latin America, still fight against the geo-political-cultural coloniality.21 The term ‘Latin America’ refers, of course, to the geo-historical space known as ‘Latin America’ (basically Central America and South America) but, above all, refers to Latin Americans as an object and subject of thought, as a philosophical locus of enunciation and as living agents of decolonization.22

The path we open while walking (because there is not a path previously opened, nor is there a pre-defined project, but only criteria that guide walking and moving forward) is defined from the pluri-versal horizon (a world in which many ‘worlds’23: a pluriverse), and not from the universal (a single world: the European), as in the case of traditional/metaphysical philosophy. This does not mean the establishment of some particularism that, converted into a new ‘center’, reproduces the fallacies of Eurocentrism; it means that all regions of the world are ‘centers’ or that there is simply no ‘center’, thus contributing with objective conditions for this world to become, one day, an integrated set of regions, human beings and cultures.

A horizon of pluri-versal, de-colonial and trans-modern understanding

Is the thought we propose, is it post-modern, post-metaphysical, post-philosophical? These denominations are still Eurocentric and that referentiality or European-North American centrality that makes us de-estimate our own processes is what we need to overcome. Although not ignore. Some Latin American philosophers now propose to visualize the ‘epistemic otherness’ (which, located at the intersection between the traditional and the modern, produces interstitial, ‘hybrid’ knowledge forms, in the sense of ‘subversive complicity’ with the system and of ‘semiotic resistance’ capable of re-signifying the hegemonic forms of knowledge) from the point of view of a post-Eurocentric and trans-modern rationality.24
It is about thinking, thinking about our reality, thinking about our history, thinking about ourselves, and criticizing epistemic coloniality from us; think de-colonial, liberating thinking that assumes the challenges of our re-positioning on the horizon of ‘being’ and ‘logos’ and that, to the extent that it does, constitutes a re-start of philosophy. It is about thinking as a reflective-technical activity from/on our historical-social reality and not as a frozen set of categories, theses, doctrines, principles, impositions, imported and repeated (taught, commented) naively from a situation of coloniality. Such decolonization in/by discourse, such liberating logos, calls for the overcoming of philosophy/metaphysics as knowledge of domination: in this sense it has been spoken of ‘death/sunset/end’ of that philosophy.

The classic re-starts of Greco-European philosophy (with Christianity, with Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, etc.) that ‘surpassed’ the systems of concepts of their predecessors, are not involved here; in areas of coloniality it is a re-start in the genealogical sense, whose deconstructive moment of Eurocentric philosophy is, at the same time, a moment of rational construction of a thought that thinks the fundamentals of Latin American reality and being within it. It is, literally, a re-start in the sense of overcoming the metaphysics-of-domination with a historical ontology that re-founds the belonging of the Latin American people to ‘being’, to ‘being there’ and to the logos.

That is why the question ‘who are we today and what is our relationship with the logos’ so that it does not allude to the totalized, colonial “being”, and alludes, instead, to our ontological re-positioning that de-veils our belonging to ‘being’ and ‘logos’ as subjects and not as objects. It is about opening our space-time for an event of ‘being’ and of the logos, overcoming the degradation and devaluation of our existence. ‘Bing’ and the logos as an event constitute the fundamental (not the only) that, in historical situations of coloniality, must be thought and expressed through philosophical discourse.

The logos that de-veils our historical being brings to light new parameters for our own philosophy and re-define it as a ‘critical’ knowledge (that problematizes the received/imposed philosophy), ‘pluri-versal’ (there is no ‘world’ -Europe- that universalizes itself by totalizing itself and privatizing the logos, but multiple historical ‘worlds’ that open the logos and multiply it with ‘other’ visions/epistemes), ‘de-colonial’ (which criticizes the system of categories with which coloniality has been justified and justified, here or anywhere), and ‘trans-modern’ (which goes ‘beyond’ modernity, as a stage of organized humanity based on ‘domina-
tion’ over the nature and of some men over others). All this supposes an ‘ontological turn’ that de-constructs the ‘metaphysics of domination’ and opens the way to a ‘historical ontology’ of our present.

**Philosophy as “historical ontology of the present”**

*The historical (s) ‘ontology (s)’ as a re-constitution of the ‘being’ and ‘dis-position’ of the logos*

It has been seen that asking about ‘philosophy’, ‘philosophizing’ and ‘philosophers’ demands a direct confrontation with this Greco-European manifestation in order to make it transparent and purge it of the equivocal (ideological) representation that it acquired from the moment of its imposition in America by the conqueror who assumed the role of dispenser of the *logos*, while the Americans borrowed it (because the *logos* of the indigenous cultures was systematically destroyed). Such confrontation seeks: a) to make viable in the plane of the concepts the fundamental concern of ‘who we are today and what is our relationship with the *logos*’; b) bring out the theoretical strategies to identify our resistance to colonial inheritance; and, c) globally assess the advances that have taken place at various moments in the historical struggle for the ontological, epistemological, ethical-political, social, economic and cultural re-constitution of the Latin American people.

If ‘philosophy as metaphysics of domination’ was constituted in the horizon of justification of the ‘coloniality of being’, the task that corresponds is to think about the conditions of an ontological decolonization, which makes possible the re-constitution of the colonized as subjects\(^\text{25}\) as an affirmation of themselves, as animals defined by the *logos*. The problem has been that we have only been able to think and philosophize with the same language and the same system of categories that we received from the conquerors and that served to hide, dehumanize, dehistorize and devalue the Latin American people. How to open the way to a true and genuine philosophizing, that thinks the theoretical conditions of decolonization from the same existing coloniality and from the received language and philosophy? This is the fundamental question.

The questioning of the colonized about its ‘being’ and its relation to the *logos* before the ‘amazement’ of its degraded and dehumanized ‘being’ constitutes in itself a radical, ontological re-positioning formulated in the same language the dominator has used to degrade it and subsume
it as ‘dispensable’ in its exclusion. This ontological re-positioning is symbolized, in the case of Latin America, by the myth of Caliban26 by Shakespeare (1953): the ‘cannibal’ that arose from metaphysical death, from nothing-of-being, to cursing his master in/with the same language that he had been taught and with which he had been denied as a man, making him a slave. It must be remembered that until the mid-twentieth century the slave/indigenous was not the owner of himself but was owned by the master/landowner, and by being part of the hacienda he/she could be sold with it. Not being his own master, he could be converted into a pack animal (remember the four thousand Indians who carried the baggage in the expedition of Orellana to the Amazon) or in a labor force without a soul (used until his exhaustion and death in domestic service, in the mines, in the obrajes, in the fulling mills).

The radical response to the question that has to do with the possibilities of generating philosophical thinking in situations of marginality and exclusion, is found symbolized in this ‘ontological turn’ by Caliban, who is able to say: “You taught me to speak, and my only benefit/is that I know how to curse. The radical response to the question that has to do with the possibilities of generating philosophical thinking in situations of marginality and exclusion, is found symbolized in this ‘ontological turn’ by Caliban, who is able to say: “You taught me language, and my only profit/is that I know how to curse. The red plague rid you / for teaching me your language!” (Shakespeare, 1953, p. 138), using in this way the same language learned from Prospero, his master, to ‘curse’ him: original pathos (attitude) with which he overcomes slavery and re-constitutes himself as a human being, affirms and valorizes himself as a subject of his own knowledge, his relations of power and the morality of his actions.

By learning and redirecting the language of the master (European philosophy), Caliban ‘rises’ from ‘non-being’, from the pure substantiality of a slave to uncovering his belonging to ‘being’. This ontological equalization allows him to ‘talk’ (before Prospero taught him his language, he did not speak), ‘curse’ and wish that his ‘red plague’ fell on his master: primary manifestations of a ‘being’ that emerges as pathos, as desire, and which, however, open a horizon of possibilities to an evolution in the line of reason, which philosophy must account for. This ‘evolution’ of our ‘being’ was set in motion simultaneously with the same conquest and colonization and has not necessarily advanced along the lines of the self-sufficient, individualistic and closed (solipsistic) self that Europe developed, but in the line of an open being, multiple, relational, friendly, communitarian and supportive.
But, beware, this ‘curse’ is not something irrational or mere revenge: it is something more complex that involves a determining relationship between the master (Prospero) and the slave (Caliban), and that requires to be correctly understood. The original relationship has been colonial, of the mastery of the master over the slave; the ‘curse’ of Caliban does simply invert that relationship? No. The attitude of Caliban establishes an ontological relationship that frees Prospero from his domain as ‘being’ and Caliban from his submission as ‘non-being’, equating them in the ontological range of ‘being’ and establishing conditions for a horizontal relationship of similarity-difference that makes the hegemony of one over another illegitimate.. It is this attitude of Caliban regarding the language learned from the master and the understanding of things, which serves as an example of subjects in a situation, like Latin Americans, can problematize and legitimize philosophy as an activity of reason that seeks to be constructed and re-constructed, not from the hegemony of one or the slavery of another, but from their equalization in the ontological scale. Therefore, it is not correct to problematize and legitimize the philosophy received and imposed from a supposedly valuable historical-geographical-cultural peculiarity (Latin America, for example), but by a rational exercise that reveals our belonging to the universal species of the animals that have logos and dispose of it instead of borrowing it.

‘To curse’ Prospero’s philosophy from the standpoint of Caliban means to decipher it, de-ideologize it, de-construct it and redirect it to the historical ends of the colonized in the process of decolonization and self-affirmation. How to do that? De-saying, criticizing, disarticulating, bringing to light the negative and dark (ideological) background that that Greco-European-North American philosophy acquired in America, instead of repeating it. De-say that philosophy, to curse it, means to discuss the colonial side of ‘being’ that such a philosophy holds, and then re-signify it, re-conceptualize it and re-direct it towards the re-constitution of the colonized as historical ‘being’ (ontological re-constitution), as man (anthropological re-constitution), as an end in itself, (ethical re-constitution), as valuable for itself (axiological re-constitution), as free and sovereign (political re-constitution). In this way the logos/discourse is opened to a pluriversal language that legitimizes the access of the colonized to ‘philosophy’ and ‘philosophizing’. To think the conditions of possibility of this liberating process of the mental colonization of our region or of any part, is to philosophize and those who do it can be called ‘philosophers’. We present in this way a ‘philosopher’, a ‘philosophy’ and a condition of ‘philosophers’ that, when confronting intellectually the fun-
damental question of ‘who we are today and what is our relationship with the *logos*’, they open immediately (we open ourselves) to a ‘pluriverse’ (a world in which many ‘worlds’ fit) of new subjects, new *loci* of enunciation, new horizons of understanding and ‘new’ philosophies. Sometimes, by performing as professors of philosophy and philosophizing about already made philosophies, the illusion of making true and genuine philosophy is fabricated. But that philosophical modality does not position us as protagonists of thinking and, therefore, does not cause ruptures, dislocations, or incommensurability, or radical choices in thinking, or distancing from the hegemonic power (internal and external), but illusory (theoretical) problematizations that move under a common parameter with the imposed or the usual, reproducing it. Caliban ‘teaches’ to position ourselves as protagonists of thought, a position from which one can assume, repeat, gloss any philosophy based on our own unappealable decision to do so, if we see its need, without being seduced or dragged by the imposed, the traditional, the ideological, the supposedly ‘new’ or ‘latest’ in/of Europe or North America.

In this way, access to philosophical-critical rationality is constituted in a historical re-constitutive conquest of ourselves, which converts philosophizing and the activity of critical philosophers, not only into a modality and an exercise of thought, but in an experience of de-concealment and re-constitution of subjectivity. This problematizing the Eurocentric philosophy allows for Caliban’s horizon:

a) Be aware of the ‘place of enunciation’ of the fundamental question (‘who are we today and what is our relationship with the *logos*’): the colonized and not the colonizers; the ‘margins’ (ontological, not geographical) and not the ‘center’.

b) Place the question in the arc of time that, for the philosophy of our America, comes from Antonio de Montesinos and Bartolomé de las Casas (sixteenth century) to the current colonial philosophers.

c) Make visible the ‘philosophical situations’ that in our historical trajectory have given rise to manifestations of ‘philosophical thought’ and have fulfilled, critically, the parameters of all philosophy: link with extreme situations of a loving, political, scientific or artistic nature; rationality; abstraction; vision of totality; systematicity; radical choice; criticality; problematization; generation of concepts (Deleuze); universal singularity (Kant); incommensurability; distance between thought and power; dislocation of the usual, the given, the admitted; value of the exception, the strangeness, the rupture, the event; affirmation; transcentdentiality (in the sense of the ‘inhuman’ or the ‘infinite’)...
d) Legitimize and ‘read as a philosophical production’, that is to say as rationality that expresses its vision of the world not only through univocal concepts, but also through ‘narratives’ and expressive own and specific resources to the multiple and diverse cultures: traditions, symbols, images, festivals, iconographies, etc. Artists, writers, and even leaders (political, social, cultural) can enter the philosophical horizon if they manage to capture in their works and discourses the ‘colonial difference’, which allows them to de-colonize the ‘being’ and uncover new subjects.

The ontological re-positioning of Caliban reverts his situation of slavery and generates an ontological relationship of equality in which master and slave ‘are’. As original pathos, it generates possibilities for an ‘other’ philosophy that assumes us as subjects and not as objects. The re-constitution of the colonized, their return from the ‘nothingness of being’ to the ‘being’ that is expressed in the ‘cursing’ (that is, in speaking, asking, thinking, knowing what is denied or devalued by the language of the dominator), constitutes in itself an ontological decolonization and a re-signification of logos and philosophy; that is, a concrete and historical liberation of ‘being’ and the logos.

Connections and derivations of the ontological question of the “new” philosophy

The ‘ontological turn’ exemplified by Caliban allows us to re-constitute our belonging to ‘being’ and position ourselves as ‘being-there’. But not everything is sewing and singing: our historicity (condition of historical subjects) is still hidden by the coloniality that ‘locates’ us in the current geo-political division as exploitable nature, as mere futurity (Hegel), or, as pure substantiality (underdeveloped regions/countries), which prevents or hinders our self-consciousness and self-construction. If we start from a different locus of enunciation, the ‘new’ philosophy finds that Caliban’s positioning represents a new ontological event, which puts in the hands of the individual/people/community the task of being historically constructed and defined from a logos that allows make it visible and value it. This is called ‘historical ontology of ourselves’ because it has to do with the ‘being’ that we become, with the logos with which we understand and express our ‘being’, and, with the history that allows us to see ourselves and project ourselves as beings temporary, multiple, empirical, mundane.

Philosophy thus becomes a ‘field’ of decolonizing struggle by/through discourse and in a ‘workshop’ of dismantling the domination metaphysical category system, which uses the acquired ‘toolbox’: the
new concepts, categories and attitudes with which the Calibans think. Philosophy must get its hands dirty in the hard work of the ontological re-constitution and thereby create possibilities for epistemological, ethical, political, economic and cultural decolonizations. This will take time and perhaps several generations of thinkers/activists, but the path that will be opened will have its immediate gratification: such decolonizations will be the “new” modes of subjectivation/objectification, that is to say, of historical realization of those that emerge from coloniality, since it is not the a priori conditions of thinking that determine our philosophizing but our ontological, anthropological, ethical and political re-constitution assumed as a priori.

Conclusion

Education, as a determined/determining philosophical situation that has to do with the self-possession of the ‘being-there’ and its spatial-temporal realization, that is, with the existence, life, thinking, acting, relating, of human beings that learn, know, project and become, requires to be proposed; in its fundamental core, within the horizon of a historical ontology that claims, as the original moment, our condition as subjects, that is our full belonging to the ‘being’ and our full disposition of the logos.

Notes

1 Colonialism and coloniality require a distinction: ‘colonialism’ refers to the military subjugation, territorial occupation and legal administration of a people by a foreign imperial power; ‘coloniality’ refers to the inheritances that colonialism leaves in the symbolic, affective and cognitive order of that people, even after the territorial occupation and the legal administration have ended.

2 Paul of Tarsus, First Letter to the Corinthians: 4, 10.

3 When in allusion to the conquered and colonized the expressions of ‘not-being’ or ‘nothing-of-being’ are used, it does not mean that they are ‘nothing’ (nullity of nothingness) or that they do not exist, it means -according to the modern/European philosophers- that their ‘being’ is still immersed and dispersed in pure substantiality (in their essence of ‘such’ entity) and has not evolved enough to become Spirit, Self-consciousness, Reason, Logos that ex-press their own evolution.

4 Scholasticism did not make a sharp distinction between ‘being’ and ‘entity’ and the indiscriminate use of these concepts generated ambiguity in many cases. Heidegger introduced in the twentieth century the so-called ‘ontological difference’ that allowed him, on the one hand, to clarify and specify the meaning of those concepts and, on the other hand, to identify that from Plato the ‘being’ ceased to be thought of as ‘be’ to be thought of as ‘entity’, thus producing a ‘forgetting of being’. This work
The historical ontology as a horizon for education

La ontología histórica como horizonte para la educación

does not seek to validate one or another position, but instrumentalizes them in the direction of our decolonial theorizations.

The characterization of ‘being’ as ‘what it is’, which the Metaphysical Manuals bring, is a description, not a definition.

“"In the beginning was the Word (Logos, Word)... And the Word was God”, Gospel of John, 1.1: Latin American Bible, Pauline Editions/Divine Word, Madrid, 1972

This Greek metaphysics, re-semantized by Christianity, was irradiated in America under the educational action of Scholasticism in its three aspects: that of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), under the action of the Dominicans; that of Juan Duns Scotto (1266-1308), under the action of the Franciscans; and, that of Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), under the action of the Jesuits.

It can be seen how the great philosophers of European modernity spew their opinions on America in Antonnello Gerbi (1960).

This way of thinking was wrong because human beings, however primitive, have never lacked institutions that allowed them to organize and advance, as contemporary anthropology demonstrates. And not only human beings, but even bees and higher apes have institutions (that of the ‘bee-queen’ or the ‘dominant male’, for example).

Currently there is a tendency to see an unsatisfactory explanation in the dialectical dichotomies. We believe that we must distinguish: one thing is the use of these dichotomies as categories of analysis or interpretation and another, very different, is to put them as ‘ways of being’ that arise from the objective data of the reality (epoch, system socio-historical, structure) investigated. In the first case, it is about the researcher’s impositions about the investigated reality; in the second, it is about determinate/determinant exteriorizations, epochal syntheses or defining structures of the investigated reality. The correct attitude of the researcher in front of the dialectical dichotomies is to investigate their ‘genesis’ and their ‘function’ within the investigated reality and not only remain at the explanatory level. All reality is complex and does not end in the dialectical dichotomies, but these, when they emerge as defining characteristics of the same reality, can offer a vision of totality that captures the essence of reality and time investigated. Hermeneutics knows that capturing the investigated object as a whole is the culminating moment that allows validating if the analytical assumptions with which it has been operated have been able to capture the fundamental, that is, the essence of what has been investigated.

In 1552 an edition of this controversy was made in Seville, in the house of Sebastián Trujillo, printer of books. The consequences of this debate up to today keep their relevance and resonance. See also Lewis Hanke (1974).

The ‘America’ of the colonial centuries will be called ‘Latin America’ from the 19th century to the present day. At the end of that same century, José Martí, the Cuban hero, called it simply ‘Our America’.

Many have called the philosophy and vision of the world of the Indians or black “philosophy” and perhaps they are right if those social groups advanced from the rationality based on experience to the rationality based on abstract concepts; but it is certainly not philosophy in a Greco-European sense. Because it is the one that still dominates our culture and our vision of things, it is this we refer to in this work, without this meaning that the thinking of indigenous or black cultures should not be studied: the study of these cultures and their thinking, which began decades ago, is still open as an urgent and significant task for indigenous or black peoples, for Latin Americans in general, and, for all those who want to approach them, if in reality we want to include ourselves all in one full understanding of what we are
today and our relationship with the *logos*. The author of this article made a study of the historical structuring of our ‘metaphysical mind’ and of the need to re-educate it and transform it successively into ‘historical mind’, ‘strategic mind’ and ‘master mind’. Cf. Guerra Bravo (2004).

14 The author of this article made a study of the historical structuring of our ‘metaphysical mind’ and of the need to re-educate it and transform it successively into ‘historical mind’, ‘strategic mind’ and ‘master mind’. Cf. Guerra Bravo (2004).

15 Philosophy was not always cultivated as an end in itself, but as an ‘instrument-for’. Suffice two examples: Scholasticism made it the ‘slave of theology’ (ancilla theologiae), Averroism also instrumentalized it for its theological speculative purposes. In this perspective, it would be useful to ask: why areas that experience situations of coloniality cannot instrumentalize it for their decolonial ends?


18 Cf. Letter from Jamaica, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico, 1978.


20 Enrique Dussel, Eduardo Mendieta and Carmen Bohórquez (2009) published as editors a thick volume entitled Latin American, Caribbean and “Latino” philosophical thought (1300-2000), which reflects the philosophical thinking of the Latin American and Caribbean cultural continent, from the seventh century to the twentieth century, including the ‘Latinos’ of the United States.

21 We must not forget, however, that the dominant philosophy has been reproduced and continues to be reproduced in the Academies and outside of them and that the history of Latin American philosophy also has a vein of important philosophers and intellectuals, in general, who have not broken with the Eurocentric horizon of understanding and have re-produced coloniality, without wanting it or without knowing it, even when they have dealt with systems of critical thought (such as Marxism, for example). See, as examples, Francisco Miró Quesada (1981); José Luis Romero (1967).

22 It is also legitimate to speak of “South Philosophies” in which the word “South” refers not only to the southern hemisphere but also to the geo/historical/political areas of production of critical, pluriversal, decolonial and transmodern thought: Cf. E. Dussel (2015).

23 The expression “a world in which many worlds fit” comes from Zapatism and the Colombian anthropologist Arturo Escobar (2013) has categorized it as ‘pluriverse’, in the social sciences.

24 Walter D. Mignolo (2001, 2006, 2018), one of the members of the decolonial group, finds for example the first manifestations of this ‘decolonial turn’ in the Hispanic viceregalities, in the Anahuac and Tawantinsuyu in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but also in the English colonies and in the metropolis during the eighteenth century; that is why he studies, from the decolonial perspective, the New Coronel and Good Government (1616) of Guaman Poma de Ayala and Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil of Slavery/Thoughts and feelings on the evil of slavery (1787) of Otabbah Cugoano, as original manifestations that opened the doors to another thought from the experience and memory of the Tawantinsuyu, the one, and the experience and memory of the brutal black slavery of the Atlantic, the other. Cf. Castro-Gómez and Ramón Grosfoguel (2007, p.20).

25 Here the concept of the subject is not mentioned in Cartesian terms, as the unconditional foundation of all thought, but in historical terms, as the ‘hard work’ of the
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colonized to re-constitute their subjectivity degraded, disqualified and devalued by the system colonial.

26 Philosophy, which is a rational, logical knowledge, has always used myths to exemplify or make its arguments more accessible. It would suffice to recall Plato’s mention of the philosopher as the creator of myths. Myths do not constitute the fundamental argumentation around a question, they are mere exemplifications so that the arguments are easily understood. Myths are ‘narrations’, not ‘discourses’. Myths can be used perfectly without abandoning the Logos, as demonstrated by Gadamer (1997). From this perspective, it seems legitimate to appeal to a myth of American roots, although the literary source is Shakespeare, so that the students of the First Level of the Philosophy Career can better assimilate the rational explanations of the text they have in hand. I refer to the myth of Caliban, which has been widely discussed in the field of Latin American literature and which we want to re-interpret now in the field of philosophy.

27 In a geographical sense, the current globalization is more interested in blurring the ‘margins’ and homogenizing the world, because, according to various specialists, globalization is only the contemporary name for the world hegemony of the Northern empire.

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Ontology of language, a new device for the construction of the neoliberal subject? 
Ontología del lenguaje, ¿un nuevo dispositivo para la construcción del sujeto neoliberal?

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze critically the implications of language ontology and transformational learning for education and social order reproduction. The hypothesis supports that these formulations can be understood as a new device of neoliberal subjectivation that internalizes the notion of performance based on linguistic reductionism. The criticism is inscribed in the debate on the construction processes of neoliberal subjectivity and collective action. The foundational premises of language ontology are contrasted with critical learning experiences of Chilean militant’s university students and with educational experiences developed by the Landless Rural Workers movement in Brazil. The results show that is experiencing a process of intensification of a new dominant rationality, which is necessary to justify the transformations of contemporary capitalism in all the orders of human existence. We conclude that the ontology of language means, in short, the internalization of the logic of the market in the constitution of being-in-competition, which seeks to reproduce the neoliberal ideology. It is observed that the new interpretation of the human being and the world proclaimed by the ontology of language, denies the world itself on which this notion is based, considering the individual as the central value of society and language as the source of its transformation. In this way, a postmodern relativist ideology is promoted that finds in the subjective —and its transformation potential— a new technology of the self to consolidate the notion of the individual-company. It is concluded that the ontology of language means, in short, the internalization of the logic of the market in the constitution of being-in-competition, which seeks to reproduce the neoliberal ideology.

Keywords
Ontology, language, neoliberalism, subjectivity, learning.

Resumen

El propósito de este trabajo consiste en analizar críticamente las implicancias de la ontología del lenguaje y el aprendizaje transformacional para la educación y la reproducción del orden social. Se sustenta la hipótesis de que estas formulaciones pueden ser entendidas como un nuevo dispositivo de subjetivación neoliberal que interioriza la noción de rendimiento a partir del reduccionismo lingüístico. Se inscribe esta crítica en el debate sobre los procesos de construcción de la subjetividad neoliberal y la acción colectiva. Se contrastan las premisas fundantes de la ontología del lenguaje con experiencias de aprendizajes críticos de universitarias y universitarios militantes chilenos y con experiencias educativas desarrolladas por el movimiento de Trabajadores Rurales sin Tierra de Brasil. Los resultados muestran que vivimos un proceso de intensificación de una nueva racionalidad dominante, la cual es necesaria para justificar las transformaciones del capitalismo contemporáneo en todos los órdenes de la existencia humana. Se observa que la nueva interpretación del ser humano y del mundo pregonado por la ontología del lenguaje, niega el propio mundo sobre el cual se sustenta esta noción, al considerar al individuo como valor central de la sociedad y al lenguaje como fuente de su transformación. De esta manera, se promueve una ideología relativista posmoderna que encuentra en lo subjetivo —y su potencial de transformación— una nueva tecnología del yo para consolidar la noción del individuo-empresa. Se concluye que la ontología del lenguaje significa, en definitiva, la interiorización de la lógica del mercado en la constitución del ser-en-competición, con lo cual se busca reproducir la ideología neoliberal.

Palabras clave
Ontología, lenguaje, neoliberalismo, subjetividad, aprendizaje.
Introduction

In the context of the great transformations of the capitalist world-system characterized, according to Wallerstein (2001), by the incessant accumulation of capital, in the mid-twentieth century in the central countries of Europe and the United States, philosophical criticism found a new bifurcation: the linguistic turn. This new stream of reflection installed in the center of its concern the question of language, which, according to Oliveira (2001), became a common interest of the schools of Philosophy. This reflection was echoed and diversified and broadened the debates in different fields of the social and human sciences, resignifying the way in which the human being understands reality, his being and the world, according to Ibáñez (2003). Knowledge about the real, mediated by reason, ceased to be seen as a faithful representation of reality and the essence of things to be conceived as a social construction relative to the position of the observer who enunciates.

The language became conceptualized as performative, that is, with capacity to construct the meaning of the human being and the world, as opposed to the idea of language as a mere instrument of communication. For Gergen (1996) language is action on the world, a social artifact that works based on patterns of relationship. The meaning of things, according to Foucault (1978), is given by the discourses that constitute the objects that wish to be known. Language, says Dutra (2014), is a dimension of the constitution of the world, as an institution of social reality. It is not, in the final analysis, about knowledge that becomes part of a progress oriented towards objectivity defended by modern science.

Rodríguez (2013) considera que, a la base del giro lingüístico, pueden identificarse a lo menos cuatro ejes de crítica a la razón moderna y a la filosofía de la conciencia. These axes constitute an important part of the core of postmodern thought, namely: a) the transition from the idea of the subject sovereign of consciousness to the idea of subjectivation and production of subjects; b) the transition from the possibility of understanding the totality of history, as progress, towards fragmented non-objective narratives; c) the transition from the claim of universality of knowledge as the faculty of reason to the plurality of universes that come from specific cultural contexts; and d) the transition from the idea of ideology to the idea of social discourses and imaginaries inscribed in multiform power structures. These transitory critiques opened new paths for the construction of criticism, ethics and politics, allowing to establish new comprehensive frameworks around the processes of social and institutional domination and hegemonic thinking.
Derived, in part, from this broad reflexive tradition, a new selective perspective appears that has become popularized as a language ontology. The ontology of language acquires its specific content from a set of philosophical premises related to the construction of an interpretation of the human being, of the meaning of the human and the world. This could be recognized as new, because, as Echeverría (2003) states, it is confronted with the classical metaphysical program of medieval philosophy and aims to overcome modern philosophy. It is, therefore, postmetaphysical and postmodern. It is nourished, at the same time, by specific postulates that are organized as an eclectic framework and that select specific aspects of different ways of thinking such as those of Nietzsche, Humberto Maturana, Fernando Flores, Heidegger, among others.

This particular proposal of the ontology of language is understood as a positive derivation centered on the interiority of the individual, in contrast to the broad spectrum of negative instituting criticism that exists in different currents of thought influenced, in different ways, by the philosophy of language. Among these is Lacanian psychoanalysis and the social-institutional and epistemic critique carried out by Foucault, Habermas, Austin, Wittgenstein, Jesús Ibáñez, Derrida, Deleuze; among many others. Authors who decentralized their analytical attention to objects-things to focus on words, language, communication, and discourse.

This derivation of the ontology of language is made of individual positivity because it presupposes the discovery of a new paradigm that is oriented to the future, to action, to results, to subjective transformation and the world; where the individual is the protagonist of the change for that promising future. In this sense, following Echeverría (2003), it is stated that: “a new and radically different understanding of human beings is being developed. This is one of those special events in history that have the power to reconfigure the possible and to modify the future” (p.14).

This affirmation, so convincing and suggestive, motivates to examine what is that which is presupposed in the central premises of this self-described new paradigm, which affirms to provide a new horizon of positive meaning to the world. It is worth highlighting the fact that the conditions of possibility and concrete realization of these proposals have been developed in the world of companies, large corporations, high performance groups, international seminars, and training courses in ontological coaching; but it has also been influencing the field of formal education. In these social spaces there is a growing interest in the ontology of language, product of its pragmatic utility to improve personal and organizational effectiveness. This results in a set of questions worthy of
analysis: What implications does this new understanding of human beings have for education and the current social order? What is the real power of transformation over the possible and the future that this perspective assumes, putting in the center the question of language? What is the world of reference that must be changed and what is the horizon of meaning of said change? What limitations can be found in the tools proposed for the change? To what extent is this proposal related to the reproduction of neoliberal globalization?

In response to these questions, the hypothesis is supported that the formulations of the ontology of language and transformational learning can be understood as a new device of neoliberal subjectivation that internalizes the notion of performance based on linguistic reductionism. To present this argument the article is organized into two sections: first, we delve into the premises and presuppositions of the ontology of language, examining its limitations and contradictions. This is to affirm that we are dealing with the configuration of a language according to the construction of the neoliberal subject and an ethic of coexistence that is in tune with neoliberal globalization. Secondly, the category of political subjectivation is retaken as an analytical key to understand the relationship between learning and social transformation, and resituate the proposal of transformational learning, which is a central objective of ontological coaching. To this end, the experiential content of young Chilean university activists and the educational experiences promoted by the Movement of Rural Landless Workers of Brazil (MST) are examined. Finally, the most important conclusions and the implications of the proposal of language ontology for the field of education are synthesized.

From the ontology of language to the language of the neoliberal-being

Due to the economic recession of 1973 that affected much of the planet, there was a complex process of restructuring the world-system, which resulted, after the debt crisis of 1982, in the violent generalization of the process of neoliberalization of the social-economic system. This meant a redefinition, in theoretical, social and political terms, of the relationships between government management, civil society and the market. This process of redefinition, marked by the imposition of the well-known Washington Consensus, the crisis of real socialism and the fall of the Ber-
lin Wall, needed to rebuild new normative, evaluative, and discursive systems to legitimize the new social and economic order in expansion.

Dardot and Laval (2016), consciously surveying the nefarious consequences of the implementation of neoliberal policies in the world, asked themselves: How is it possible to continue deepening this type of policy without having a strong response from society? The answer given by these authors lies in the thesis that this is a new phenomenon. A new rationality of the world is being constructed that consists in constituting and spreading a specific type of neoliberal subjectivity, of patterns of consumption and way of life. Diez (2019) argues that neoliberalism is the instrumental reason of contemporary capitalism. A capitalism fully assumed as a contradictory historical construction and general norm of life, which creates, maintains and justifies a single thought.

Neoliberalism is not a simple ideology of the time, fleeting or momentary. Nor is it a simple economic policy that gives importance to the market and that may or may not be incorporated by the States. Neoliberalism is the dominant form of our existence. Hence, we understand the idea of neoliberal subjectivation as a process of social construction of the self-linked to the demands of the social system. However, the argument is emphasized, according to Dardot and Laval (2016), that the subject of this era is a being-in-competition, which comes from the logic of the market society itself.

Now, it is in this framework that the emergence of the proposal of the ontology of language is understood. This allows to situate the production of new knowledge and its effects in a horizon of meaning that crosses, directly or indirectly, all the dimensions of human life. In the following section its most important postulates are analyzed.

**A new universal: linguistic reductionism and being as interpretation**

As suggested by Echeverría (2003), the proposal of the ontology of language is affirmed in three general premises with a claim of universality: “we interpret human beings as linguistic beings. And we interpret that human beings create themselves in language and through it” (p.19). From it we can infer that the human being is by his ability to interpret and interpret himself in language. The interpretations give an account of the observer who interprets, so the ontological character would be given by the meaning associated with what the human being is, by the particular way of being as we are.

Here, the question is relevant, how can language be signified, from language itself? This places a problem that is difficult to solve when study-
ing language from one’s own language, since it is not a thing. This circularity of the problem goes through the very formulation of the object of reflection when we contemplate on what is meaning, and therefore, an interpretation. To say that the being depends on its interpretation and that it depends on the language with which it is referred, implies assuming that what is indicated carries a meaning. But, how do words connect with the objects of the world? In common sense it is assumed that the answer to this question is, precisely, the meaning as the central axis in the cultural constitution. This problem, which is central to the reflection on language, is absent in the analytical proposal of language ontology. It is accepted that the language activity is interpretive, but it is not known how the language organization systems that speak to itself work. Signification is source and product of itself, because its activity is contained in language and not in things.

This question raises the epistemological problem of subjectivist relativism, which can be recognized in three principles proposed by Echeverría (2003). The first principle indicates that: “we do not know how things are. We only know how we observe them or how we interpret them. We live in interpretive worlds” (p. 25). In this principle, it is presupposed that the act of knowing things depends on the constitution of individuals to establish judgments about them, even if one cannot know things as they are. If the question of truth and the possibility of knowledge ultimately depends on the particular observer, then it is subjectivism because it reduces all truth and judgment about things in the world to individuality, from which the impossibility of truth arises. Each point of view is valid from the point of view of who declares it under certain conditions of reference, which implies that the universal validity of the formulations on how things are is not possible. But the capacity for interpretation is based on the capacity of the language that is constitutive of the human being. Every individual lives in language and from it, therefore, the capacity for interpretation is based on a new universal: language.

Language becomes an absolute in the sense that it seems to carry a universal validity. When the question is asked, how are interpretative differences between individuals explained? It is found that there is an absolute at the base: language. Without that universal, or substantive capacity of the human being, the act of interpretation is impossible. Thus, a universal formulation that rests in a subjectivist relativism is constituted. There is a general property that is activated by each individual, however, each individual cannot make judgments about the whole system, because there are as many possible interpretations of language as there are ob-
serving individuals. Consequently, the theoretical activity of the social historical system is practically impossible. The relationship between universality and particularity in human formulations is a dilemma that has no centrality in the debate of the ontology of language, but which is fundamental when thinking about the transformation of that social system.

The second principle, says Echeverría (2003), refers to: “not only acting according to how we are, (and we do), we are also according to how we act. The action generates being. One becomes what one does” (p 29). The third principle presented by Echeverría (2003) complements the previous one by asserting that: “individuals act according to the social systems to which they belong. But through actions, although conditioned by these social systems, such social systems can also change” (p. 37). Here arises the philosophical problem of the intentional action of human beings and the question of social change. Echeverría (2003) contrasts his proposal with any type of metaphysical essentialism. It is even claimed that today continues to dominate a metaphysical thought in the common understanding that the being is something immutable. But what common understanding do we mean? In fact, the notion that things are constantly changing and becoming is a principle of political liberalism, of enlightenment and of modern ideas of progress and of Eurocentric Western civilization. Enlightenment is based on the belief that human societies are structures that can be known and understood, given that human beings have the capacity to affect their world. If one does it from a rational condition, then one will achieve good society. This faith in the possibility of the improvement of humanity was the foundation of modernity and the company is the institution that embodies the idea of progress and prosperity. It seems that it is unknown that this matrix is typical of the development of the capitalist system that must generate innovations and new conditions to deploy capital accumulation strategies.

And what is social? According to Echeverría (2003) “the social, for human beings, is constituted in language. Every social phenomenon is always a linguistic phenomenon” (p.13). This definition, although consistent with the general formulation, does not explain the social. The social is reduced to a mere linguistic phenomenon. Poverty, political violence, discrimination by gender, race, socioeconomic status, wars, authoritarianism, inequality in all its expressions, commercial monopoly, the dispossession of common goods from transnational corporations, are they issues that can be conceived as problems of interpretation of the social? Is it possible to change the world with a change of interpretation that comes from the universal linguistic subject? There is doubt about it. The social
cannot be reduced to just language because it obscures the possibility of understanding the structuring of social power relations. This is precisely the way in which the multiple and complex unit that is the social, as Osorio (2012) argues, is reduced to a problem of subjective-relative interpretation, because the structures of interpretation of reality are cultural. The being and the social as interpretation leads to a properly metaphysical conception, since the explanation is based on language as the fundamental principle of the reality of the human being, it is an entity, a being, not a thing. The human being as such is a being in language.

There is no rigorous formulation of what social change is, because the constitution of the social system is not analyzed in terms of its conflicting structuring and its history. But, although it is affirmed that there is no teleology in the formulation of the ontology of language, it does assume a very clear one: that of the result. The actions are oriented by results. They acquire their meaning when goals are achieved and behaviors and emotions are changed. This teleology is towards/for itself. It must transcend towards the modification of the subject itself.

*From the ethics of the coexistence of the neoliberal-self to the ethics of life*

The ethics of human coexistence is for the defenders of the ontology of language a substantial concern. Faced with the new challenges of globalization it is necessary to build innovative proposals for social coexistence, which lies in an intrinsic relationship between language, body and emotion. For Echeverría (2003):

Language can affect emotions, just as emotions can affect language. Due to our emotional state, we will engage in certain conversations and will not be available to others. (...) We consider the emotional aspect of the person as the most important aspect when it comes to, for example, learning and coaching. The emotional field of the person is the factor that defines their limits for change and personal improvement. (p. 213)

These general formulations insist on the idea-force that the source of the problems lies in the being of the individuals and in the external conditioning factors that hinder that being. Faced with the dissatisfaction of the being and the distressing difficulty of responding to the mandate of performance and effectiveness-efficiency of interpersonal actions and relationships, a change is necessary. If the reference of the problem is based on the being of the people then the change must be placed in the construction of a new being of such persons. The change requires orient-
tation training in the areas of language, emotions and body, to achieve
the desired results. It is about looking for a new interpretation of the
world and of oneself, because the problem is formulated precisely as an
inadequate interpretation of the world and of oneself, therefore of being.

By unveiling the person’s being, we can identify that which can be
modified to work on the source of dissatisfaction of human existence. That
is why it is fundamental to live the principle of lifelong learning, since soci-
ety and the world are rapidly changing. It is an ethical imperative, therefore,
that a new duty be rebuilt to ‘be’ in the world: self-realization and effective
personal development. The self stands as the privileged field of veneration
and cultivation, of change and transformation. The self happens to be con-
ceived as a consumer of tools that are useful for its empowerment. In fact,
there is a fairly diversified market that offers multiple therapies to enhance
that self, to add value and distinction. Díez (2019) identifies techniques
such as coaching, neurolinguistic programming (NLP), transactional anal-
ysis and multiple procedures linked to a school or a guru.

A permanent evaluation of the self must be developed to repro-
duce the economic and social mandate of innovation, competitiveness
and leadership. This implies, according to Castro-Gómez (2010), to
undertake self-management that entails the ability to “constantly rein-
vent oneself and manage our own human capital” (p. 216). People must
conceive themselves, according to Becker (1983), as a profitable human
capital that seeks to maximize profits in the future, as a result of previ-
ous investments. They must submit to continuous self-control in social
development. Becoming, which, in terms of López-Ruiz (2007; 2013), is
plagued by changes, in such a way that the singularity of people’s being
tends towards their homogenization, due to the construction of a new
ethos that promotes a set of values derived from economic theory and
business administration. That is, a standardization of desirable behav-
ioral patterns in a context determined by social competence, since it is
personal identity that is subordinated to the reproductive mandates of
corporate neoliberalism. For Díez (2019) competition becomes the can-
on of universal behavior of every person. The singular being must be
constituted as a being-brand in order to establish differences and thus be
completed in the market of beings-companies that compete with each
other to improve their offers.

The void that implies the construction of the meaning of life facili-
tated by the ontology of language is filled with a change of attitude and
mood. According to Echeverría (2003):
If someone is not in the right emotional state, he will not see the new possibilities that are shown to him. To see these possibilities, one often has to modify our emotional state first. However, once this is achieved and that someone sees possibilities that he did not previously observe, it could even happen that his emotional state did not allow him to take those actions that he now sees possible. The emotionality that allows us to observe something is not necessarily the same that will lead us to act within that space of possibilities. Many times, another emotional change is required to generate the disposition that will lead to those actions. The anthological coach has the responsibility to design all those emotional interventions. (p.214)

Not only must we become competitive beings, we must be emotionally stable, prone and predisposed to the proximity with the other, with the team, as the self, for Olalla (2008) is always found in the other. The relationship between emotion and language is in the judgments that are made based on the interpretations and the meaning that one has.

Notwithstanding the above, and in line with Han (2014), the neoliberal mandate calls for more performance and does so by appealing to our emotions, for which it becomes a capitalism of emotion. Consumption capitalism capitalizes emotions because it sells meanings, not values of use, but emotional values. It promotes the emotionalization of the productive process to generate needs and boost consumption. The manager, for example, must generate positive emotions and be motivators par excellence.

In line with the statements of Han (2014), we live in a system that promotes internal forms of coercion that limit individual liberties by the fact of guiding human action to the pursuit of performance and optimization. This neoliberal mandate is clear in the proposal of the ontology of language, by implying that each person must be in permanent improvement and obliges himself to respond to the model of the subject to which he aspires. This is what Han (2012) calls exploitation of oneself, which is a form of efficient exploitation since it is done voluntarily in response to the performance imperative.

Neoliberalism turns the worker himself into an entrepreneur. It is a being-company, so that contradictions cease to be associated with material conditions and increasing inequality in order to be experienced as an individual problem. The entrepreneur must develop within himself, which is monitored by the self, not by an external disciplinary system. This is so because of the development of what Han (2014) calls psychopolitics, which is an instrument of domination that allows intervention in the thought, emotion and action of people. Neoliberalism seeks, precisely, to dominate the psyche, to reproduce and expand.
Happiness is related to the achievement of selfish goals. We must prepare for happiness by exploiting the narcissism present in the need for success that is part of an internal emptying and continuous dissatisfaction. The exploitation of narcissism occurs in the exploitation of dissatisfaction promoting competition and complacency of narcissistic desire. This is an essential component of the process of commodification of life, as new innovative niches must be created to satisfy that human appetite. Then, there is an economic and cultural construction of that state of perpetual dissatisfaction, which must be processed with new goods to seek comfort, distinction, ostentation and overvaluation of personal self-image.

The fundamental reason for the unhappiness of humanity, which is denied by the professionals of the ontology of language, refers precisely to the reproduction of a social system that is based on the incessant accumulation of capital and power. The alienation of being is due to the naturalization of the structuring of society in social groups that deserve more than others. In effect, neoliberal thinking for Hinkelammert (1984) is a thought of legitimization of bourgeois society that defines its identity by distancing itself explicitly from a socialist society proposal. The aim is to avoid self-improvement of bourgeois society by means of market thinking that is based on polarities: on the one hand chaos, on the other, the market and perfect competition. This supposes the old idea of infinite progress that in reality is not realized. For Hinkelammert (1995) “modernity leads to a self-destructive carousel. The neoliberal policy does nothing but boost the speed with which the carousel moves. It is a carousel of death” (p.148).

The selective and positive philosophical content of the ontology of language denies philosophy itself because it avoids contemplation, leisure, imagination, doubt, existential anguish. The term negocio (business) comes from the Latin negotium, which in turn is composed of the adverb nec negation and otium which means leisure. Business as a buying and selling activity is the denial of leisure, of reflection. The mercantile activity, as it is known in the capitalist system, is based on the principle of instrumental, interested and speculative rationality. To relate philosophy to business profitability is, to say the least, problematic and dangerous. The need for performance generates the opposite of happiness: anxiety, the tension to achieve the goals set for optimal institutional functioning. The reinforcement of this imperative is given by social approval and economic growth.

This type of rationality reifies the social system and the modes of neoliberal capitalist domination. Not only is there a denial of the world, but there is a domestication of being in the world for the dominant type
of economic, social and political relationship. The negation for the case of the ontology of language is concealment of the conditions over which life is produced, reproduced and transformed in an unequal manner.

The criterion of ethical judgment must be based on a criterion of life, from which one speaks of social coexistence. The transformation of the neoliberal self passes through the social system that gives it a sense of being, that is, the overcoming of neoliberalism. The positivity that is sought with the neoliberal subject rests with the ego itself. It is a reflection of itself. It is an ego-entrepreneur ethic. More than affective coexistence there is a decomposition of coexistence based on the imperative of being-in-competition. There is an ideology that operates as thought and action schemes, with which the misery of others is not problematized, but rather problematizes why the ego does not achieve its objectives of performance and optimization. To follow, the reasons why the ontology of language can be understood as a new component of neoliberal ideology are specified.

Why is the ontology of language a neoliberal ideology?

The ontology of language is an ideological construction. Ideology, according to Chauí (1986), is a specific form of the modern social imaginary. It is a necessary way by which social agents represent for themselves the social, economic and political appearance. Appearance that, by virtue of being the immediate and abstract mode of the manifestation of the historical process, is the concealment or dissimulation of the real. Ideology is a body of representations and coherent norms and rules that teach us to know and act, institute an order and are able to explain and justify concrete reality. It follows that the ideological discourse aims to coincide with things, to cancel the difference between thinking, saying and being. It operates a logic of identification that unifies thought, language and reality, in order to obtain the identification of all social subjects as a particular universalized image, that is, the image of the ruling class.

The ideology of language ontology gains coherence by universalizing the particular and eliminating differences, contradictions, and disarming attempts to question it. The revised principles clearly express this. The search for universals in language, interpretation and human being. There are no explanations about the gender, ethnic differences, the unequal distribution of wealth in capitalist society and the increase of social and territorial inequality in neoliberalism. Explanations are obscured on the determinations that organize and structure neoliberalism,
and therefore, the conflicts related to the various existing processes of accumulation and domination. The problems are formulated as a matter of relative interpretation of reality, which, be it present, cannot be known. In this sense, the real that is found in the language (positive version of the ontology of language) is inverted, a tool for the naturalization of social inequalities that guarantees that, contrary to what they propose, everything remains the same: society structured based on social relations of one social class domain over the others.

It is fundamental to understand that ideas are not the determinants of the historical process, but that they are constituted by the historical process. In the ideology of language ontology, ideas assume the form of knowledge, that is, of instituted ideas propagated as competent discourses that appeal to aspects of philosophy and biology. These discourses are preferred, authorized and dominant. For Chauí (2014) the ideology of the competition realizes its domination by the power and prestige of the knowledge and scientific-technological ideas. This ideology had its origin in the factories with the scientific managers. They were supposed to know more about work than the workers themselves. This conception then spreads throughout society under the notion of the knowledge society. The competent discourse is, in effect, that of specialists, of those who know about some dimension of the nature or life of people and who teach to live better. This has a central political consequence: society, thus understood, is divided between competent individuals who command and incompetent individuals who obey. This replaces the idea that society is divided into social classes.

The ontology of language, as a competent discourse, justifies and legitimizes the construction of a new neoliberal being in the world of anti-philosophy, that is, of business and success as a universalized particular value. The neoliberal subject characterized by its ability to innovate, to establish cordial and affective relationships, which is, in turn successful and competitive, which must apply a permanent self-assessment and modify its behavior by resorting to new interpretations of itself and the world; becomes the universal subject. This neoliberal discourse circulates on multiple forms: educational institutions, media, large international and intergovernmental organizations, social policies; among others. The new norm of life remodels the subjectivity of the people what implies, as they refer Dardot and Laval (2016), that this new reason of the world acts at a deeper level than the ideology.

The universalist ideologies present in neoliberal globalization seek the homogenization and expansion, not only of the market society, the degra-
dation of the public sphere and the supremacy of the private sphere, but also and above all, as indicated by López-Ruiz (2013), the construction of processes of political subjectivation oriented to depoliticization. This is because the condition of the company configures a new mode of subjectivation.

Next, the relationship between the processes of political subjectification and the notions of learning and education, oriented to social change, is examined. This is in contrast to the notion of the neoliberal school whose purposes, according to Laval (2004), are not conditioned by the human need for responsible training of citizenship, but rather by economic efficiency, where students are conceived as human capital. The school, for Díez (2010), is submitted to the economic reason and the pedagogical ideal is put at the service of the needs of companies and the market, so that education provides flexible and versatile people.

**Political subjectivation: a repositioning of transformational learning in the educational field**

In the line of reflection of Foucault (2009), government consists of a set of actions that are made to influence the behavior of others and direct their lives. In addition to this government of the others, there is self-government, which consists in the influence of the government around the actions that the subjects carry out with themselves, which constitutes a certain type of individual. The neoliberal rationality configures a process of subjectivation that must be compatible with the changes in the prevailing rationality in society. Neoliberalism is a way of being and thinking, a way of governing life with a regime of social practices. In other words, devices of neoliberal subjectivation are activated that (re) create a subject of epoch, akin to the systemic demands. Hence, following Foucault (1999), the subject does not pre-exist but is instituted by means of discursive mechanisms associated with the institutions of knowledge and power.

The neoliberal ideology of language ontology has as its central consequence the depoliticization of social and educational issues, when it naively affirms that the transformation of the world depends on the interpretation of being in the world and the corresponding actions. In effect, the notion of subjectivity is reduced to the phenomenon of language as a foundation. We talk about individuals without assuming a theory that explains the way in which the subjectivity of people is constituted and adopts a particular conception of power as a capacity to transform the world.
The language of power as capacity to collective action

To reflect on the transformation of the world, it is necessary to enter into the unavoidable discussion about power. Echeverría (2003) proposes:

- Our central postulate regarding power is that this is a phenomenon that emerges, as such, from the capacity of language of human beings. Without language, the phenomenon of power does not exist. (p. 222)
- To the extent that language is action, language is a source of power. The way we act in language is, therefore, a crucial aspect to assess how powerful we are in life. (p. 227)

This way of conceptualizing power reinforces the idea of an individual conscious of his abilities to expand his power. This vision is opposed to that of a repressive power. According to Han (2014), that is precisely what neoliberalism intends, since it expresses power silently so that the dominated do not feel dominated. Neoliberal power is more efficient than the old disciplinary power. Its objective is not to control, it is to activate and motivate rather than to prohibit. Power is more affirmative than negative and generates positive emotions, stimulates expression and exploits freedom; It is seductive and seeks to promote complacency in people. As Echeverría (2003) points out:

- It is not only the capacity for action that defines the human being. It is, above all, the ability to expand our capacity for action. It is what we have called power. In today’s world, in a world in which our meta-narratives, our transcendental discourses, have stopped adequately feeding us the meaning we need to live, we have no other option for living well than opening ourselves to the path of power, to the path of expansion permanent of our possibilities of action in life. (p. 236)

This positive conception of power enhances a vision of the individual limited to the ability to act in life as a desirable general rule: performance. In this framework, the relationship between power and learning is understood as the extension of individual competences that depend on certain personal judgments. For Echeverría (2003):

- (...) there is no learning, as there is no knowledge, that does not refer, in one way or another, to our capacity for effective action (p. 230). [And he continues to point out, when we learn something, we expand our capacity for action and, therefore, we increase our power. Every time we acquire new skills, we gain power. (p. 231)
A richer relational vision is what provides the perspective of collective action to understand the social power and subjectivity that is (re)configured in that process. It is based on the premise that collective actions are not an isolated sum of individual actions, but are a way of understanding the configuration of individuals in their social relationship. But, a very particular one according to Corcuff (2008): the one that tends to the individual and collective emancipation. There the individual is conceived, according to Martucelli and Araujo (2010), as the consequence of an action, consecrating it in the production of a social life, since it remains immersed in the social spaces of which he is a part of, through the social forces in dispute. The individual as such exists in the domain of interpersonal life, which allows openness to the other, a solidarity that gives life to the social process, of which said individual is part and motor.

This connects with the question of power from the political. In the line of understanding of Alvarado, Ospina and García (2012), the political can be understood as a relational reality that expresses itself and acquires a body in the public sphere, in the field of the collective. It is meant by a self, charged with the instituting meanings of the private sphere. It is possible, according to Castro (2008), to link the subjectivity of the individual to a way of being, being and acting as a social being, in the perspective of being a configurator of the social world and, in turn, permeated by it. It is there where the subjects are configured as such, as social beings.

The symbolic construction implied by subjectivity is generated in correlation with others in the construction of the self, which in many cases has the capacity to generate an alternative to the institutional forms of power, constructing subjectivities that do not necessarily respond to the hegemonic normativity. It is in this way, how political subjectivity options are constituted and configured that emerge as emancipatory alternatives to the dominant power. Political subjectivity implies the empowerment and expansion of the frames that define it: its autonomy, its reflexivity, its historical awareness, the articulation of action and narration about it, the negotiation of new orders in the ways of sharing power; and the recognition of public space. There is thus, for Alvarado, Ospina and García (2012), a game of pluralities in which the subjects recognize themselves as equals as humans, as men or women who share multiple identity conditions but who, at the same time, recognize themselves as different in how particular is their biographical appropriation of the shared meanings.

Political subjectivity is, in fact and as Castro (2008) points out, contrary to intentional individualization by processes of domination, since individuals can detach themselves from imposed identity forms by not
identifying with the categories that classify them. For Melucci (1989) these individuals announce to society that there are problems of this or that type through claims that are given from symbolic and cultural projects. It is in this domain where the system is confronted and spaces of freedom are generated. Space that, mediated by political subjectivity materialized in political commitment, can be understood as a libertarian act, which comes from the dynamic relationship between individual and community.

The ontology of language ignores the discussion about the power relations that structure contemporary neoliberal society and its multiple contradictions. Rodríguez; Betancourt and Varas (2018) argue that there are real hegemonic processes of depoliticization and fragmentation of political citizenship in the educational field. At the same time there are multiple experiences of re-politicization of the students who dispute forms of contemporary material and ideological domination. These experiences constitute real places of re-existence and proposals for social change that are not based on the principle of reproduction of multiple inequalities that are created by the market society. Next, two experiences that are in still in development are reviewed. The first is the educational proposal of the MST and the second corresponds to a report of a doctoral research related to the political commitment of young university students of pedagogy in Chile.

**Socially engaged learning: the experiences of the MST in Brazil and university students with political commitment in Chile**

An undeniable reality is the historical and growing inequality and marginalization that exists in Brazil. The huge concentration of land associated with the agri-export economic development model and the usurpation of the lands of indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants and peasants has perpetuated this situation of exploitation and marginalization of a large part of the population. These historical conditions of oppression have been accompanied by dynamics of exclusion in various areas, especially in the educational area by the state formal education system.

In this scenario, initiatives of rebellion and resistance emerge among some social movements, who build alternative political projects, such as the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra-MST. Organization that from its roots identifies education as one of its main axes, supported, according to Barbosa (2015), from an epistemic matrix where the sociocultural and political inscription of experience and knowledge is articulated, with its own plan of political struggle.
During the early 1980s in the first camps of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, the MST, as indicated by Bahniuk and Vendramini (2016), performs the first actions to fight for access to education in the areas of agrarian reform. By 1986 the first school of the Anoni Fazenda was made official, educating 600 students in the basic cycle from the perspective of field education. From this and other various experiences, in 1988 the education sector was created within the movement, which is shaping a pedagogical proposal and strengthening the work of education for youth and adults. Process that has been based, as indicated by Kolling, Vargas and Caldart (2012), on the inclusion of 1,800 public schools of basic and middle education in the settlements, with a reach of 200,000 people among children, youth and adults Without Land; and training for about 8000 educators to work in these schools.

The educational project of the MST includes among its objectives the struggle for the recovery of its memory, cultures and identities, its liberation and political emancipation through the struggle for agrarian reform. This project contains a set of characteristics that reposition the relationship and debate between education, learning, individual and social transformation. Next, three central aspects that make it possible to contrast this pedagogical experience with the notion of transformational learning of the ontology of language are highlighted.

In the first place, the MST (2000) sees education as popular, because it is at the service of the real interests of the popular classes that make up the popular movement. According to Martins (2013), from the influences of proposals such as the popular education of Paulo Freire (2004), the social pedagogy and the education of the work of Moisey Pistrak and Makarenko, the socialist pedagogy of Krupskaya and the theories of the learning of Vygotsky, among others, the political-educational project was being configured. It is not a matter of moving from learning to entrepreneurship, as proposed by Echeverría (2003), but of a concrete proposal that contrasts with the notion projected by the neoliberal school.

In this popular education project, the subjects are immersed in their relationship with others and with the world in which they are enrolled. That is why the subject is constructed as such, problematizing the material, symbolic and spiritual social reality in his context. It is their own individuality understood from the community that is guided by principles of solidarity and commitment to social transformation. Education, in that sense, is an instrument of transformation of the complex social reality that conditions social existence for the reproduction of life.
Individuality is constructed as a political stance against the reality that transcends the notion of the egoistic-narcissistic-neoliberal individual.

Second, the educational proposal of the MST (2005), being committed to the transformation of society, which is based on social relations of exploitation of human beings and nature, constitutes a liberating social practice. Liberating because it puts at the center of the debate the contradictions of capitalist society, the democratization of the land and also of knowledge. Because it is about reading the world to identify and understand the causes of the oppression conditions of most social sectors, so as to be able to intervene on it. In this way, this proposal operates under the philosophical principles of education for: social transformation, work and cooperation, the various dimensions of the human being, promoting humanistic and socialist values; in order to build permanent processes of human formation and transformation. In this line, Erivaldo Barbosa (2015), teacher of the field schools, in a documentary says:

The traditional school is marked by the fragmentation of knowledge, by decontextualization, and say, training for the market. Our schools have fought those main characteristics of traditional education, thinking of strengthening the struggle of the working class and giving more dignity to the people living in the countryside, then, it is to give a social utility to the knowledge produced in the school, to give answer to the problems of reality.2

Education is conceived as an arena of political dispute that should promote values related to social participation, democracy and social coexistence. Therefore, this critical pedagogy translates into the idea of working together to find solutions to the problems that directly affect their communities and settlements. Therefore, collective organization is prioritized, rather than the development of individual competences.

Third, the MST (2005) proposes 15 pedagogical principles, namely: the relationship between theory and practice; methodological combination between education and training processes; reality as a basis for the production of knowledge; socially useful training content; education by and for work; organic link between educational processes and political processes; organic link between educational processes and economic processes; organic link between education and culture; democratic management; student self-organization; creation of pedagogical groups and ongoing training of educators; research attitudes and skills; combination between collective and individual pedagogical processes.
One of the principles of the political-educational project of the MST stands out: the omnilateral formation, which, according to Bahniuk and Vendramini (2016), is defined by its integrality, since it seeks to train human beings in their cognitive, aesthetic, technical-professional, political, corporal, moral dimensions among others. The aim is to decentralize the educational practice from its reduction to the cognitive and to the reproduction of capitalist morality. Rather, it is related to the debate on education as a reproducer of social inequalities that fulfills an ideological function, since it contributes to the reproduction of capitalist production relations. In this sense, Bourdieu and Passeron (1996) argue that “the education system must produce selected and hierarchical subjects once and for all and for all of life” (p.104). Unlike this present trend in formal education, the MST, in the words of Wrobel (2014), proposes that:

Education for work is given through a real and concrete work, represented in some cases in what is called pedagogy of alternation: students spend time taking the theoretical course and a time participating in the activities of the community and of the work of the field. (p.102)

For Lia Barbosa (2015) one of the most important contributions of the political-educational project of the MST is the strengthening of the political dimension of education. It is conceived as a concrete space for the construction of a critical conscience and a political direction, essential for the conduct of the political project of the movement. Through an emancipatory and critical pedagogical thought, which questions and proposes new concepts, and renovates educational methodologies and practices.

In Chile, a recent investigation by Marcela Betancourt (2019) aimed to analyze the experiences of young pedagogy students who present political commitment. Thirty dialogic interviews were applied which, according to La Méndola (2014), focuses on mutual and horizontal recognition in the communicative act. This study highlights three dimensions that make it possible to counteract the arguments of language ontology about social transformation and learning as a precondition of entrepreneurship focused on individual abilities.

In the first place, young people, who have been part of the student movement, that socially and politically claim quality education as a human right, associate social transformation with the processes of democratization of society. This is understood from a notion of individuals as citizens, not as consumers. There is a need for collective action to generate change which must be constituted from the active and committed participation in the decision making of public affairs. This need arises
from the very history of problematic family life. In most of the cases analyzed, the problems are related to overcrowding and the material precariousness of the families of the young people. Families must make an economic effort, and therefore work for life, to get their children to study at the university. This over demands and anguish to the parents product of the high monetary costs that a commodified education implies, which is translated, finally, in the imposition of the indebtedness. This is the reality that we want to modify from the collective action to gain space of student and social decision in the organization of the educational system, which is subsumed by the commercial logic of economic profit. It is desired to reverse the weak and incomplete democratic forms of the State that becomes a manager of neoliberal educational policies.

A second relevant aspect refers to the construction of spaces of freedom in the organizational autonomy from militancy. It is there where the instituting social relations, which activate new forms of social imagination, are collectivized. From that place, significant experiential learning processes are reconfigured, especially in the experiences of occupation of educational spaces and organization of the student movement’s demands agendas. In the words of the student María Isabel (Betancourt, 2019), regarding collective action and political commitment:

I militate because there is indeed a possibility to transform this miserable world in which we live. (...) The contribution of the militancy is to intervene or contribute to social processes and movements and propose programs and political solutions. (...) It allows me to see life with other eyes, I have been able to share with women, workers, they change your paradigms, militancy makes you break with prejudices, for that reason the relationship with your students becomes a contribution in your life, more that only one teacher in the classroom, we are also trying to change society. (p. 155)

Consequently, they must generate negotiation strategies with the authorities to make their requests visible and commit themselves to collective improvements in both the quality of education and the material conditions tending to dignify their educational spaces. In this process a disidentification with the organizational form of the political party is evidenced by a feeling of distrust and discredit of such forms of exercise of power. Young people choose to visualize structures of domination that are present in society and in school daily life. This refers to the discussion of gender, feminism and patriarchy.

The conception of oneself as political subjects committed to social change is the third dimension that stands out. In this sense, the recogni-
tion of themselves as militants, which comes from family influences or from other students, strengthens them. This is an important aspect that accompanies them in their lives and therefore is part of the dynamics of their identity. It is the experiences of political commitment that have largely allowed them to build their spaces of autonomy, from the personal decision to their social position, which entails citizen and collective responsibilities. Political commitment is meant as necessary, as mandatory, as their lifestyle, as a contribution not only to the country’s democracy, but also to their own future teaching work. Thus, their projections are in the visualization that what they learned in their militancy, will make them be democratic teachers, recognizing the differences in the ways of understanding the reality that their students have. In this sense, beyond the social value and the importance that they assign to the political commitment in their lives, for them, it is an activity where they are educated and trained, becoming better citizens and better teachers.

Faced with the phenomenon of construction of neoliberal hegemony that impacts on the political organization and functioning of educational systems, we will have to advance in the collective and reflective challenge of revealing the importance and transcendence of the critical pedagogies that exist and that are found in the margins of society. The question is, according to Rodríguez (2009), to contribute to the construction of education for social transformation.

Conclusions

Based on the critical analysis and the concrete experiences of socially engaged learning, we argue that the central formulations of the proposal of the ontology of language constitute a new device of neoliberal subjectivation that internalizes the notion of performance from linguistic reductionism. It is observed that the new interpretation of the human being and the world proclaimed by the ontology of language, denies the very world on which this notion is based, considering the individual as the central value of society and language as the source of its transformation. In this way, a specific type of postmodern relativist ideology is promoted that finds in the subjective -and its transformation potential- a new technology of the self to consolidate the notion of the individual-company.

The interference of this type of rationality in the field of education creates a series of controversial implications that need to be problematized by the philosophy of education and the critical social sciences.
is noted that on the ethical level the ontology of language promotes the
construction of the student under the imperative of performance and
the logic of self-assessment. A relationship with himself is established as
being a human capital. Learning becomes an instrument that seeks to
strengthen the idea of entrepreneurship, expanding the power of action
of individuals through the development of personal skills in a competi-
tive world. At the political level, the question of power is addressed to
oneself and the school becomes an active political instrument for the for-
mation of competitive-beings, and therefore depoliticized. At the subjec-
tive level, personal performance is sought based on the conception of
oneself as being-company, innovator and consumer.

The ontology of language in its positive version means, conse-
quently, the internalization of the logic of the market in the constitution
of being-in-competition, with which it seeks to reproduce and expand
the neoliberal ideology. Business rationality affects the processes of sub-
jectivation, where each person is conceived as a human capital that must
be managed to bear fruit. The extension of commercial rationality ex-
pands to all spheres of human existence, making neoliberal reason, as
Díez (2019) and Dardot and Laval (2016) argue, a new world-reason.

Notes

1 For a detailed and grounded systematization on ‘field education’ see “Caderno de
2 This story was taken from a documentary that we recommend. The translation is
ours. It can be seen at: https://bit.ly/2KBV5nS

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ONTOLOGY AND LANGUAGE: TRUTH AND MEANING
ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE TWO CULTURES
Ontología y lenguaje: verdad y sentido
en el umbral de las dos culturas

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Abstract
This article proposes an exploration of the implications between language and ontology in the light of two different traditions. On the one hand, the scope of the scientific statement and the relationships between meaning and truth: knowledge as the activity of describing a world that is made up of particular facts; on the other, the historical consideration whose objective is to understand a multiformed reality, where language does not only enunciate facts, but builds a meaning of the world in which human life finds the significant elements of its concrete reality. To put these two sites in perspective, it is assumed that in their development, philosophy and science were interconnected. However, as knowledge expanded, field differentiation became more and more necessary. But that strict parceling must be left behind; today a new critical reflection is required that goes beyond the dichotomy of Natural Sciences and Human or Spirit Sciences. At present, this schematism is the manifestation of an illusory understanding of nature as if it were an area of reality alien to man, and as if human beings were a ‘subject’ disconnected from the natural order. This classification evidences a rupture between nature and society, which obstructs the possibilities of an ontological gaze absent from prejudices. XXI century humanism must overcome such disjunction, as science is an essential activity for human beings to be present in multiple spheres of culture, from health services to food production, communications, recreation, politics, economics, education, etcetera. And, reciprocally, philosophical thought has provided a perspective of totality that allows to notice that the knowledge, in any of its branches, participates in the same objective, scope and value. Reflection on language can open up to understanding the differences and closeness of a shared reality.

Keywords
Language, ontology, logic, thinking.


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Resumen

Este artículo propone una exploración de las implicaciones entre lenguaje y ontología a la luz de dos tradiciones distintas. Por un lado, los alcances del enunciado científico y las relaciones entre significado y verdad: el conocimiento como la actividad de describir un mundo formado de hechos particulares; por el otro, la consideración histórica cuyo objetivo es comprender una realidad multiforme, en donde el lenguaje no enuncia sólo hechos, sino que construye un sentido de mundo en el que la vida humana encuentra los elementos significativos de su realidad concreta. Para poner en perspectiva estos dos emplazamientos, se parte del supuesto de que en su desarrollo, filosofía y ciencia estuvieron interconectadas. Sin embargo, a medida que el conocimiento se fue expandiendo, la diferenciación de campos se hizo cada vez más necesaria. No obstante, esa parcelación estricta debe quedar atrás; hoy se requiere de una nueva reflexión crítica que rebase la dicotomía de Ciencias de la naturaleza y Ciencias humanas o del espíritu. En la actualidad, este esquematismo es la manifestación de una ilusoria comprensión de la naturaleza como si ésta constituyera un ámbito de realidad ajeno al hombre, y como si el ser humano fuese un ‘sujeto’ desvinculado del orden natural. Dicha clasificación evidencia una ruptura entre naturaleza y sociedad, que bloquea las posibilidades de una mirada ontológica ausente de prejuicios. El humanismo del siglo XXI debe superar tal disyunción, ya que la ciencia es una actividad esencial para el ser humano al estar presente en múltiples esferas de la cultura, desde los servicios de salud hasta la producción de alimentos, las comunicaciones, la recreación, la política, la economía, la educación, etcétera. Y, recíprocamente, el pensamiento filosófico ha aportado una perspectiva de totalidad que permite advertir que el saber, en cualesquiera de sus ramas, participa de un mismo objetivo, alcance y valor. La reflexión sobre el lenguaje puede abrirnos a la comprensión de las diferencias y proximidades de una realidad compartida.

Palabras clave
Lenguaje, ontología, lógica, pensamiento.

Introduction

The limit of my world is the limit of my language.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

In philosophical and scientific thought, the move to Modernity was marked by the enthusiasm for a new rationality, which would lead human beings to a state of freedom and justice, to the realization of all the potential contained in their faculties, which would make evident the “hidden plan of the nature”, according to the sentence contained in the work of Kant. However, the first signs of the social crisis brought by XIX industrialism, the events of the 20th century and the rise of violence in the current era require a critical look at the past, in search of the causes that led not to the desired society, but to a growing bureaucratization of social reality according to productivist standards. Now it is pertinent to carry out a reflection on some of the issues that have shaped the fabric of the real in the societies of the moment, which has been called -for the scientific development and the rise of engineering, and not without a
dose of euphemism- ‘knowledge societies’. But along with the undeniable success obtained by the initiatives of science and technology, certain characteristic features of the present still appear as shadows: psychosocial diseases, genocide in its increasingly refined forms, violence and cruelty, the spectacle industry that keeps individuals absorbed away from the most urgent problems, the monopoly of the media that uses new forms of censorship and the discretionary management of information, wars created to reanimate the economy, the widespread destruction of ecosystems, climate change attributed to the excessive exploitation of nature and, most seriously, knowledge converted into a commodity. Given this outlook, one could ask if the ‘knowledge society’ has an answer to an urgent question: what can be expected in the face of nuclear and biological domination of the planet?

At this crossroads, a large part of the scientific and intellectual sectors that integrate contemporary rationality are shown to be limited to the mere instrumentation of processes under the means-ends scheme and framed in the nonsense of a growing extraction, transformation and sale of natural wealth. With this outcome, the illustrated reason precipitated its own annihilation, since science itself, used as a fruitful means of production, was subjected by functionalism to a series of external factors and, far from contributing with its discoveries to the emancipation of the human being -due to a host of other interests that intervene in public policies- suffers deflation of its concept to utilitarian principles, omitting the emancipatory dimensions it had and giving way to the hegemony of instrumental rationality that has reduced everything that exists to fungible relationships. The cultural malaise of our era expressed in economic inequality, political irresponsibility, the commercialization of education, technocratic nihilism and the logic of destruction. Here is located one of the critical positions of this article, in the need to reflect on the conditions of existence that divide human beings by means of an open or concealed fragmentation of their intellectual capacities, biological conditions and cultural expectations.

In this regard, in literature, the writer Franz Kafka has narrated such a situation. His work shows the disintegration of the human personality in industrial society, accounting for the labyrinthine spaces inhabited in the overcrowding of the masses, while providing a description of the way in which men are reduced to the unreality of ghosts forgotten in nothingness. But what is most remarkable in the story of Kafka (2004) is that this apparent unreality turns out to be the true background of existence, in which the inhabitant of factory cities wanders through a delete-
rious environment populated by individuals considered organic waste of the system, torn from all community bonds and radically alienated from nature, capable of committing the most atrocious crimes. This corollary reveals the conditions in which human life takes place and the social and civilizational crisis that societies of our time are going through.

The attempt to explain this wasteland caused a series of reactions, from those who saw in the scientific and technological development linked to industry, the cause of all evils, to the defense of knowledge as the only instance capable of getting us out of the quagmire. However, the simplification of such a schematic system does not allow much progress in the understanding of a phenomenon like this, which combines the deployment of knowledge and inventiveness with the most moral and political backwardness. Initially, it should be said that such a scenario cannot be explained unilaterally nor can responsibility be attributed to science as such - despite the fact that science is implicated in many of the great problems that afflict humanity today - but it is necessary to frame the phenomenon in the emergence of a type of society in which a representation of nature prevails as if it were an area that only provides raw material; as a sphere completely split off from the human condition and in which the individual and his or her history are conceived as if they were dimensions disconnected from that natural contour, thereby blocking the possibility of a holistic or, at least, broader understanding of existence. But this analytical or fragmentary view has its own formation juncture, which arises when experimental research had to specialize to reach the degree of deepening that it has achieved to date, but also this brought with it a breakdown and differentiation of planes of knowledge and, at the same time, the appearance that we live in a separate reality that demands different theoretical locations. Such a condition was not exempt from prejudices and restricted visions, which ultimately led to one-dimensional perspectives that confronted humanists and scientists in equally recalcitrant camps.

A clear expression of this polarity is found, on the one hand, in the rudimentary idea that some humanists were formed around Newtonian physics, which describes the universe as a deterministic machine provided with laws that can be explained by causal relationships expressed in formal language of mathematical science, but that has forgotten the free subjectivity incarnated in the human being; and, on the other hand, the counterpart of the scientists who disqualified Leibniz’s effort to trace this causal explanation, without appreciating the philosopher’s arguments in stating that, although nature has to be known through the causalist understanding, can only be understood from the principle of finality. Here
we could note the origin of the controversy that later German idealism directed against enlightened thought, pointing out that with the reduction of facts to formulas, nature, history and the human condition have been reduced to a mere relationship between things, ignoring that in addition to ‘causes’ there are ‘ends’, and that these are for human life the elements that give meaning to existence. And, similarly, on the part of the apologetics of science, any reflection on meaning was disqualified as an expression of metaphysics that would have to be fought on any of its fronts. In the midst of this fully recognized confrontation in the first half of the XIX century, the idea of what Charles Percy Snow (1959) called, a century later, *The two cultures and the scientific revolution*, unleashing a controversy that accounts for the prejudices that erected a barrier between science and humanities: a scientific culture that represents modernity and the future, and an ancient literary culture anchored in tradition.

With regard to the present research, the threshold of this bifurcation will be exposed, which occurred much earlier than the term used by Snow and much deeper, which was configured when considering, at one extreme, the Natural Sciences and, for the another, the Sciences of the spirit. Disjunctive that emerged as an attempt that, in its conjuncture, it could be relevant in the face of the disparity of methods and objects of study typical of modern research, which represents a year’s long prolonged differentiation and even some mentalities prevail to this day.

Thus, while the first disciplines are conducted under the principle of simplicity and seek knowledge of natural phenomena; the second focus on the study of human phenomena through the recognition of complex events; they use as a method of knowing the ‘explanation’; while the latter resort to ‘understanding’ as a suitable procedure. In order to study the Sciences of the spirit, Wilhelm Dilthey (1949) believes it necessary to make a foundation similar to the one that Kant (2013) gave to the physical-mathematical science of nature in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and to carry out a Critique of historical reason in which a concept of science forged in the German classical philosophy is developed. In this direction, the certainty of the Sciences of the spirit is, in Dilthey’s opinion, superior to that of the Sciences of nature, because in the humanities it is feasible to pose an identity between the subject that knows and the object that is known, for this reason, Dilthey calls the conception of the world, or philosophy, to this elaboration, because the spirit can integrate in a single unit the dispersed of being. The humanities give the opportunity to structure a systematic vision, since only in the spirit of man can the intensity of human existence be grasped.
But that schematism that proposes two realities and two different cultures no longer responds to the configuration of this globalized era, which demands an integral vision of the historical development of human beings, in whose daily life science has become a central factor, to such a scale that the scientific activity does not fall exclusively within the guild of scientists, but its impact forces non-specialized people, ordinary citizens, to reflect on the way in which life is traversed by the conceptual elements of science, by the diverse notions that constitute the sense of current reality and by the complexity of the technological devices now in use. The article proposed here presents a brief incursion in the relationships between ontology and language, emphasizing the claims of truth from a genealogical elucidation on the origin of the bifurcation experienced within the philosophical and scientific research that led to thematic fields, discursive practices and incompatible certainties that gave rise to the threshold of the two cultures.

However, beyond the diversity with which these theoretical positions assumed the definition of their objects of study, the appreciation for language makes them coincide in different moments of their history. It should be remembered that the reflection on language can be found from the very origin of philosophy, although it is true that only as an object of collateral study to the main speculative problems. However, in the first two decades of the XX century, it acquired a dimension so broad that it far exceeded the delimitation that had made it a means of communication or an instrument to access knowledge. Now, on the contrary, language is conceived not only as the path that makes knowledge possible, but also that truth, language and reality cannot be assumed as differentiated elements. For large specialized academic sectors, today more than any other aspect of cultural life, language has provided the ability of abstract reasoning to conceptualize and hatch a relationship with the world as has been done throughout civilizations. It is for this reason, that human beings owe to the acquisition of language the fact of becoming people. But language also plays a central role in the political sphere, in the domain and manipulation of the population, no less than in the possibilities of emancipation for individuals. Hence, knowledge or, even, thought itself is considered as language, so that since the beginning of the last century there has been an awareness that has made it a matter of vital importance for philosophy, to the degree of recognizing that it is a fundamental production both for humanity and for the particular existence, so today it is possible to identify a whole horizon of understanding and
study that has legitimately been called philosophy of language and that has far exceeded the issues that gave rise to it.

As a starting point it is feasible to say that, in its genesis, the main problems of the philosophy of language can be summarized, in broad strokes, in the following cardinal questions: How do words relate to objects? What is the relationship of language with the world? What is the nature of meaning? What is the truth? What is the relationship of language with thought? What is a speech act? Why the existence of language has to originate a philosophical problem? It is true that these questions can be seen from different perspectives and controversially contrast their possible answers, but it is also true that the language was taken for granted. That has changed. A first consequence that can be extracted is the conviction that concepts are part of human experience, and that this experience could not be judged without a domain, at least approximate, of the vocabulary that makes it comprehensible. By assuming that the experimentation of the world is accessible to us through objects, for philosophy it has been essential to discern that an object is a function of our faculty of representation. Therefore, it is important to point out the error of supposing that language is applied as a sort of template, or that it consists of a gradual process that leads to placing labels on things. Faced with this naive consideration, the philosophy of language has been responsible for indicating that, in any case, the conception of reality depends, to a large extent, on linguistic categories.

In this perspective, it is essential to refer to the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* by Ludwig Wittgenstein, emblematic work published for the first time in 1921 and that now, almost a century after its publication, the influence it has exerted, among other things, seems fundamental to us for conceiving philosophy as clarifying praxis of language and, therefore, of thought, not as a doctrine that must transmit its postulates dogmatically, but as a critical exercise, an activity. Under this canon is located the first section of this article, entitled “Ontology and truth: the relationship of things with names” and it consists in exposing some general lines of this school in which the work of Wittgenstein cited above is written, which formulates a conception in which phrases and sentences have a clear function: to represent pictorially facts in the world that exist independently. The *Tractatus*... is a paradigmatic reference of a reflexive line that raises the problem of how language is possible and how its use is possible to describe the world, state facts and determine when what is said through it is true or false. This line of development can be traced initially with Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, but it reaches authors such as Willard Van Orman Quine, John Searle and Donald Davidson, in whom it mani-
fests and retains a common interest: to elucidate the relationships between meaning and truth. However, despite the fact that the Tractatus... was a text that led to the adoption of unilateral positions, the depth of Wittgenstein’s work and its theoretical perspective also led to the recognition that, beyond the principles and categories of the science, is the scope of the unknown, of the inexpressible, life itself: that which language fails to apprehend. For now, there is no controversy here if there is a continuity or two stages in his thinking, but it is necessary to note that with this change of direction in the reflection on language, Wittgenstein himself gave an account of the breadth and complexity of what is at stake, so that it is not enough to understand language from an axiomatic point of view, but that it is mainly geared to its substantial use in life forms.

The aforementioned idea allows introducing the second section of the article, “Ontology and meaning: the language of the spirit”, where a succinct foray into another philosophical tradition is carried out in which language also has a wide-ranging reflexive line, which criticizes the conception that made it a mere instrument to designate independent entities and, declaring in favor of the constitutive role of language, underlines its importance in shaping a profile from which life becomes accessible and understandable. In this discursive orientation, the main allusion is the work of Wilhelm Dilthey and his idea of the historical world, the lived experience and the task of philosophy, not seeking to clarify but to understand, where language not only enunciates facts, but constructs a sense of the world in which human life finds the significant elements of our concrete being.

Finally, the conclusions frame a brief elucidation of the reasons why the irreconcilable dichotomy between theoretical sites and objects of study must be overcome, giving rise to a different humanism, to a new horizon of understanding and criticism in which the relations between meaning and expression that impregnate ontology and language can contribute to a broader discernment of the linguistic and cognitive processes involved in the sense of current reality and, eventually, face the challenges presented by research and learning in today’s education.

Ontology and truth: the relationship of things with names

[...] the current grammar and syntax are extraordinarily deceptive, they entail vagueness and inaccuracy when the logic is applied.

(Russell, 1988, p.180)
The first radical question of the relation between things and their name was raised at the beginning of philosophy in the Cratilo dialogue, in which Plato reflects on the accuracy of the names and whether this conformity is given by nature or, otherwise, if what is behind them obeys to factors such as consensus, convention or habit. Although it is necessary to notice that the Platonic dialogue does not intend to carry out a study of language in its structure and functioning, its value does not cease to be relevant, since it is proposed to debate around its validity in order to reach knowledge. In Aristotle there is a common interest with his teacher in the acceptance that it is not possible to completely and arbitrarily separate the plane of reality from the plane of language, because words necessarily refer to things. In Metaphysics (2000) the Stagirite tells us emphatically:

[...] is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; so that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is false; but neither what is nor what is not is said to be or not to be. (p. 186)

The problematic opened by the classic Greek philosophy around the nature of the language evidently had diverse implications. This trace touches the ontological, gnoseological, aesthetic, linguistic, logical and even ethical planes, generative domains of categories that are present since then and that are still used to conceptualize the lived reality that is intended to be known. Thus, from the questions related to the universals, which were profusely studied by the medieval logicians and that emerge in the abstruse scholastic treatises about meaning, to the sober expositions of the philosophical systems of the XVII century, with the meditation of René Descartes who exposes what knowledge is, going through the alternatives of explanation of a rational order proposed in the monadology of Gottfried Leibniz and in the theory of the substance of Baruch Spinoza or in the Port-Royal Logic, written by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, in all these places there are determining intervals in which a gnoseology develops that makes of the ideas the objective to investigate in the elucidation of the source of knowledge. John Locke’s empiricism deserves special mention, since in the Essay on Human Understanding (2002) there is a whole book entitled Words dedicated to the topic of language and to the agreement with rationalist positions on the object of study, which is not in things, but in the representation or idea of them. Throughout this journey it is possible to see how a first semiotic theory that interprets words as the signs of ideas is extracted. These problems about language show a general attitude that goes through different mo-
ments in the long tradition of philosophy and that began as an instrument and vehicle of communication, and then conceived as an indispensable factor for knowledge.

In this historical evolution, the problem of the existence and preaching of things was often linked to questions about being and language, as well as about the meaning of words, the scope that, in the plane of knowledge, could logic have and the punctual analysis of it as an instrument to elucidate this problem. How far can experience and thought be possible if they are not limited to the realm of language? What relationship do things have with words and what forms of linkage can they derive from their study? Is it feasible to affirm that in the thematization of language the central core has consisted in knowing what is the relation of it with reality and determining from it a place to interpret the world?

In this brief overview it is important to reiterate that it is not correct to think that, suddenly, in the XX century the philosophers came across language, in fact there are many reflections around it in a wide range that goes from the pre-Socratic schools, the Platonic dialogues, the Aristotelian Organon or even the Stoic logic, even the idealistic systems of the XIX century, so its thematization is not something recent. However, beyond the importance that undoubtedly reached the search for explanations in this thematic field, it is also true that logic and, therefore, language, for many centuries were not considered something that required a whole study or discipline on the part of philosophy, but were conceived as tools, as a natural instance linked to all philosophy, but not a properly indicated sphere of reflection. Even Kant sets the example of the constitution of logic as a science in comparison with what metaphysics has not yet achieved, by remaining lost and not having yet taken the safe path of science. Logic was implicitly an integral part of philosophical systems, but not a horizon of study that captured the attention of the most representative thinkers. However, this circumstance radically changed from the end of modernity with the new conception of logic proposed in the Hegel system and, almost a century later, in contemporary thought with the development of the logical foundation of science, occasion in which the existence of a philosophy of language can be fully identified. We must accept that there is a recognized tradition in the study of language, but also that something changed in the consideration of its status, and this change has to do with the abandonment of that assumption in which language was a transparent medium through which one could see the world directly.

But why in the XX century does language acquire this central place for philosophy? As a preamble, it should be said that there are, at
least, two determining moments for this condition. In the first instance it would suffice to assess the development of the mathematical logic of the beginning of the century, which began with the research undertaken by Frege and Russell framed in a cultural moment that gave rise to schools and currents that still remain in force. Both authors were interested in exploring the foundations of mathematics and the nature of mathematical knowledge; their research led them to an elucidation about logic and linguistic representation. No doubt there was a favorable context that put philosophers and mathematicians in the best opportunity to ground mathematics in logic and make philosophy an activity based on the capacity of definition and rational clarification, where the work *Principia Mathematica* (1910-1913), written jointly by Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, exerted a determining influence. On the other hand, the posthumous publication of Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in *General Linguistics* (1916), which will become the basis of the structural linguistics developed later by the so-called Prague School (1929) and by the Linguistic Circle of Copenhagen (1931).

With regard to the first aspect that relates philosophy, logic and mathematics -which this section deals with-, the investigations of Frege, Russell and Whitehead originated in a central interest around the role that language plays in knowledge and, from there, they vindicated the need to unravel their possibilities and limits, a task that was all the more urgent inasmuch as they were convinced that the language is ambiguous. For these authors mathematics was essentially an extension of logic and mathematical statements seemed true by definition, but it was necessary to develop a theory of truth and a theory of logic that point to the same path. This inquiry about language and philosophy from a logical-mathematical perspective will find in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* of Wittgenstein a horizon of understanding in which philosophy came to be conceived as an activity whose objective is to clarify language through the logic to arrive at the correct vision of the world. In the opinion of Wittgenstein (1963), this appropriate view is far from what philosophical systems have proposed at the time and, in specific terms, is to point out that: “The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: say nothing except what can be said, ie propositions of natural science -i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy- (p.151). The correct method then consists in “not saying anything more than what can be said, that is, propositions of natural science - that is, something that has nothing to do with philosophy” (Wittgenstein, 1997, p.183).
With this emplacement contrary to metaphysics and rooted in the propositions of natural science and mathematical principles, the logic of language will be condensed in the tautologies, in the various repetitions of thought through different expressions. In this way, under the strict logical domain, language resides in a formal structure that is deployed in the use of valid alternatives to arrive at certain inferences. Something that matters to underline is that the logic proposed here is not the Aristotelian one that studies the syllogism through the relations between subject and predicate, nor the ontological logic of the Hegelian system. For this theoretical direction, the clarifying intent is to structure a language for pure thought that goes beyond grammatical relations and can be conceived through formulas, analogous to how arithmetic does.

Frege (1972) defines the concept of number as a fundamental notion for mathematical science that can be extensive as a model for language and thought as such. The purpose of the logic that Frege proposes to structure is to account for the conceptual content of thought, which is the support of all inference. This conceptual content allows access to the objective. For this Frege proposes a new logical-symbolic language which he calls “Conceptualism” (1972). The conceptualism can be described according to Frege as a tool that allows to show the logical foundation of arithmetic through the definition of number. The relations between logic, language and mathematics are approached until they touch, because the term ‘concept’, the basis of the conceptualism, is defined by Frege through an element taken from mathematical science. This rudiment is that of ‘function’.

Thus, the concept is a ‘function’ of an ‘argument’, whose significance is always determined by a truth value (V/F). The conceptual content is declared as ‘the objective’: that which exists independently of a subject being made a representation of it. Under this reasoning, human language could access knowledge if it is organized similarly to how mathematics does it: each concept is a quantifier, and what matters is the connection between the concepts. The premise of this equation is that language has in common with the world the logical form. In the proper realism of such a conception of knowledge, the concept is the objective, and the objective is thought: here is an analytical judgment. This means that only within a formal logical language it is possible to refer to the structure of thought from its laws of truth, which do not change. If the series f(\(x\)) is taken as an example, f expresses a function and \(x\) a variable; in the Frege exposition the function can assume a truth value when an object (argument) appears in the place of the variable (\(x\)). Frege (1972) then argues that the number is not reduced to a property of things, since it is not abstracted...
from them, but neither is a subjective entity derived from the subject who thinks it. The number is a concept, a function, a logical relation with objective content. In the number a fundamental relation is made that consists in that an object falls under the name of a concept. What happens is that a function has assumed a truth value. Frege then introduces a couple of other words: the ‘relation’ and the ‘simplicity’, both belong to the analytical logic, which is pure or formal logic. The definition of number is proposed by Frege with the following sentence: \( n \) is a number designating a concept (function), where \( n \) is the number that corresponds to it. Frege establishes the equivalence between the concepts, that is why conceptualism is analytical. Its aim is to establish a series of correspondences so that arithmetic is considered a part of logic, without the need to resort to experience or intuition to obtain the basis of its demonstrations. For Frege the simplest laws of numbering would be obtained by purely logical means. Simultaneously, Frege’s conceptual exposition consists of a rigorous deduction covered with the maximum logical accuracy, which is clear and brief, and which advances as if it were a calculation, in which an algorithm in general is always present: a set of rules that rigorously determine, from one or two propositions, the step towards a new proposition. This is how he describes it in his work:

The knowledge of a scientific truth passes, as a rule, by various degrees of certainty. Perhaps conjectured at the beginning on the basis of an insufficient number of particular cases, a general proposition consolidates itself more and more surely by charging connection with other truths through chains of inferences, whether it results in consequences that find confirmation of another way, whether, conversely, it is recognized as a consequence of already established propositions. According to this, on the one hand one can ask about the way in which a proposition is gradually won and, on the other, about the way in which it is ultimately based with maximum certainty. (Frege, 1972, p.7).

For his part, Russell will develop his reasoning in relation to the horizon opened by Frege, in which the objects of mathematics-namely: numbers, classes, relationships, etc.-have an existence independent of the subject and of experience, with which both subscribe a kind of Platonistic realism. Russell defines the problems addressed by the philosophy of mathematics in the following terms: instead of doing what is commonly done by asking what can be defined and deduced from initial postulates, he introduces a variable and questions from what ideas and more general principles could be defined or deduced the postulates of which it is part. This proposition inquiries into the form of thought and, like Frege, it is
now the Cartesian tradition that is assumed. Indeed, Russell defines the principles of reasoning as simple units and, to reach them, it is necessary to use an instrument: logic. This is the logicist ideal, in the attempt to reduce mathematics to logic. But in Russell (1988) logic is also related to the establishment of a criterion of truth, therefore can only be founded on a sense of reality. Despite all the attempts of formalism, the reference to the sense of reality shows that it has not been possible to disappear definitively from ontology and that it has not been so easy to break the domination of the word over the minds of men.

However, in the rejection of idealism and the eagerness to overcome metaphysics, in Russell’s work the statements are necessarily played in the double truth/reality, since when it comes to beings considered imaginary, there is no way to speak of values of truth, that is, their names are not logical concepts. For example, a sentence that contains the name of some imaginary being has no truth value, because with that name there is no designated thing; in other words: it is an indefinite description. Russell says that, if it is pointed out that these entities exist in literature or imagination, this is no more than a simple evasion. But those imaginary beings are not strictly unreal either. The unreal for Russell makes sense only when (x) is in a description; when for example I say ‘x is unreal’ or ‘x does not exist’, in that case it is not an absurdity, but in this scheme even said imaginary being becomes significant and, sometimes, the proposition in which it can be judged according to the true/false criterion, because it is referred to a proposition susceptible of evaluation. This reflection, which leads to the analysis of the descriptions, constitutes an attempt to reveal what the indefinite descriptions are and reject them. The theory of descriptions aims to arrive at the simple, the work of clarification proper to philosophy is manifested in this way.

Now, when Russell affirms that logic must be based on a certain sense of reality, with this ontological background it does not necessarily affirm that it is a study of empirical facts. Russell proposes a pure logic that is valid in any possible world, objective that is feasible to raise due to the reading and assessment that makes of the Tractatus... of Wittgenstein, where it is established that to reach the pure logic is necessary the careful study of the ‘tautology’. The Tractatus... is a work written in the form of aphorisms ordered according to the decimal classification system. It contains seven cardinal propositions: the first two are ontological propositions that refer to the world and reality; the next four are the development of his logic and his theory of language; and the number seven, the last proposition, paradoxically has become the most significant, because
it contains the well-known and enigmatic phrase “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” (Wittgenstein, 1997, p.183), with which it closes the book marking the limit of what one can think and say. In effect, what can be thought is that which is feasible, and what can be said is that which has its proof in the proposition. Language represents the world by making a painting of it; the propositions are paintings of the facts, but, in addition, the propositions are expressions of the thought, they are what the human being thinks, the statements that do not appear facts will not have coherence. Beyond the states of things is ‘the beautiful’, ‘the valuable’, the appreciation of human existence, God, the mystical, the inapprehensible, what language cannot do, that which cannot be spoken of.

Although most of the Tractatus... speaks of logic and language (of the proposition), the initial paragraphs contain ontological expressions, they deal with the world and the metaphysical vision, and they do so in terms very close to what Russell calls the sense of reality that underlies all logic or theoretical elaboration, which consists of what he calls logical atomism. While there are agreements between them, Wittgenstein, on the other hand, prefers to talk about states of affairs... In the Tractatus..., ‘world’ is a concept that refers to the totality of the facts. On the other hand, ‘language’ refers to the totality of propositions. The idea that in this work is formulated is that world and language share the same structure and, in this composition, Wittgenstein assembles in an intrinsic relationship reality, logic and language through three fundamental concepts: atomic fact, logical figure and proposition. In order for this painting of the world that makes language through propositions to have meaning, the utterances must be able to be analyzed until they are decomposed into final elementary sentences, consisting of names correlated directly with the objects spoken of. For Wittgenstein (1997) “The elementary proposition consists of names. For Wittgenstein (1997) “The elementary proposition consists of names” . “The elementary proposition consists of names” (p.77). But, unlike Russell, for whom the ultimate component lies in objects or things, the entities that we perceive with sensitivity, in the course of Wittgenstein (1997) “The world is the totality of facts, not of things” (p.15). Although he agrees with Russell that the objects are simple, Wittgenstein points out that these are part of the atomic facts. In the Tractatus... the atomic fact is the combination or relation of objects or things; the atomic facts are the substance of which the world is formed, its basic constituent. In this direction, what can be known about the things of the world is only ‘what happens’, ‘the states of things’, that is, the combinations or relations of things and objects: the
atomic facts or simple facts. But it is also possible to know the composite facts that are formed from simple facts, all of which together constitute the foundation of reality.

Having laid the foundations on which the investigation stands, Russell assumes that logic has to deal with the purely formal and, consequently, no particular object or relation can intervene here; this gives rise to the existence of the pure forms that contain the propositions, opening with it the possibility that there is a language in which all the formal aspects are included in a logical syntax and not in the vocabulary, which is always conventional. Hence, the main characteristic of this language is to be symbolic, because with it is possible to designate variables that can be ordered in different ways, but there are also logical constants that account for the common among the propositions; this common fund is its ‘form’. The propositions of this logic could be known a priori, without a study of the real world, without having to resort to all those propositions whose knowledge is empirically obtained; therefore, its peculiar characteristic is tautology. Tautology is structured and maintains a close relationship with other concepts used by Wittgenstein as: ‘object’, ‘fact’, ‘name’, ‘proposition’, ‘language’, ‘figurative theory’, ‘logical form’.

Form and content are essential in language and allude to logical organization, to the possibilities in which states of things can occur. Logic is not a theory, but a specular figure of the world; for this reason, logic is transcendental, because its function is to show all possibilities of occurrence in states of things. Tautology, on the other hand, is not a simple repetition, but is the universal condition of possibility insofar as it shows the structure of language and is at the limit where all possibilities are. In this field certainty, the truth and universal unity gravitate, the object as Wittgenstein conceives it. When knowing the object, all the possibilities of its occurrence in states of things are also known. According to this assessment, all the possible relationships that may be the case, that is, the shape of the objects, are given in the logical space. In the logical space the total reality is given: the world. This is ultimately based on the possible. It should be noted that it is not asserting that language ‘makes’ reality, but that knowledge of what happens as reality depends on the categories that are imposed on the world, and these categories are linguistic.

Expanding the theoretical line of his predecessors, Wittgenstein (1997) then defines thought as the logical figure of events. The objective set out in the Tractatus... is to set limits to philosophy by means of a method: the logical analysis of language. This logical analysis will be called ‘clarification’, a necessary elucidation, since, according to the au-
thor, most philosophers ask questions that they cannot solve due to the logical incomprehension of language. Like Russell, when the language is thematized, Wittgenstein (1997) starts from an ontology that has the following formulation: “The world is all that is the case” (p.15). This means that the real, the facts or ‘all that is the case’ are the diverse connections between the objects, that which happens. From the analysis of what is given (the occurrence of things) and their possible combinations, it is feasible to extract the form of objects, which lies in its structure: the form of reality is the possibility of all states of things. Objects have a structure that enables such states. If this possibility exists, then the structure of the objects is logical, and it is feasible that the language can figure out the reality, because the root of the sense of reality in which the conception of the world is configured lies in this arrangement and combination of the objects. Therefore, it is said that a statement is true if it harmonizes with the facts or if the things are as the statement represents them.

For this theoretical direction the key is in the idea of object. The object is simple, but this is where the research encounters a great difficulty, since it does not go beyond this statement, it is not possible to have a broader explanation or to conform an example of what an object is, what is real only can be shown, painted or figuratively alluded, philosophy necessarily reaches a limit and the tacit acceptance that there is something in the background that cannot be said, the world remains ineffable, only its logical form is available.

The Tractatus... exposes a figurative or pictorial theory that consists of the following: language portrays or figures the facts through the logical form. The logical form is the limit of what can be said, it represents the possibilities in which the signs have meaning. This set of possibilities constitutes the ‘logical syntax’, the elementary or primitive logical figure. The world unfolds in this totality of facts that occurs in the logical space, and it is the elementary propositions that portray or appear the effective giving of possible states of things. The elementary propositions (which are ‘the simple’) consist of names; Following the thesis of Frege (1972), elementary propositions are a function of names. If an elementary proposition is true, the state of things is given effectively; if it is false, the state of things is not given. The limit of language lies in this possibility, therefore it is not feasible to fully define the object, the most that can be pointed out -in the purest Cartesian procedure- is that objects are related to other objects as links in a chain and, in this concatenation, objects are structured as such and the states of affairs of which the world is formed are formed.
For Wittgenstein (1997) the essential thing in the states of things is their form, that is, the object. The objects are the fixed substance, the form, what does not change, everything that must remain for the world to be. For this reason, the totality of possible states of things that can occur constitutes the world. It should be remembered that for this philosophical tendency the common between world and language is the logical form, hence the facts can be ‘said’ in the propositions. Therefore, what is essential in language is the symbol, which is expression (form and content) and represents the general form that unifies constants and variables in a proposition. The form is the structure that allows to signify the language, which makes it possible for the language to figure reality. The form is shown in the logical propositions that are the tautologies, which say nothing. The logical propositions are the frame of the world, they are its specular figure, they represent it and at the same time they admit that names have meaning and that propositions have meaning. In a valuable interview with Anthony Quinton called The Two Philosophies of Wittgenstein, which along with other Bryan Magee (1982) later published as a book, reads the following:

All this theory of meaning presupposes a certain ontology; It presupposes that what exists must have a certain character. According to it, the world, independently of us and of language, must consist, ultimately, in simple objects that can be related to each other in certain particular ways. (p.101)

For a sentence to reflect the world, there must be an internal structure of the sentence so that its names correspond to the internal structure of the states of things. This equivalence of scaffolding shapes meaning, which allows language and world to be linked. This structure is the logical ‘form’ and in turn reflects a possible disposition of the real. Consequently, through a study on logic, one is in a position to show the support that is found in the language as a thought that constitutes the logical figure of the facts.

This structure or figure of the facts can only be shown; nevertheless, from the point where the connection between language and reality is established nothing can be said. The logical form of the expression accounts for a configuration that makes it possible for the proposition to have meaning, but it is impossible for the language to enunciate the meaning of the structure. What ‘is’ can be shown, but cannot be expressed, for this reason Wittgenstein (1997) says that, whoever understands it, recognizes its propositions as absurd; however, they are still necessary to have a correct view of the world. The thematic line followed in this section...
shows the interest in establishing the truth of the statements, the correct view of the world and, therefore, the relationship with the philosophy of science is completely evident, because the main issue between ontology and Language consists in determining the link between meaning and truth. Due to this inquiry it is fair to recognize that the scientific method makes it possible, to some degree, to give a voice to the description of reality with certain signs of truth, that is the greatest achievement of the analytical tendency in philosophy; but, in another direction, it is also imperative to note that its limit and inconsistency lies in the logistic reductionism in which it incurs. In addition, in its claim to objectivity we go on to say that ‘the world has a logical structure’, a statement that becomes a *sine qua non* condition for the agreement between facts and propositions. Consequently, if the analytical current sought to overcome any speculation that was deemed inadequate to that objectivity assumed in the logical canon, with such a postulate it falls at the very center of metaphysics, even though its defenders are reluctant to accept it. Next, a different conception between ontology and language is developed, one that does not shy away from metaphysics and reflects on the constitutive historicity of the human being.

**Ontology and meaning: the language of the spirit**

In a philosophical tradition parallel to that of scientific knowledge, emerged in the modern project of the XVIII and XIX centuries, there is an approach that seeks to overcome the instrumental concept of language and sees in it a wider source for understanding reality and the being of mankind. This conception is based on research related to language but inspired by the idea of expressivity, which finds in German Romanticism and the works of Johann Gottfried Herder and Karl Wilhem von Humboldt, some of its channels. For this initiative, language is not a mere product or human work, but an energy of the spirit, which embodies the worldview of a nation, and models and dominates the subjectivity of the individual. In this plot occurs not only the beginning of the studies of historical and comparative linguistics, but, from the philosophical point of view, the leap of perspective according to which language stops being a simple means and becomes a structuring element and, at the same time, the primary reality in which the human being is immersed, a dimension that is prior to him, consequently, the understanding that man reaches of the universe and himself cannot be achieved except through language.
But just as analytic philosophy tried to differentiate its interests from that terminology that it disqualified as metaphysics, at the same time, there is in the tradition of classical philosophy a critical position towards the schematic view of the conceptual analysis that made the differentiation between ‘Natural sciences’ and ‘Sciences of the spirit’, which implies the separation between the explanatory method and the comprehensive method.

With the controversy between ‘explanation’ and ‘comprehension’ noted above, the debate arises between different traditions in research. On the one hand, the naturalist current proposes a methodological monism in which only one method of research is recognized, which postulates that all science must be adapted to the nomological principle of the natural sciences, which is based on experimentation and its results entail the formulation or access to general laws. On the other hand, the hermeneutic tradition, based on an interpretative methodology, among its characteristics supports a methodological dualism in which natural sciences and human sciences have objects of study, methods of interpretation and ways of being different.

The nature sciences, whose object of study is the material and organic domain, namely: physics, chemistry, biology, botany, zoology, etc., resort to the experimental method, observation and quantification and, although modern science has its origin in the XVII century with the scientific revolution, the full awareness of an independent method, distinct from any other type of knowledge and applied to the investigation of nature, dates from the XIX century, in the context of emergence of utilitarian positivism and, from the work *A System of Logic* (1843) by John Stuart Mill. The thesis that is proposed here is that the whole reality has to be explained beginning with the law of causality obtained by induction; even human life, which is studied by a positive science such as morality, must be based on facts and laws to use them as instruments of action on the social space, in the same tone in which the natural sciences to act on the natural environment. According to Stuart Mill (in Abbagnano, 1978), if a person is thoroughly known and the reasons that act on him, then his behavior can be predicted with the same certainty as any physical event.

On the other hand, the Sciences of the spirit constitute an expression that has gained ground due to the influence of Wilhelm Dilthey who, with some nuances, uses it to give an account of that differentiation that, in his time, has been introduced between the research that has for object the knowledge of nature, and those other disciplines such as psychology, history, law or aesthetics, which study the historical and social horizon in...
which the human being develops. The method required by both is different, given that in the former what is observed are regularities external to man, governed by the principle of causality; while in the latter, what is examined is the human spirit itself or its concrete manifestations, governed not by mechanical causality, but by the principle of finality or intentionality. Therefore, the proper method of the sciences of the spirit is understanding. However, beyond the clarification that distinguishes methods and objects of study, Dilthey criticizes the relative and partial nature of this division, as will be discussed later.

However, if such a demarcation was important at the time, it would be pertinent to review the terms in which it was formulated to establish whether there is still room to speak about two cultures and different ways of knowing. In this path, Dilthey points out that everything that man is, he experiences only through history. This assertion is based on the conviction that the Sciences of the spirit are knowledge about culture, society, man, religion and especially history, which try to be defined from a fundamental presupposition: men put in their own creations an end, that to be grasped, demands a proper method of understanding. The ability to decipher the creations of man, to understand their literary texts and their historical documents, was given from ancient times the name of hermeneutics.

In fact, Maurizio Ferraris in *Hermeneutics* (2003) makes a panoramic account of the Greek term *hermeneutike techné*, which comes from *hermeneia*, translation, explanation, expression or interpretation that, in general, means the art of interpreting a text, that is, the possibility of referring a sign to its designee to acquire the understanding. With the passing of time the concept was identified with exegesis, but nowadays ‘hermeneutics’ refers to a general philosophical theory of interpretation and, for some, a whole horizon of understanding of reality. However, in its early stages hermeneutics designated the action of carrying the messages of the gods to men, in Plato *hermeneutiké*, refers to the technique of interpretation of the oracles or of the hidden divine signs, hence the etymology indicates the relationship of the hermeneutics with Hermes, the messenger of the gods. Later, with Aristotle, that approach to the interpretation of the sacred is lost. In *Peri hermeneias* (On the interpretation, second text of the Organon), Aristotle analyzes the existing relations between the linguistic signs and the thoughts, and between the thoughts and the things. For him, as for the later Aristotelian tradition, hermeneutics deals with the enunciative propositions and the principles of discursive expression in relation to the ontological structure of the
real. In Hellenism, the Stoics inaugurated a peculiar form of allegorical hermeneutics that makes it possible to interpret the rational contents hidden in myths. During the Middle Ages, due to religious influence, especially Jewish and Christian, hermeneutics was associated with the techniques and methods of interpretation of biblical texts, but without eliminating relationships with logic and knowledge. Thus, in medieval speculation the Aristotelian guide is maintained and, in authors like Boethius, hermeneutics designates the reference of the sign to its alluded to, in an action of knowledge that occurs in the soul, a postulate that will later hatch in the philosophy of subjectivity. But while the relationship between the linguistic sign and the concept is arbitrary, the relationship between the concept and the object is necessary and universal; the influence of Aristotelian logic is patent here. In general, this has been the field of significance of the term hermeneutics: as an interpretation of sacred writing that includes literal exegesis referring to the linguistic analysis of a text in question; as the study of the adequacy between language and reality; or according to the symbolic exegesis that observes meanings and evidences beyond the literality of the text. However, in the XVI and XVII centuries, when the system of Aristotle has succumbed to the experimental method and the new theory of knowledge, in addition to theological hermeneutics that interprets sacred texts, different hermeneutics appear: a profane one oriented to the interpretation of Latin and Greek classic texts, a legal and a historical one. The horizon in which both the knowledge about the natural world and those that interrogate the historical world have both a millenary tradition.

In this direction, although the problematic field of hermeneutics was linked to approaches typical of mythology, religion and theology -since it was in Christianity that reason had to deal with the interpretation of the texts in which they codified their beliefs- this required setting criteria of interpretation and understanding; Catholic Christianity then unified such criteria under the principle of tradition, which is appealed as the final instance that decides on the veracity of one’s own history. However, the advent of the Modern Age and the progressive development of subjectivity, determined a radical shift in the approaches and principles set by tradition. Thus, contrary to the theologians, the humanists undertook the philological criticism applied to the classical texts and, with this, they broke the rigid schemas of medieval scholasticism, opening the discussion to broader interpretation problems and not closed exclusively in the precinct of religiosity. The Protestant Reformation opposed the principles of the tradition and authority of Catholicism, the foundations
of the self-sufficiency of the Sacred Scriptures and the acceptance of them as the Word of God, which is accessed through a personal reading of the Bible. But it is the emergence of historical consciousness at the very center of the Enlightenment in the XVIII century, with thinkers such as Giambattista Vico and Herder, and its subsequent development throughout the XIX century, which will provide the determinant impulses that made hermeneutics the theory par excellence of the interpretation of historical texts, which goes beyond this objective, by making it all a horizon of understanding of human existence. A clear example is the definition of common sense, which Vico formulates, and which is valued by Hans-Georg Gadamer in *Truth and Method* (1977):

Vico’s appeal to the *sensus communis* undoubtedly exhibits a special coloring within this humanistic tradition. In this sphere of knowledge too there is a *querelle des anciens et des modernes*. It is no longer the contrast with the “school,” but the particular contrast with modern science that Vico has in mind. He does not deny the merits of modern critical science but shows its limits. Even with this new science and its mathematical methodology, we still cannot do without the wisdom of the ancients and their cultivation of *prudentia* and *eloquentia*. But the most important thing in education is still something else—the training in the *sensus communis*, which is not nourished on the true but on the probable, the verisimilar. The main thing for our purposes is that here *sensus communis* obviously does not mean only that general faculty in all men but the sense that founds community. According to Vico, what gives the human will its direction is not the abstract universality of reason but the concrete universality represented by the community of a group, a people, a nation, or the whole human race. Hence developing this communal sense is of decisive importance for living. (p. 50)

In the light of this research program outlined by Vico, common sense has a special significance, it does not refer to a kind of limited certainty radically different and inferior to that granted by scientific knowledge, but to the formation of community that is of decisive importance for life. But here too comes the energetic pronouncement that with the irruption of modern science and its mathematical methodology something has been lost: the *sensus communis*, that which guides human life. In this line of analysis, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1991) picks up the concept of hermeneutics of religious discourse and reworks from it the theory of how all kinds of historical and literary documents of the past have to be interpreted and understood: “Language is the clearest mirror in the world, a work of art in which the spirit is known” (p. 95).
From then on, hermeneutics begins to take on full philosophical relevance, to conform as a general theory of interpretation and understanding. Schleiermacher goes beyond mere exegetical work, since the historical and philological data are only the starting point of understanding and interpretation, which should not be considered in terms of its object of study, but from the subject who interrogates. For Schleiermacher (1991), “language must represent the thoughts of the spirit and reflect the highest intuition and the most intimate observation of one’s behavior...” (p. 101). But, in turn, the interpretation cannot be limited to the mere understanding of texts, but is devoted to the understanding of the whole. This romantic version of hermeneutics represents a diverse alternative to the positivist and critical method practiced by historians and exegetes of the Enlightenment, and lays the foundations of the path that later will make up the so-called Sciences of the spirit.

Indeed, the hermeneutics understood in this broad philosophical spectrum influences Dilthey and the followers of the historicist current, for whom the textual, historical and biographical data are elements prior to the process of approaching a situation that one wants to understand and, to understand it, it is necessary to articulate the data in a unit of meaning. Hermeneutics appears as the method of the Sciences of the spirit, counterpart of the explanatory method of the Sciences of nature. Dilthey conceives ‘interpretation’ as an understanding that is based on historical consciousness and enables one to better understand an author, a work or an era; in turn, it conceives ‘understanding’ as a process that is directed towards the objectifications of life, which are manifested as signs of a life process or experiences of the spirit. Such experiences, which are the objectifications of life, are apprehended as an objective spirit in the Hegelian sense and are properly objects of science.

According to this assessment, since the scientific revolution of Modernity, science is understood as a set of propositions composed of elements that are clear and distinct concepts, completely determined, simple, constant and of universal validity for human subjectivity. Science is, then, an activity that establishes well-founded links and whose parts are interwoven into a whole that, thanks to the universality of language, can be communicated independently of the individual that states it, or because that whole is thought of entirely an integral part of reality, or because a specific branch of human activity is regulated. Science is the possibility of reducing any event or phenomenon to rational terms, therefore the rational path is the only one that grants access to the truth because human intelligence is based on certain basic operations, conceived as nat-
ural operations, which allow determine the rationality that nests within the phenomena themselves. The following is a long excerpt from the *Introduction to the Huan Sciences* (1949), a work in which Wilhelm Dilthey proposes this differentiation of approaches, to later point out also the arbitrary nature of such division:

That which has developed in the course of human history and which common usage has designated as “the sciences of man, of history, and of society” constitutes a sphere of mental facts which we seek not to master but primarily to comprehend. The empirical method requires that we establish the value of the particular procedures necessary for inquiry on the basis of the subject matter of the human sciences and in a historical-critical manner. The nature of knowledge in the human sciences must be explicated by observing the full course of human development. Such a method stands in contrast to that recently applied all too often by the so-called positivists, who derive the meaning of the concept of science from a definition of knowledge which arises from a predominant concern with the natural sciences. On the basis of that concept, they determine which intellectual occupations merit the name and status of science. Thus on the basis of an arbitrary concept of knowledge, some have shortsightedly and presumptuously denied the status of science to the writing of history as it has been practiced by great masters, and others believed it necessary to transform those disciplines which are founded on imperatives, rather than on judgments about reality, into cognitive sciences of reality. What is contained in the concept of science is generally divided into two subdivisions. One is designated by the name “natural science,” while for the other there is, curiously enough, no generally accepted designation. I shall follow those thinkers who refer to this second half of the *globus intellectualis* by the term *Geisteswissenschaften*. In the first place, this designation is one that has become customary and generally understood, due especially to the extensive circulation of the German translation of John Stuart Mill’s *System of Logic*. This term seems the least inappropriate among the various from which we can choose. To be sure, the reference to the spirit (*Geist*) in the term *Geisteswissenschaften* can give only an imperfect indication of the subject matter of these sciences, for it does not really separate facts of the human spirit from the psychophysical unity of human nature. Any theory intended to describe and analyze socio-historical reality cannot restrict itself to the human spirit and disregard the totality of human nature. Yet this shortcoming of the expression *Geisteswissenschaften* is shared by all the other expressions that have been used: *Gesellschaftswissenschaft* (social science), *Soziologie* (sociology), *moralische* (moral), *geschichtliche* (historical), or *Kulturwissenschaften* (cultural sciences). All of these designations suffer from the same fault of being too narrow relative to their
subject matter. And the name chosen here has at least the advantage of appropriately characterizing the central sphere of facts in terms of which the unity of these disciplines was actually perceived, their scope outlined, and their demarcation from the natural sciences established, no matter how imperfectly. (p. 13)

The separation of these two spheres of research was marked by specialization as the driving force that made possible the advancement of knowledge. Impulse that undoubtedly had an unavoidable effect on the conscience of men beyond the practical and obvious consequences of the scientific advances linked to industry, technology and the increasingly diversified sphere of engineering. But for Dilthey (1949) the main reason why the habit of separating the sciences of the spirit from the natural sciences was born, was due to a breath of development of human self-consciousness, when in the XIX century the human being found in himself powers that led him to raise the sovereignty of the will, the possibility of being responsible for his actions, the ability to submit everything to analysis and strengthen his existence within the individual subjectivity of each person, which could infer that humans are beings that differ from nature, taken as a whole. However, at present, this separation is only the reflection of an old positivist and ideological view, which responds today to particular interests and not to the real way in which scientific research is carried out. The following lines delineate the scope and limitations of this other conception that links language, knowledge and ontology.

Humanism as a reflection that is basically interested in the meaning and value of the human cannot participate in the division into two cultures, this is so because throughout its history, it has gone through different circumstances, in which its basis always has been the understanding of human life as a whole. This happened with the sociocultural phenomenon of the XIV and XV centuries, known as ‘Renaissance humanism’; in the same way with the ‘new humanism’, typical of German classicism and romanticism in the XVIII and XIX centuries; and later with the ‘contemporary humanisms’, based on general philosophical approaches and fundamentally ethical orientation. In this journey we can find characteristic phenomena, among them would be the following: the return to the classical, the affinity for nature, the Copernican turn, science as free thought, individualism, the rejection of authority, the valuation of history, interest in culture and knowledge. But at the same time an ideology of utilitarianism and productivity arose in these stages, converted in the end into hegemonic principles of the capitalist system, although in parallel, a strong criticism against this ideology broke out, which made
humanism flourish at the end of Modernity and gave impulse to an integrating thought based on the concept of ‘formation’.

This notion of formation became the essential element of the new concept of ‘humanity’ crystallized in the so-called ‘Science of the spirit’ of the XIX century. The contemporary humanisms are also inscribed in this line, but they are based on the Hegelian scheme of the idea that constitutes itself throughout history. Philosophy about man develops as a fundamental part of a philosophical system, willing to emphasize the value and dignity of the human being as an individual who builds his own path. During the second half of the XIX century and the beginning of the XX, the phenomenon of historicism offers an opportunity for a thorough rethinking of the methodological assumptions of the historical and social sciences. Therefore, in the attempt of what in Dilthey would be a ‘Critique of historical reason’ appear new themes and concepts, such as the distinction between explanatory knowledge (Erklären), form of knowledge that governs the ‘Sciences of nature’, and Comprehensive knowledge (Verstehen), peculiar mode of knowledge of the ‘Sciences of the spirit’.

Next, Dilthey is referenced again to locate the point at which the idea of dissimilar theoretical sites arises and, at the same time, to denote how relative this division is in Dilthey’s own opinion (1949):

All purposes lie exclusively within the sphere of human spirit, for this is what is truly real for man; but a purpose seeks its means of realization in the system of nature. The change which the creative power of spirit produces in the external world is often nearly inconspicuous. Yet only through it does the value thus created exist for other people as well. The few pages which came into the hands of Copernicus as the material remnants of the profound mental efforts by which the ancients first conceived the idea that the earth moves became the starting point for a revolution in our conception of the world.

Now it can be seen how relative the delimitation of these two groups of sciences is. […]The sciences of man, society and history have as their basis the natural sciences, for the same reason that psychophysical units can only be studied with the help of biology but also because the environment in which they develop and in which teleological activity takes place, directed largely to the domain of nature, is constituted by it. (pp. 25-26).

That exiguous polarity - supported mainly by positivist visions - lasted for several decades, until in the seventies of the XX century the methodological problem re-emerged and was centered with renewed purposes in the social sciences. In this emergent context, it is possible to mention at least three alternatives of research: the one that neopositivism
leads, that goes out in defense of the rights of the objectivity of science and reproduces that discord of research horizons; that represented by phenomenology, which includes the approaches of the humanist philosophical tradition placing the problem in the immanence of reflection, and, finally, Marxism, which emphasizes the social interests that are at the base of any type of knowledge.

Conclusions: towards a new understanding horizon

Up to this point the confrontation of opposite theoretical orientations has been described, but if the intention is to trace this discussion of the two cultures, the most pertinent thing is to sustain the phenomenological proposal of Husserl and to accept that all knowledge is inserted in a determined historical time and in a space, which are the time and space of the knowing subject. And that this in turn is in a given world, the world of life, where both the subject and the object of knowledge coexist in an inescapable interaction. In this world of life, mankind plays his role in creating cultural phenomena, among which are, of course, science and technology as social products, whose approaches and procedures change in the course of history. Thus, man as historical subject establishes horizons of interpretation and, in turn, is conditioned by the historical, social and linguistic contour to which he is ascribed. That is the life of human beings, the dimension that the word strives to relate and where the ‘understanding’ takes a new turn. With the development of phenomenology and hermeneutics in the XX century, Gadamer (1977) proposes “the idea that language is a center in which the self and the world meet, or better, in which both appear in its original unity” (p.567), and that the reality to be interpreted must be understood as a fusion of historical horizons. Hence: Hence: “The being that can to be understood is language” (p.567). With this approach, hermeneutics is conceived in a universal plane that transcends the analytical positions that were intended to make the dissection of language to identify its structural elements. To this new perspective -which fuses language, thought and being-, Gadamer attributes the configuration of basic concepts that characterize current humanism, in which the aforementioned concept of “formation” refers to the process by which the culture of the spirit culture is acquired, as opposed to the acquisition of ‘mere’ science as a specialized knowledge. In this way, in Truth and method (1977) Gadamer points out that:
which, since the days of humanism, criticism of “scholastic” science has made itself heard and how this criticism has changed with the changes of its opponent. Originally it was classical motifs that were revived in it. The enthusiasm with which the humanists proclaimed the Greek language and the path of eruditio signified more than an antiquarian passion. The revival of the classical languages brought with it a new valuation of rhetoric. It waged battle against the “school,” i.e., scholastic science, and supported an ideal of human wisdom that was not achieved in the “school”—an antithesis which in fact is found at the very beginning of philosophy [...]. Beginning with the new methodological awareness of XVII science, this old problem inevitably became more critical. In view of this new science’s claim to be exclusive, the question of whether the humanistic concept of Bildung was not a special source of truth was raised with increased urgency. In fact, we shall see that it is from the survival of the humanistic idea of Bildung that the human sciences of the XIX century draw, without admitting it, their own life.

The previous fragment proves that the idea of two spheres of investigation penetrated with certain depth in both discordant positions. However, now it is opportune to recognize that very soon it had opponents that, until now, have only been seen here in some voices that start from the philosophers, especially for the perspective of totality that accompanies their reflections. But if in the humanist sense it was necessary to clarify the separation made in the different fields of knowledge, in the scientists it is possible to trace a similar demand, which conceives science not as an isolated activity cultivated only by specialists, but as an element indispensable of humanism. This is what Erwin Schrödinger does in his book *Science and Humanism* (2009) when he answers the question “What is the value of scientific research?” (pp. 11-19).

In this important text, Schrödinger expresses a reflection on the arbitrary separation of regions and disciplines -a point made by Dilthey- and offers another vision to understand the problem and underlines the absurdity of having split the paths of knowledge. Schrödinger accepts that if one wants to make a genuine contribution to scientific progress, specialization cannot be avoided. However, the objective, scope and value of the natural sciences are the same as those of any other branch of human knowledge: none of them by itself has a significant weight. The isolated knowledge that has been obtained by a group of specialists in a limited field is not important in itself, it only obtains it from its synthesis with the rest of the knowledge, and this is achieved as long as said synthesis really contributes to answer a radical question: what are we? In Schrödinger’s opinion, although specialization cannot be completely dispensed with,
one must change the perspective regarding it and not believe that specialized science is dealing with a virtue, but rather with a necessary evil, since all specialized research possesses an authentic value only in the fabric of the totality of knowledge.

For Schrödinger (2009), the practical achievements of science tend to hide their true value, but to reverse this prejudice is not an easy task, because in his opinion scientific training has been neglected for a long time, such disinterest is a structural defect in the education inherited from generation to generation. In this discernment, the criticism that Schrödinger carries out is very relevant, especially coming from one of the most important scientists of our time; so that this division of two fields of knowledge and of two respective cultures, is but the result of a partial understanding of reality which in turn has been based on a fallacious understanding of nature and an equally fragmentary definition of being human, which is seen as an alien entity, completely disconnected from the natural order. This misunderstanding previously alluded to by Dilthey is now presented in the reflection that Schrödinger (2009) makes in that same tenor:

Most cultivated people show no interest in science and do not realize that scientific knowledge forms part of the idealistic background of human life. Many believe—in their absolute ignorance of what science really is—that its main task is to invent new machinery to improve living conditions. They are willing to leave this task in the hands of the specialists, just as they leave the repair of the plumbing in the hands of the plumber. If people with such a vision of the world are those who dispose of the lives of our children, we will inevitably arrive at the result that I have just explained (pp. 19-20).

The stage in which this differentiation of fields of knowledge is formulated refers to the context of the second half of the XIX century, when there is an unusual boom in science, and it is also the period in which industry and engineering had an influence never seen before in the material and economic aspects of life, which caused them to fade into the background, or frankly fall into oblivion, all other aspects of science, only exalting the productive nature of knowledge at the service of the company. The emergence of a trend such as utilitarian positivism, which had one of its greatest exponents in Stuart Mill, is not accidental. But it is an equally important fact that contemporary science cannot remain a field reserved only for those versed in those disciplines or specialists in particular problems of cutting-edge research with an impact on the generation of wealth. From the XX century, the general scientific development and
physics, in particular, has transformed the sense of reality in which the existence in this region of the universe passes and, consequently, the human condition has been affected by new language schemes, new patterns of behavior and their corresponding ways of life. It would be enough to think about the radical change that the concept of matter has had, to conclude that science involves all human beings and not only those who professionally cultivate some of their disciplines. The need for a multidimensional education today is a requirement rather than a good wish, life on the planet demands resignifying the concept of formation.

The relevance of research on language and ontology is that it also involves the investigation of the different ways of knowing, the different styles of living, being and, in general, the corresponding exploration of the very structure of experience. According to tone of the investigation with which the second half of the XXI century began, the distanced position that Wittgenstein defended in the Tractatus would be modified in his later work, in which he accepts that this initial figure is a logicist simplification of language functions. Language has several functions, not only is it a logical function. Under this new critical pattern, particularly in Philosophical Investigations - first published in 1953, thirty-two years after the Tractatus-Wittgenstein (1988) states that there is no ‘language’, there is a diversity of games of language. Therefore there is no single rule, there are as many rules as there are human needs; language penetrates life and the most diverse activities, in our ways of life, and words, phrases, statements, etc., are seen as pieces of a gear integrated into the totality of our behavior that consists of an infinity of codes. The language responds, in its multiple forms, to the existential needs. It is not a question of proposing a logical structure that articulates the possibilities of meaning; on the contrary, the forms of life are the ontological sustenance of language, since words have meaning only in the course of life. Each language game has its own grammar, its own rules that are determined by use. The use is not reduced to a mere isolated linguistic operation, but it serves a profound practical dimension. The task of philosophy is to understand what game is being developed in each case. Hence, the relationship between language and ontology is revealed with much greater urgency if one considers the oppressive sense of reality in which human history now passes.

For this reason, on the horizon of the XXI century, a critical theory of society warns about the fatal consequence of the crisis of the present, which translates into the experience of damaged life and the degradation of individual existence, despite so much cognitive development. A clear example of this loss is the techno-scientific praxis implied in the industri-
al program of the military administration, established to create the new genocidal weapons, concrete manifestation of the political control that has made use of the advanced technologies of destruction, the same ones that, ironically, the scientists imagined how the artifact that could end the threat of war. This unmask[s] the paradigm of a sector of scientific practice, unable to reflexively assume the conflict between its own development and the corporate or military interests that finance it, which is evident in the problems arising from climate change, exploitation of work, the destruction of the biosphere or the use of agricultural production systems under the effects of the implantation of genetically manipulated species. In a decisive text for the understanding of contemporary reality such as *Crisis of the European Sciences* (1984), Husserl gives an account of this distancing of scientific research with respect to human existence as a whole; there we see how the Kantian ideal of a knowledge detached from the sphere of economic interests and political powers is already unsustainable, knowledge has been transformed into power and hegemony, a phenomenon that highlights the structure of current technoscience put at the service of the desire for dominion over nature. Following the analysis of the survival of two exclusionary research fields, it can be seen that this polarization has given any ground; but that inside science and philosophy, itself, has increased this phenomenon of in-communication, which clearly responds to the productivist dynamic that permeates the vast majority of human activities and keeps people isolated. This fact has reached such a high degree that philosophers and scientists are busy cultivating, as experts, a specialized plot, without maintaining any relationship with other interlocutors who do not belong to their small group, nor dare to build a bridge to cancel the ostracism caused for the individualistic mercantilism to which education has succumbed.

Critical thinking has been concerned with studying the dialectical tension between culture and progress, but in doing so it uncovered the framework in which the establishment of the cultural order brings with it the negation of the person and the breakdown of the individual experience of life. There is then a drastic break with the premises of the rationalist conception of history, upon noting the moral and psychological inconsistency of the conscience, since under the conditions of conflict and frustration that characterize the life of individuals in contemporary society, what we see emerging is the ‘rational’ idea of destruction. Culture works in favor of death, therefore, by denying life, culture rushes into the deepest crisis: we need to wake up from the technological dream.
As Adorno and Horkheimer (1998) point out, after the rupture of the ideals of the Enlightenment, pessimistic positions were imposed that related the transition from progress towards regression, from the domination of nature towards the subjugation of human beings. But despite everything, scientific reason cannot be seen as an autonomous entity to which all evils can be attributed and, for its part, the humanities should not be seen as a knowledge of dilettantes that does not involve any rigor. What the society of the present requires is to promote a new critical reflection that breaks once and for all with that false idea that there are two cultures and fight at the same time the schematic and uncreative procedure with which science is taught at all educational levels. If it is necessary to criticize the automation in which human life has fallen, it is also necessary to accept that in many aspects we have to go beyond sectarian positions and recognize the presence of scientific research in different margins of social materiality, which makes this time is a crucial moment to leave the dichotomies behind and to promote, apart from the necessary specialization, binding ways of thinking, in which disciplinary differences are also recognized. It is worth pointing out that the fact of changing the physical concept of causality and arriving at indeterminacy does not mean expecting an immediate impact on the ethical level, but we could hope for an awareness more in line with the achieved cognitive development. The humanism of the XXI century has to work on a concept of non-repressive culture and make it see, both to all and sundry, that despite the complexity and abstraction of its postulates, all scientific knowledge takes root in the world of life.

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Document receipt date: December 15, 2018
Document review date: February 20, 2019
Document approval date: April 25, 2019
Document publication date: July 15, 2019
Abstract

Like cognition, the language in which the cognition finds expression has, in principle, a function of synthesis, that is, a function of connecting the cognizing subject with the object of cognition. Language enables the human subject to have epistemic access to the object; in its form and function this epistemic access constitutes the necessary referentiality of the language itself. Cognition must inevitably refer to the object of knowledge in the mode of pre-linguistic-sensory and abstract-conceptual accesses, as clearly highlighted by Kant in his basic notion of the synthetic nature and structure of conceptual knowledge. This points to an aporetic ambiguity of the epistemic referentiality of language. In the process of cognition, the subject should have an epistemic access to the particular. However, the conceptual cognition departs from the particular and is directed to a general universal idea. The ambiguity between the referential access and the referential departure in cognition necessarily requires a supplementation of the abstract-logical through the pre-linguistic-sensory or aesthetic knowledge, as emphasized by Alexander G. Baumgarten in his doctrine of sensory cognition (cognitio sensitiva) and the aesthetic-logical truth. Such a supplementation within the framework of a theory of perception seems to establish a unique form of epistemological reference, in which the subjective-epistemic access to the particular object does not terminate in the ontological finality of a concept or conceptual cognition, but transcends the cognition into the infinity of an aesthetic perception.

Keywords: Aporia of language, epistemic access, referentiality of cognition, cognoscibility and existence, linguistic individuation.

Resumen

Al igual que la cognición, el lenguaje en el que se expresa la cognición tiene en principio una función de la síntesis, es decir, una función de conectar el sujeto conocedor con el objeto de la cognición. El lenguaje permite al sujeto humano tener acceso epistémico al objeto, que en su forma y función constituye la referencialidad necesaria del lenguaje mismo. La cognición debe referirse inevitablemente al objeto de conocimiento en el modo de accesos pre-lingüístico-sensoriales y abstracto-conceptuales, como lo destaca claramente Kant en su noción básica de la naturaleza sintética y la estructura del conocimiento conceptual. Esto apunta a una ambigüedad aporética de la referencialidad epistémica del lenguaje. En el proceso de cognición, el sujeto debe tener un acceso epistémico a lo particular. Sin embargo, la cognición conceptual se aparta de lo particular y se dirige a una idea universal general. La ambigüedad entre el acceso referencial y la salida referencial en la cognición requiere una suplementación necesaria de lo abstracto-lógico a través del conocimiento pre-lingüístico-sensorial o estético, como destaca Alexander G. Baumgarten en su doctrina de la cognición sensorial (cognitio sensitiva) y de la verdad estética-lógica. Tal suplementación dentro del marco de una teoría de la percepción parece establecer una forma única de referencia epistemológica, en la que el acceso epistémico-subjetivo al objeto particular no termina en la finalidad ontológica de un concepto o cognición conceptual, sino que trasciende la cognición al infinito de una percepción estética.

Palabras clave
Aporía de la lengua, acceso epistémico, referencialidad de la cognición, cognoscibilidad y existencia, individuación lingúística.

Introduction

Language is known to be the bearer of knowledge. The human subject cognizes objects in the world through language or linguistic concepts. The linguistic concepts, in this respect, form epistemic accesses of the subject to the objects that are cognized or judged. This synthetic function of the linguistic concept, to which Kant points in the propaedeutic part of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in the Transzendentale Elementarlehre, relates to a necessary reference or referential relationship of language to the real world, which is linguistically and conceptually known. However, the subject or the term has a significantly different existential mode compared to individual objects, which, as objects of reference, must participate in the linguistic-conceptual reference in the cognitive process. In addition to this ontological problematic of language and its reference to the world of particular objects, a fundamental epistemic ambiguity of linguistic reference -to extra-linguistic objects- seems to contribute significantly to the aporetic character of language. Cognition mainly implies the epistemic access to the particular, but conceptual cognition is clearly a way of deviating from the particular and orienting towards abstract and universal ideas, which alone are legitimized as knowledge. Through senses we perceive the particular, but we cognize a general and abstract-universal
idea. This problematic ambiguity of the epistemic reference that emerges in each cognitive process ultimately points to an objective-phenomenal aporia, that is, to the ambiguous ways of knowing the object of cognition as concrete-particular and abstract-universal, a common problem in the disputes over universals in Middle Ages, which historically goes back to the philosophy of Plato. Furthermore, this epistemic-referential ambiguity indicates the very aporia of phenomenal individuation, which for a long time was debated within the framework of medieval scholastic philosophy, and which was strategically suppressed by Descartes while establishing the philosophical modernity. The Cartesian-epistemological turn in early modernism used the method of epistemological negation and the appropriation of sensory qualities and subjective attributes in the object and, subsequently, the axiomatization of basic scientific concepts within the framework of mechanical philosophy. The axioms as final justifications imparted an epistemological and ontological finality to basic scientific conceptions, which eliminated the aporetic discourses of natural philosophy (philosophia naturalis) of medieval scholasticism in favor of the apodicticity of modern axiomatic sciences.

However, the axiomatization of the otherwise aporetic knowledge inevitably led to the aforementioned problem of the epistemological reference of scientific knowledge. The aporia of objectively phenomenal individuation complicates the process of cognition from the outset, that the epistemic-referential access ends in an apparently final linguistic-conceptual knowledge. In addition, the ambiguity of epistemic access in any cognitive process points to a general aporia of linguistic-conceptual knowledge and its reference to particular objects. This epistemic ambiguity in the referentiality of conceptual knowledge requires a renewed consideration of the cognitive potential of the sensorial sphere, which is otherwise strategically subordinated in the modern epistemology to the mental sphere. In the history of modern philosophy, several attempts have been made to systematically address the problem of ambiguity in the epistemic referentiality of conceptual knowledge. Kant hierarchized the elementary faculties of the subject, sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) and understanding, in an epistemological system, by subordinating sensibility, in which alone the objects are given, to the understanding. However, the essential ambiguity of the epistemic reference, such as the sensory access to the particular and the departure of the mind from the particular and its orientation towards abstract universal ideas, does not require a hierarchical order, but rather a certain equality of the more participatory epistemological functions of sensibility and understanding in the cognitive
process. This requires a certain revival of the teachings of Alexander G. Baumgarten, that is, of ‘sensory cognition’ (cognitio sensitiva), ‘aesthetic-logical truth’, etc., which seems to have been paradigmatically suppressed by the prevailing modern epistemology, introduced by Descartes and significantly expanded by Kant.

**Aporia of the language**

Knowledge is always synthetic, that is, it connects a cognizing subject with an object of cognition. Since the mode of cognition is usually linguistic-conceptual, this connection, in which each cognition takes place, points to a nexus between a sphere of language and a purely objective sphere of reality. Knowledge is based on linguistic concepts, but this construction necessarily implies an extra-linguistic reference of the concept to an object that, as Nietzsche (1999) has radically problematized, belongs to a fundamentally different sphere. The linguistic concept originally contains a synthesis between two completely different spheres, namely the sphere of the subject and the sphere of the object, between which “there is no causality, no correctness, and no expression; there is, at most, an aesthetic relation”.¹ On the part of the language and the maker of a language, the subject, the aporia of language, insinuated in this observation of Nietzsche can in principle be considered as an aporia of linguistic-conceptual cognition, which is revealed with each one of the necessarily intuitive references of the concept to the cognized object. Intuition, as a means to this necessary connection of cognition with the object, was already established propaedeutically by Kant (1998) at the beginning of his opus magnum, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, with the doctrine *Transzendentale Elementarlehre*:

> Auf welche Art und durch welche Mittel sich auch immer eine Erkenntnis auf Gegenstände beziehen mag, so ist doch diejenige, wodurch sie sich auf dieselbe unmittelbar bezieht, und worauf alles Denken als Mittel abzweckt, die Anschauung. (Kant, 1998, p. 93)

The reference of the cognitive subject to the object is a relation whose basic trait is obviously an epistemic access. Through the intuition that arises from sensibility, the subject seeks an epistemic access to the object that, in turn, is ontologically separate from it and exists as such. This epistemological access can be called a form of reference because the reference points to the reference of a subjective knowledge of an object or of an objective existence. Thus, epistemic-referential access implies that
the subject refers to an external object in cognition. While the subjective mode of cognition is a linguistic concept, the sensory intuition, as Kant points out, forms the mode of reference. In the cognitive process, the referential process develops from the subject referring to an objective referent, towards which the subjective-epistemic access is oriented.

Although the subject as the referring agent and the object as an object of reference turn out to be ontologically different, but absolutely stable entities, the conceptual reference as the necessary epistemic access is still a problem, in reality it is an aporia. These two ontologically different spheres, namely, the linguistic concept and sensory intuition, are synthesized here, which for Nietzsche is an impossibility. Furthermore, this inability to properly synthesize is based on the ontological difference mentioned above between the subject who cognizes and the object to be cognized. However, the knowing subject is manifested in linguistic-conceptual knowledge. Therefore, one can correctly accept the linguistic term as the one that is referred here. In cognition a concept is associated with an objective referent through intuitive reference, in which each epistemic access ends.

Sensory intuitions as the necessary epistemic access to objects of cognition can be easily understood, because only in them can objects be given, as Kant emphasizes, and they are experienced in everyday life. However, the aporias of this reference come to light when through this reference the referential term is linked to the objective referent, as the linguistic concept ontologically demonstrates a completely different entity in relation to the objective referent. In addition, each concept points to a general and universal idea, while sensory intuition -as an epistemic-referential access- is inevitably directed to individual objects. With naked eyes one can see only a particular object, but one recognizes a general conceptual idea. This ambiguity of the epistemic reference - in the mere intuition and in the synthetic cognition - is ultimately the aporia of the language itself, since only in the framework of it can objects be cognized.

If the concept is like the subject it refers to, it is tacitly attributed with an ontological autonomy. In other words: as a referent, the term has a special ontological status. Consequently, the following questions can be asked: What are terms? or, how do concepts exist? -in the same way that we ask these questions about objective existence. The existence of the concept implies an ontological aporia as against the material objects, as well as mathematical objects, to which Plato seemed to attribute an intermediate ontological status -that is, an ontological status between the objects of senses and the eternal ideas. This seems to have resulted from the
ambiguity of an epistemic reference. How can a general term epistemologically represent an individual object? Obviously, a particular object, in addition to the term, is predicated and specified by additional spatial and temporal factors: as “the mango tree in the middle of our garden, in which we played during our childhood”. The ambiguity of the reference remains, through which this generic term can access a single object existing in the past. From the generic concept to the concept of species and finally to the individual concept, this epistemic ambiguity becomes increasingly smaller, but it remains an inevitable residue, even if a single concept, like a proper noun, can represent a single object. The Kantian differentiation between analytic and synthetic judgments also ultimately refers to the object-reference or to the nature of the epistemic reference to a predicated object. This differentiation does not appeal much to the self-referentiality of the concept (although the so-called analytical judgments give the impression of the self-referentiality of the concept, as a subject). An example given by Kant (1998) in the introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) for a priori analytic judgments, namely that all bodies are extended, barely points to an epistemic reference that is strictly included in the concept of a body. Because extension as primary spatial quality necessarily requires a clear reference that goes beyond the scope of a self-referentiality. Therefore, in the framework of the Kantian transcendental philosophy the concept itself, as well as the ‘thing in itself’ (*Ding an sich*), seem to form an aporia to which sufficient epistemic access cannot be found. According to Kant, the concepts without intuition are empty. The indispensable element of intuition, therefore, must essentially determine and guarantee the ontic status of the concept. However, intuition, as an indispensable remnant is always binding in the concept; and, in doing so, it breaks with the self-referentiality of the concept (which is the basis of the autonomy of the concept itself) and necessarily reaches a referent in an extra-verbal object.

Existence and cognoscibility

The problem of the existence of concepts was expressed most clearly in the well-known disputes of universals, which prevailed in medieval scholastic philosophy. The universals are actually abstract-linguistic concepts that represent particular objects. The same term - tree, table, plant or human - means a particular object in concretion and a general idea in abstraction. A particular object is recognized through a universal concept.
According to Plato, in cognition a particular object participates in an eternal, perfect and universal idea that the term embodies. The particular comes from this process of partaking. Both in Platonic philosophy and in the disputes over universals in the Middle Ages, the issue of existence predominates. Platonic ideas are not mere constructions of thought, but exist as eternal ideas, whose imperfect images constitute the totality of the perceptible singular objects. The participation of individual objects in general and universal ideas certainly take place within the framework of an epistemological process, but cognition here is based on the existence or ontological predetermination of ideas and objects of the senses. A similar case would be the primacy of existence over cognoscibility, hence the primacy of ontology over epistemology, as is generally assumed in medieval scholastic philosophy. Kenneth Barber (1994) sees the predominance of ontology -or at least the parallelism between ontology and epistemology- in the Middle Ages as a natural consequence of the predominant discourse on individuation in scholastic philosophy.

These two concerns, ontological and epistemological, are uneasily linked in the history of philosophy. In an ideal world, philosopher’s heaven as it were, the marriage of ontology and epistemology would be completely harmonious in that all the entities catalogued and classified by the ontologist would meet with approval by the epistemologist and in turn all items on the epistemologist’s short list of knowable entities would be sufficient for the ontologist’s account of the world. In a less than ideal world, however, the two concerns are often at odds; the epistemologist complains about the cavalier attitude of his ontologically inclined brethren who generate entities and distinctions in an unconscionable manner, while ontologist in turn dismisses the epistemologist as one blinded to the richness of the universe through a neurotic fixation on a few favorite sense organs. (...) Less dramatically, but more sharply focused, epistemology and ontology can be related in two ways. On what I call the Strong Model of their relation, epistemological considerations serve as criteria for the adequacy of an ontological system: putative candidates for inclusion in the catalogue of existents must first pass a test for knowability and, once included, their classification in terms of categorical features must again meet the same rigorous standard. Failure to pass these tests is, or ought to be, sufficient reason for discarding all or parts of the ontology in question, no matter how firmly entrenched the latter may have been in a philosophical tradition. On what I term the “weak model”, epistemology and ontology are understood to be parallel methods of investigation having in common only the fact that their respective inquiries are directed toward the same classes of objects. While the ontologist asks what it is in objects that individuates those objects,
Individuation - from material objects to metaphysical ideas - is, in principle, an ontological problem. Existence (including the existence of God) must be cognized, but this presupposition cannot invalidate the existence, as it must guarantee the individuation. This dogmatic predetermination was rejected by the early Cartesian modernism, in which the long-standing discourse on individuation ceased more or less abruptly, and consequently the primacy of existence over cognoscibility was reversed. In Cartesian philosophy, epistemology had a clear primacy over ontology. Consequently, every form of existence - from the individual objects to God – can be accepted only when it is sufficiently cognized. Instead of the parallelism between ontology and epistemology, as prevailed in the Middle Ages, the Cartesian-epistemological turn of the early modern age led to a hierarchical primacy of epistemology over ontology.

Broadly speaking, the weak model is dominant in medieval philosophy. Epistemological concerns are subordinate or at best parallel to ontological concerns. The existents, beginning with God, are given as are the categories available for their analysis. The task of the epistemologist is to support not to challenge the schema, and any attempt to reverse the subordinate role assigned to epistemology (or to advocate the Strong Model) would have been regarded not as indication of philosophical acumen but rather as a potential source of heresy.

By 1641, however, the strong model has replaced its weaker medieval counterpart. In the opening paragraphs of the Meditations Descartes announces that he will suspend belief in the existence of anything not known with certainty. Ontological claims concerning the existence of material objects, of God, and even the self, must be subjected to a most rigorous epistemological scrutiny before one (or at least Descartes) is entitled to accept those claims. (Barber, 1994, p. 5)

However, the cognoscibility of a phenomenon depends on its mode of existence. Through the epistemological method of negation, Descartes (2009) reduces the experiential reality to two final modes of existence, namely, the thinking substance (res cogitans) and the extended substance (res extensa). This reduction is followed by the famous Cartesian dictum: ego cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore, I am). It refers to the perfect ontological difference between the existence of the soul and the existence of the body. According to Descartes (2009), the soul and the body, to which the human body belongs, point to completely different modes of existence.
being, because they are known in different ways. Here the difference in cognoscibility presupposes the difference in the form of existence. However, the paradigmatic pre-eminence of Descartes’s precedence, that is, the primacy of cognoscibility over existence -accordingly, the primacy of epistemology over ontology- can easily be reversed. Compared to the materially extended body, the thinking soul, as res cogitans, is known in a completely different way (as shown by Descartes in his method of epistemological doubt, in which all the subjective-sensory qualities and mental attributes of the body are denied and epistemically isolated from the body), because the soul can exist without corporeal matter. That is to say, the cognition of the soul - as res cogitans - and its absolute differentiation from the cognoscibility of the materially extended body are presupposed by the existence of the soul, which is completely independent of the existence of the body (as Descartes thinks), and not the other way around. The existence of a phenomenon here, in turn, has a clear primacy over its cognoscibility, something that even Descartes seemed unable to overcome through his strategic preference for epistemology.

The ontological basis of epistemology

The primacy of epistemology over ontology - as a doctrine of existence - was for Descartes a clear strategy in early modernism to overcome once and for all the predominance of ontology passed down from the medieval scholastic philosophy that had dominated for several centuries in aporetic discourses - within the framework of natural philosophy and metaphysics. The predominance of ontology in the medieval scholastic philosophy was tacitly supported and guaranteed through the theological assumptions or dogmas propagated by the church, that is, the necessary existence of God, the eternity of the soul, etc., as Barber (1994) suggests in the aforementioned observation. The philosophical basis of these and such infallible assumptions was established in a dominant discourse throughout the history of medieval scholasticism, namely, in the discourse on the phenomenon of individuation. Scholasticism has for a long time and incessantly pondered on the problem of individuation, in particular, on the principle of individuation (principium individuationis) (Gracia, 1984, pp. 36-39). The basic questions that were asked in this discourse were: How are the phenomena individualized? What is the basic principle of individuation?

The individuation of physical, mental and metaphysical phenomena is obviously an ontological problem. The basic questions mentioned above
from the discourse on individuation indicate it clearly. However, in the me-
dieval scholastic discourse on individuation, the problem of individuation
was never solved completely, but was repeatedly discovered as an indissol-
uble aporia. The discourses on individuation thus obtained the basic char-
acteristic of aporetics, which never ceases or ends in a final justification.

Cartesian modernism wanted to replace precisely this incessant
discourse from the medieval scholasticism in favor of the emerging pri-
macy of epistemology over ontology. Barber (1994) describes how the
scholastic discourse on individuation, which prevailed throughout the
Middle Ages, ended abruptly in the sixteenth century:

Some philosophical problems, by virtue of their importance relative to a
philosophical system, are widely discussed by those safely within the pa-
rameters of a system —solutions are contested, distinctions are gener-
ated, and the promise of eventual resolution is entertained by all. Once
the system comes under attack, however, leading either to its piecemeal
or even wholesale rejection, those problems formerly of consummate
importance may reduce to minor irritants mainly of antiquarian inter-
est. […] One issue constituting the theme of this volume apparently
shares the same fate, namely, the problem of individuation (or, more ac-
curately, the cluster of related problems discussed under that heading)
whose contending solutions were debated with much vigor during the
medieval era, but to which only passing reference is made by philoso-
phers in the early modern period. Thus, while Francisco Suárez in 1597
devotes 150 pages to the problem of individuation in his Disputationes
metaphysicae, the seminal work in early modern philosophy appearing
a mere forty-four years later, Descartes’s Meditations, not only fails to
advance Suárez’s discussion but refuses to acknowledge the existence
of the problem. Although this neglect is rectified to an extent elsewhere
in Descartes and in the later Cartesians, the problem of individuation is
never restored by the Cartesians to the place of prominence it formerly
held in medieval philosophy. (Barber, 1994, p. 1)

The disappearance of the discourse on individuation was a natural
consequence of the Cartesian epistemological turn, in which the prece-
dence of cognizing the existence was almost paradigmatically established.
In the Cartesian philosophical system, introduced in his main works Discours
de la Méthode, Les Méditations métaphysiques and Les Principes de la
Philosophie, the physical, mental and also metaphysical ‘existences’ were
secured and accepted as such due to their apodictic cogniscibility. The
unquestionable acceptance of existence -from material objects to God-,
particularly represented in the accentuation of individuation without its
sufficient cognition, has been banished in philosophy and, subsequently, in all the emerging sciences.

The primacy of cognoscibility over existence was achieved in Cartesian philosophy by the method of doubt, which was fundamentally the questioning of objective existences, and the subsequent denial and separation of all subjective *qualia* and attributes from the object. Here one can clearly see how the Cartesian-epistemological method of negation and separation opposed the principle of individuation, which had prevailed during the Middle Ages. Individuation implies the accommodation of all the qualities of the object, which are perceived by the subject, in the object itself. After the complete separation of all the *qualia* and other properties that Descartes only attributes to the subject, nothing remains in the object except a mere extension: the *res extensa*. Descartes (2009), in the famous parable of wax in *Meditations*, shows how the original qualities of raw wax in nature, namely, color, taste, smell and sound are lost when heated, leaving a mere material extension. The original qualitative individuation is here epistemologically negated, since the subject separates and appropriates all the subjective *qualia* of the object. Subsequently, there remains only a mere extension, a *res extensa*, which Descartes attributes to the extra-subjective object as its only certain characteristic. The Cartesian method of negation and epistemological segregation could thus almost completely eradicate the ontological principle of individuation and, consequently, invalidate it in favor of a strict and prevailing epistemology.

What Descartes denies in his strictly epistemological method of doubting and separates from the object and finally attributes to the subject alone, are the essential features of objective individuation themselves. The epistemological negation and the separation of objective qualities are processes that, in principle, complement the necessary epistemological access of the subject to the object. However, these epistemological processes seem to contradict each other. That is to say, the Cartesian-epistemological method of negation and separation, by means of which Descartes seeks to establish the primacy or even the hegemony of epistemology over ontology, inevitably poses an epistemological problem of sufficient epistemological access of the subject to the object. The epistemic-referential access ends in aporetic modes of existence, which in turn do not guarantee any finality or final justification of scientific knowledge.

However, the Cartesian method of epistemological doubt and the consequent negation and separation of all subjective qualities and attributes from the object are tacitly based on the above-discussed original correlation between epistemology and ontology, in which epistemology
is based on ontology. The Cartesian mode of epistemic access is, without doubt, the systematic negation of all the subjective qualities of the object and its subjective appropriation, so that a final ontic entity, the res extensa, objectively remains. This means that the epistemic-referential access ends in a secure and final mode of existence of the object, so that knowledge is ultimately justified by an epistemic finality and its apodicticity. In summary, modern epistemology requires the finality or the ending of epistemic-referential access, which also presupposes the ontological finality of the object of knowledge. That is, the finality of the mode of existence of the object determines the epistemic finality in each ultimate justification, which is the end -the terminus- of the epistemic referential access itself.

The ultimate justification, in which the epistemic-referential access ends, is an irreducible reality that, as such, cannot be traced back to another, deeper cause. Here the reality of the phenomenon forms its ultimate causal basis. Reality without causality, or an ontological state in which reality and causality are unified, constitutes a phenomenal aporia. Such phenomenal aporias were numerous in the aporetic discourses of medieval scholasticism in the field of philosophia naturalis, such as space, time, movement, impetus, infinitesimal, place, gravity, etc.; as Pierre Duhem in his seminal work Le système du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic discussed in detail. The aporicity of these phenomenal and mechanical individuations was the reason why the discourses on the modes of existence and the causes of these aporias continued incessantly throughout the Middle Ages. In aporia, the epistemic-referential access cannot end or achieve any finality. The causal finality of the phenomena, which determines its ultimate epistemological justification, is in fact the ontological finality of its individuation, and of its existence. The epistemological finality that gives rise to ultimate axiomatic knowledge presupposes in this way the ontological finality of the cognized phenomenon.

Cartesian modernism wanted to axiomatically end the incessant continuity of the aporetic discourses mentioned above in order to establish stable foundations for philosophy and science. For sciences cannot be based on aporias or aporetic propositions of basic phenomena; they presuppose the ontological finality of the individuation or mode of existence of the phenomenon, in which the epistemic-referential access ends. The method for solving the prevailing aporias of philosophia naturalis of scholasticism was the axiomatization of the basic mechanical phenomena. Axioms as causal final justifications of mechanical phenomena could give the sciences
such a basis, and indeed a basis of ontological finality. Since axiomatization is a final causal justification, axioms are mere statements about the reality of phenomena without any reference to a deeper causality.

Descartes, Newton and other founders of early modern mechanical philosophy reduced the aforementioned aporetic discourses of the natural philosophy of medieval scholasticism to axioms, upon which the early modern mechanical philosophy was built. Newton axiomatized space, time and movement in his classical mechanics as absolute space, absolute time and absolute movement. Similarly, the enigmatic notions of particular gravities of celestial bodies (proposed by Kepler, Hooke, Roberval, and others) were rejected by Newton; he postulated in their place the boundless universal gravity that he could axiomatize mathematically. However, the principle of inertia was the most appropriate example of the final axiomatic explanation of a fundamentally aporetic phenomenon:

That each thing remains in the state in which it is so long as nothing changes it. […]

That every body which moves tends to continue its motion in a straight line. (Descartes, 1955, pp. 84-85)

Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it. (Newton, 1974, p. 13)

The Cartesian or Newtonian principle of inertia is, in the final analysis, a mere statement without a reference to causality. Such an axiomatic statement conceals in principle the aporia of impetus long debated as a causal principle underlying any free movement. As is known, Newton sought to discover the true cause of magnetic and gravitational attraction, that is, the magnetic or gravitational action at a distance. Finally, he had to abandon his research and be content with the reality of these mechanical phenomena, in particular, with ‘the reality’ of gravity. This was the basis for Newton’s famous saying: ‘Et satis est quod gravitas revera existat’. This conviction of Newton was obviously based on his problematic axiomatization of gravity as universal gravity at the level of reality alone that he could easily mathematize.

Mathematical sciences such as mechanics and optics were developed in the early phase of modern mechanical philosophy. The basic phenomena in these sciences, such as forces, movement, inertia, gravity, the phenomenon of light and dioptric phenomena such as reflection
and refraction, etc., can be easily represented in geometric forms and structures. The mathematical formalism imparts these mechanical and optical phenomena an ontological finality. For mathematics (geometry, arithmetic, algebra, etc.) have final forms and structures at its disposal, which are causally irreducible. Mathematical formalism, which had a substantial influence on the thinking of mechanical philosophers such as Descartes, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Huygens and others, and which, therefore, became a decisive foundation of the epistemology of mathematical sciences, actually masked the aporias of the mechanical phenomena that prevailed in the medieval scholastic natural philosophy. The ontological finality and irreducibility of geometrical-mathematical forms and structures enabled the natural philosophers to axiomatize these and other essentially aporetic natural phenomena and their laws. Axioms, as fundamental principles, also show the epistemological finality as the termination of epistemic-referential access, and the ontological finality and irreducibility of the object of knowledge. Axioms disguise in this way the phenomenal aporia. In other words: Many axioms are graves of scientific aporias! The axiomatization was a measure and a necessary strategy in modern age, as the modern sciences could not be based on the aporetic discourses passed down from the philosophia naturalis of medieval scholasticism. The aporetic discourses of medieval-scholastic natural philosophy should cease, so that the modern axiomatic sciences could emerge.

Linguistic individuation

As mentioned earlier, scientific axioms are final statements without an additional causal explanation, a matter that Bertrand Russel found problematic. That is to say, axioms are the scientific knowledge finally justified, in which the epistemic-referential access ends. The basis of the final epistemological justification is the ontological finality of the axiomatized object of cognition. The ontological finality of the objects of science refers to the finality of phenomenal individuation. In contrast, the correlative epistemological finality -that is, the termination of the epistemological access- seems to be accomplished by the finality of certain concepts, for example, the principle of inertia postulated by Newton and Descartes, as cited above. These axiomatic principles describe the phenomenon of inertia in the static and dynamic states of a body.

The linear and uniform inertial movement of a body (on which no external force acts) is not causally explained in this principle. That is,
the principle of inertia does not explain why a moving body continues its movement infinitely, linearly and uniformly, as long as no external force (such as air resistance or gravity) acts on it. Faced with such a question about a causal explanation, the ghost of the impetus from the scholastic philosophy of nature reappears as the mysterious cause of the free movement of the body. The impetus as an aporetic causal principle was strategically suppressed in the Cartesian-Newtonian law of inertia, or even buried under a perfect geometric-mechanical form of inertial movement. The axiomatically described inertial movement must, therefore, represent an ontologically final individuation of a mechanical phenomenon.

However, the axiomatization of inertial motion in early modernism could hardly exclude the aporia of this mechanical-phenomenal individuation. In the linear and uniform inertial movement of a body, the problem of the unity of opposites reappears: a *coincidentia oppositorum*, that is, the aporetic unity of static and dynamic states. In the case of inertial movement, the body rests on itself or remains static; it also moves in relation to an external frame of reference. Furthermore, the infinitely linear-uniform movement of the body in its dynamic state of inertia cannot be causally explained. Therefore, the axiomatic principle of inertia is scarcely free from the aporia of impetus as identified by the scholastic philosophers of nature in the free movement of a body.

However, the Newtonian principle of inertia implies a causal principle of the state of static and dynamic inertia in the form of an ontological principle, meaning, the inertia of the material body itself. Therefore, inertia, as an intrinsic quality of the body, can be an ontologically final or limiting phenomenon that cannot be traced back to any other cause, but at the same time does not refer to a sufficient causal principle. For the mechanical individuation of inertia is incomprehensible in comparison with the individuation of mechanical inertial motion. Here, a certain linguistic individuation, that is, inertia as the causal basis of the static and dynamic inertial states, seems to contribute significantly to the axiomaticity of the mechanical individuation of inertial states.

In comparison with the concretion of the inertia of the static state and the inertia of the state of motion, the physical quality of the inertia seems to exhibit a certain linguistic individuation. In the same way, Newton’s law of gravitation tacitly presents the cause of gravitational attraction as a fundamental mechanical phenomenon of gravitation itself. The idea of the absolute functions in a similar way in the axiomatic conceptions of absolute space, absolute time and absolute motion, and the idea of infinitesimal in potential and actual infinity in the conception of infinitesimals.
itesimals - within the framework of the differential and integral calculus of Newton and Leibniz. The linguistic possibility of a greater conceptual abstraction - as represented in terms such as inertia (of the static and dynamic states of the bodies) or the infinite (to which the infinite movement of the diminution or enlargement of magnitudes tends) - seems to complement the epistemological finality of axiomatic ideas, including protecting them and preserving them from axiomatically masked mechanical phenomena."

However, concepts such as linguistic individuations with epistemological finality seem to be the basic principle of the origin of a language itself. The Latin word for ‘word’ or ‘term’ is *terminus* - in German *der Terminus* - which, unchanged or with some modifications (like *term* in English), exists in many modern European languages. *Terminus* means at the same time concept and final (like ‘terminal stop’ or ‘final station’), something that apparently has the end of an original epistemic access, that is, the finality of an epistemological process. Similarly, the axiomatic definition, which is finally justified and cannot be traced back to any other cause, indicates the *finis* - a Latin term for ‘final’ or ‘limit’ - of a cognitive process. In an analogous manner, the German ‘*Begriff*’ (concept), which the cognitive subject has under control (*den das Subjekt im Griff hat*), points to the end or finality of an epistemological apprehension. Previously, it has been analyzed how the epistemological finality of knowledge presupposes the ontological finality of the object of knowledge as a reference. By analogy, the epistemological finality of the concept, as subject or referent, determines its ontological finality that is necessarily based on the existential autonomy of the concept as linguistic individuation.

Concepts as existential and autonomous linguistic individuations form an ontological framework in which they seem to overcome their usual epistemic-referential directionality and limits. For, as autonomous-existential individuations, the concepts -as referents- acquire a significantly different referentiality or reference to abstract ideas; they make little reference to the individual things that, as referents, are cognized in concepts. The higher the conceptual abstraction and, therefore, the autonomy of linguistic individuations, the more distanced is their reference to concrete individual objects, which become accessible only to immediate sensory perceptions. Therefore the knowledge of an object presupposes an epistemological ambiguity or an ambiguity of the epistemic-referential access, namely that an object is directly and specifically perceived in the particular, but at the same time it is conceptually known only in an indirect and abstract way as general idea.
The ambiguity of the epistemic reference as a problem in epistemology, however, goes beyond the scope of language. It extends to the sphere of pre-logical and pre-linguistic sensibility. This ambiguity is determined by the difference in the directions of the subject’s epistemic-referential access. In the initial and pre-linguistic sensibility, the subject that perceives focuses on the individual object. This constitutes the necessary preliminary phase of knowledge. In understanding, however, the subjective-linguistic concept focuses on a general idea. While the subject orients epistemically and referentially through the senses towards the individual object, it moves away conceptually, that is, in the case of conceptual cognition, from the individual object, as presupposed in abstract cognition. In *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Kant (1998) presents a compositional structure of knowledge, in which the concept and intuition are synthesized:

Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind. Daher ist es eben so notwendig, seine Begriffe sinnlich zu machen (d. i. ihnen den Gegenstand in der Anschauung beizufügen), als seine Anschauungen sich verständlich zu machen (d. i. sie unter Begriffe zu bringen). (Kant, 1998, p. 130).

However, the aforementioned ambiguity of the epistemic reference in cognition seems barely resolved by such synthesis of concept and intuition, as they have ontologically different forms of existence. Kant manages to introduce synthesis by integrating sensibility and understanding in a hierarchical order. The sensibility is reduced to a mere means, whose function is to supply the raw material to the intellect, which only conceptually cognizes. This hierarchization of Kant corresponds to the process of cognition, which appears more or less uniformly from sensibility, in which alone objects are given, to understanding which conceptually cognizes the objects given in sensibility. Beyond this limited function of a medium between mind and object, Kant does not attribute an epistemic potential to sensibility. According to Kant, the senses accomplish only intuition and not cognition, which only the intellect performs on the basis of language. Through this strategic hierarchization of intellect and sensibility within the framework of his epistemology, in which the epistemic intellect clearly prevails over sensibility, Kant, as is known, tried to overcome a notion of the cognitive potential of senses which had certain recognition in his time. Alexander G. Baumgarten, Kant’s famous predecessor in the field of aesthetics, developed his theory of sensory cognition, *cognitio sensitiva*, originally from an idea in the Leibniz-Wolffian system, that is, senses as a lower imperfect faculty of cognition. Baumgar-
ten (1750/58) tries to epistemologically equate sensory cognition with *cognitio abstractiva*, the abstract intellectual cognition.

According to Baumgarten (1750/58), the senses have an epistemic access to objects, which is quite similar to the abstract-conceptual knowledge of the intellect. The senses, like the intellect, are capable of knowing without presupposing a logical-conceptual form. Through the legitimation of sensibility as an autonomous cognitive faculty, which is inferior but comparable with the intellect, Baumgarten tries to develop a science of sensory cognition, which forms an analogy with the traditional science of logic. For the legitimation of a science of aesthetics - as a doctrine of sensibility and sensory cognition - Baumgarten seeks to go back to the ancient-Greek and medieval-scholastic differentiation between *aistheta* and *noeta*.

Die Theorie der Sinnlichkeit, die der Einundzwanzigjährige am Ende seiner 1735 veröffentlichten Meditationes de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus zur besseren Begründung der Poetik fordert, erscheint ihm zunächst als Aufgabe der Logik im allgemeinen Sinne. Aber gleich anschließend fragt er sich, ob es nicht „eine Wissenschaft geben könne, die die Aufgabe hat, das untere Erkenntnisvermögen zu leiten, oder eine Wissenschaft vom sinnlichen Erkennen (scientia sensitive quid cognoscendi). Entsprechend wird im nachfolgenden Paragraphen die Ästhetik der Logik an die Seite gestellt: Schon die griechischen Philosophen und die Kirchenväter haben immer genau zwischen *aistheta* und *noeta* unterschieden...Es sind also die *noeta* als das, was mit Hilfe des oberen Erkenntnisvermögens erkannt wird, Gegenstand der Logik; die *aistheta* gehören der ästhetischen Wissenschaft, oder der Ästhetik an. (Schweizer, 1983, p. VIII)
Sensory cognition has access to aesthetic truth, which underlies the aesthetic experience of poetry and arts. “Die ästhetische Wahrheit ist die Wahrheit, soweit sie sinnlich erkennbar ist” (Baumgarten 1750/58, trans. Schweizer, 1983, p. 53). From Descartes to Leibniz and Wolff, the participation of the senses in the cognitive process was subordinated to understanding, since only the intellect can process sensory perceptions that are unclear, confused and epistemically neutral into clear and conceptual knowledge. The Cartesian criteria for knowledge were, therefore, clear and distinct (clara et distincta), which were denied to sensory perceptions. Baumgarten (1750/58) describes the necessary clarity and distinction as claritas intensiva, which only the abstract and conceptual knowledge can claim. In contrast, sensory knowledge has an extensive clarity (claritas extensiva).

Baumgarten suggests that the extensive clarity (claritas extensiva) of sensible representations be taken as the standard for the perfection of sensible cognition in the Reflections on Poetry, as well as the Metaphysica. According to Baumgarten, extensive clarity is a kind of clarity which gathers together as many confused representations as can be combined in a particular sensible representation. Extensive clarity is made the standard of perfection for sensible cognition because it is clear, while remaining indistinct. It is clear because “more is represented in a sensate way” in extensively clear representations than it is in representations which are extensively unclear. Yet extensively clear representations fall short of distinctness, because they are not “complete, adequate, profound through every degree”. (McQuillan, 2011, p. 6).

While the intensive clarity of abstract-conceptual cognition is inevitably at the expense of sensory impressions (which abstraction requires), the extensive clarity of sensory cognition is based on a large number of sensory impressions that seem confused and unstructured due to their abundance, but allows the subject the true aesthetic experience and, therefore, the epistemic access to the aesthetic truth.

The clarity and distinction of a logical-conceptual cognition point to a certain ending, or rather to a finality of cognition; Clarity implies the emergence of an adequate final state of a process of cognition, which arises here through the epistemic finitude of the concepts. In contrast, the extensive clarity (claritas extensiva) of sensory cognition, which gives abundance to rich but vague and confused sensory impressions, seems to indicate an aesthetic-epistemic infinity or an infinite epistemic-referential access.

However, the linguistic concepts harbor the general, universal and platonic ideas, which do not imply the finitude and termination of cogni-
tion, but point to an epistemic infinity. That is to say, the apparent epistemic finality of concepts and conceptual predicates mark the infinity of ideas, as represented in their existence and cognoscibility. From this it can be concluded that the concepts also hide a vagueness and indetermination analogous to sensory impressions. Thus, the abundance of vague and confused sensory impressions is explicit in the pre-conceptual and pre-logical sphere of senses, while in concepts the infinity of ideas is hidden and, as such, implicit.

In addition to the epistemological autonomy of sensibility within the framework of his doctrine of *cognitio sensitiva*, Baumgarten attempts to integrate sensory and abstract-conceptual cognition, *cognitio sensitiva* and *cognitio abstractiva*, into a unified epistemological system. Consequently, Baumgarten develops the notion of an aesthetic-logical truth represented in an aesthetic-logical cognition. Such systematization of epistemology, in which the epistemological equality between logic and aesthetics is preserved, clearly constitutes an important alternative to conventional epistemologies with a hierarchical order of logic and aesthetics, intellect and senses. However, the epistemological equality of aesthetics and logic seems to complicate their epistemological nexus from the outset, as the senses and intellect have different potentials of cognition. The difference between *cognitio sensitiva* and *cognitio abstractiva* appears in the binary concepts discussed above, which are based on this differentiation, such as *claritas extensiva* and *claritas intensiva*, or aesthetic and logical truth. Another pair of terms that Baumgarten uses in relation to the difference between logical-abstract cognition and pre-logical and purely aesthetic cognition is attention (*attentio*) and abstraction (*abstractio*). The aesthetic process of cognition is determined, therefore, as an interplay of *attentio* and *abstractio*:


The factum of *attentio* is indeed a well-founded assumption in the context of sensory cognition, but if the *cognitio sensitiva* is synthe-
sized with *cognitio abstractiva* in the framework of an aesthetic cognition and truth, the interplay of *attentio* and *abstractio* inevitably points to an epistemic-referential ambiguity in the cognitive process. How can the opposite epistemic processes, *attentio* and *abstractio*, be integrated into a unified epistemic-referential access, which presupposes synthetic aesthetic-logical knowledge and truth? Can the subject look at an object in perception and at the same time abstain from it in an abstract and conceptual cognition?

The ambiguity of the epistemic reference depends here on the directional nature of cognition, and on the other hand it arises from the inconsistency in the implementation of the epistemic-referential access, that is, the contradictory composition between an aesthetic access to the fullness, confused state and infinity of sensory impressions and a logical-abstract access to the clarity, distinction and above all finality of conceptual knowledge. Could these apparently contradictory epistemic-referential accesses be integrated into a unified system of epistemology? According to Baumgarten (1750/58), such an epistemology should produce aesthetic knowledge and truth. That is to say, the *cognitio sensitiva* must effectively complement the *cognitio abstractiva*. Consequently, the aesthetic truth must enrich the conceptual-abstract truth. The emphasis and priority of sensory cognition and aesthetic truth make Baumgarten reverse the hierarchical order of epistemology that has prevailed since Plato. In Baumgarten, the individual terms that refer to individual objects are aesthetically truer than the generic terms:

Die ästhetikologische Wahrheit des Gattungsbegriffs bedeutet die Vorstellung einer großen metaphysischen Wahrheit, die ästhetikologische Wahrheit des Artbegriffs die Vorstellung einer größeren, die ästhetikologische Wahrheit des Individuellen oder des Einzelnen die Vorstellung der höchsten denkbaren metaphysischen Wahrheit. Die erste ist wahr, die zweite wahrer, die dritte am wahrsten. (Baumgarten 1750/58, trans. Schweizer, 1983, p. 71)

However, the veracity of individual concepts should not supplant the truth of the general and universal ideas, but should complement and enrich them in an aesthetic framework. What resists such a combination of aesthetics and logic in the context of a unified epistemology is the ambiguity of the epistemic-referential access described above, as represented in Baumgarten’s system as *attentio* and *abstractio*. How can in a unified process of cognition an epistemic intuition that is directed to a particular object in sensibility be integrated with the abstraction, i.e. turning
away from the object in conceptual cognition? Here the ambiguity of the epistemic-referential directions is the basis of this epistemological aporia. The two completely different epistemic-referential accesses seem to bring the cognizing subject into a certain aporetic despair.

The same idea of epistemic-referential access seems to offer an adequate solution to this aporia of cognition. Like the impressions of the senses, the general idea inherent in abstract-conceptual knowledge does not indicate an end or finality of the epistemic-referential access, but its infinity, as discussed above. That is to say, the domains of sensibility and that of ideas inherent in concepts have in common the infinite epistemic-referential access. However, linguistic concepts give the impression that the epistemic-referential access ends in them and, as such, attains a finality. Within the framework of the aesthetic cognition and truth, this finality of abstract-conceptual knowledge is dismantled and revealed in the infinity of hidden ideas. The cognitio sensitiva complements the cognitio abstractiva - by analogy, the aesthetic truth enriches or potentiates the logical truth - in which the division or polarization of the epistemic-referential access - in the context of the sensory and abstract-conceptual cognition - is lifted into the unity of an epistemic infinity. Such a suspension gives the cognitio sensitiva and, consequently, the aesthetic truth a new dimension and potentiality. Instead of becoming obscure and confusing, the cognitio sensitiva complements the cognitio abstractiva - therefore, the aesthetic truth complements the logical truth - in which the epistemic-referential infinity of the aesthetic perception deconstructs the finality of the logical-abstract concepts. One experiences here the epistemic-referential infinity of aesthetic perceptions directed towards ideas. Only the senses open the windows of concepts, which remained closed for a long time, and enable us the infinite epistemic access to ideas.

The aforementioned aporia of cognition - or the aporia of the epistemic-referential access within the framework of aesthetic-logical cognition - must therefore be detached from its traditional meaning and re-imagined entirely. This aporia does not imply a stagnation of cognition coupled with an epistemic-referential despair, but the continuity and intensification of the epistemic infinity itself. It does not limit the epistemic access or take the cognitive process to any conceptual limit, but it leads us to infinite epistemic access and its infinite experience. Therefore, this aporia does not mark the desperate end of an epistemic access, but its intensification and infinity.
Conclusion

The relation between language and reality constitutes, above all, an epistemological problem; it is based on the referentiality of language, which defines the epistemic access of the subject that cognizes the object of knowledge. However, the necessary epistemic access of the subject to the object through the medium of language is not unitary. The term refers to a significantly different epistemic access (therefore, to a different referentiality) than a sensory perception, in which the senses are directed to particular objects. While sensory perception has an immediate reference to the particular, in conceptual cognition the particular objects of the senses and the epistemic access to them are tacitly overlooked, and the reference of the subject is directed towards general and universal ideas. The sensory access of the subject to the particular and its abstract-conceptual departure from the particular to the universal demonstrate here an aporetic ambiguity intrinsic to the cognitive process, which as such is the inherent aporia of language itself. The aporia of epistemic referentiality arises here also through the indeterminate finality of the cognitive process. The term only gives the appearance of a possible end of epistemic access.

In fact, epistemic access or epistemic reference cannot end in the term that incorporates a universal idea, nor in particular objects of sensory perception, since the aporia of conceptual-linguistic cognition does not finally reside in the subject, but in the object itself. This generally points to the foundation of the perceptibility of the object in its existence and, therefore, the foundation of epistemology in ontology. In the prevailing modern epistemology, the aporetic ambiguity in the cognitive process is attempted to be suppressed or masked through a hierarchical order of cognition by strategically subordinating sensory perception to conceptual cognition of the mind, as most adequately represented in Kant’s transcendental philosophical system. The inherent aporetic ambiguity of epistemic referentiality, ultimately attributable to an objective ontological aporia, necessarily eliminates the predominant hierarchical notion of the system of modern epistemology in such a way that the epistemological access of the senses to the particular and that of the intellect to the universal idea inherent in a term are no longer hierarchically structured, but are presented in a parallel and equivalent manner.

Accordingly, cognition no longer takes place in the framework of a hierarchically structured process, but in an egalitarian and participatory correlation between aesthetic and logical access or reference of the subject to the particular object. Here, the equivalent participatory cooperation of the senses and the intellect transcends the epistemic finality of
linguistic-conceptual cognition, so that the subject approaches a sphere of infinitely aesthetic perception, and even enters it.

Notes

1 “... zwischen zwei absolut verschiedenen Sphären wie zwischen Subjekt und Objekt gibt es keine Causalität, keine Richtigkeit, keinen Ausdruck, sondern höchstens ein ästhetisches Verhalten, ich meine eine andeutende Uebertragung, eine nachstammelnde Ubersetzung in eine ganz fremde Sprache” (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 884).

2 "For particularity has to do with an individual’s “participation in” or “partaking of” a universal. In this sense the individual is considered as being a part of something else, or as partaking of it. Thus, a man, for example, is particular (particularis) in that it participates in man, which itself is not particular” (Gracia, 1984, p. 25).

3 “...für die Scholastik entstehen die qualitates secundae aus den primae im Objekt und nicht erst, wie für die späteren, im wahrnehmenden Subjekt. Ihre Realität wurde darum in der traditionellen Philosophie nie in Zweifel gezogen, und ebenso wenig die Abbildlichkeit der Qualitätsempfindungen. [...] Wie die Qualitäten im einzelnen von den primären abhängen sollen, wird, besonders wenn es sich um die nicht-taktilem handelt, in der älteren Philosophie nur sehr undeutlich gewusst und gesagt. Die Argumentation geht häufig über die Vorzugsstellung des Tastsinns, denn der ist zwar nicht der vornehmste, aber der notwendigste Sinn, der von allen vorausgesetzt wird, selbst aber keinen voraussetzt. Die Betrachtung wird damit auf ein Gebiet hinübergespielt, das vielleicht die stärkste Problematik und die meisten Ansatzmöglichkeiten für die Weiterentwicklung enthielt” (Maier, 1968, p. 18).


5 In his seminal work Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne, Nietzsche considers higher conceptual abstraction as the causal principle of the same concept in the form of a qualitative concretion, such as: Honesty as the cause of a human quality, to be honest: “Wir nennen einen Menschen „ehrlich“ Warum hat er heute so ehrlich gehandelt? fragen wir. Unsere Antwort pflegt zu lauten: seiner Ehrlichkeit wegen. Die Ehrlichkeit! Das heißt wieder: das Blatt ist die Ursache der Blätter. Wir wissen ja gar nichts von einer wesenhaften Qualität, die „die Ehrlichkeit“ hieße, wohl aber von zahlreichen individualisierten, somit ungleichen Handlungen, die wir durch Weglassen des Ungleichen gleichsetzen und jetzt als ehrliche Hand-
lungen bezeichnen; zuletzt formulieren wir aus ihnen eine qualitas occulta mit dem Namen: „die Ehrlichkeit“ (Nietzsche, 1999 p. 880). The result of this investigation is that Nietzsche convincingly demonstrates how the possibility of greater abstraction in language produces autonomous linguistic entities – similar to finished building blocks - over which the sciences construct their safe conceptual columbarium.

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Document receipt date: December 10, 2018.
Document review date: February 20, 2019.
Document approval date: April 25, 2019.
Document publication date: July 15, 2019
Abstract

This article explores an unattended component in the field of language philosophy, namely: the voice. Through the theoretical apparatus of representatives of the so-called Slovenian psychoanalysis, especially Slavoj Žižek and Mladen Dolar, it is intended to show that the voice is a communication component that resists its registration within the significant chain and on the contrary it is presented as a limit and, at the same time, an excess in meaning, which opens possibilities to think about the way in which the integration of the subjects occurs in the existing social order. In this way, the voice contains in its core a component that shows the antagonistic gap of the social, which would allow renegotiating the senses that order the social. The work constitutes a dialectical philosophical reflection on the phenomenon of the voice, since it explores speculative, ethical, political and educational aspects concerning this phenomenon, which aims to contribute to an understanding of orality over its instrumental aspects in the communication. That is, instead of understanding the voice as a secondary phenomenon in communication aimed at serving as a means to transmit a message, the voice appears as that which enables, interrupts and exceeds the communicative intentions of the subjects participating in the communicative dialogue. Finally, the article uses examples taken from the contemporary educational context, in which the way in which the voice bursts into education as an element of an eminently political nature is shown.

Keywords

Voice, phonocentrism, education, ethics, politics.


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Resumen

El presente artículo explora un componente poco atendido en el campo de la filosofía del lenguaje, a saber: la voz. Por medio del aparato teórico de representantes del denominado psicoanálisis esloveno, Slavoj Žižek y Mladen Dólar especialmente, se pretende mostrar que la voz es un componente de la comunicación que se resiste a su inscripción dentro de la cadena significante y por el contrario se presenta como un límite y, a la vez, un exceso en el significado, lo cual abre posibilidades para pensar la forma en la cual se da la integración de los sujetos en el orden social existente. De este modo la voz encierra en su núcleo un componente que muestra la brecha antagónica de lo social, lo cual permitiría renegociar los sentidos que ordenan lo social. El trabajo constituye una reflexión filosófica de carácter dialéctico sobre el fenómeno de la voz, ya que explora aspectos especulativos, éticos, políticos y educativos concernientes a este fenómeno, lo que pretende aportar a una comprensión de la oralidad por encima de sus aspectos instrumentales en la comunicación. Es decir, en lugar de comprender la voz como un fenómeno secundario en la comunicación orientado a servir de medio para transmitir un mensaje, la voz aparece como aquello que posibilita, interrumpe y excede las intenciones comunicativas de los sujetos que participan en el diálogo comunicativo. Finalmente, el artículo se sirve de ejemplos tomados del contexto educativo contemporáneo, en los que se muestra la manera en que la voz irrumpe en la educación como un elemento de naturaleza eminentemente política.

Palabras clave
Voz, fonocentrismo, educación, ética, política.

As an introduction

Hegel in the introduction to the Phenomenology of the Spirit (2010) questions the image of knowledge as a mere instrument to know reality, in the manner of some lenses that we use to look more or less clearly at certain phenomena that are beyond the cognizant subject. In this perspective, the function of scientific theory and, in our case, philosophy, is to refine this instrument so that reality appears as clear as possible, without spots or signs of manipulation. However, contrary to this conception of knowledge as something neutral, Hegel (2010) categorically writes:

For, if cognition is the instrument for getting hold of absolute being, it is obvious that the use of an instrument on a thing certainly does not let it be what it is for itself, but rather sets out to reshape and alter it. If, on the other hand, cognition is not an instrument of our activity but a more or less passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then again, we do not receive the truth as it is in itself, but only as it exists through and in this medium. (p. 143)

From this quote it is inferred that knowledge is an activity that always affects the studied reality as such, either as a passive mediator, that is, as a capture of the object that only happens within the limits of consciousness, or as an active mediator, in the sense that consciousness continuously distorts the studied object. One way to avoid such intrusions of
consciousness in access to reality would be to eliminate the elements that correspond to consciousness from the object, but as Hegel observes, the final product would still be an effect of consciousness. Therefore, both consciousness and objects are trapped in a dead end: either we know reality only as scattered fragments that cannot be integrated, or conscience has to pay the price of giving up any accurate and absolute knowledge of reality.

The strategy deployed by Hegel to overcome this impasse, as commented Žižek (2015), lies in a shift in the way the problem of access to reality is understood, since this happens to be an epistemological problem, understanding the conditions of possibility that make valid the knowledge of the phenomenal, to a fundamentally ontological one, since the representations that the subjects make of the reality are not external marks that adhere to the objects, but they are a constitutive part of the same. Said in a summarized way: reality is also constituted from what the subject knows about it. Consciousness is not the problem to eliminate, but to integrate into the object, hence for Hegel (2010) there is a speculative identity between the subject and the world, but not in the sense of an ‘I’ abstracted from reality, around which reality has to be accommodated, but for him the objects of the world are not neutral data that need to be processed and interpreted by a subject, but the objects are understood as they really are and only by the reference and relationship that they establish with the subjects. Consciousness does not distort reality, but due to it, new aspects of objects can be revealed, which in turn open up the possibility of thinking about new horizons of understanding reality.¹ Hence, in the Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel proposes, through consciousness that reaches absolute knowledge, to overcome any metaphysical foundation of reality², that is, for the German philosopher there is no noumenal reality that hides behind the world of appearances. There is no absolute foundation of reality that transcends the limits of what can rationally be known and justified, since for Hegel the speculative identity between subject and object is nothing other than the recognition that the rational foundations that the subject establishes to understand the reality has an absolute character, and they are not mere theoretical constructions or biased images of reality. The truth lies in appearances, since, paradoxically, the only way to access the absolute is through a point of view located in reality. We must insist, the subjective is the door that opens the way to the knowledge of the fundamental structure of reality.

Following this line of thought, the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, states that a subjective displacement in the form of observation...
of an object leads to an ontological transformation in the object as such. This is what he calls the parallax vision:

subject and object are inherently “mediated,” so that an “epistemological” shift in the subject’s point of view always reflects an “ontological” shift in the object itself. Or—to put it in Lacanese—the subject’s gaze is always already inscribed into the perceived object itself, in the guise of its “blind spot,” which that which “in the object more than the object itself,” the point from which the object itself returns the gaze. (Žižek, 2016, pp. 25-26)

This has nothing to do with a certain relativistic attitude according to which there is no alternative but to accept that reality is a set of opposing narratives, all with the same or equal explanatory power over the world. The parallax is not a truth about the reality that lies behind our partial observations, but the truth is a certain gap that constitutes reality as such and that prevents it from being completely itself. Read in this perspective, what the Hegelian dialectic shows is the way in which negativity is located within objects, which means that they are never reconciled with themselves, but inhabited by an inherent contradiction that becomes visible through the place which are observed. The inconsistencies of our knowledge are not flaws in the observation or analysis of data, but reveal the strength of negativity as the fundamental component of the world.

Mutatis mutandis this also happens with language. That is to say, this is not a mere instrument or support for communication, nor is it a means oriented solely to transmit a knowledge ‘about’ the world, but there is a discursive nature of reality, since the different components that make up Human communication reveal ontological aspects of the structure of reality, in such a way that the subject not only enunciates something in relation to some aspects of the world, but that through his statements the world as such manifests itself. Language, as will be discussed more in depth later, does not form a closed network of meaning, but is crossed by an excessive presence, by a point of negativity that puts in suspense the order of the symbolic and, as such, allows to visualize the antagonisms that constitute reality, and for the objectives of this article, the split that is found in the social reality of the educational field. This element is the voice, which, from a parallax displacement like that proposed by Žižek, is revealed as the gap in the significant chain, as the point that exceeds the scope of meanings. In other words, the voice is the element that instead of serving as a vehicle for communication is rather the obstacle that makes it possible and threatens to dilute the meaning of language emissions.
This article has an approach to the phenomenon of the voice and its participation to understand the field of education.

This article constitutes an approximation to the phenomenon of the voice and its relevance to understand the field of education. For this purpose, we intend to follow the speculative reflections that Slovenians Slavoj Žižek and Mladen Dolar, in a Hegelian-Lacanian code, to situate the voice as a phenomenon that disrupts the relationship with the world of the symbolic. In this way it is intended to outline some theoretical elements relevant to the philosophical understanding of the field of education. To this aim, it is shown that within postmodern reflection there is a lack of attention to the problem of the voice, since the Frenchman Jacques Derrida has installed the idea that the deconstruction of logos has to be oriented towards the field of writing, since orality would enjoy greater privilege. Thus, in the first section, it is intended to refute this idea. Next, the relationship that the voice has with the so-called order of the symbolic, and how the voice, in its phenomenal aspect, is shown as the condition of communication impossibility. Finally, in the last section, some inferences that affect the educational field and the philosophical understanding of communication within educational and specifically school relationships are presented.

Is metaphysics reduced to the logocentric/phonocentric pair?

The French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1985) in his deconstruction of Western metaphysics states that it has been erected on the concept of presence as a guarantor of the unity and consistency of phenomena. A sample of that, according to Derrida, constitutes the Husserlian phenomenology, in which the phenomenon is approached as presence identical to itself, unconditioned, and fully accessible to the subject by means of phenomenological reduction. This is what is known as the return to the same things (Zurück zu den Sachen selbst!) Posed by Husserl (2006): “Phenomenology expresses descriptively, with pure expression, in concepts of essence and in regular statements of essence, the essence apprehended directly in the essential intuition and the connections founded purely on that essence” (p. 216). For Husserl, thinking is directed on objects which are presented as units that can be identified and represented.

Now, in order for the unity of the object to be presented as such, the perception of it must contain a temporal space unit that ensures the unity
of the phenomenon. If for example I observe a building that is in front of me, I must be certain that in the immediate past and in the near future this object will contain the characteristics of a building, as well as, if I observe only its front face, I must be sure that in the back it will remain a building and not become an object outside of that convention. The presence of the phenomenon is a certain agreement that the subject makes with the objects so that they can interact with each other in a coherent way.

Derridean deconstruction is aimed at destabilizing these presuppositions, since he emphasizes that difference is a constitutive part of phenomena. Derrida (1985) intends to dismantle the entire system of thought of Western metaphysics, for which he finds in difference the condition of possibility of presence, and of the representation of it. There is no access to identity itself, because there is no such entity; what there is access to is to difference, which is a non-presence:

This relationship with the non-presence, once again, does not come to surprise, to circle around, even to disguise the presence of the original impression: it always allows its emergence and its renascent virginity. But it radically destroys any possibility of identity with itself in simplicity. (p. 119)

If there were no such difference, things would always be perceived and represented in the same way. With this, Derrida does not want to affirm that we inhabit a fictional world in which things, like the building of the previous example, spontaneously transform into mythological beings or implode into nothingness. For Derrida there is an aspect in phenomena that cannot be fully symbolized and whose meaning varies from context to context. However, this openness to difference is achieved for Derrida only by means of writing, since the texts would offer an expressive and interpretative plasticity that everyday language, specifically speech, does not. Hence, deconstruction is developed primarily through literary studies.

In this perspective, the literary shows itself as a resource of emancipation, while the sound, the voice, appears rather as a retardant element, so to speak, since it resists capturing the difference as such, and takes refuge in a certain substantial unity of the phenomena. That is why for Derrida the metaphysics of presence is nothing but another name for phonocentrism, since the logos has always been immanent to the spoken word. Writing, in this perspective, has been subject to the phonetic because the voice is pronounced on the presence of an object, while writing does not refer directly to an object, but it is presented as absent, for that reason, for the Western thinking, writing has led to misunderstandings:
Insofar as the ideality of the object seems to depend on the voice, and thus become absolutely available in it, the system that links phenomenality to the possibility of the Zeigen [point, point] works better than ever in the voice. *The phoneme is given as the dominated ideality of the phenomenon.* (Derrida, 1985, p.136)

According to this, voice and logos are presented as elements linked in a line of continuity, as those that ensure the consistency of reality in its ontological aspect. However, is the voice a mere evanescent mediator who submits to objects? Is literature the only escape route to any kind of metaphysics? For the Slovenian philosopher Mladen Dolar, the logos/voice articulation is not as simple as deconstructivism shows, since within the history of metaphysics the discontinuities between them are much more evident than Derrida considered, which would imply a revision of the role that voice occupies in its relationship with phenomena. The Dolar’s goal is to show that the voice is not the mere companion of the logos, the vehicle of the rational, but that there are elements in the voice that transgress the logos as such and that must be made visible.

**The excessive character of the voice**

Dolar proposes a political analysis of the phenomenon of the voice, for which he points out how from Aristotle the voice is not a mere sound articulation by means of which the signifiers are communicated, but in it lies the origin of the politics. In this regard, the Stagirite notes the following:

> The reason why man is a social being, more than any bee and that any gregarious animal, is evident: nature, as we say, does nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. For the voice is a sign of pain and pleasure, and that is why animals also possess it, because their nature reaches a sensation of pain and pleasure and indicates it to each other. But the power of speech is to manifest the convenient and the harmful, as well as the just and the unjust. (Aristotle, 1988, pp. 50-51)

The fundamental distinction between men and animals lies in the possession of speech (*logos*), which unlike the mere voice (*phoné*), is not limited to the field of the sensible, to the mere perception of things and in a quasi-instinctive behavior, but is able to generate a mediated relationship with the world and therefore ethically judge the acts to identify that which is good for the community, that which is close to the ideals of justice and political rectitude. In this case, speech comes to signal the
point of rupture of the animal with the human, its lack of continuity, but as observed by Dolar (2007), this does not rest on a mere naturalism, that is, on a biological phenomenon, but that the constitution of the word has a political nature, while the definitive question of the polis consists in the question of whom to grant and also to whom to deny the ability to speak. Thus, in the public sphere there are some subjects that emit rational discourses, and others, that despite using language, border the threshold of animality and their discourse is reduced to exclamations motivated by impulses that have no validity or legitimacy. The logos retroactively establishes those subjects who only emit sounds (mere voice), of those who can only communicate ‘sounds’ in the public space.

The voice is not any kind of remnant of a precultural biological state, but is the product of the logos, it is that which invigorates and at the same time disturbs speech. For this reason, for Dolar (2007) the concept of phonocentrism does not do justice to the fact that the voice, instead of being an epiphenomenon of the rational, has been rather characterized as an element associated with the residual, the sensual, the animality and it is contingent, contrary to the written word, particularly the law, which rests above its condition of being or not pronounced:

The history of “logocentrism” does not quite go hand in hand with “phonocentrism,” that there is a dimension of the voice which runs counter to self-transparency, sense, and presence: the voice against logos, the voice as the other of logos, its radical alterity. “Metaphysics” has always been very well aware of that, as we have seen, compulsively clinging to a simple exorcizing formula, repeating it over and over again, compelled by the same invisible hand throughout millennia. Maybe what defined it as metaphysics was not just the demotion of writing, but also the banishment of the voice (Dolar, 2007, p. 67).

What is the need to prohibit or at the least control the voice? What is the monstrous aspect that it contains? Slavoj Žižek (2007) comments that in the voice there is no relation of transparency between the subject and the pronounced thing, much less the subject with itself. When the subject listens to himself speak, his identity is short-circuited, as he fractures and when he hears his voice there is recognition of a foreign body that inhabits him. The ‘voice of conscience’ paradigmatic figure in children’s stories is a very good example of this situation, because it indicates the irruption of a foreign agent that prevents the character from listening to himself. Or one can also think of the reaction of a subject when listening to himself talk through a radio recording: ‘That is what I sound like? Am I the one who is really talking?’ Žižek says in this regard:
The voice’s ‘self-identity’ resides in the fact that the voice qua medium of transparent self-presence coincides with the voice qua foreign body which undercuts my self-presence ‘from within’. In the antagonistic tension between signifier and object, voice is thus on the side of the object: voice, in its fundamental dimension, is not the ideal (totally transparent, pliant, self-effacing) signifier, but its exact opposite, the opaque inertia of an objectal remainder. (2007, p. 100)

The voice is not defined by its utilitarian aspect, it is not oriented to satisfy a need, in this case to generate the conditions for communication between subjects, but it has a disruptive nature, it is plagued by an excess that makes the dialogue lose its character of being a mere face-to-face link, since the voice, in its ephemeral irruption in the intersubjective encounter, is that part of the signifier that resists meaning, because the meanings of a statement can become its opposite by a certain mode of presence of the voice. This is similar to when an educator asks his students if they have understood the lesson, and everyone in chorus responds in unison and almost stridently, ‘Yes!’ The voice, in this case, fulfills a function contrary to communication, since it is the surplus that puts at risk the generation of meaning in speech, therefore, the educational dialogue in this case, so that it can work, requires certain self-deception in the part of subjects that participate in it, and one have to pay a price: cancel the excessive component of the voice to take the meaning in its literal form, although neither educators nor students really believe what they have heard and said respectively.

Seen this way, the voice is in an ambiguous position. On the one hand, its existence depends on the subject, it needs someone to pronounce it, but on the other hand, its consistency and credibility is acquired by its reference to another (the other⁷), to the order of the symbolic, to the cause in which the subject is engaged. This is similar to what Heidegger (1993) proposes with the ‘call of conscience’, in which, the only way that Dasein has of leaving the anonymity of an existence in which it is already interpreted and immersed in the mass, it is to listen to that voice that impels it to assume its condition of project and projected in the world. This voice does not have a transcendent origin, but emerges from Dasein itself although it does not belong to it completely:

The fact that the call is not something which is explicitly performed by me, but that rather ‘it’ does the calling, does not justify seeking the caller in some entity with a character other than that of Dasein. Yet every Dasein always exists factically. It is not a free-floating self-projection; but its character is determined by thrownness as a Fact of the entity which it is;
and, as so determined, it has in each case already been delivered over to existence, and it constantly so remains. (Heidegger, 1993, p. 300)

This allows us to pick up another of the fundamental aspects of the voice. In its reference to the Other, the voice does nothing more than show the inconsistency or incompleteness that characterizes it. In this lies the ethical aspect of the voice, since it is the point of coincidence of two faults: both the lack in the subject (the subject is not the one who emits the voice), as well as the lack in the Other (the cause to which the subject seeks to commit is not fully realized either, it is a project, it does not exist by itself). The ethic of the voice consists in showing that the social order to which it appeals, to the possibility of an intersubjective consensus that allows to coordinate intentions and actions, is actually plagued by an inherent antagonism that prevents it from being. Furthermore, when the voice tries to suture the void of the Other, it becomes authoritarian and repressive uses of the voice. Dolar (2007) offers two extreme cases to understand this.

The first case he refers to is the voice of Hitler, the charismatic leader who dazzled audiences for his rhetorical capacity. The Führer’s voice owes its effectiveness, as shown by Dolar, to occupying the voice of the Other, that is, what it mentions performatively produces the legal order of the social and the mode of insertion of the subject within that order. His voice, by itself, articulates the meaning of the nation and the political. It is a voice that runs over the laws, which rewrites them, since their enunciation has the effect of generating orders that must be immediately fulfilled.

The other example cited by Dolar is the case of the Soviet bureaucracy in the Stalinist period. In this case the voice of the officials is a voice devoid of vivacity, it is an opaque voice that limits itself to repeating mechanically the letter of the documents. This atonal use of the voice fulfills the function of serving a bureaucratic order, which shows itself as the representative of the people. Therefore, it generates the fantasy of a social order that works and sustains itself due to the inevitable obstacles of bureaucratic mediations.

Dolar, as has been said, comes to the conclusion that the voice emerges in the intersection of two absences: that of the subject and the Other, hence the ethicity that is announced implies assuming the indeterminate character of the social, since the voice it is the excess that, at the same time, transgresses and sustains the functioning of the symbolic.
The voice in education: the case of banking education and its interpellations

The philosopher of education Paulo Freire (2005) emphasized the role that language plays as a decisive component of the liberating educational practice. He warned about ‘banking’ education, that is, an education devoid of dialogue in which the learning contents are mere bureaucratic requirements that must be deposited in students, is based on the ability to transmit a message in a transparent way and without vestiges of residual elements in the act of teaching. This education, we say, shows that the voice of the teacher and the voice of the students fulfills the function of serving the institutional rituals that aim to ensure the alleged full character of the school, the nation, the culture, etc. This education, from the perspective we have been working on, is part of rites that help satisfy the Other, in which the subject surrenders, donates a part of himself, so that the Other acquires its impossible consistency. Think, for example, of acts where the voice is predominant: the raising of a flag, the singing of a hymn, civic or religious discourses, among others, are a performance of the voice in which the objective is to show that the social order in which the subjects are immersed really works, that there is effectively a collective identity to which the subjects can be ascribed and that gives them security. But its very enunciation, as we will try to show, makes the elements that exceed these representations based on social reconciliation re-emerge through the voice. Let’s take some examples.

In June 2018 in the city of Quito a group of high school students from a major public educational institution spread a video through social networks in which the following scene can be observed: a teacher, with a stick in his hand, orders that a group of students form a line in front of him, since presumably they have committed some serious disciplinary offense. The video shows that, as a sign of punishment, the teacher proceeds to inflict a blow -not so hard- on the backside of each of these young people.

The scene, which seems to be taken from The Wall-Pink Floyd, has spread and, as expected in this type of case, provoked different reactions among those who support such measures as exemplars to correct the behavior of young people, and those who reject it because of its lack of relevance. In any case, the most striking was the reaction of the parents of that institution, since once it was known that the teacher was sanctioned and separated from the institution by the educational authorities, the parents organized a march not only to ask for the re-entry of the
teacher, but also for that type of practices to return more firmly to the schools. Nostalgia for the voice of the Other that breaks into the social out of all mediation? This is a sample of how the ideological fantasy of banking education works: it is not interesting to judge the institutional mechanisms that a school has to solve problems of coexistence, nor is it of interest to judge the effectiveness of physical violence -anyone knows that a blow with a stick it is not going to change a young person’s life, much less when it is staged before a camera-, but that ideology creates the image that children or young people are the ones that cause such disorders in the school and therefore, the punishment shows that they are the necessary exception that strengthens institutionalism and traditional pedagogical practices.

In the same way, educators need to know that what they do is still working, that the methodologies they apply are still relevant and that the content they teach still has some meaning, even if they recognize that this is not the case. As Žižek (2003, p 57) would say “they know very well what they do, but still, they do it”, since there is confidence that the school is still the place of the great Other, the space that can provide meaning and orientation to their lives and that of the students, or at least they have to stage or ritualize the school as if it can still work with the structure that saw it emerge and through the reinforcement of the banking-type pedagogical methods.

However, as suggested by the Argentine pedagogues Ignacio Lewkowics and Cristina Corea (2005), we find ourselves at a time when the pedagogy of bored is prevalent since there are educators who ‘simulate’ teaching and students who ‘simulate’ learning; educators who ‘simulate’ disciplining and students who ‘pretend’ to obey; educators who ‘pretend’ to have the monopoly of the word and students who ‘simulate’ listening, etc. The simulacrum school is one that is not capable of dealing with cultural transformations and one that externalizes its problems in particular subjects: students who are ‘dysfunctional’ or problematic. But what Freire comes to put in tension is that the school can only fulfill that task if it becomes a site of constant dispute, if it dares to take the step of reconstructing and de-structuring itself. In other words, a space that allows the ethical irruption of the voice.

The ethical, we must emphasize, lies paradoxically in an unethical element, namely: in the possibility of showing that the social is crossed by a constitutive failure that puts at risk all kinds of social conventions. This is what the Slovenian philosopher Alenka Zupančič (2011) calls an ethics of the real. That is, an ethic in which the subject is not only defined by his
commitment to a cause, but also, this commitment can lead to the sacrifice of the cause as such. Sacrifice in the sense of stripping ethical ideals as a field of values that remains beyond the contingencies of the material and finite world, as if the ideals were always the safeguard or resource that will help the subject in moments of deep anxiety. What Zupančič shows, repeating a Hegelian movement, is that values are not something that is ‘beyond’, but that the contingent, abrupt and inconsistent social reality is crossed by an excess, which is possible due to an infinite aspect, absolute. Reason why we must find the gap, the point at which the social breaks down and cannot be reconciled with itself. The voice, in this case, expresses a moment of duplicity of reality, of an unfolding in the finite reality that shows the infinite abyss that constitutes it.

Therefore, the voice rises towards the ethical and the political when it ceases to be a mere instrument to satisfy social rituals, and when it avoids its authoritarian enunciation, that is, when the subject is staged as the embodiment of social order. In this intermediate space, in the gap between the subject and the social order is when the voice acts as an ethical-political element. Ethical because it encourages reconsideration of social conventions and shows a subject that exceeds them, and political because it is oriented to generate other conditions, also contingent and provisional to live in society. Dolar (2007) says about this:

It is also here that we have to disentangle, from the sonorous and shrill voices, the non-sonorous voice of pure enunciation, the enunciation without a statement: the enunciation to which one has to supply the statement, the political statement in response to that voice—not by listening/obeying, not by merely performing social rituals, but by engaging in a political stance. (2007, p. 146).

A paradigmatic example is the ecological movement displayed by the young Swedish activist Greta Thunberg Fridays for future, which has attracted the attention of thousands of high school students in various parts of the world since, contrary to what one might think, it is not a mere strike school that seeks to replace education by a form of political activism, but that puts in evidence the same educational objectives, namely: the ability of educational institutions to train new generations in their full integration and participation in society. This youth strike puts the educational questions par excellence on the table for debate. What society do we educate ourselves for? What future does education advertise? The form of the strike is consistent with what we wanted to point out with respect to the voice, since the street demonstration is the expression par
excellence of the voice, of this ethical-political voice that wants to negotiate the meanings of the social, because it is a voice that shows the contingency and precariousness with which they are built.

Thus, by means of posters, slogans and other ‘auditory’ elements or elements that go beyond the mere literality of speeches, this voice reveals the abyss that constitutes the current democratic order. It is a political moment par excellence, which has provoked reactions that seek to appease this voice and re-circumscribe it within the limits of banking education. Sample of this last constitute the reactions of the German politician Christian Lindner who, at the beginning of March of 2019, facing the retorts that there were in the country regarding the climatic change school strikes, cataloged that the care of the climate is not a subject for children and young people, but for ‘professionals’, and therefore, the role of students within the school must remain the same: be academically trained so that in the future their voice will be inserted in the existing institutions. Within a few days of this statement, something really surprising happened. Scientists from Germany, Austria and Switzerland joined the strikes for a better climate policy and declared outright: Wir sind die Profis und sagen: Die junge Generation hat Recht (We are the experts and we say: youth is right).8

An educational policy of the voice is not limited to the letter of the texts or to the mere use of digital tools as educational resources, but it generates conditions of dialogue in which the voice fulfills a double function: to show the gap that crosses the Other and show, in turn, the excessive and disruptive character that subjectivity has. The case of Fridays for future is paradigmatic, because it is not only a claim directed at the political class, but it is a movement that is directed against itself, that is, they are young people who protest against their own lifestyle, who recognize that what they do in their daily lives has serious consequences for the sustainability of the planet. For this reason, the voice remains as a strange element to the subject and strange to the social, and it is in that opening where the educational operates as a liberating practice.

Conclusions

There is a dialectical relationship between the voice and the word. That is to say, even though the rational tries to establish itself as an instance in which the argument prevails, it requires a surplus that makes it possible, otherwise, the logos remains as a “dead letter” incapable of generating any
kind of effect on the social. The educational is a space in which the voice manifests this role, since, although the content of teaching rests on school texts or is accessible through various digital platforms, its pronunciation in class makes it effective and gains legitimacy. There are even contents that are only transmitted through the voice, because they remain as the dark side of institutional planning. One can think, for example, of the 'hidden curriculum', which is not explicit teaching, but habits and ways of understanding reality that are formed by the excessive character of the voice.

The voice, therefore, escapes being a mere rhetorical device to transmit a message, or to lead a class before a group of students. The voice is the limit of intersubjective dialogue, it is what makes it impossible and at the same time allows communication, because it raises what crosses the symbolic, but in turn allows its redefinition. The voice, as excess, is what allows one to escape from the consensual narratives of language, in which communication, once it has eliminated antagonistic points, can articulate ideas and actions between subjects. As we have seen, in the voice there is a rest that resists meaning, hence the political and educational debate also revolves around the voices that can be heard, those that dispute the meanings, and the voices that are not audible because their single presence is an unbearable excess.

Seen this way, banking education is the ‘utopian’ place to which the educational institution aspires, since it is based on reciprocity in the exchange of signifiers: the statements are understood and reproduced as they are issued. Faced with this fantasy, the task of a liberating education, is not merely to generate another utopian scenario, but to risk showing that in the voice of educators and students, although there is a certain ventriloquist act, it also involves the possibility of living temporarily in the antagonism that structures the subject and his society.

Notes

1. Rolf-Peter Hortsmann (2008, p.74) summarizes the subject-object speculative identity in four fundamental aspects: 1) there is a subject that is related in different ways to the objects of the world; 2) each of these modes of relationship can be identified and differentiated; 3) within each relationship with the world there is a pretense of truth; 4) truth reaches its maximum point of expression when the object is identified with the concept that the subject has developed. But the latter is only achieved if the subject has gone through different stages of development or experiences of consciousness.

2. It surpasses the scope of this work to make a more detailed analysis of what Hegel understands by this absolute knowledge as the culminating point of the becoming subject of the substance. But what is important to consider is that it is not a deter-
ministic ontology that reduces the subject and the object to simple means of manifestation of an Absolute that is beyond consciousness, let alone Hegel intends to establish access to the eye of God 'as the point of view that brings together all points of view, or what is the same, a disconnected and abstracted view of all concrete reality. For a more detailed review of the postmetaphysical character of the Phenomenology of the Spirit, one can review Pinkard (1994, pp. 221-268), Solomon (1983, pp. 187-210; 295-318; 635-640), Taylor (2010, pp. 66-110; 183-192).

3 One can think, for example, of the role played by the voice-over as a cinematographic resource. This narrative element not only serves as orientation for the viewer to know first-hand the feelings and self-perception of the protagonist of the story, but also marks a point in which character is divided in two: on the one hand is the character that pursues a desire within history and that faces its antagonist to reach it, and on the other is its voice, which emerges as an element that has already been redeemed from the conflict that history is going through, because it is a voice that already knows what it will happen in history, and therefore, we, the spectators, somehow reassured us to know that the character will be victorious.

4 Proof of this is the metaphysical status that the voice has had in the philosophical reflection in antiquity and middle ages, specifically in regard to music, since on it, authors as diverse as Plato or Agustín coincide in the impossibility of voice as an element to show the essence of things, and instead propose a certain outlawing of the voice as it constitutes a corruption of the logos, since it is an element associated with sensuality and the accidental (Dolar, 2007, pp 57-67).

5 This approach is closely related to what is posed by the French philosopher Jacques Rancière (1996), who points out that the democratic order is founded through exclusion, a part-without-part in the social, who serve not as mere subjects that are outside the political, but that, in their exclusion, make possible the institutionality of democracy.

6 The voice, for Žižek, is the incarnation of a certain enjoyment, that is, of the obscene reverse that constitutes the social, as that inherent transgression that founds the social. Thus, for Žižek, politics is not the opposite of the domination of the impulses that threaten the social, but rather it is based on a way of regulating this enjoyment. For a more detailed explanation of the relationship between politics and enjoyment within Žižekian thinking, as well as the function that language fulfills in this interrelation, Finkelde can be reviewed (2013, pp. 19-76).

7 The concept of the Other in capital letters, the great Other, refers to what in the Lacanian field is known as the sociocultural network of linguistically mediated rules and customs that organize the social, or the insertion of the subject in the social. Hence, the Other is the one who structures the desire, because it is presented as the instance that can restore the loss that occurred to the subject by its insertion in the order of the symbolic. The Other implies a promise of completeness even if it remains inaccessible: “If speech is founded in the existence of the Other; the true one, language is so made as to return us to the objectified other, to the other whom we can make what we want of, including thinking that he is an object, that is to say that he doesn’t know what he’s saying. When we use language, our relation with the other always plays on this ambiguity. In other words, language is as much there to found us in the Other as to drastically prevent us from understanding him. And that is indeed what is at stake in the analytic experience” (Lacan, 1991, p. 244).

8 Personal translation In this regard, the following newspaper article can be reviewed (Brech, 2019).
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Voice and excess: speculative, ethical-political and educational approaches to orality

La voz y el exceso: aproximaciones especulativas, ético-políticas y educativas a la oralidad

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Document receipt date: December 10, 2018
Document review date: February 20, 2019
Document approval date: April 25, 2019
Document publication date: July 15, 2019
LISTENING AS EXISTENTIAL OPENNESS
THAT ALLOWS THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHER
La escucha como apertura existencial
que posibilita la comprensión del otro

Abstract
The article approaches the subject of listening as a central axis of an existential openness that promotes the understanding of the other. It is an relevant issue since that widely reflected about the language and its possibilities; however, the listening has been little addressed so it remains in a discreet silence that is important to clear. The main objective of this proposal is to highlight the value that listening has to reach the understanding of the other and the construction of dialogical relations between humans’ beings. To do this, a descriptive journey is made about language and its characteristics, emphasizing its two components: speech and listening as an interrelated process to understand its role in the construction of linking narratives among human beings. An essential part of this process is the time for which some reflections on the subject are made to conclude with the question of listening that provides the possibility of an existential openness that facilitates the understanding of the other. The description is made in a descriptive, reflective and hermeneutic way, with the support of the ideas of the main authors of the Philosophy and of other disciplines. The ideas and their arguments have been organized into three essential themes: language, time and listening, to conclude by highlighting the main arguments of each of the aspects considered in the reflection.

Keywords
Language, time, listening, understanding, communication.

Suggested form of citing: Joaqui Robles, Darwin, & Ortiz Granja, Dorys Noemy (2019). Listening as existential openness that allows the understanding of the other. Sophia, colección de Filosofía de la Educación, 27(2), pp. 185-212.
Resumen

El artículo aborda el tema de la escucha como eje central de una apertura existencial que favorece la comprensión del otro. Se trata de un tema relevante puesto que se ha reflexionado ampliamente acerca del lenguaje y sus posibilidades; sin embargo, la escucha ha sido poco abordada por lo que permanece en un silencio discreto que es importante despejar. El objetivo principal de esta propuesta es resaltar el valor que la escucha tiene para alcanzar la comprensión del otro y la construcción de relaciones dialógicas entre seres humanos. Para ello se hace un recorrido descriptivo acerca del lenguaje y sus características, resaltando sus dos componentes: el habla y la escucha como un proceso interrelacionado para poder comprender su papel en la construcción de narrativas vinculares entre los seres humanos. Una parte esencial de este proceso es el tiempo por lo que se realizan algunas reflexiones sobre el tema para concluir con la cuestión de la escucha que brinda la posibilidad de una apertura existencial que facilita la comprensión del otro. La descripción se realiza en modo descriptivo, reflexivo y hermenéutico, con el apoyo de las ideas de autores principales de la Filosofía y de otras disciplinas. Las ideas y sus argumentos se han organizado en tres temas esenciales: el lenguaje, el tiempo y la escucha, para concluir resaltando los principales argumentos de cada uno de los aspectos considerados en la reflexión.

Palabras clave
Lenguaje, tiempo, escucha, comprensión, comunicación.

Introduction

The present text deals with the theme of language, time and listening as a form of existential openness that favors the understanding of the other, a very important part of human interactions. The objective is to value listening as an essential aspect of language that has often been dismissed because verbal language has been given more value. In the same way, listening is considered as the essential basis of an existential openness through which the otherness sought among human beings is consolidated.

An essential basis of this process is language, as a basic condition of human existence, which makes him a being in the world, who is a speaker and who also listens, which fully founds him.

Nowadays, a big problem in society can be identified since people listen in a deficient manner. Often, it is difficult for them to listen to what others say and have difficulty making themselves heard in the way they would like. This phenomenon occurs in all domains of daily life. According to Nieto (2005) there is a hypothesis that the silence that occurs in the current context, probably, is linked to the fact that it is a world in which the visual is privileged over the auditory.

It is basically a visual world, in which a large number of messages are issued with attractive images, bright colors and seductive forms, so that our gaze is captured by these elements. The clearest proof of this situation is the impact of the ‘virtual reality’ that is perceived and experienced through sight. Thus, a world that is mostly explored through sight
prevents, to a certain extent, the development of the other senses, in this particular case, the auditory one.

From this situation, then, the importance of thinking about one of the components of human interaction, often used, misunderstood and even unknown, such as ‘listening’, arises as an eminently ethical process due to which it is possible to encounter the other. It is a current issue and of great relevance since people, by privileging more the visual than the auditory aspects, leave aside a range of information records that enriches the personal sensory world, but that also allows the encounter of the other, when it is heard.

Therefore, the subject is of great relevance because listening allows us to understand, as Gadamer (1993) has pointed out. The hypothesis from which we work is that ‘listening’ is a deep and invisible phenomenon that favors a condition of existential openness that allows the understanding of the other.

In order to do this review, an inductive, reflective and hermeneutic methodology will be followed, trying to understand, in the first place, the phenomenon of listening as an invisible part of language in order to arrive at its implications in relation to the other. The content is developed in three sections: language, time and listening. In the first case, it will be described in its various components and its importance in the individual and social development of the human being. Then, the question of the time involved in a narrative construction of a version about oneself and the history each one has will be addressed, to then conclude with the theme of listening as an essential aspect of the relationship with the other and the founder of an ethic of respect and openness.

**Language**

Language is one of the most complex functions of the human being since it combines neurological, psychological and social aspects for its production and understanding. Due to this, it is important, in the first place, to describe it in a basic manner according to the biological structures involved in its production. Language, according to Lenneberg (1985), is made up of the interaction of three individual components linked to a social aspect.

The first of them has a biological basis, is made up of the anatomical structures located on the face and neck: the nose, the oral cavity, the larynx and the vocal cords, essential elements to pronounce the sounds.
Another component, linked to the previous one and already mentioned by Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1995) refers to the functions performed by the central nervous system, in particular the cerebral cortex, certain subcortical areas and the cerebral hemispheres, with its particular and defined specialization hemispheric in which, the left side uses the so-called digital language consisting of letters and numbers while the right, more holistic, uses the language of the images.

The third component involved in language is the ability of the human being to pronounce sounds that become words that, then name the objects, the people and the phenomena associated with both. When a person mentions the word 'key', everyone understands the object to which he is referring, even if it is not the same for each one.

To this possibility, Lenneberg (1985) has called it: 'naming'. It is a capacity that appears in the human being, to name the information and data that it receives from the environment, from itself and from other people, in increasingly structured and hierarchical categories. Of course, the information is received through all the organs of the senses, however, it is more relevant to the topic of interest at this time, the sense of hearing, with its specialty to receive sound waves and transmit them to the brain.

The interaction of physical components, nervous connections in the human brain and ability to emit sounds facilitate the understanding and emission of sounds, whose development would be impossible without human interaction since language developed as a particular element of this process and, at the same time, it favors it.

Carrera and Mazzarella (2001) emphasize the role of language as a mediating element of human experience and thought, stressing that the meaning of the word becomes particularly interesting at the moment of speaking and listening since it is transmitted in the chosen words to express a certain thought.

Thus, the analysis of language, as seen so far, considers several elements that escape the objective of the present text; however, it is important to note them since they are part of the phenomenon and account for its complexity.

With this background, it is better understood the conformation of what Molina (2008) has called a code and is commonly known as 'language' and the elements involved in it; as well as the importance of listening to the sounds produced by human beings during interactions in which, both the emission of sounds and their reception (listening), are important to achieve a fruitful dialogue.
In the same vein, Campillo-Valero and García-Guixé (2005) point out that, in human history, language emerges as a need to communicate with another and transmit information; it is completely impossible to think of human development without this code or without a means of transmitting data; but, in the same way, the transmission of this information would become quite difficult, in the absence of the ability to receive them through listening.

Luria (2000) already pointed out the contribution of language to human development:

... thanks to language, the subject can penetrate into the depth of things, get out of the limits of immediate impression, organize their behavior aimed at an end, discover links and complex relationships that are unattainable for immediate perception, transmit the information to another man, which constitutes a powerful stimulus for mental development by the transmission of information accumulated over many generations. (p.222)

Thus, language became a very powerful function of connection and exchange, since it determined the psychic and social development throughout the centuries of existence of the human being on earth. Watzlawick et al. (1995) have pointed out the importance of this function for the exchange to take place; however, they also clarify that the presence of two components is necessary: the sender and the receiver.

The first one emits data in the form of sounds organized in a particular language, accompanied by gestures, looks and bodily postures that give a meaning and qualify the information issued verbally. The second one receives the information, the emitted data, decodes it in the cerebral sectors constituted for it and emits answers in the form of sounds or behavioral reactions regarding what has been said.

Thus, language contributes to interconnection and interrelation in a process in which there is a person speaking; that is, the person emits sounds and another that “listens”; that is, he receives them, decodes them and reacts to them. These are the two poles of a binary exchange process, which becomes increasingly complex as the number of participants in it increases.

To better understand the basic communicational dyad, it will be divided, temporarily, into the two constituent elements and then focus on the second: the receiver who receives the message, through listening.

Watzlawick et al. (1995) highlight the characteristics of the sender, one of the parts of the communicational dyad. It is a person who expresses himself verbally, which is why he becomes the sender of a message; use a consensual code to communicate with another person and, as a conse-
sequence, enter into an interaction that may involve (or not) the possible construction of a relationship in which it is important to communicate and for that, language is the main tool.

For the purposes of this article, following Echeverría (2003), consider that the sender can use a language, like the so-called “generative” language. It is a “language of action, which creates realities” (p.35), not only describes things, but takes place in this process, the role of the receiver, the listener, is particular, as it will contribute to consolidate or ratify the elaborated narrative.

Watzlawick et al. (1995) point out the importance of this process, in which two levels are involved. The first is made up of the language that transmits data and information. The second level, which accompanies the previous one, is constituted by the ‘form’ in which things are said and transmitted in the tone of voice, in the looks and in the gestures.

Thus, language can forge realities: the narrator organizes the information in a certain way and the receiver captures the story to confirm, reformulate or reject it outright, which will determine the evolution of the established relationship: consensus, dissent or the conflict will be the results of this process. Therefore, and following Gadamer (1993), it can be pointed out that language constructs different, new, creative realities. These realities can lead to important changes in the life of a person as well as building worlds, value ideas, establish productive, creative and generative dialogues, can also destroy them, erasing hopes, disqualifying ideas, denying realities and people or as indicated the author in 1992:

the sign has its being only in application, and so its “self” consists only in pointing to something “other.” It must be foregrounded from the context in which it is encountered and taken as a sign, in order for its own being as an object to be superseded and for it to dissolve (disappear) into its meaning. It is the abstraction of pointing it self (p. 256)

Criteria that can be supported by what was sustained by Carrera and Mazzarella (2001) when they point out that language (and the meaning assigned to it) activates mental processes that reproduce forms of social interaction that, subsequently, will contribute to the self-regulation of each person. And here, again, it highlights the role of listening and the benefit it brings in the interaction. Adding, in addition, that the meaning of the word springs, in a certain way, in a ludic fashion, from the situational value of the words, with which, it is considered again by Gadamer (1992) who explains that language is born in a interaction defined, also, by the context in which it is produced and which is marked to a large extent, from the moment of birth, or as he himself says:
The life of language consists in the uninterrupted continuation of the
game that we started playing when we learned to speak [...] nobody fixes
the meaning of a word and the linguistic capacity does not mean only
having learned and knowing how to use the fixed meanings of words.
(p. 130)

And this happens, since the meaning of words is intimately linked
to the situation in which they sprout. Cabrera-González (2010) points out
very well when he indicates that “the participants are able to adapt the pro-
duction and the reception/interpretation of the speech to the interpersonal
social communicative situation” (p.2). And so, the importance of listening
in this process immediately arises, because in order to make such an adap-
tation, it is necessary in the first place, an understanding of the situation
that is only possible when you have heard what is happening.

Gadamer (1992) points it out masterfully when he mentions that
the word has a very important value and together with dialogue, they
have a moment of play in themselves:

... have a word, keep the word, stop someone from speaking and getting
an answer, the way to give it and how the word fits into the precise con-
text in which it is pronounced and understood, all this points to a com-
mon structure between understanding and the game. The child knows the
world in linguistic games, the words are not a game but they trap thought
and integrate it into relationships that go beyond thought. (p. 129)

With which, one can easily distinguish the importance of listen-
ing in this game and in the construction of possible, feasible stories of
scenarios that are unfolding in the day-to-day interactions and in which,
following Balbi (2004), it is possible to distinguish two different scenarios
but that occur simultaneously: consciousness and action.

In the first, thoughts and feelings of the people who intervene in
the narration stand out, which are expressed in the language and which
reach the receiver to be heard and react to them. In the second, the acts
and situations and instruments involved in the execution stand out; in
which, the receiver can be involved, due, precisely, to the fact he heard
the message.

Then, following Balbi (2004) we can affirm that “in the narrative,
the psychic reality is always present and, with more precision, it can be
said to predominate” (p. 314) and it acquires meaning in a given time,
which allows the construction of the personal meaning, both of the event
itself, and of the self of the person experiencing the event. Over time,
feedback loops are created in which the language emitted, received and
heard plays an important role in the construction of human identities and realities.

Due to the importance that time has with respect to the narrative, it is always built in relation to it. It is important to make a small deviation towards the analysis of this physical magnitude that determines the evolution of a human being. For this, following Held (2009), taking into account the proposal of Husserl with respect to time, whose phenomenology is based on the analysis of the present awareness of time, which extends a certain stretch, depending on the level of attention that the person pays to the event.

**Time and its role in the narrative**

It should be noted, as Held (2009) mentions, that Husserl’s conception distinguishes between every day or ‘improper’ time, also called ‘objective time’ and ‘own time’ or ‘living present.’ In the first case, the ‘objective time’ is taken in a fixed and immobile way and for that reason it becomes improper since it is a way in which the human being has tried to control this dimension, without realizing that it is unalterable and fluid. In the second case, the ‘living present’ called by Husserl (2002) is considered time as an event and is closely related to the consciousness that the human being has of this dimension and, which is also expressed in the time forms used in the language.

This distinction is not new as pointed out by Chernyakov (2002), since it was proposed in Greek civilization by Aristotle and Plato and gives an account of the importance of this dimension in human history because it is intimately linked to its future.

According to Reeder (2011), in the passage of time, the human being and his conscience, assign to each object a ‘temporary position’; that is, object and time are integrated into a specific unit: ‘in the morning’, ‘today’, ‘yesterday’, ‘five years ago’, ‘in my childhood’, ‘when I was young’; there are so many other forms of locate the object and the experience associated with it at a given moment.

As can be easily demonstrated, language is the instrument used for this positioning and listening to this description (object and time) also gives an account of the individual’s history and its actual passing.

Therefore, the language allows the expression of this temporospatial unit placing it in three moments: the past, the present and the future. To the point that there are particular verb forms for each of them.
The human being is left with impressions that can last in the conscience during some moments; the perception of the here and now (of the present) is realized in a slight moment in which the conscience experiences the today that, quickly, becomes past and the future arrives. It is an eminently particular experience, due to which one becomes aware that something has happened.

Therefore, it is possible to distinguish two particular manifestations, already mentioned by Husserl (2002): time itself and the experience of it. In the first case, it is a physical magnitude that the human being perceives as a backward movement, while always immersed in an eternal present and moving or ‘flowing’ into the future. This ‘displacement’ that is not physical but temporal but which, apparently is related to a sensation of movement, is most likely linked to the sequence of light/darkness (in day to day) and seasons (spring, summer, autumn and winter) in the year.

Husserl (2002) considers this displacement as “sinking into time” (p.84). Here the physical magnitude is linked to the experience of time, since the consciousness of each person perceives it as a displacement, as something that continuously flows. At the same time, this sensation is part of the experience that is expressed in the language through different verb tenses that also help the listener to locate the description.

Therefore, it can be affirmed that consciousness, like time, flows and this flow is expressed in language. However, Searle (2008) states that it is possible it presents itself in the form of ‘states’, however, its primary manifestation is like a flow, in the form of a continuous river that does not stop.

The human being perceives its arrival, presence and departure; these are moments that are clearly identified in the language: ‘is, was and will be’ are the most basic verbs with which each person gives an account of himself and of the time elapsed in his narration. In addition, it also expresses the measure of this passing, in an ‘accounting’ series, since it is expressed in hours, minutes, seconds and other more common denominations such as ‘yesterday’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘in the future’ and many more.

Consequently, each object or experience is associated with temporary reference points (moments, hours, days, weeks, years) that remain fixed in the continuous flow of time; that is to say that a certain object, in a certain way, is ‘fixed’ at a given time and defined and kept in it, without modification.

Which inevitably leads to the fact that the human being learns both; that is to say, next to the object and the experience, the representatives of the places of time are also apprehended; that is, the units of
objective time that human beings have defined to measure it: days, hours, minutes, seconds, decades, etc., and which are described in the language used by each person when narrating or relating the experience with them. Concomitant with this process of ‘temporo-objetal fixation’ appear three related phenomena. In the first place, when the object and the experience become past; that is, they are placed in the ‘yesterday’ (whatever the period considered), they remain invariable, they are ascribed a given point in time and they ‘fix’ to it in such a way that they become history.

Secondly, the person describes the present moment as something immediate and slight since it passes fleetingly and without solution of continuity from the future to the past. The present is lived, and narrated, as something ephemeral that quickly dilutes in the flow of time. In third and last place, when the object and the experience are located in the future, they can be modified since the person cannot establish with absolute certainty that the event will “really” happen in the way it has been proposed in the language; with great probability, the person will wait for it to happen in such a way or will hope that it does not follow the course that is foreseen and, even if the object or experience is assigned to a certain point in the future time (tomorrow, next month, in the following year), what happens can only be known when the predicted point is reached.

For this, the person, in a certain way, is condemned to wait for the passage of time and that the experience be in a determined manner; however, once arrived at the precise moment, it can be something totally different and/or unexpected. Here lies the mystery of what the human being calls ‘future’ and the paradox of time since the past is known, however, it cannot be changed and, at the same time, the future is not known but it can be modified.

All these aspects, without a doubt, will be expressed and narrated through stories described in the language, in which each person will locate his past, present and future in such a way that he constructs a particular narrative, the same as It needs to be heard and understood so that it acquires a purpose and a vital meaning.

This is important, since the human being, as the possessor of a consciousness, experiences time as a ‘continuum’; that is, as a flow and not as a state. Then, the experience of time, of the objects in it and the narration that is made of it, by means of language, is also a becoming in which the subject fixes the object in the past and realizes slight flashes of it, but it is also projected into the future even if it is unknown.

This movement is mental and is subject to other phenomena such as emotions, memory itself and possible accidents that will prevent this
remembrance from being clear and reliable. The human being can only move to where his memory leads and will also do so through the language through which he tells the story associated with a specific time point.

In addition, apart from the awareness of time and this passing that is also explained through language, we must consider that the experience refers to some basic principles already raised by the ontology of language and that will be explained below following Echeverria (2003).

One of the most basic principles states that “We do not know how things are. We only know how we observe them or how we interpret them. We live in interpretive worlds “(p. 40). Idea also considered by Bateson (1998) when pointing out that the categories that each one constructs about things and phenomena are constructions of each person, although they are linked to particular objects; however, each person has definite ideas about them. The description of objects and experiences as well as the interpretation that is made of them, is done through language. Papa- lia, Wendkos and Duskin (2007) explain very well that, in the first years of existence, when children observe an object and point it out, the people around it indicate the name of that object; that is, they name it.

The cognitive importance that this capacity has for the development of language has already been determined, following Lenneberg (1985). Like the learning of the denomination of things, it is in childhood where we learn the denomination of the units of time that discourse uses. Units that do not escape the process of interpretation closely linked to the ability to name the things that human beings use to organize the sensory experience.

A large part of the people have experienced situations in which certain ‘temporary locations’ provoke different experiences considering the contextual implications already mentioned above: ‘close’ for a farmer can mean an hour of travel time for a city dweller or, conversely, ‘tomor- row’ can be a very distant moment for an anxious waiting man for the result of a biopsy that will determine his future and that of his family.

We must also consider that Maturana (1984) affirmed that the per- ceptions result from the conditions inherent to the biological structure and not from the features of the agents that disrupt the environment. The senses do not provide a faithful representation of how things are, they only give us certain information about them: size, weight, color, shape and many more that are then assigned a certain name.

Each of these conditions generates, in each person, certain experi- ences linked to memories (past), sensations (present) or longings (fu- ture). Thus, interpretation is a key element in listening to a given situation and in the experience of it. Therefore, we must consider what Echeverria
(2003) points out with great certainty, when he affirms that human beings, when organizing things around them, try to give them a meaning, assign them a meaning. The human tendency to search for meaning is manifested in language through the invention and adoption of stories about oneself and the world.

Then, the internal world, constituted by ideas, thoughts, emotions, perceptions and many other aspects, is connected to the external environment conformed by objects and experiences that generate certain stimuli, in such a way that the human being constructs and organizes his experience so that have a sense for yourself and for others. Later, each one tells other people these ‘meanings’, in the form of stories and descriptions about the world and about oneself that are connected with those of other people, which leads to the second principle enunciated by Echeverría (2003): “we not only act according to how we are (and we do), we are also according to how we act. The action generates being. One becomes according to what one does “(p 46).

These actions, of course, are described through language, hence their interpretative function that manifests itself in the temporal thread in which each one lives and builds a valid and meaningful story for oneself and others. Echeverría (2003) emphasizes it by stating that “since being human is being in a permanent process of becoming” (p.37) and language contributes to the continuous re-construction that each one makes of himself in that process. This process is carried out in relation to others, since each person tells stories to the people around him.

Therefore, the language, generative as it has been designated, that constructs realities, when it is thought of as a possibility, is constructed in a relationship and, at the same time, maintains them; that is to say, that language is, in essence, relational; it is a means by which one person comes in contact with another, communicates with another or as Watzlawick et al. (1995) points out very well, language is the essential part of a process of information exchange called communication.

Language opens or closes certain possibilities depending on what is indicated or chosen as relevant or even indicated as important, since life is the space in which individuals invent themselves. It is a space of possibility towards the creation itself; it is a autopoietic space would say Maturana and Varela (1984) and would point out Echeverría (2003) in the ontology of language.

In addition, Gadamer (1993) contributes in the reflection, to indicate that this human experience is narrated in stories that become own memories about life, that are told or relate to other people:
But this does not imply, on the other hand, that the word precedes all experience and simply advenes to an experience in an external way, by subjecting itself to it. Experience is not wordless to begin with, subsequently becoming an object of reflection by being named, by being subsumed under the universality of the word. Rather, experience of itself seeks and finds words that express it. We seek the right word—i.e., the word that really belongs to the thing—so that in it the thing comes into language. (p. 258)

This modeling, this construction that the human being makes of the world in which he lives and of his identity is a process that takes place through language. When two people talk, they speak the same language, which is necessary to achieve a certain understanding of the topic they are dealing with and the actions and reactions of each one. As expressed by Joaqui and Ortiz (2016) “other worlds can be known when their particular language is accessed: when there is expression, communication and understanding are possible” (p.169).

However, each person also speaks his own language; reason why, it is necessary that an agreement is produced so that there is mutual understanding, since, in conversation, people move to the representative world of the other in such a way that there is an alternation, until the moment in which it begins the game of giving and taking, which is the real conversation. And in this interactional process of exchange in language, listening is an essential part since it favors encounter, communication and conversation. Without listening, there would be no interaction and language, perhaps it would die in a vacuum, which is why this element is going to be addressed.

**Listening**

In addition to the act of sending messages, analyzed in the previous section, there is the complementary part, corresponding to the act of listening to them. This phenomenon, without a doubt, is essential for relationships to develop: a simple desire expressed through language needs to be listened to, attended to so that something unfolds and achieves the transcendence that, by nature, has the message in itself. The communication process.

The history of humanity also emphasizes, on many occasions, the impact of a word that indicates important revolutions in ideas and conceptions, even in ways of understanding the world. From the ‘eureka!’ of Archimedes who moved the world with a lever, going through the ‘And
yet moves!’ Of Galileo that took the Earth from its center, to the lapidary phrase of Mirror ‘My pen killed him ‘upon learning of the death of García Moreno, president of Ecuador, in his republican period, they all indicate key moments in the lives of human beings that have been marked by a word or a phrase that has been heard by other people and therefore, it is known about them and the events that have taken place.

All these words and millions more that are pronounced every day throughout the Earth, in different languages and with different accents, have reached other ears, have been heard and understood in a certain way; that is, there is someone, somewhere and at a certain moment, who receives the message and captures its meaning.

This process is also observed in the texts that resonate since ancient times and whose words reach the present moment. In a similar way it happens with the messages that are sent in social networks and that transmit with great ease what is happening, sometimes, in real time, to the other side of the world. Human beings also listen to these messages and they have an effect, precisely, because there are people who listen to them.

At this point, an interesting difference can be made between what is looked at and what is heard. Such a task could seem futile; nevertheless, it is something fundamental since the first, one sees, is captured through the gaze and the second does not, which undoubtedly would make the Little Prince (Saint-Exupéry, 2009) exclaim: “what essential is invisible to the eyes “(p. 26).

Sight, without any doubt is extremely important to know the world: its shapes, sizes and colors. However, Gadamer (1993, quoted in Nieto, 2005) points out that when the world is heard, then it is interpreted, “it is one of the gifts of hearing, of knowing how to hear that it is in harmony with listening” (p. 18).

It establishes a radical difference between what is seen and what is heard. The first reaches sight and is captured by it and, in the beginning, does not require any interpretation, only perception. On the other hand, what has been heard, especially in regard to language, is always accompanied by this second level of interpretation. For words and language to have an effect, they must be heard and understood, Linares (1996) points out that every narration is made by a person for someone else or as he says in his own message:

The dense plot of narrations in which the family of origin, the couple and the family of procreation are articulated with other multiple relational spaces, also significant although generally less important, constitutes the framework of the relational activity of the individual and,
therefore, of his psychic life. Admitting very diverse combinations of identity and narrative, in it fit enjoyment and suffering, ability to change but also redundant functioning. (p.53)

These communicational exchanges that take place in a determined time also determine the construction of the human psyche. The language is relational since it is the privileged vehicle to start a dialogue, but it is also the imperishable source of many misunderstandings, of literal interpretations that can lead to innumerable problems.

And for this to occur, the presence of someone who listens to the message is required, so we cannot fail to point out the importance of this process, which generates positive effects experienced by all those people who have told their story to an attentive and empathetic listener. In the same way, an endless number of difficulties appear due to the simple fact of not listening to the ideas and arguments of others. How many conflicts could be avoided with the simple exercise of listening attentively to what a person says. The positive or negative results arise, precisely, from the fact that the discourse has been listened to and understood or, on the contrary, has not been paid any attention. The discourse is always directed towards someone and human beings seek and want to find that other attentive person who listens to the narration of their experience, validates it and recognizes it, as much as possible, in such a way that the story is given value.

By doing this, Watzlawick et al. (1995) argues that the person who had the experience is also validated, by the fact of listening to it, or as indicated in his own words:

The basis of human coexistence is twofold and, nevertheless, only one: the desire of all human beings to be confirmed by others as to what they are or even as what they can become, and the innate capacity of men to confirm in this way his fellowmen [...] True humanity only occurs where this capacity develops. (p. 21)

Consequently, listening is not just the simple act of capturing a message and decoding its meaning. The act of listening entails a deeper and more powerful sense for human relationships, since it “recognizes” the other as a human being and validates him in its presence, narrative, identity and authenticity.

Following Echeverría (2003), it can be affirmed and coincided with the fact that listening constitutes the hidden side of language, since human communication has two facets: speaking and listening and much has been reflected on the first part of this process. However, listening is
Listening as existential openness that allows the understanding of the other

La escucha como apertura existencial que posibilita la comprensión del otro

something that is only recently being paid attention to. And this happens
in such a way, since the act of listening takes each person out of his or her
own thinking and rationality and returns it to the scope of what is shared
as Cepeda (2012) points out.

Listening to something necessarily implies the establishment of a
communication that can become a dialogue and then a relationship or
as proposed by Cepeda (2012): “what will come out of a conversation
cannot be known in advance” (p. 205). This introduces each person into
an unknown environment, is an intermediate terrain in which both par-
ticipants meet and in doing so (they) share, which necessarily implies the
ethical condition as a contextual framework, in which communication
and, therefore, communication, the relationship.

Nieto (2005) emphasizes the power of listening as an essential eth-
ical component of human relationships:

... to give an outlet to the voice that is kept in the inner and particular
world of each one, is to highlight its sound, generating meaning; but
first, revealing the common territory between the own and the strange,
which in turn delimits the value tension established between me and
the other, and grants the act of speaking and listening an ethical content
that cannot be postponed in the circumstantiality that links saying and
listening in a certain moment. (pp. 17-18)

Echeverría (2003) also affirms the ethical component of listening,
since it validates speaking: “When we listen, therefore, we listen to peo-
ple’s concerns. We listen to why people perform the actions they perform”
(p.157).

Ideas also shared by Cepeda (2012) when considering that listen-
ing is the most appropriate way to have access to the other in its entirety
speaking and, not only in the sense that is literally manifested in spoken
language, but in the most intimate and deep that is to understand the
other in an integral way and in the depth of his being that, may not be
expressed, but that can be heard. In this reflection, it should be empha-
sized that there is a fundamental difference between daily listening and
listening comprehensively. The first is practiced many times when you are
in front of the radio or television; it is a hearing without necessarily un-
derstanding what is said; It’s like listening to a song in another language.
But what is dealt with in this article is the ‘true listening’ that Gadamer
(2002) calls ‘understanding’:

Hearing and understanding are so closely linked that the entire articula-
tion of language is at the service of the situation. Linguistic sounds are
not enough: gesticulation and everything else must come together in a convincing unity. If that unit is missing, it is not understood. (p. 69)

Thus, listening and understanding form an indissoluble unity: true listening leads to an authentic understanding and this amounts to an opening towards the other in most of his dimensions. At this point it is important to highlight what is called the ‘hermeneutic circle’ in philosophy, particularly from the perspective of Gadamer (1993), by which understanding transcends the very nature of what is commonly understood by listening.

The hermeneutic circle refers to a formal rule; that is, to a way of proceeding regarding the texts that can be or want to be understood and that could also be applicable to listening. This rule is translated, in the simplest way: to understand the whole from the parts and these from the whole.

In other words, it is necessary to listen to the narration, all of it, from the multiple episodes that comprise it, since a narrative is usually organized in a beginning, a development and an outcome. In the same way, it is important to listen to each part that gives meaning to the entire narrative.

This rule is not prescriptive; that is, it does not impose a ‘must be’; it is rather a descriptive rule which implies that it says what it is and, in doing so, it is the closest way to the understanding that appears when a certain way of listening is established and not when it is imposed.

When a phrase is heard, it is usually understood in the context of the entire narrative, at the same time, that each of the words uttered is understood. The two directions of the comprehensive exercise (the whole and the part) are always conjugating each other. The same happens when you understand a text, a movie (another form of text), among other expressive forms; that is, that anything is understood from the description that is made.

Therefore, the hermeneutic circle refers to an ontological feature, it is a mode of presentation and conception of the human being; according to which, each one only understands what has already been understood and that has been expressed in the language. This leads to the fact that each person only understands and, consequently, only listens, what has already been understood, what has been bequeathed in the tradition to which it belongs. This is the ‘way of being’ in which, moreover, each one listens to what is part of this formal rule of understanding (what it is) and that, in this sense, ceases to be so to become the common way of expressing of the human being.

Therefore, the hermeneutic circle refers to the way of being of each person; according to which, one understands and our being is also mani-
fested in this process. In this complex situation, the historicity of human existence is captured and the fact that the human being is inscribed in a specific historical tradition is brought to light.

The ontological feature of the human being is the hermeneutical circle; according to which, the subject is a being that understands: to others, to himself and to what surrounds him, and can only do so from what has already been understood. This situation brings out the fact that the human being is historical, that is, determined by his belonging to a tradition.

In this way, Gadamer (1993) wants to question the idea according to which belonging to tradition makes each person a mere extension of what has already been. This is a way of listening and understanding tradition is supremely sterile and unproductive. Apparently, tradition is assumed as a kind of heavy burden that does not allow creating something new, opening other horizons.

However, there is another way of listening to the tradition that is not a burden, that slows the pace, that immobilizes. Rather, tradition is what contributes to what each one is, and that is the case, because each human being belongs to it and, for that reason, has an understanding of the world and has a world that can be heard and transmitted with language.

The tradition itself is not a burden; it is something that promotes a new understanding, as long as it is listened carefully and each one knows how to elaborate well the relationship between tradition and human being. If this link is sterile, conservative, too limited; the person is involved in a harmful relationship (also Nietzschean characteristic) that prevents understanding. However, when the relationship is dynamic, critical, active and permanently heard as such; then, it allows to understand new things, to open new horizons of understanding.

For the above, Gadamer (1993) also contributes saying that prejudices should not be considered as negative in themselves, as the enlightenment believed. It is in the prejudices where the belonging of each person to a determined tradition is sedimented, that not only has been heard, but has been assumed as truth.

Being aware of the determination imposed by the tradition to which one belongs and the impact it had on each one, the most characteristic aspects of this tradition, when it is listened to without any reflection; it is the fundamental issue that comes to light through personal prejudices and that are the clear expression of belonging to this tradition that has been heard and assumed at that.

For this reason, ‘rehabilitating’ the tradition implies modifying the prejudices that make possible a certain understanding, at the same time,
that limit a deeper understanding and true listening of the being of the other; it is thus treated, to be saved from a situation of misfortune with something that still has ‘potential’, by making each human being able to listen and properly understand the tradition and how it manifests itself in the discourse of the people.

According to Gadamer (1993), prejudices are the condition of possibility of understanding. Without them, nothing is understood. Only, thanks to them, everyone is able to understand. In prejudice it is condensed, membership becomes a tradition, and this makes understanding possible. How does it do it?

Prejudice can become something negative when it determines listening without the person knowing it; behind him, he is dominated by the prejudice that prevents him from understanding. On the other hand, Gadamer (1993) also affirms that it will not be possible to reveal a prejudice while acting constantly and behind each person’s back without him knowing it, only when he is, so to speak, brought forward.

A prejudice can become positive when, in a certain way, each person listens to himself and gains a certain level of consciousness about the determination he has on the part of that prejudice, and how is that consciousness achieved? For a prejudice to stop determining a person behind his back and thus to dominate it and prevent it from understanding, one does not have to do anything else but to ‘put it into practice’; that is, let the prejudice arise, appear. At this moment, it stops blindly determining who manifests it.

And how does the prejudice come to light, so that one becomes aware of it? This happens when something attracts our attention; there is no understanding without something drawing our attention and what is different usually does: it is something ‘other’, something different, something new that attracts attention and does so because it is different, not familiar, strange and this encourages listening and the search for understanding.

To stop our gaze and to direct the ears towards something, it is because that which draws attention, stands out in the midst of others and this happens, because, in the background of that something, there are certain new features, outside of what is already known, which makes it stand out, that needs to be heard and understood. And just because it appears as ‘other’ is that one seeks to understand it.

If it is confused with what is already known, if there is no contrast, there is no tension; if there is no longer something that stands out, then, simply, it is not even sought to understand and this does not depend on
the person, since there is something that comes from the event, which belongs to the plane of pure happening and, therefore, does not depend on the action of the person, but simply occurs.

The subject who listens and understands is not an individual who has control over what he understands; nor does he have complete control over the instrument he uses to understand what is happening and, in certain cases, he listens to the experience and its characteristics. The subject that understands is the result of a series of determinations that, beyond his own control, constitute him as such; it is a historical subject, determined by it and that continues to exert an effect that cannot be totally dominated, nor converted in any way into an object, neither of knowledge nor of methodological use.

When something is understood, a slight modification occurs in each person, which neither could be foreseen (anticipate) nor completely controlled; it is an ‘event’ that brings with it the possibility of understanding oneself better, insofar as, due to the event, what determines each person comes to light with what happens. And one stops being a simple extension of their power of determination.

When it is understood it is because something has attracted attention and the person has stopped to listen to it, it has not passed by, it has been retained because it excels in relation to something familiar, and judged and that does not depend on the person. What captures attention is that which exerts a partial power over us and is what we pay attention to and listening to.

You would never understand anything if that understanding does not go hand in hand with a self-understanding. When something is discerned, such understanding cannot occur without prejudices, it happens thanks to them since they are the ones that determine, not only what I understand (in their otherness), but also those ideas that, in essence, come to light. Therefore, we also understand ourselves.

This moment of self-understanding does not have to lead us to think that this understanding has a moment of full and absolute self-awareness. Gadamer (1992) expresses that this understanding of oneself is an endless task; there can always be new events that bring up determinations of which one is not fully aware and therefore cannot be fully mastered.

Here the infinite historical character of the human being is deeply reflected. It is always determined in a way that cannot be the object of full consciousness. There is always a historical effect that constitute everyone and that cannot be converted, in any way, into an object of objective knowledge.
History in the human being is a state of constant openness to the event, to what is not prescribed, is not predictable, is not controllable. There is no human existence that does not occur in a historically and culturally determined time. Human existence is pure historicity, it is pure finitude and what is all about here is to be ‘faithful’; that is to say, to stay in the idea that there are these events that surpass every human being and that cannot, simply, dominate, as a sovereign subject capable of setting limits, to everything that happens and thus try to control it.

Here is a profound critique of hermeneutics to the notion of the modern subject. On the contrary, the hermeneutical subject is historical and finite; open to the event driven by what is different from him and that appears when it is incomprehensible. This attracts someone’s attention and then becomes a reason for listening and for an attempt to understand.

The hermeneutical subject, as a historical being, is active, not passive, critical, but he does not deny his belonging to tradition, but he makes of that belonging the condition of possibility to be what he is. This hermeneutical circle experience is of an ontological nature (it describes the way of being of the human being, historical) and not methodological.

On the other hand, it is known that understanding as stated by Dilthey (1994) is an “ability to recognize an interiority considering external signs” (p. 322) but when this understanding assumes a hermeneutical task as posed by Gadamer (1992) always includes a reflexive dimension since “effective understanding requires the explicitness of the unconscious component of a knowledge operation” (p. 122). It is, therefore, to achieve an authentic understanding of oneself and others, Gadamer (1992) states that the real issue at stake is that “understanding cannot be conceived as an activity of comprehensive consciousness but as a way of happening of being itself” (p.125) and this concept acquires its historicity with Heidegger.

If understanding is a way in which the being happens, it is because it is a form of openness. Dasein understands the world both in its facts and in its meanings. It is a possibility of ‘being able to be in the world’, that is, it is essentially a project that corresponds to a certain vision that Dasein has about itself and its potential, which implies, necessarily, that Dasein has access to itself and possibilities of (re) discovering itself.

In this way, understanding develops in an explanation that Dasein makes of itself in the world and of its abilities to remain in it. According to Berciano (1991), this is an “explanation” that “explicitly places the entity, understanding it now” as something “within a world as a totality of relationships” (p.66).
Understanding, then, is determined by the relationships and context in which each person develops; adding further, as Heidegger (1953) puts it: “understanding is always an affectively tempered understanding” (p.146), which requires attentive listening to perceive and be attentive to the perception of the affections that arise accompanying certain experience, since with the understanding arise two other conditions mentioned by Berciano (1991) and that are concomitant with it: the meeting and the speech, due to which the existential opening of Dasein is manifested.

Understanding is expressed in speech, in which, Dasein expresses itself and also discovers how to be, how to express itself and how it can be. When the being has discovered the intramundane entity and understands it, it has reached a ‘meaning.’ Berciano (1991) expresses it very well when affirming:

Meaning is that in which the comprehensibility of something stops [...] is where the project is structured by having, by seeing, by previous understanding, from which something becomes comprehensible as such. (p. 71)

The other way that characterizes existential openness is to ‘meet’: here Dasein knows itself in its facticity and also in its temper or in its state of mind. This encounter, at the same time, indicates its responsibility to have to be. According to Berciano (1991), the characteristic way of this level is fear, especially by itself: “fear is something privative, which obfuscates and makes one lost our mind” (p. 65).

Thanks to the correlation between encounter, comprehension and speech, the possibility of ‘existential openness’ takes place, which according to Heidegger (1953) implies a ‘co-existence’; that is, a coexistence with others that facilitates mutual knowledge and makes it possible to open up or close oneself facing that same world and others; this mutual understanding:

This phenomenon, which is none too happily designated as ‘empathy’ [“Einfühlung”], is then supposed, as it were, to provide the first ontological bridge from one’s own subject, which is given proximally as alone, to the other subject, which is proximally quite closed off. (p. 128)

This reciprocal knowledge depends, to a large extent, on Dasein itself knowing itself and, as a being-in-the-world, finding it condition of possibility rather than it real character, of reaching existential openness; it is a constant becoming and transcending in itself and in front of the world; that is, the existential opening comes from the pure event, belongs to this plane and does not depend on the person.
According to Berciano (1991), Dasein is, in essence, openness, which is indicated in the prefix “Da” indicating that: “the opening that occurs in Dasein is the opening of being, which also belongs to Dasein” (p.65). Openness in the thrown state implies that states of mind simply occur as a basic condition of Dasein and of being in the world; then, the affective disposition is a characteristic mode of opening in which, the Dasein remains open to itself before all knowledge and will.

This implies that emotions are the most basic and primary mode of contact with oneself and with the world. Heidegger (1953) also states it in the same way, when he points out:

And only because the ‘senses’ [die “Sinne”] belong ontologically to an something in such a way that what touches them shows itself in an affect. 2 Under the strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an affect would come about, and the resistance itself would remain essentially undiscovered, if Being-in-the-world, with its state-of-mind, had not already submitted itself [sich schon angewiesen] to having entities within-the-world “matter” to it in a way which its moods have outlined in advance. (p. 141)

From this reflection we understand that the being is in the world in affective disposition and that this is a form of existential openness that, as has been said above, is expressed through understanding, meeting and speaking. The opening of Dasein is in very close relation with the nature of the affective disposition that becomes its existential constituent. Thanks to this, the senses can be ‘touched’ and, consequently, the world, the others and being itself acquire a meaning, are understood and then expressed in speech.

For this to be possible, a meeting is necessary. The Dasein, which is an affective disposition, which is in the mode of existential openness is found in an existential encounter that has, as a fundamental requirement, otherness. This condition, according to Nieto (2005), creates the need to have:

Of an intersubjective territory for the subject, territory of dialogue and discourse; land established by the author as a pillar of the structure of being, possibility of permanent exchange, between what is and what is in the way of being. (p.20)

This territory of dialogue and discourse, on the one hand, is constructed in the language that expresses the emotions, which shows to the self and to the others what each one is, thinks and feels and, on the other hand; it is sustained in the comprehensive listening that one makes
of oneself, of the other, of the world in its smallest details and without which, the construction would not be possible.

Therefore, speech, listening and understanding are essential in the existential opening of Dasein and thus, the second element of the equation appears because that other is the world or, simply, the Other that also hears what one wants to say or who also listens to what you want to express. Echeverría (2003) points it out very well when he states:

To listen we must allow others to speak […] Those who know how to listen are good builders of narratives, good producers of stories. Those who know how to listen do not immediately accept the stories they are told. They often challenge them. They are not satisfied with a single point of view. They are always asking for another opinion, looking at things from different angles. As weavers, they produce stories that, step by step, will allow us to distinguish more clearly the patterns of the event. (p. 158)

Since listening is hearing plus interpreting, as noted by Cabrera-González (2010), this becomes a continuous process of re-creation and re-formulation of what has been said for the construction of possible stories in which the ideas of one are intermingled with the thoughts of another.

History is not something that a person tells in the solitude of his speech; it is something that is constructed as a network of narratives, constituted by the stories of many people over time. It is for this reason that the act of listening has an ethical principle as pointed out by Echeverría (2003):

Mutual respect, in accepting that others are different from us, that in such a difference they are legitimate and in accepting their capacity to take actions autonomously from us. Mutual respect is essential to be able to listen. Without the acceptance of the other as different, legitimate and autonomous, listening cannot occur. If this is not present, we can only project our own way of being onto others. Instead of doing that, when we listen, we are willing to accept the possibility that there are other ways of being, different from ours. (p.170)

Then without the acceptance of the ‘other’ as different from oneself and having a narrative to do, the act of listening becomes totally impossible. It is, in this basic dialectical consideration, in this I-other tension, that listening becomes possible when the idea that the other has a different story to mine that can be told and, from which, emerges clearly and precisely the ethics of the relationship.

This is the essence of existential openness posed by Heidegger since it is the most basic and essential condition of the human being as
Dasein; that is, as being-in-the-world, for which it is essential to listen to it and to achieve an adequate understanding of this process, each one must show a condition of openness that facilitates the reception of the other as such, as different from oneself. The acceptance of the other as different and legitimate is a basic element of listening and exchanging between people through language. Echeverría (2003) emphasizes that, if a rejection occurs, the listening capacity is diminished and affected, considering that each person listens from two intermingled areas: the values, principles and ideals that each person has built on himself and that, in addition, intermingle with the socio-historical background.

This position is also supported by Nieto (2005) since the discourse of each person (and, also the listening he is able to do) will be the product of the particular synthesis that each individual has made of the particular historical moment he lives in and that facilitates a certain level of understanding about situations and problems and one’s own individuality. This author adds that listening is a complex act and in ethical terms implies a ‘want to hear the other’ that implies a particular way of being and being together with the other.

Listening, being a complex act, is fully volitional and highly desiderative since someone must ‘want to listen’ to do so, requires an adequate context in which to carry it out. The big cities with the chaos of their traffic and the mixture of a thousand and one sounds that are broadcasted in all its extension, they seem to not offer the conditions for careful listening, which is why silence may be much better.

Similarly, to listen, is necessary to be in an emotional state of tranquility and acceptance, an essential requirement if one wants to listen and understand. When a person is obfuscated by rage or anguish, the act of listening becomes more difficult. In the same way, listening is an act of showing confidence because there is an original openness to the ideas of the other even when one does not agree with them. However, to stop listening closes the door of communication and it is not possible to engage in a fruitful dialogue.

Finally, listening is intimately related to the subject’s own history. When in the life of a person there was someone who listened with affection and empathy, with great security we will demonstrate the same towards others.
Conclusions

After presenting the reflection above, it is possible to establish the following conclusions:

Language is an important mediator of human relationships. Requires the conjunction of physical, cognitive and relational elements for its production and understanding and can only be understood in the socio-historical context in which it arises, so it is linked to the processes of each human group that uses it.

The human being builds stories that develop in a defined time. It is a fluid time that unfolds in the form of an experience in which the present quickly becomes a past and leads each person to an unknown future.

Listening is an important alterity effort; it is the complementary opposite of speech and requires an important existential opening that facilitates an approach to the other in its bio-psycho-socio-cultural and historical totality.

Listening is linked to understanding, in such a way that it is not possible to understand one without the other, if one wishes to refer to a true listening that facilitates the construction of productive dialogues between different human beings and recognized as such.

This capacity is intimately linked with the history of each human being that is linked with that of others, in an exchange of ideas and arguments that consolidate the relationship and the exchange that can be ethical when respect and awareness of alterity prevails and how it unfolds in the life of each one.

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(Re)invention of the Past
As a Gesture to (De) Compose Pedagogy
La (re)invención del pasado
como gesto de (des)composición de la Pedagogía

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(Re)invention of the past as a gesture to (de) compose Pedagogy

La (re)invención del pasado como gesto de (des)composición de la Pedagogía

Abstract

The processes of recording the past in education commonly forget their pedagogic power, thus paradoxically contributing to nostalgic, fossilized accounts. However, the matrix junction of narrative research and critical pedagogies fosters the composition of stories that invigorate and inhabit a more sensitive past—one which is more polite towards life. We hereby aim at disturbing the classical perspectives of History of Education with the partial, fluent and provisional intention of intervening in coloniality and the normalization of the legitimacy of “the” educational narrative. Specifically the objective is a (re) of a past—the past of Argentinian high schools—from a methodology of narrative research—which weighs both the data of the field and the reflections on what is done with them—; by the abolishment of its forms and the inversion of its enunciation as a means to fostering gestures leading to what we call a (de) composition of pedagogy. Preoccupation that becomes paramount to stop interpreting it as a social science that studies education, because in this way it is usually relegated to its systemic, technical and disciplinary use. The stories collected from the Argentinian high schools, dislocate it from its classical notion to try to understand it as a narrative in which human relations of education are verbalized in an extended and vital sense. In short, they activate a discursive power as a condition to restore other ways of knowing, being and knowing.

Keywords

Colonization, high school, history of education, narrative research, pedagogy.

Resumen

El registro del pasado en la educación suele olvidar su potencia pedagógica, construyendo paradójicamente relatos fosilizados y nostálgicos. Sin embargo, el cruce matricial de la investigación narrativa y la pedagogía crítica convoca a componer historias que vigorizan y habitan un pasado más sensible y amable con la vida. En este texto se propone perturbar las perspectivas clásicas de la Historia de la Educación con la intención—siempre parcial, fluida, y provisoria— de intervenir en la colonialidad y la normalización de la legitimidad de ‘el’ relato educativo. Particularmente el objetivo aquí es (re)inventar un pasado —el del bachillerato argentino—, a partir de una metodología de investigación narrativa —que pondera tanto los datos del campo como las reflexiones sobre qué se realiza con ellos—; trasgrediendo sus formas e invirtiendo su enunciación como un modo de propiciar gestos que se encaminen a lo que aquí se denomina (des)composición de la pedagogía. Preocupación que deviene en primordial para dejar de interpretarla apenas como ciencia social que estudia la educación, pues de ese modo suele quedar relegada a su uso sistémico, técnico y disciplinar. Las historias recogidas del bachillerato argentino, además, la dislocan de su noción clásica para intentar comprenderla como una narrativa en la que se verbalizan relaciones humanas de educación en un sentido extendido y vital. En síntesis, activan un poder discursivo como condición para restaurar otros modos de conocer, ser y saber.

Palabras clave

Colonización, escuela secundaria, historia de la educación, investigación, pedagogía.
Introduction

“We are at a time when we must be creative because the narratives that the past has bequeathed to us in some way have not worked, did not bring the results we wanted.”
(Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui en Souza Santos, 2015, p.112).

The stories about the past of the Argentine baccalaureate - especially in the first half of the XX century - tend to be nostalgic. Stifled and fossilized in old times, despite the wounds impossible to hide today due to the screams, cries and smiles of our bastard societies, they continue to compose -even celebrating- the colonizing and normalizing pretension of Eurocentric modernity that still painfully inhabits our minds and bodies.

The different writings of what can be recognized as the History of Education make up an extensive and varied arc whose limits could be established between the stories that assume the historical analysis as a reconstruction of real events - through a rigorous work with documentary sources and a deep faith in Western scientific knowledge- and those who, beyond what happened, intervene in the texts living in and with those pasts, believing that it is not enough to tell stories or interpret them. The latter aspire to compose a past that makes it possible to live new experiences and collect reasons of the stories in education -expanding, above all, their pedagogical meanings-.

In the case of the ways of relating the past of the Argentine baccalaureate, taking into account the temporary cut-off of the first half of the XX century, it could be pointed out that there are at least three enunciations (Ramallo, 2017a). Although they conceptually, methodologically, epistemologically and ontologically differ, in some cases they could overlap and could not be added to a progressed and self-arrogated taxonomy.

The first - in chronological order - highlights the foundational features of the national schools in Argentina, the need to legitimize these institutions and celebrate the Eurocentric modernity that proclaimed in its civilizing and patriotic task the nascent state - in the then recently delimited and occupied territory -. Its characteristics are framed, then, in
the reproduction and consolidation of state/official discourse in the expansion of positivist knowledge and white domination facing the original savagery of illiterate European immigrant newcomers and the very few survivors of indigenous and Afro-descendent peoples, stripped of privileges and threatened daily. The texts that could be cited here, illuminated by the maximum expression of the saving western reason, violently express the fear of youth and disorder in an apology to the founding work of President Bartolomé Mitre.2

The first books on the history of education in Argentina -mainly with an institutional perspective- and even the texts of the pedagogues of that time could be located here, perhaps the most devoted work in this respect is the book *Bachillerato y formación juvenil* that Juan Mantovani wrote in 1940. Although the numerous institutional histories that were written and are still written throughout the country are also related, usually as a tribute to the ‘patriotic deed’ of Argentine schooling. In addition, contribute to this picture the foundations of curricular laws, with some exceptions, and various documents of the State (in its different national, provincial and municipal orders) that even in our times celebrate the civilizatory, nationalistic and elitist task developed in the Argentine baccalaureate.3

Another story, later in time, could be recognized from some of the classic texts of the professionalization of the field of education as a social science in Argentina. Mainly since the eighties from the investigations of renowned referents -academics and public officials of education- such as Juan Carlos Tedesco, Adriana Puiggrós or Inés Dussel.4 Without detracting from these initiatory and fruitful investigations, their common trait, perhaps because of their pretensions of generalization and perspectives of studies, is the view from above that usually encourages a priori readings -if not prejudiced-. Indeed, it is identified that these ‘critical and scientific’ readings almost unconsciously reproduce common places, such as defining the students of the national colleges by their male sex and members of the elites or identifying a uniquely encyclopedic formation that annihilates the capacity for action of the subjects.5

In the third place, from the local histories, the cultural difference and above all the emergence of a pedagogical question in the past, it is possible to locate a ‘plural and contextual’ narrative, which, from the day-to-day, relies on valuing the diversity of discourses in relationship to the Argentine baccalaureate and the different practices that surround their histories in our present. The local variability, the emergence of silenced subjects and the emergence of their own landscapes, collect unique experiences that don’t forget their place of enunciation, but their claim to
generalization. In addition, in some cases writings are raised that usually enunciate a History of Education not only attentive to the consolidation of the educational system and its institutionalization, but also to the legitimation of the schooling failure of the disadvantaged.6

The importance of this reflection lies in the need to decompose the disciplinary matrix of pedagogy composed from a nostalgic and fossilized historical account. For this, at first, a conversation takes place between the field of the History of Education, narrative research and critical pedagogy. Conversation that becomes a scenario to (re) invent the past of the Argentine baccalaureate, from a narrative investigation that is interpellated by critical pedagogy. Later, in a third moment, the past of education is tensed in a grammar between fossils and gestures. That finally, in the conclusions, they put into play the very fictionality of critical pedagogy, praising its decomposition.

The History of Education, narrative research and critical pedagogy7

In these last ways of relating the past - in some cases more radicalized with respect to that arc to which it was initially alluded- the (re) invention of the instituted stories is proposed, starting from proposing other moments of emergency, identifying different points of escape and recognize inflections in the normally accepted and reproduced discourses in our daily lives. From the matrix and intersection of narrative research and critical pedagogy, the stories make it possible to invigorate and inhabit a past that fosters more kind and sensitive gestures with life. In so far as, from a narrative and pedagogical question, the History of Education is (re) inverted and (re) invented. Scarce is need for clarification that the classic history, delegitimize and annul what was lived, in a representation of the past - always subjective and incomplete - that stands up objective, retrospective and justified in the distance. On the contrary, inhabiting it from the narrative and critical pedagogy expands the lived, the imagined and the affective, the vulnerability in transformations, unconscious of its successive manipulations and susceptible to remain latent during long periods as well as abrupt awakenings. Far from asserting ‘the’ historical narrative, the narrative and the critical pedagogy interpellate the uses and meanings of the past in our day-to-day and immediacy.

Critical pedagogy, as we mean it in this enunciative act, shares the vocation for the epistemic-political agency from the exposure of the con-
ditions of oppression and the complicity of social institutions in the perpetuation of coloniality and normalization. It spreads in a movement that collects interrupted and rejected stories and cosmogonies, while adventuring horizons friendly to human life. By placing its gaze on oppression, it names the marks of coloniality and expose a specific, precise and near mode of power in history. Likewise, critical pedagogy allows us to notice the ways in which the scientific enterprise has used self-arrogated legitimacy to assume power over the ways of saying of others. In the field of the academia, these signs compromise the questioning of the bio-power logics that silently control bodies and consciences from their field and demand attentive and acute vigilance to warn of spaces of possible freedoms.

According to Freire (2005), McLaren and Kincheloe (2008) and Giroux (2018), critical pedagogy is presented as a locus for thinking about education in political terms, both for the (re)inscription of the subject as an actor and author in public spheres, by the recognition that the crossing of power in education requires a historical perspective for its understanding and transformation. The bet of this pedagogy registers at the present time a convincing movement towards the extension of the educational beyond - and even on the outside and back - of the schools to notice and to turn object of scrutiny the rest of the cultural production agencies that fight for (re)instituting meanings and monopolize the semiotic frames in the social fabric. Likewise, they are concerned with the construction of hegemony in the discursive territory, and with the resistance and irreverences of (self) organized social collectives, determined to participate in the public arena in which decisions that affect them are assumed. Therefore, following the approach of Yedaide (2016), it can be understood as practices of discursive authorization, which provide powerful socio-historical signs while opening possibilities to restore relatively undervalued ways of being and knowing.

The History of Education interpellated by narrative research and critical pedagogy warns that the stories about the Argentine baccalaureate have echoes in the present. They are alive in the old corridors of the new schools, in the memories and in the experiences of the subjects that today go through them, resonate and sediment the present, feed positions from which to educate the young people of our century. At the same time that recognizes that the stories create a public space where they work with the past not only reduced to mourning for what no longer is, but above all, destined to what can be and what can be done. The stories in the pedagogy are projected, then, as horizons of expectations aimed at public debate, as a narrated action capable of eliciting both the narrative
imagination and being willing to not return to past melancholies. In effect, to pedagogically tell the story is to understand the political function of the narrative in the mourning of stories, in a perspective of the future charged with a liberating effect. A pedagogy in history departs from the scientistic neutrality and advocates a democratic practice with ethical-political implications facing the immediate contexts.

Then the past is challenged by the uses of its representations and interventions in our immediacy. Therefore, encourages to deepen the interpretation of the stories in History of Education and ask about the regimes of truth established in this field of knowledge. In questioning the authority of official accounts, critical pedagogy is committed to narratively deepening education -in the line proposed by the Catalan pedagogue José Contreras (2016)- sharing the idea that education can be thought and lived in itself as a process of self-creation. As long as it is not expressed in “descriptions of facts or interpretations of what happens, but appeals to something that is not in what happened: rather it is in the way of asking (ourselves) why it happened and that it refers to its meaning, its desirability and its possibility” (p. 40).

In addition, for Contreras (2016) the key issues are to choose which stories to narrate, what to ask them and how to compose them so that the relationship between the story told and the questions they awaken can live (with) together; opening the story more than closing it. From critical pedagogy as a matrix in the academic community that we are part of: the Group of Researchers in Education and Cultural Studies of the National University of Mar del Plata, we deepen the idea that this type of narrative research does not only involve a methodology specific -as could be the use of the biographical/narrative approach-, but also constitutes another way of learning, knowing and being. A form that is eminently political, by reversing the equation and stressing that research is a type of narrative. That is why it cannot be valued only in terms of its procedures, but in virtue of the aims to which it is oriented and the ways in which its task constructs or annihilates the political possibilities in people. In the words of Yedaide, Álvarez and Porta (2015) this places us in a dispute about the meaning of what is to investigate and what should be expected of this endeavor.

In concurrence with this position, classical science is mapped in the most comprehensive map of the forms of colonization and normalization that still shape us today, as the primordial habitat of our bodies and minds. For Yedaide (2016) in full dissonance and precise geographic-temporal coordinates that open up diverse academic-cultural fields, our narrative positioning calls for the possibility of naming and deconstruct-
ing political assemblies, in which we can self-arrogate a discursive power from acts of involvement with our temporary immediacy.

In embracing these ideas, it is recalled that in the social sciences and, specifically, in the field of education, the so-called narrative research has a tradition as rich as it is diffuse, characterized by the defense of the study of subjects in their own social and historical contexts -in opposition to the structures that determine them. In a discussion on this issue Chase (2015) stated that, despite its remarkable emergence, it could be recognized that narrative research refers to multiple methodologies that are in different stages of development.

Also, among them it is feasible to identify a tendency to explore new ideas, methods and questions, whose power lies in the consideration of possible meanings that communicate the narrator’s points of view and include (self) reflections that emphasize the importance of telling such a narrative. Therefore, for Denzin and Lincoln (2011), they collect not only thoughts and interpretations, but also valuations, emotions and (auto) biographical experiences that propose a democratic project committed to social justice in an “era of uncertainty”.

This tendency is part of a much more provisional scientific disorder, less authoritarian and with greater (self) reflection, at the same time that it proposes to interrupt oppressive social processes. It even highlights creative ways in which researchers adapt pieces of the world, combine pieces and become weavers -as Denzin and Lincoln (2011) suggested from metaphors such as bricoleur and quilt maker-. The task of narrating, then, involves constructing a plot in a combination or assembly of images -perhaps as in cinema- in which each interpretative practice that is put into play makes a world visible in its own way.

From these readings of narrative research is recognized, in addition, the instability of the statement always linked to the fluidity of new ways of thinking more about who benefits from scientific actions. And although there is still much ahead in the review of the social critique that narrative research proposes, there has been little contribution to the breakdown of the great stories of the unique and comprehensive ontological/methodological paradigms. Whereas the focus on human subjectivity, experience and creativity led to valuing the darkened binomials of knowledge: reason/emotion, mind/body -or spirit- knowledge/ignorance, theory/practice, public/private, normal/abnormal, among others.

In this conversation, narrative research becomes key to recording stories that contrast with discursive powers and that are invisible in grand narratives -such as capitalism, scientific rationalism, bureaucracy, colo-
nialism, patriarchy or Christianity-. Faced with the concern expressed by Kathleen Berry (2008):

> Where are the stories that reveal personal and local examples that indicate where critical pedagogy exists or does not exist in action? the small stories bring to light the struggles against the established systems of power that are created through the discourse and practices inherent in the great narratives. (p. 117)

In this struggle for representation in history and critical pedagogy, the subjects could intervene, especially those who resist becoming the object of a colonial and normalizing narrative. Therefore, it becomes urgent to assume political agency and narrate, in the sense of (re) inventing stories for unlearning and the emancipation of consciences. For this it is asserted that whatever the story of the past, this should be put at the service of what Segato (2015) called ‘the people’, so that we recover the autonomy that allows us to weave the threads of our own lives.

**To (Re) invent the past of the Argentine baccalaureate**

From an investigation on the stories of the Argentine baccalaureate and the composition of a narrative about the sensitive experiences of different subjects in the National School of Mar del Plata (hereinafter CNMdP) as an example and briefly, five disturbances are mentioned that denounce the need to (re) invent the consecrated stories of the Argentine baccalaureate.

In a first aspect when investigating the very foundation of the CNMdP, the personal documents and the interviews showed that, far from being an instance of consecration and expansion of the Argentine national state, there was a conflictive history between different local groups that tried to carry out their own and alternative proposals. -With regard to those expressed by the central leadership of the national State-. Vanguardists and officialists fought between the years 1914 and 1919 for the creation of this institution, which delayed in its implementation as a result of the demands of a school linked to the local landscape and the needs of a mostly migrant and foreign population. In addition, the most interesting part of this process is that, despite the apparent defeat of the execution of an alternative project of a national school, the rejected foundational proposal continued to operate in the institutional history and marked local variations, such as the double school cycle -with classrooms for visiting students in the summer- and a curriculum highly linked to the maritime nature of the city.
Added to this by studying the biographies of the teachers and recording their teaching practices, other stories of the formation in the baccalaureate are composed. Through the voices of the interviewed students or the records of classes and work in the classrooms -conserved in the archive of the analyzed school- we disturb the encyclopedic and anti-experimental reading, which according to some specialists characterized the teaching of the baccalaureate. These other teachings highlighted the pedagogical experimentation and other hidden training proposals of the great stories. The small stories illustrate, for example, different cases, such as lessons/trips around the city in biology classes, a Cabinet of Experimental Psychology that in 1925 developed an investigation carried out by adolescents, reading in front of the sea and other scenarios of nature that characterized the classes of literature or the avant-garde music lessons between the foam and the salt of a peculiar music teacher.

In the same sense, other subjects are recognized in this formation. Other students who demonstrate that a national school -strongly defined institution for the formation of future elites and privileged sectors- far from reproducing the circles of well-off social groups, in the local context a group of women, ‘gringos’ and children of immigrants of varied social origins managed to become high school graduates. Our argument is that, although the baccalaureate was characterized as representing a ‘traditional’, ‘selective’ and ‘elitist’ teaching, in practice it acted as an open and permeable space to which students from different places in the social scale (or at least of social sectors broader than those recognized by the discourses of the time and the studies carried out in this regard). In particular, the Mar de Plata baccalaureate was led by women - who represented more than a third of the students - and ‘gringos’ and children of immigrants - whose figure exceeded two thirds.

Likewise, the analysis of the students’ files and a series of interviews allowed to know the students of the CNMdP and to characterize their diverse school trajectories. Given its heterogeneity, we classify - the most numerous - into different groups: ‘successful’ (graduates), ‘transitory’ (temporary non-graduated students) and ‘summer students’ (novelty of the institution, they took their exams during the summer tourist season). In addition, these “other students” are such in several aspects, a fourth element, then, refers to different experiences and uses of the baccalaureate. As belonging to the CNMdP enabled social doors regardless of the Bachelor’s degree, in fact sometimes having the ‘third year approved’ or even just the first year was in itself a journey with its own density and recognized as such. Which also emphasized that the national schools had
a function beyond that of the baccalaureate. Even more so in a “new” city such as Mar del Plata in the first half of the century, its national school played a role in mediating the culture consecrated in a peripheral space of the also recent and under construction nation of Argentina.

In dialogue with this, the students’ experiences show a sort of ‘metamorphosis’ in their normalization as ‘respectable’ and ‘relevant’ subjects because of their public visibility. In this way, it is recognized that the baccalaureate sought to form a type of citizen that consolidated the ideal of the ‘civilizing’ national school -with both local and globally Eurocentric markers- just as the one spread by the modernity that characterized our societies. Also, the life in the national school is crossed by the program of social whitewashing, in the expectations of turning its students into notable citizens moralists, disciplined, rationalized, Christians, heterosexuals and parents, differentiating themselves from others by their ‘culture’ and ‘success’. Indeed, the official baccalaureate history and the voices of some of the subjects who were part of this experience founded their glory in the creation of ‘good people’, who embraced their formation with such admiration that the new times only inspired a nostalgic feeling and a thought.

Beyond these disturbances recorded in our doctoral thesis, the writing of a narrative fed by critical pedagogy polarized the stories of the baccalaureate at two extremes. In this dichotomous exercise we could say that on one side is the official account -canonical and accepted- where the subjects are absent in the stories or without the capacity to act. Teachers reproduce the current order of teaching and students are the privileged Argentine white men in a well-known and great story that celebrates modernity and Western progress. On the other side, small stories of teachers emerge, teaching in other ways, different from those legitimized with other students -regarding the recognized ones-, which enhance the agency and the day-to-day transformation without limits in the past. Narrative research and critical pedagogy, then, provoke what Nosei (2010) called a transition from enunciation of ‘nostalgic narrators’ to ‘utopian narrators’, invigorating the fossilized past, opening it and branching it to give rise to new stories with new meanings. While the narrator passively repeats the same story -just as a copyist reflects a work that is alien to him- the narrator changes and (de) composes the stories of which he/she feels an active and responsible part.

We could also associate the nostalgic stories with more traditional and systemic conceptions of teaching, while the latter nourish fewer authoritarian conceptions of education. At the same time, they raise an-
other (re) affiliation of teachers with the idea of modern education, in the sense that these small utopian stories are discursive gestures and threads of meaning to imagine other (possible) worlds. The critical pedagogy in history calls for not mechanically comply with a mandate of the inertial, in pursuit of gestures that remember that the instituted story of the baccalaureate is not the only possible, but that there might be others that Paul Preciado (2004) would say are missing of the archived elements, since the criterion of selection and the hermeneutical saturation of the canonical readings seem to preclude a political genealogy of the moments of emergence, vanishing points and inflections produced in the dominant discourses.

From a utopian narrative in education other brands are recorded, which disturb the naturalized colonial story in the relentless search for a “balance of voices” (Bidaseca, 2010), authorizing low voices that accompany the higher ones. Following Bidaseca (2010) it can be added even that the collection of missing stories reconstructs invisible positions, in a destabilizing of internalized theories of the obvious and in the understanding of a living past in our times. It is in this decorrer the stories point to cracks and cracks, which Walsh (2013) would say “incite possibilities to be, to feel, to exist, to do, to think, to look, to listen and to know to resist, transgress and subvert in spite of the colonial power” (p. 25) In the terms of Boaventura De Sousa Santos (2006) the important thing about these stories is not to see how their knowledge represents reality, but to recognize what they produce in reality. In the intervention of the real and in a step from reproduction to the production of new meanings. Therefore, it is important to recognize the type of intervention that knowledge produces in the stories of the past in education and to develop other forms of articulation between knowledge and emergencies, capable of intervening in the classical matrix of critical pedagogy.

The past of education between fossils and gestures

The authorization of the stories that promote narrative and critical pedagogy, that have become instrument of revision of the ideological and geocultural inscription of the practices, is relevant with regard to the place of the subjects in the History of Education. Beyond that (re) inventing the past of education is constituted as a double movement between history and critical pedagogy, the pedagogical question reflects on the meanings of the stories and the historical question (narrative) on the meanings of
pedagogy. That is to say that in this back and forth movement the stories (re) invent a past that offers the possibility of (de) composing the stories of pedagogy. The pedagogy from these stories is no longer understood as a social science relegated to its technical and planning function, in order to be interpreted as a narrative or set of stories that investigate the human relations of education.

The past in education commonly fossilized by its nostalgic enunciation place pedagogy in a taphonomic function, like that which interpellates the phenomena that act in the formation of fossils from the death of individuals to their findings. Therefore, the narrated stories utopically call for a resedimentation that buries death and revives life. This taphonomic function opens the fossilized story of the past while (de) composing the pedagogy itself, decentering and de-normalizing it. The pedagogy itself is (de) composed with the living past that dismantles its entombment from one (de) composition, in which the stories that are recognized as subversive - in the sense that they predate the stories we inhabit, by their previous ontological, epistemic, political and pedagogical reflection.

From the political-pedagogical practice of the present investigation that tries to radicalize the meanings of a narrative exploration based on a vital pedagogy, these convergences are useful for referring to a radicalized narrative character of research in education. Such reflections could be inspired by the idea of a composition - as Fine and Weis (2011) did - prioritizing the creative, subversive, fluid and humble character of the ways of knowing. At the same time, it allows an oscillation between the particular and the structural as a legitimate arsenal in the struggles for the representation of the real and the unreal, of knowledge and ignorance, of subjectivity and objectivity. Added to this, the idea of (de) composition refers, on the one hand, to understand pedagogy from and as a narrative and, on the other, to recognize a constant and never definitive and true process of fluidity and becoming, while also offering the possibility of (de) colonize and (de) normalize language - the first social contract as Monique Wittig (2006) pointed out-.

In this reflection one could also allude to the fact that in the social sciences and the humanities a composition could refer to the morphological procedures that allow the creation of new words -or neologisms-. In other fields of knowledge, such as that of the arts - to which the radicalization of narrative research and critical pedagogy approaches- a composition is recognized as a process of creating a work or also the sequencing of a choreography. Then, together with the idea of composition linked to the traditions and ways of knowing the arts, such as the ways of creating a
music, the stories could feed a (de) composition of pedagogy in the sense of (de) composing stories that they can compete for the representation of the world - or the worlds - and that they are favorable for the decolonization and denormalization of minds, bodies and spirits.

To (De) compose also in the present language means to separate the diverse parts or elements that form a compound or a whole, for example, an optical prism is a transparent body that decomposes the light into several lights of a single color. In addition, it can be thought as to un-organize a certain thing, break a mechanism or an apparatus, cause a person to lose calm or tranquility, a deterioration in the health of a person - or a part of their body - or the state of putrefaction of an animal or vegetable substance. With such meanings, more and less metaphorical, the radicalization of narrative and critical pedagogy becomes in itself an opportunity or a gesture to (de) compose disciplinary pedagogy.

Faced with the conditions of domination and oppression that humans compose, we understand that the transgressions that in the (de) invention of the past make possible the (de) composition of pedagogy always act through small gestures. In the literatures of critical pedagogy, the gesture has been recurrently used to highlight the partiality, fragmentation and smallness that constitutes our emotions, actions and thoughts. Given the impossibility of a zero coloniality or a total transgression, reinvest from what Porta and Jeddaid (2017) called the ‘sensitive affectation’ the day-today, our immediacy and our neighborhood.

In addition, the gestures could be interpreted as warnings and anticipations that are not essential for the future, as a transitoriness to live despite colonization and normalization. In this case they are projected as what we can do when we stop preferring the current disorder and, at least a little, we move away from the pretensions of the scientific and civilizational certainty that make up the stories of education. From a gesture of enunciation is that the past could become prophetic and hopeful, between the inertia towards the re-updating and re-articulation of the dismantling of the symbolic structures that today generate spaces of suffering in the un-banishable human vulnerability.

Freire (2005) and other critical pedagogues would say that a gesture mobilizes and remembers the possible that is the (de) composition of the worlds we inhabit, in which “hope is an ontological necessity and hopelessness is hope that - losing its direction - it becomes a distortion of the ontological necessity” (p.24). Recently the young Brazilian pedagogue Tiago Ribeiro (2018) invited (re) to think about our production context, haste and result -which imposes the acceleration of a single pos-
sible temporality of experiencing time - a pedagogy of gesture. In which the acceleration, anxiety, panic, depression and insomnia that confuses the time of life with time of capitalist production, interrupt what which arises from stories that stop time. A pedagogy of gesture - or a gesture in pedagogy - removes the plural, chaotic, complex, multiple, affective, poetic, productive, useless, suspense, intense, fragile human time and brings it closer to the time of learning and the kind life (P. 63). In addition, it reminds us that not everything is lost in the day-to-day and that the small and the minimum is gigantic before the potential of the minute.

Finally, we notice our gesture of awareness of the site of power and the civilizing and normalizing continuity that certain ways of telling stories in education still promote and that even this text does not escape. Although it is exciting to think that pedagogy has not been weakened in everyday life, it acts by imprinting new insurgent and still unknown meanings in human life. These transits, far from being fixed, emphasize the fluidity of what is enunciated here and project a necessarily changing language for education. To which they invite to abandon the (self) arrogance of scientific knowledge, delimiting these intentions that are always listening to other possible ways, in this broadening of horizons to inhabit a pedagogy capable of living in other stories more sensitive and friendly towards life.

Conclusions: Stories to dislocate pedagogy

The intention of this article comes from the concern to de-discipline pedagogy from its own histories, made invisible by the coloniality and normality of its legitimated knowledge. In as much they are histories that put into play the very fictionality of the critical pedagogy, praising its decomposition. Since the histories become narratives to stop interpreting them as just classical science and cause a dislocation in its systemic, technical and disciplinary use. That is why the stories collected from the Argentine baccalaureate, in addition, are an opportunity to understand pedagogy as a narrative in which human relations of education are verbalized in an extended and vital sense.

Walsh (2013) understands that critical, decolonial or southern pedagogy needs stories that result in “a process of unlearning for the recovery of other ways of being and living, from meaning-building practices in the service of good living” (p. 17). Among other writings of the pedagogical landscape, these stories share a place of knowledge and power, useful to discover how some discourses came to be instituted as truths about the
behaviors and bodies of people and institutions. It could be asserted that these stories activate a discursive power, a condition to restore other ways of learning, being and knowing that they become a civic necessity in the face of complicity with the oppression that their composition has still barely questioned.

Moreover, from these considerations the idea of decomposition is constituted as a useful convergence to refer to the particularities of the narrative character of these other ways of learning, being and knowing: that above all also involve and not only epistemological, political and pedagogical but also aesthetic and poetic questions. Here the concept of bricolage and montage of stories by Norman Denzin and Yvonne Lincoln (2011) acts as a grammar to bring the production of scientific knowledge to social emancipation and artistic knowledge. Indeed, for Denzin and Lincoln research could be thought of as a method of editing images, that juxtaposed or superimposed on one another (re) invent a story. At the same time, we emphasize a fictional and weak character, to which the decomposition refers, without the intention of looking for truths or analyzing a given or objective reality. And here these stories highlight the need to weaken the power of knowledge in education and combat its arrogance.

In an interview conducted by Ramallo y Farías (2019) Rui Mesquita expressed the will to weaken in the narration of the stories of education, “despite the false belief that the stronger or more we expand, the more able are we to get or have more power to transform things” (p.12). Then decompose is also a way to resist the trap that exists there, or as Édouard Glissant (2009) would say, the only way to grow is paradoxically to weaken ourselves, to decompose so that others flourish and do not disappear” (p.11).

Notes

1 The baccalaureate corresponds to the studies of secondary education in Argentina, despite the apparent disappearance of the national schools -original institutions from which it was projected since the second half of the XIX century- continue to be the most powerful tradition of teaching in the country.
2 Bartolomé Miter was a politician and military hero and leader of the first rank and a recurring honoree in Argentina. During his presidency (1862-1868) -recognized in official historiography as the beginning of the “national organization”- he established the decree creating national schools.
3 On a counter-hegemonic writing of the curricular laws in Argentina and in Latin America in recent times, the text of Ramallo (2017b) can be consulted.
4 We refer to the following texts as an example: Puiggrós (1991); Tedesco (1994); Dussel (1997).
Regarding the work of Adriana Puiggrós, we only refer to her assessment of the baccalaureate, while her contributions -together with her APPEAL work team- were key in the historicization of pedagogical alternatives and in the recovery of other fragments of the educational story against the hegemonic pedagogical discourses.

Only by way of example could be mentioned: Schoo (2014) and Cammarota (2014).

When we alluded to critical pedagogy we also highlighted the impossibility of separating - to our understanding - pedagogy of criticism, recognizing this field of studies in education for its insurgency and irreverence, which is even highlighted by systemic pedagogues and continuators of Western schooling like Philippe Meirieu.

In this case, the use of parentheses highlights a recursive and transitory action of the concepts, while allowing double readings and simultaneities in the language. Especially in this work the idea of pedagogical (dis) composition alludes to the queer and decolonial drive to compose the colonizing and normalizing pedagogy.

With modern education we refer to the idea of naturalized education that we mostly know, accept and share with modernity, since it was born with the universalization of the Eurocentric and Western culture imposed on the rest of the planet Earth. Today internalized by the great majority of educators, it is painful because of its colonizing attitude and the perpetuation of the social inequalities it proposes.

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Ontological foundations of Finnish educational system as reference for overcoming problems in emerging contexts

Fundamentos ontológicos del sistema educativo finlandés como referente para superar problemáticas en contextos emergentes

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The present article arises from the reflection on the failure of external educational models applied in emerging contexts without considering contextual factors of each town. According to Carnoy (1974) there is a strong tradition between underdeveloped countries of coping the cultural forms and successful models from first world societies, without having prepared beforehand the objective and subjective conditions that would determine its success or failure. The aim of this paper is to analyze the philosophical basis of success behind the Finnish educational system, with the purpose of identify in it, references to overcome problems of educational reality in emerging societies. In this way contribute to the discussion about the failure on adapting external educational models to emerging contexts. It is an exploratory, descriptive and comparative review, and the character of it is bibliographic and qualitative; in addition, it will make use of logical-scientific methods (deductive-inductive) with their respective procedures, supported by phenomenological and hermeneutical philosophical methods. The results of the copy and implementation of changes in education based on successful models from other latitudes, without considering the philosophical and epistemological substratum that sustains it, or preparing the ground for its adaptation, has resulted in poor educational systems that do not respond to the concrete needs of the educational reality of emerging societies, and limit and frustrate the autonomous and original creation of contextualized and relevant educational models too.

**Keywords**
Finland, ethics, Latin America, educational systems, educational needs.

**Introduction**

The present work arises from the reflection on the failure of external educational models applied in emerging contexts without considering contextual factors of each people. According to Carnoy (1974) there is a
strong tradition in underdeveloped countries to copy the cultural forms and successful models of first world societies, without first preparing the objective and subjective conditions that will determine their success or failure, resulting in educational systems that do not respond to the specific needs of the educational reality of emerging societies, and also limit and frustrate the autonomous and original creation of contextualized and relevant educational models.

In recent years, the changes and reforms made to the educational system of emerging countries, such as Latin American countries, have been directed to achieve, at all costs, the acclaimed educational quality and meet international standards, resulting in, according to Chacón (2009), an education totally decontextualized and disconnected from its reality.

Undoubtedly, the copying of educational models has hindered the pedagogical action of the emerging peoples of Latin America, however, the real problem lies in the poor, and often null adaptations of these models to different contexts, therefore one can see the need to critically rethink the educational situation of these societies, to understand the conditions of the success of educational models and to promote education designed for the specific Latin American situation.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the philosophical foundations of success behind the Finnish educational system in order to identify in it, examples to overcome problems of the educational reality in emerging societies, and thus contribute to the discussion on the failure in the adaptation of external educational models to emerging contexts.

The research is of exploratory, descriptive and comparative nature, and its character is bibliographic and qualitative. In addition, in order to meet the research objectives, logical-scientific methods (deductive-inductive) will be used with their respective procedures and will be assisted by the phenomenological-hermeneutical philosophical methods, for the study and interpretation of texts of thinkers who have reflected on the subject, as well as official documents of the ministries of education.

The first part of the work aims to make an approximation to the Finnish educational model, describing the principles, essential characteristics and epistemological foundations on which their educational philosophy is based. For this purpose, an attempt to identify the basic postulates of the philosophy of Finnish education, eudemonic theories, the ethics of virtues and educational constructivism is made. The second part of the work focuses on the study of the educational situation of emerging societies in Latin America, which will address the main characteristics of their educational systems, as well as the epistemological and
ideological foundations of their educational philosophy. In the third part of the work the philosophical foundations that make possible the ideal conditions for the success of an educational system are contrasted and the examples provided by the Finnish education to overcome problems of emerging contexts are analyzed.

Approximation to the Finnish educational model

To talk about Finland is talking about the success of a comprehensive educational and political model, as suggested by the results of: the 2015 PISA tests, which measure skills in reading comprehension, mathematics and science, in which, according to the OECD (2016), Finland was positioned in fourth, twelfth and fifth place correspondingly; the annual competitiveness report 2017-2018, which assesses the factors that drive productivity and growth, in which according to the World Economic Forum (2017) Finland is in tenth position; and, the results of the 2017 World Happiness Report, which evaluates per capita income, health quality, life expectancy, freedom, generosity, social support, as well as the level of corruption of private institutions and government, in which, according to the presentation of the BBC (2017), Finland ranks fifth.

All these indices and results show that the Finnish model has found the key to success in education. However, these educational results are not an isolated phenomenon, but are the product of a philosophy and ideological model that directs educational and government policies for the structuring of a support program for the integral development of its inhabitants. Next, the principles, characteristics and philosophical and epistemological foundations that support the Finnish educational model are presented.

Historical trajectory of the Finnish education system

In order to understand Finland’s education system, its characteristics and principles, it is necessary to analyze its history and the changes in education that have occurred in it. For this purpose, three decisive historical events are presented in the construction of the Finnish education system:

The first is the Swedish influence of the middle of the XII century extended to the beginning of the XIX century, which, according to the data presented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (2015), began with the crusade of the King of Sweden Eric IX (called The Saint or
Saint Erik) and the papal bull to Christianize the Nordic peoples, both events resulted in the conquest of Sweden over Finland and the cultural and linguistic clash with it. Later, in the middle of the XVI century, the Lutheran reform was introduced, which made possible the first translation of the new testament into the Finnish language; as stated by Oittingen and Koskenniemi (1960), in the historical development of the Finnish educational system, religious education, especially of the Lutheran Church, has been the starting point of public education, since the synod of 1686, it was decreed that “all the ministers of the Church should organize public examinations of Christian reading and doctrine, and demand certain knowledge of the latter for confirmation and marriage” (p.16), a situation that made possible the development of literature in Finnish language. Thus, since the XVI century, Finland experienced a great change in education, but also a time of religious and political wars that ended in the defeat of Sweden to Russia.

The second event is the incorporation of Finland to the Russian Empire; according to Sarrión (2017) after the defeat of Sweden, Finland experienced a time of civil wars caused by the disparity of the language, which led to strong internal social clashes seized by the Tsar to dominate the territory. Finland was conquered by the Russian Empire, “moving its capital to Helsinki, for practical reasons, since it was closer to Russia and easier to control” (p.467). Thus, as stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (2015), by the year 1809 Finland had become an autonomous duchy with great industrial development and outstanding commercial activity. Regarding education, according to Oittingen and Koskenniemi (1960) one of the relevant events of this era is given in 1866 with the promulgation of “the first school law, which served as the basis for a rapid development of the school system in the municipalities” (p.16).

The third event is the independence of the Russian empire, which occurred between the concussion of the first world war and the Bolshevik revolution that made possible its independence in 1917. With the independence of the nascent Finnish Republic, the search for solutions to the internal and linguistic conflicts of the nation took place, since the heritage and the cultural mix of Finland, the Swedish and Russian empires, prevented the structuring of a homogeneous education model for its population, mainly in relation to language. As noted by Sarrión (2017): “after the independence of 1917 education was conceived as a tool for the reproduction of social identity, literacy and political freedom” (p. 467).

In 1921 the law of obligatory education for all the children of 7 to 13 years was approved, the same one that consists in the Finnish Con-
stition and that according to Sarrión (2017) tries to overcome the evident linguistic fracture, that made impossible the construction of a strong educational system for its inhabitants. That law stipulated that “… the two most important linguistic communities, of Swedish and Finnish language, would have the right to receive education in their mother tongue” (p.467). From this moment the education system of Finland undertook the long journey marked by laws and educational reforms that have led it in the last decades to position itself among the first worldwide positions. Below is a brief characterization of the current education system in Finland.

According to Gösta Esping-Andersen (1990) the countries of the Nordic region of Europe show great commitment to meet social needs, which is why they maintain a heavy burden of social services. However, because of the great benefits and good results, the inhabitants of these states help to sustain the Welfare State through the high taxes they pay, and therefore, free education is guaranteed and quality and excellence are encouraged through social support and financing thanks to tax revenues. As expressed by Fernández (2014), Finland is characterized by promoting a high welfare state, evidenced in its laws, in its concern for the integral development of its inhabitants which involves health, education and other social services, and to build “a homogenous population in ethnic and religious terms, in which the Principle of Universality is the one that should guide the policy of its Welfare State: Everyone benefits, everyone supports” (p.90).

In addition, following Fernández (2014), Finnish education is characterized by a marked governmental commitment to achieve a high Welfare State, which is reflected in policies of global coverage of the social needs of its population. On the other hand, government commitment is a shared feature among countries of the Nordic region, which has led them to be considered as:

Social services states instead of social benefit states which means that social services of a public nature are provided mostly by local authorities, playing a fundamental role in the development of the Welfare State. (p. 90)

To this is added the axiological aspect of social organization, because, as stated by Melgarejo (2015), contrary to the typical individualist values of the West, Finland proposes as essential values “home and family, followed by work, friends and leisure time, while politics and religion do not occupy a relevant role in their scale of values” (p.58), importance is given to the value of solidarity and helping to the other in order to build a society of equality without discrimination of any kind.
Regarding the essential characteristics in the triad of education (knowledge-teacher-student) present in this educational system, it should be noted that:

a) The school contents that are managed within the Finnish educational system, according to Enkvist (2010) have a “very specific national curricular framework that has the force of law” (p.56), and it is the obligation of teachers to meet the objectives of learning stipulated in the curriculum. However, the curriculum does not limit or frustrate the educational dynamic to rigid and dogmatic processes within the formal or normative field, but on the contrary, it shows “enthusiasm for education, faith in students and teachers” (p. 56), therefore it is flexible to the changes that must be made, provided that its purpose is to respond to specific educational needs and meet the learning objectives.

b) Teachers perceive a good salary, although not generous or exuberant, as stated by Jakku-Shivonen and Niemi (2011) the key to the success of the Finnish education system is the commitment to the teaching staff, and support for the development of research, practical studies and mentoring, which among other experiences has led to position Finnish teachers among the most prepared on the world.

c) Finnish students are considered valuable members of their society, so, in accordance with the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Finnish National Board of Education and the Center for International Mobility (2016), they are entitled to full support from the State in their studies, and will be guaranteed a “personalized teaching or oriented according to their needs” (p.7), which maximizes the potential of each individual.

Principles of the Finnish education system

Before referring to the principles of the Finnish educational system, it is considered necessary to present schematically the structure that governs this system.

Finnish education as presented by the Ministry of Education and culture and the Finnish National Agency for Education (2017) is structured by: a pre-school level that is contemplated from birth to 6 years, time in which Finnish children can attend to free or low-cost day care centers for early stimulation and motor and cognitive development through the ludic element; a basic level of compulsory education that ranges from 7 to 16 years, to later make a year of complementary education, volunteering or work experiences that will help the students to decide if they will
continue their studies in the upper secondary school, in an profession institute or if they will opt for a professional degree.

However, whatever the choice of the Finnish students, the State guarantees continuity in the educational process. Thus, those who choose to pursue upper secondary education have the option of carrying out third-level university studies as graduate or bachelor’s degrees, and continue with fourth-year doctoral studies, while those who opt for studies and professional degrees can complete their training through specialized professional degrees. From the study carried out on the Finnish educational system, the following are deduced as practical principles of development and social coexistence, which direct it:

**Gratuity and equality:** According to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017), Finland’s education system is characterized by “offering everyone the same opportunities to study, regardless of social and economic status. Instead of encouraging competition and comparisons” (p.2). According to Jakku-Shivonen and Niemi (2011):

> The main objective of the educational policy has been, and continues to be, the creation of equal educational opportunities for all citizens. Education is a fundamental right and a public service. Politicians, administrators and teachers are generally committed to promoting educational equity (p. 3).

These proposals are supported on the basis that it is the people and not the capital or the raw material that are the most important resource for the nation, and in accordance with this principle, the State seeks to enhance the right to a free and excellent education, which “help to make the most of their potential, so that they become who they want to be and what they want to be”(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, p.3).

**Autonomy:** according to the Finnish National Directorate of Education (2007), educational institutions are authorized to “provide educational services in accordance with their own administrative arrangements, provided that the basic functions determined by laws are respected” (p. 5). This added to the gratuity and state coverage of education allows that the development of the educational system unfolds without subordinating to economic or private interests, opens the possibility to a contextualized education and coherent with the concrete educational reality and specific local needs and grants to the teacher methodological and procedural freedom in development of their activity as long as the central guidelines of the curriculum are kept intact.
**Equity:** In the research on the Finnish education system, in the online magazine FOYND (2016), it is established that due to the high taxes that citizens pay, the State can guarantee the total, equal and equitable financing of its educational centers, supplying them of adequate equipment to generate a good educational environment that drives the teaching-learning process. In addition, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (2017) the principle of equity fosters community life, as it invites “diverse personal development, the ability of individuals to act in the community, as well as promoting the democracy, equality and diversity in Finnish society” (p. 18).

Thus, equity becomes a transversal principle of Finnish education to face the problems of overvaluation of one subject over another, of judging students by their socioeconomic conditions, of rejecting them for their level of performance or discriminating against them for any type of disabilities. In this way, Finnish education seeks to build a more inclusive and equal education for its citizens.

**Skill development:** Finnish education is concerned with developing and stimulating the talents and potentials of their students. As proposed by Stanley (2016), in order to stimulate the development of personal talents, “from the last year of basic education and in upper secondary education (...) the labor practice through apprenticeship contracts between the educational institution, the student and the company” (p. 5). However, the concern of Finnish education is not limited to the development of job skills, but also to the development of artistic and cultural skills. The Embassy of Finland in Buenos Aires (2017) refers to the Finnish philosopher Snellman to explain the sense of support for art and culture, because as this author says “the strength of a small country lies in its culture, and this is its only path to progress” (p.1), therefore, the cultural factor has been strongly internalized by the Finnish population and is reflected in its educational proposal.

**Teacher training:** in the opinion of Jakku-Shivonen and Niemi (2011), this principle is the key to the success of Finnish education, and it translates into a “commitment to the teaching staff” (p. 6), therefore, the process of training future teachers is a priority of the Finnish education system. According to the National Center on Education and the Economy (2016) “in Finland, entering a teacher training program is already an honor. The Finnish teacher training programs are extremely selective, admit only one out of every ten students who apply” (p. 3), consequently to the high level of demand for the career, the teaching work has become a highly recognized profession of prestige.
According to Melgarejo (2006), thanks to the high level of demand in teacher training, the Finnish education system can strengthen its foundations by assigning its best teachers “in the first years of teaching, at the beginning of learning, where the fundamentals of all the subsequent learning: language, mental structure, habits, etc... are learned” (p 251). Teachers are responsible for ensuring the roots of educational processes and thereby ensure educational success.

**Independence.** Following the research carried out by the online magazine FOYND (2016), it is evident that the principle of independence in Finnish education focuses on helping students “learn how to think, analyze and acquire knowledge independently” (p. 1). Therefore, one of the main concerns of Finnish educators is that students are able to find necessary and valid information from open sources, which is assured, as Puukko (2012) explains in a publication of the Council for the Promotion of Finland, by the Finnish State that through a system of local and municipal libraries provides public and free access to information for all its citizens.

On the other hand, the Finnish educational system is clear that the optimization of resources in the educational process helps to enhance the autonomy and independence of students in educational processes, therefore, bets on the great possibilities and facilities provided by the didactic use of tools, books and the internet for teaching, learning and self-education. It should be noted that independent learning practices, based on the free access to information provided by the Internet or other sources that facilitate learning, do not frustrate or hinder the development of intellectual abilities and the development of mental operations in the student. On the contrary, they are presented as new and innovative ways of learning, coherent with the changing and globalized world of today.

As it has been affirmed from the beginning, the success of the Finnish educational system is not an independent and isolated phenomenon, since it integrates a projection towards the needs of the social, political and cultural dimensions of the nation. In the words of Montaño (2014), the success of this system is related to “the high qualification and motivation of its teachers, individual attention to students, continuity in political programs in education, as well as government support to students and teachers” (p.91). All this suggests that education in Finland is framed within a comprehensive program of accompaniment and social development and is not anymore simply a state function or obligation.

After studying the historical process, the structuring of the educational system and analyzing the principles on which this successful system is based, it is worth asking about the ideological and philosophical
substrate that lies behind it, that is, rethinking the prevailing philosophy in the policies and practices of the Finnish education system.

**Philosophical foundation of the Finnish education system**

This section clarifies that, information on the philosophical foundations of the Finnish education system is scarce, so it is decided to identify the basic postulates of Finnish education with the philosophical and psychological substrate intrinsic to their theory and practice, such as for example, the Aristotelian and Rousseauian eudaimonia, the ethics of virtues and educational cognitivism.

The first philosophical assumption with which it relates to the Finnish education system has to do with its aims, because as Jakku-Schivonen and Niemi (2011) put it, the aim of Finnish education is to make its citizens “become who they want to be and what they want to be” (p. 3), and for which the State will guarantee the necessary means to enable it through the Welfare State. In the educational field, the eudemonic goal for personal development is maintained. From this perspective, this goal has been internalized by Finnish society after thirty long years of educational reforms to improve educational quality and teacher preparation, which were developed as an “innovative” educational proposal for the conquest of happiness and harmony with nature, as stated by Jakku-Schivonen and Niemi (2011).

According to Robert (2006), the fundamental idea that guides Finnish education is that:

... a happy, well-developed student, free to progress at his own pace, will acquire basic knowledge more easily; it is not an utopia of an enlightened pedagogue, it is simply the idea that guides the action of everyone: the State, the municipalities, the directors of establishments, the teachers... (p. 2).

This eudemonic ideal of the educational system is manifested in the strong concern for the needs of students, the prioritization, individuality and freedom of the individual to establish and achieve their own goals of self-realization. In addition, this foundation, according to Ramírez (2002), can refer to the Aristotelian thought about eudaimonia, which “calls to live well and be well” (p.220). Finnish education puts in the balance an education for life or an education to pass exams or to respond in the labor market needs, and it chooses the first option trust-
ing that working in personal development is also assuring a better social development.

As described by Rousseau (2000), “the innate desire for well-being, and the impossibility of satisfying this desire with fullness, are causes that constantly seek new means of contributing to it” (p.207). In this way, education becomes a means to achieve this good life, so it has an edudeonic purpose. With this is understandable the Finnish Government’s interest in building the Welfare State. In addition, the Rousseuean understanding of happiness identified with the principles of individualization and autonomy that guide educational processes is visualized. Likewise, agreeing with Vilafranca (2012), Rousseau argues that happiness “consists of temperance, wisdom, the freedom to want what you can and do what you like” (p. 48), recurrent elements in the eudemonic end of Finnish education.

Therefore, the Finnish educational system maintains characteristics of Rousseau’s edemic naturalism that foster and stimulate the intrinsic and extrinsic conditions for the individual to reach happiness, thus struggling for an education that does not alter the teleological order of the nature of the individual, but drives their desire for well-being and fulfillment to live in harmony with themselves and with others.

The second philosophical assumption with which Finnish education is identified is the ethics of the Aristotelian virtues, understood according to Araos (2003) and Garcés and Giraldo (2014) as a reflective philosophical knowledge about one’s own life and moral experience that induces a critical education, reflective but above all ethical and respectful of human life. For this purpose, the origins of ethics in Finnish education and its identification with the ethics of Aristotle’s intellectual virtues are explained below.

As stated by Melgarejo (2015), with the creation of the Turku Academy in the mid-seventeenth century, Finland had its first higher institution at the national level, stopping the migration to countries such as Sweden, France or Germany for higher education; this meant for Finland a considerable increase of professionals at the service of the State. However, the Turku Academy was mainly aimed at training officials and the clergy of the kingdom of Sweden, which according to Melgarejo (2015) “allowed the development of a Protestant ethic that was applied at all levels and aspects of education, and of which the values of effort and personal responsibility are highlighted “(p.54), so that the ultimate aim of ethics in Finnish education is aimed at individual growth and improvement, from there, to promote the growth and development of the nation.
Previously, the interest of Finnish education in the development of the potentialities of its inhabitants, as well as the discovery of talents and intellectual development through free, compulsory and quality education for the whole population, all this about the basis of the good life (living and being well) was explained. According to Reale and Antiseri (2010), for Aristotle, man seeks to live well, and he achieves it only when he lives in a manner consistent with reason, which is why: “the supreme good that man can achieve - and therefore happiness- consists in perfecting oneself as a man, that is, in that activity that distinguishes man from all other things” (p.169). Thanks to this, it can be evidenced that Finnish education is identified with the philosophical assumptions of the ethics of Aristotelian virtues, more specifically with the so-called intellectual or rational virtues.

The domain of reason in practical behavior is for Aristotle an ethical virtue that can be perfected in each man through its exercise and implementation, to make them “a kind of custom, state or mode of being, that we have created ourselves” (Reale & Antiseri, 2010, p.170). To clarify the elements shared by both Finnish education and the ethics of the Aristotelian intellectual virtues, we can analyze the work *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which Aristotle (2005) points out the intellectual habits that form and perfect the person, which are: understanding, wisdom, art, science and prudence, elements that are considered by the Finnish educational system as principles for the development of competences, independence, autonomy and quality education for the good life.

For the third foundation it is necessary to clarify that the interpretation is made mainly from the theories of cognitivism and constructivism of developmental psychology. To begin with, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (2017) announces that Finnish children enter school education at the age of 7, an age relatively late in relation to the education systems of other nations, however, this Late entry can be justified from the cognitivist theory of Piaget and Inhelder (2015) by stating that within the stages of child development, it is from the age of 7 to 8 years that the child is ready to understand and solve specific operations. This was also explained by thinkers such as Campanella (2007), who in his work *The City of the Sun* affirmed that after reaching the age of seven, when the child has developed certain linguistic and mathematical skills, he would be introduced to the study of “all natural sciences, to show each one of his inclinations” (p.16).

Before the age of seven, Finnish children attend free or low-cost day care centers where they work on the development of gross motor
skills and social relations. In addition, according to Hernández, Figueroa, Carulla, Patiño, and Tafur (2004), in the first years the children resemble small scientists since their behavior is aimed at discovering, experimenting and testing the limits and functioning of the world that it surrounds them, so that their way of understanding reality resembles “the learning processes in which the scientific world is immersed; that is, the way in which scientists discover and interpret the phenomena of the world “(p.52). The child through play discovers his surroundings and turns them into his own laboratory, in which he will experience and submit the different elements found in him, as well as himself, to the test-error test to understand how it works. This is recognized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (2017), stating that for Finns, each child has “time and space to grow and develop is a basic principle (…) so that Finnish education takes advantage of the most delicate development, motivating children to think independently and be creative” (p. 6).

Approximation to the educational system of emerging societies

Based on the thought of Guerra (2007), emergent societies are understood to be developing societies, which are in the process of overcoming the “historical conditions of submission or dependence” (p.88), that is, emerging not in the negative sense of emergency as it is mostly understood, but in the positive sense, as a possibility for societies to emerge over their own historically conflictive political, economic, social and cultural situation, in search of a revaluation and recognition of their culture. This second part of the work focuses on the study of the educational situation of emerging societies in Latin America, which will address the main characteristics of the context and educational systems of these contexts, as well as the epistemological, historical and ideological foundations of their educational philosophy, to finish with the analysis of the concrete case of education in Ecuador.

Characterization of emerging societies

Being Latin American, according to Paladines (2006), is not limited to a geographical determination, because in it is marked “a qualifying action that is internal (...) is not a territory but a human community, concrete, historical, located in a territory” (p.1). Thus, the identity of the Latin
American peoples is imbued with a common history and a social praxis that has determined the proper way of interpreting and responding to reality, and within is located the educational reality. This horizon can address Latin American society and the common characteristics of their peoples, their historical development, their struggle for emancipation, their emergence situation and their educational system.

First, as noted by Nassif, Rama, and Tedesco (1984), the education system of the Latin American peoples has a common structure, which historically responds to the proposal of traditional education based on levels according to the social recipients; these levels can be identified in: “universal primary education, secondary education for the middle classes and higher education for the elites” (p.17). However, by updating this theory to suit the educational reality of Latin America in 2018, it can be shown that several formal changes have been achieved, such as gratuity and free access to higher education that, in theory, should mean greater equity and equality in living conditions and the reduction of the social gap, but that has only been achieved in part, because the changes have not been made in the substantive aspect, since the only thing that has been done is to go up one more level (Fourth level education) equally elitist and restricted to a particular social stratum, just as university education was a couple of decades ago.

Secondly, according to Guerra (2007), the great problem that characterizes the educational system in Latin America is that historically it has been determined and thought from the “interests of the external and internal colonizers and not according to the victims” (p. 91). To a large extent, the history of emerging peoples is common, and is characterized by the situation of “coloniality of power and knowledge” (p.92) that has not allowed to achieve a true self-valuation, self-possession and sovereignty. Katz (2016) reaffirms this position by expressing that the Latin American peoples have been historically molded and subjected to a state of dependency, which has meant the backwardness of the periphery and the impossibility of individual and social development and growth for the region. As Guerra (2007) affirms, these are the elements that have conditioned and historically frustrated the development of the potentialities of the Latin American being, and with this refers to:

... use and deployment of reason; to self-ownership; to self-knowledge; to self-control; to self-care; to freedom, autonomy and sovereignty (individual and collective); to interdependence and mutual complementarity with other human beings; to interculturality; to transculturality; to the planetary vision (Morin); and the sense of transcendence. (p.90)
For the aforementioned, and in the words of Guerra (2007), the need for a revaluation of the existential intuition, the re-appropriation, the decentering, the misalignment and the humanization that has shaped the luminous side of our history becomes evident. In short, it is necessary that the reflection on education starts from the concrete reality and the educational needs of each people. Every philosophy of education has as presupposition a type of anthropology, that is, a type of human being that will be formed, in the case of Latin America it is necessary to look at the free Latin American subject and actor of his own history and from there seek to develop an educational system designed from and for the emerging context.

A third characteristic element of emerging Latin American contexts is related to the alienating conditions of its praxis. According to Dussel (1998) there are two coercive categories of social praxis: alienation and liberation. When analyzing the situation in Latin America, it is concluded that it is determined by alienating structures and the imposition of totalizing systems, which repress human freedom and makes the individual a resource or tool of the system. However, the alienating conditions have been addressed before by great Latin American philosophers such as Alberdi, Montalvo or Mora who agree on the need for mental emancipation, as a break with the colonial culture in which Latin America had been formed, to achieve progress of the peoples. But that, unfortunately, has not been achieved and has ended in new forms of economic, political and cultural subordination. These conditions are reflected in the role given to the school as an instrument of reproduction of social structures.

For Dussel (1998) the alienating conditions can be overcome through an analytic and dialogic process, in which “the principle of the positive affirmation of reality, denied by the totality, leads to a negationist praxis of the oppressive totality, that is, in a praxis that in order to liberate, must transform” (p. 58). Applied to the educational field this would mean a transformation to the very ends of education, no longer for reproduction or to respond to external alienating structures, but an education for the liberation and empowerment of the individuals over their own reality.

Education must respond to specific needs and circumstances, therefore pretending that adopting successful external educational systems and models will solve all the problems of the people is a naive idea. A clear example of this is the positivist movement of the XIX century in Latin America, which adopted the positivist philosophy as an educational and technical instrument to incorporate the peoples of the region into
progress, following American and Western models, but which was limited to the simple adoption of a philosophy (in this case just to be a copy) and not to its assimilation and adaptation.

For this point it is clear that the best option will be one that arises from the problematic situation, from those who know and live that reality, however, it also becomes clear that the problem lies not so much in applying changes to the educational system (structural changes and functionalities that have been successful in other locations), as is the bad adaptation of these to the contexts of emerging societies, since in the application of educational reforms the objective and subjective conditions that made their success possible are not considered. If there is groundwork before the adaptation, as Zea (1969) states, “the original, if it has to be of any importance, will be given by itself, independently of the instrument and, moreover, by the way this instrument has been and can be used (p.58).

Finally, as Carnoy (1974) states, there is a strong tradition in underdeveloped countries to copy the cultural forms and successful models of first world societies, without first preparing the objective and subjective conditions that will determine their success or failure, giving as a result educational models that do not respond to the specific needs of the educational reality of emerging societies and that also limit and frustrate the autonomous and original creation of contextualized and relevant educational models.

Education in the current Ecuadorian society

In recent years, the changes and reforms made to the education system of emerging countries, as is the case of Ecuador, have been directed to achieve, at all costs, the acclaimed educational quality and meet international standards, resulting in, according to Chacón (2009), an education completely decontextualized and disconnected from its reality. Undoubtedly, the copying of educational models has hindered the pedagogical action of emerging societies in Latin America, however, the real problem lies in the poor, and often null adaptations of these models to different contexts, which is why is clear the need to critically rethink the educational situation of these societies, in order to understand the conditions of the success of educational models and to promote education designed for the specific Latin American situation.

According to the Mercurio newspaper (2010), in its journalistic note, between 1963 and 1979, Ecuador had been submerged in a series of
military dictatorships, which sought, at all costs, to establish a developmentalist model that would transform the country into a self-producing nation of its own technology and industrialization, in which education would play a very important role. According to Milton Luna (2014) in this stage education was aimed at:

… Establish clearer guidelines in relation to the specific roles of education based on the political project of the “nationalist and revolutionary” government of the Armed Forces. In this sense, education would generate training not only for development, but for the transformation of reality and social justice, to strengthen the nationalist spirit of Ecuadorians and to promote democracy. (p. 89)

However, this did not go from being a simple ideal that ended up sinking Ecuador into statism, and meant a big drop in the development index. From this stage one can rescue the interest to generate changes through education, although this has been directed to the industrial and technological development, which can be verified according to Luna (2014) in the enrollment index of 1972, exposed by the National Board of Planning and Economic Coordination, which shows an index of 35.7% of enrollments in technical schools, but which, by 1977, decreased to 31.6%. Added to this is the closure of normal schools that occurred at the time, and that generated a high demand for teachers for secondary and higher education. This is a clear example of trying to implement changes in education without groundwork and analyzing the conditions of the context, while large nations experienced rapid industrial growth, in Ecuador the development rate declined.

This situation began to become favorable as of 1979, the year that begins the democratic phase of the country, and with it the desire for a new progressive constitution, and a reformist government that transforms Ecuadorian democracy to affirm the very institutions of the country (El Mercurio, 2010). However, Luna (2014) states that with the fall in the price of oil in the 1980s and the high public spending that was dragged by previous governments, Ecuador deepened external indebtedness, and a new crisis was generated, which was confronted with policies of openness to the economy and the progressive affirmation of the neoliberal model in the country, but unfortunately they only widened the gap between social classes.

The aforementioned serves as a preamble to understand the changes made in the education system of the country, according to the Ministry of Education of Ecuador (2009) and Vera (2015), from the nineties...
to the present, in which Ecuador experiences three different substantial curricular changes: 1) the consensual curriculum reform of 1996, which proposed a new form of curricular planning based on objectives, b) the reform of curricular updating and strengthening of basic education in 2010, which again changed curriculum planning, but this time based on the development of skills with performance criteria or development of competencies, and c) readjustments to the curricular reform of 2016, in which a new structuring is made in the levels of basic and secondary education, which led to the elimination of specialties in secondary education by the EGB (General Basic Education) and the BGU (Unified general baccalaureate). But, nevertheless, due to the short time in the application of said changes, it has not been possible to objectively evaluate the concretion of the educational policies and reforms or obtain objective results of the evaluation and fulfillment of each one of the executed plans.

Likewise, we can mention the changes and infrastructural implementations made in the Government of Rafael Correa, who opted for a greater investment in education thanks to the good economic situation that the country experienced through the oil trade. As indicated in the documentary *Se nos fue la alegría* del Contrato Social por la Educación (2016) the educational revolution proposed by Correa in its first term of 2007, aimed to promote an inclusive, quality and efficient education according to needs and characteristics of the Ecuadorian population; by 2013, the Territorial Reordering Plan of the educational offer was launched, which meant that hundreds of single-unit rural schools were closed, relocating their students to *millennium schools*; but that, contrary to what was expected, meant a setback in education for rural sectors, as the distance, cost of transportation and time spent to go to school increased; this without mentioning the cultural, political and historical implications that the closure of the rural school for the indigenous communities entails. Therefore, the implemented changes did not achieve a substantial impact on Ecuadorian education, as they generated new problems related to an increase in institutional bureaucratization in education, academic standardization programs, changes for university admission or the closure of hundreds of rural schools, which have not allowed a really significant progress in the field of education.

With regards to the university in the last decade, emphasis can be placed on priority policies for higher education, which according to Zabala (2017) were: a) the program of studying abroad scholarships for careers related to the change of the productive matrix (exact sciences), b) the consolidation of the SNNA to guarantee the relevance and educe-
tional quality, and c) the creation of four state universities; projects that responded to the revolution in education and the search for educational quality, however, along with it, there are also programs such as the evaluation and recategorization of higher education that ended with the closure of 14 Institutes of Higher Education and left around 42,000 students without a place of study.

In the same way, following Aguilar (2017) in 2015, the Council of Higher Education of Ecuador launched a set of reforms to guide the institutions of Higher Education in the country towards the review of their curricula, which as a rule were focused on in traditional approaches and paradigms (p.132), this refers to the contents and objectives, in order to transform them and promulgate a curricular redesign based on professional competences. But that, despite the benefits of the project it sought only to answer a portion of the problem in education, since as Zabala (2017) states “these changes are discontinuous in nature, as they seek to overcome the inadequacies of the adjustments in previous levels to face the anomalies that cannot be understood in terms of a previous policy paradigm” (p.84).

The Finnish education system as a benchmark for education in emerging societies

The basic premise of which we start is that before applying any change in education, is necessary to prepare the groundwork first, and that is why, if there is something that can help overcome the educational problems of emerging contexts it is not the models or educational systems in themselves, nor the tools and didactic implementations carried out in the teaching-learning processes, but rather, the foundations that are behind it, those philosophical, epistemological, ethical and even bio-psychosocial development bases that make possible the subjective conditions for the success of an educational system. As Chavez (2003) points out, the philosophical foundations serve as a guiding compass and theoretical-practical guide of every educational system, since they are the ones that determine “the unity of thought that has to give coherence to the different answers that are offered to all the spheres of the educational process” (p.10), as well as to all the areas of the process of development and integral human formation that occur in them.

The holistic nature of philosophy broadens the field that education alone ends up limiting, as Valdés and López (2011) affirm: “Educa-
tion takes philosophy from reflection and the point of view of the whole, in order to clarify the problems relative to pedagogy” (p. 3). It is clear that every educational proposal, and therefore every educational system, is based on philosophical assumptions that determine the basic guidelines of its formative action, its structuring and its purpose.

According to Mantovani (1983) there are three basic problems of any educational system that are addressed from their philosophical foundations, which are: the type of human being that one tries to form (anthropological question), b) the way to reach that ideal of being human (axiological question), c) the very purposes of education (teleological question). As it has been presented in the first part of the work, the Finnish educational system is clear about these elements, which is why, added to the historical context and its cultural and ideological implications, it is clear why it success in educational processes, how its programs have been directed to respond to their specific situation and how the social dynamics have helped to concretize and strengthen their educational system. For these reasons, and following the scheme of the problems of Mantovani (1983) below is discussed the benchmarks to overcome problems of emerging contexts evidenced in the philosophical foundations of the Finnish educational system.

**Anthropological question:** according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (2017) the Finnish educational system seeks education that helps to achieve the best use of the potential of each human being, “in order that they become who they wish to be and what they want to be” (p 3). As an example of this, the education of the youngest children in Finland “focuses on the abilities of each child, giving support to their feeling of security, to the development of their emotional life and their skills” (p.2), thus affirming the importance of individuality and personal growth within the training process.

For this, it is necessary to prioritize a personalized education, situated and coherent with the reality of the individual and its sociocultural condition, so that the center of the entire educational process is always the human being and not the welfare of the State as it is in other cases. Thus, when analyzing the implementation of changes in the educational system of emerging societies, it is evident that their application is not directed to the self-realization and the deployment of the individual’s potential for personal growth, but rather to respond and comply with standards of quality that position the nation within international rankings and allow the progress and development of the State.
Therefore, the anthropological problem is found beforehand in the educational system of emerging contexts, since it broadly maintains the guidelines of the classical school that depersonalize and massify the human being, which does not consider the individual stages of development and learning rhythms, and that frustrates the development of individual capacities and the deployment of the potential of the human being. What one achieves with this, is in terms of Ortega y Gasset (1983) to form a *mass man*, a tool, incapable of self-governance and that is content to follow others and fulfill what the system asks of him. However, the results of countries like Finland show that if education works to help the individual achieve self-realization, consequently social development and progress will be assured.

An axiological question: once the type of human being that one wants to form has been established, the second step is to identify how to achieve it - that is, to identify what values, techniques and strategies to apply to achieve it. As presented in the first part of the document, Finnish education finds one of its philosophical foundations in the intellectual virtues of Aristotle, which will outline a path for the formation of the virtuous human being, through the exercise of intellectual habits such as: understanding, wisdom, art, science and prudence, which according to Garcés and Giraldo (2014) “accompany reason and by possessing it, govern the soul and prepare it to perfect true acts” (p. 221), and which, as stated above, are considered in Finnish education.

The development of intellectual virtues or of reason allow the individual to own their own actions and decisions, as Kant (1981) also affirmed by proposing *sapere aude!* as the motto of the illustration which can be translated as having the courage to think for oneself, and thus achieve:

> man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. (p. 25).

This can be summarized in the recognition of the individuality and self-governing capacity that each human being has, and that should be fostered by education. However, an education that does not respond to the growth and self-realization of the individual, will not succeed in developing it. This educative proposal of cultivating reason together with an ethic that values human dignity is the one proposed by the Finnish system, and that, if it was promoted it in emerging contexts, it would
achieve the ideal that Zea (1969) already envisaged of transforming the Latin American people:

> Turned and on themselves, they will try not only to know themselves in a certain horizon of history but also as men, as the concrete actors of that history, as those who suffer the situation or circumstance that determines, personalizes, individualizes. (p.96)

*Teleological question:* Lastly, Mantovani (1983) proposes the evaluation of the aims of education, that is, what the educational system expects as a product of education. For Finnish education, two closely related goals can be identified, an individual goal based on eudemony or happiness as a product of self-realization and the practice of intellectual virtues for a good life, and a social purpose that manifests itself in the level of social welfare, development and progress. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (2017) makes it clear that “Finland’s most important resource is its people” (p. 4), therefore it seeks to encourage the school, especially in the early years, to promote social skills as much as the development of a healthy self-esteem, all this supported by the social services offered by the Welfare State.

The Finnish education system places the educational process as a key element within the comprehensive development program proposed by the Finnish State to accompany its inhabitants from gestation to the death of the individual. On the other hand, by comparing the goals of education in Latin American societies, one can see the great difference that exists; for Latin American children, education is more an obligation than a pleasure, and its purpose becomes instrumental and pragmatic, a tool for improvement in many cases, but not a way to achieve happiness and self-fulfillment.

**Conclusions**

Undoubtedly, the copying of educational models has hindered the pedagogical action of the emerging peoples of Latin America, but the real problem lies in the poor, and often null adaptations of these models to different contexts, since they do not take into account elements that can actually help overcome the problems of emerging contexts and ensure the success of changes in the education system; these are the philosophical foundations that underpin education and that enable the subjective conditions for transformation in education. As Alberdi (1842) states in
his work *Ideas to preside over the confection of the course of contemporary philosophy*:

... there is no universal philosophy because, in the end, there is no universal solution to the problems that constitute it. Each country, each era, each philosopher has had a peculiar philosophy (...) because each country, each epoch and each school has given different solutions to problems. (p. 6)

In the same way it can be affirmed that there is no universal education model, there is no perfect educational system that can obtain the same results in all latitudes, since they always respond to the interests and needs of their context and of whom develops them. However, this does not mean that they are destined to fail in different circumstances and geographies, if it is useful to solve a problem from another latitude then one must study its philosophical, epistemological and its historical-cultural context to determine if it can be assimilated and adapted to the reality one wants to confront. In this way, avoid reproducing copies or distorting the original model; and, on the contrary, a necessary, grounded, situated and coherent adaptation to the circumstances of the concrete educational reality is proposed. It is necessary to consider that within every educational system converge psychological aspects of human development, socio-historical-cultural aspects and formative policies that provide with meaning and purpose to educational planning, which integrates theory and praxis as dynamic elements of any educational process.

In summary, the result of copying and implementing changes in education based on successful models from other latitudes, without considering the philosophical and epistemological substratum that sustains it, or without groundwork for its adaptation, have resulted in poor educational systems, that do not respond to the specific needs of the educational reality of emerging societies, and that also limit and frustrate the autonomous and original creation of contextualized and relevant educational models.

Notes

1. The Diplomatic Information Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (2018) describes Finland as a republic of northern Europe, belonging to the European Union, and whose capital is Helsinki. Its population is around 5.5 million inhabitants and its official languages are Finnish and Swedish.
2. PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) is “a continuous program that offers ideas for educational practices and policies, and helps to track student
trends in the acquisition of knowledge and skills in different countries and in different demographic subgroups of each country “(Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, 2016, p.3).

According to the definition of Pedro Fernández (2017), the welfare state is a set of activities developed by governments, and are related to “the search for social and redistributive purposes through state budgets, such as: unemployment benefits or old age, health care, services and provision of housing, food and other welfare services “(p.1). In addition, as Gösta Esping-Andersen states, the Social-Democratic or Nordic model of the Welfare State “covers all risks based on the principle of universality of social benefits. It involves the transformation of traditional social assistance systems into systems with erga omnes rights (in front of everyone) and extensive social services programs “(in Fernández, 2017, p.1).

The Finnish government grants free school books, as well as Tablets and open access to wireless internet for all students.

The exact data on the closing of schools at the national level has not been made public, however, Domingo Mina, ex-leader of the former Union of Educators (UNE), in a newspaper article from El Comercio newspaper (2018) states that: only “in the last 10 years, in the Esmeraldas canton, 265 schools were closed “(p.1), of which 30% were single-teacher.

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Print ISSN: 1390-3861 / Electronic ISSN: 1390-8626, pp. 233-260.
MANTOVANI, Juan

MELGAREJO, Xavier

MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES DE FINLANDIA

MINISTERIO DE EDUCACION

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Ontological foundations of finnish educational system as reference for overcoming problems

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WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM

ZABALA, Tania

ZEA, Leopoldo

Document receipt date: June 10, 2018
Document review date: August 20, 2018
Document approval date: September 25, 2018
Document publication date: July 15, 2019

© Universidad Politécnica Salesiana del Ecuador
Print ISSN: 1390-3861 / Electronic ISSN: 1390-8626, pp. 233-260.
THE CONCEPT OF CRITICAL THINKING ACCORDING TO CHILEAN PRESHIELD TEACHERS

El concepto de pensamiento crítico según estudiantes chilenos de pedagogía

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the concept of critical thinking according to the perspective of a group of preservice teachers from a Chilean university; they are currently in the fourth year of their program. Twenty future teachers participated in a focus group discussion in which they expressed their perspectives on the subject. The answers collected were analyzed using the content analysis technique, which allowed the creation of different categories. Among the most recurrent concepts about critical thinking, we could find: analyzing, reflecting, reasoning, change generation and problem solving. The students defined a critical thinker in their different dimensions: as someone competent, both cognitively and socially, and, at the same time, as someone who takes personal and collective aspects into account. The interviewees also mentioned their role of educating critical thinkers, and explained some of the key elements for making that possible. Some of them were: teaching the importance of feeding on reliable information sources, and accepting feedback from their peers. After a comparison between the interviewees’ conceptualizations and the existing literature, it is found that the students’ perspectives are closely related to those of theory.

Keywords
Thinking, pedagogy, conceptualization, content analysis, student, teacher.

Introduction

The improvement of educational quality is currently facing challenges such as developing competencies of scientific skills, encouraging participation, improving the level of knowledge, adapting to diversity, not
allowing oneself to be influenced by ideological pressures or groups of power and moving towards autonomy of the thought (Marsillac and Gastalho, 2012, Morales et al., 2018).

Critical thinking is seen as a fundamental part of the skills that a cultured human being should have. It is required in academic and work contexts of different kinds and the subject has been studied for decades. Following this logic, it is expected that students of pedagogy, who are just steps away from being educators, know, at least roughly, what it is to be a critical thinker and how we can get to train one, in order to continue the knowledge network and apply what they have learned in their formative years, thus obtaining competent students in the application of critical thinking in various fields.

Unfortunately, it is not easy to find a brief or exact definition of this concept, on the contrary, it is very complex and includes several axes, therefore it is essential to learn about it through much reading and analysis. On the other hand, since this concept is not easy to explain, many educated people - despite understanding its meaning and being able to judge their presence or absence - are unable to provide a satisfactory definition.

For the above, it has been pointed out that the formation of critical thinking is a complex reality, since there is no general agreement about its definition (Davies, 2011), nor about what are the skills that make up critical thinking. It has been historically defined as a type of elaborated thinking, that is, as a cognitive process that involves evaluation and reflection (Butler, 2012, Saiz and Rivas, 2008a), which allows the construction of new knowledge and the strategic use of it in the solution of problems present in daily life (Black, 2012; Marin and Halpern, 2011).

The study that gives context to this publication aims to know if this is the case of the Chilean pedagogy students, who in the future will assume an important role in the understanding and application of this concept in many children and young people. In addition, it is inserted in the context of the research project DIUBB 152023 3/IDU: “Evaluation of a training program in critical thinking based on collaborative learning in students of pedagogy in mathematics and pedagogy in natural sciences of the Universidad del Bío-Bío” (Directorate of Research of the Universidad del Bío-Bío).

The objective of the research is to analyze the conceptualization of critical thinking presented by students of pedagogical majors at a Chilean university. This paper presents an analysis made with the participants of the research, then, it is an interpretive and descriptive case study, which seeks to deepen the concept of critical thinking from the perspective of the pedagogy students, who will become teachers of the Chilean school system.
Critical thinking is a recurring theme in different fields of knowledge. It is not only a desirable behavior, but also one that occupies a large part of the objectives that educators establish in their respective areas. López (2012) states that we should focus on “the formation of critical students, who become aware or question their social and historical reality and participate in their role as social actors as main goals” (p. 43). The development of critical thinking has taken more and more ground in the classroom, from an early age, and seems to be the key to success not only academic and labor fields, but also personal. For Saiz and Rivas (2008), this capacity is key for any active member of a society. Citizens with responsibilities in the future of a society should have sufficient development of their argumentation or decision-making skills. In short, they should manifest good performance in the skills that define critical thinking. Critical thinking, according to Saiz and Rivas (2008a) involves “a process of searching for knowledge, through reasoning skills, problem solving and decision making, which allows us to achieve, with the greatest effectiveness, the desired results” (p.28)

Critical thinking is, then, a complex and elementary process in equal proportions. Acosta (2018) states that “it intervenes in all human facets because of what is associated with the totality of the human being” (p. 213); likewise, Díaz-Barriga (2001) postulates that critical thinking is much more complex than a simple set of specific skills without a specific context or content, since it supposes a set of different skills and brings together different characteristics. Likewise, López (2012) mentions that “it is located as a complex, high-level thinking skill that involves other skills (comprehension, deduction, categorization, judgments, among others)” (p. 43). In spite of being studied constantly, for several decades, this sum of abilities that conform it already was being talked about.

The taxonomy of educative objectives of Bloom (1956) classified the skills hierarchically, dividing them in steps. The first, being the least complex (memory), followed by the steps of understanding and analysis, and ascending to synthesis and evaluation, achieving critical thinking. In other words, it is impossible to achieve critical thinking without climbing all the steps. Piette (1998) organizes skills in three groups. The first, includes the ability to clarify the received information, for example, formulate and understand questions and definitions, differentiate different elements of a problem or an argument, among others. The second, includes the ability to make judgments about the accuracy of the received information, here are skills such as judging and questioning the cred-
ibility of the information. The third group, finally, is where the received information is evaluated, here conclusions are reached, hypotheses and arguments are formulated, generalized and inferred.

Whatever the classification, each skill, from the simplest to the most complex, must be developed to reach the goal of critical thinking. But what is critical thinking in itself? We know that it is appreciated and considered crucial, but, as Saiz states (in Saiz and Nieto, 2008) “the way of assessing intellectual skills depends very much on how we understand them” (p. 25). These authors speak of the systematic, analytical, impartial, curiosity, the search for truth and trust in reason as elements that perhaps do not define, but they do characterize this type of thinking.

Based on some theoretical reviews on measurement instruments and experiences in the promotion of critical thinking (Ossa et al., 2017, Ossa and Díaz, 2017), it has been found that many cognitive processes are integrated into this construct and are not always explicit in the reasons for the differences between the theoretical models that develop or evaluate critical thinking. Therefore, it is important to also question what defines this type of thinking.

According to Halpern (2003), critical thinking is composed of several elements, both cognitive and non-cognitive (figure 1).

Figure 1
Components of critical thinking

Source: Halpern, 2003
In the classification of Halpern (2003) it can be seen that critical thinking goes much further than the domain of certain mental abilities. This is rather a set of social and practical skills, such as collecting and using tools that allow a good decision making in a specific context, that is, it is not only about developing a logical reasoning, but also requires being able to solve problems satisfactorily in real time and in a real environment. According to Acosta (2018), it is relevant to consider that this type of thinking must be flexible, reasonable, reflective and evaluative in such a way that it allows an adequate evaluation of the actions and decisions.

Saiz (2002) and Saiz and Rivas (2008a and b) -inspired by the Halpern model (2003) - argue that critical thinking focuses on reasoning to establish the process of refining thought. In this model, the first step is linked to the process of analyzing information, allowing proposing and reviewing hypotheses to understand the relationships between the elements that make up information, as well as the relationship between that information and its consequences. In this way, the argumentative skill is valued as a basic element, considered as the ability to investigate and organize valid and pertinent information around a logical argument that allows the communication of information (Torres da Silva, 2016).

The evaluation of the argumentation is fundamental in both models, because it is understood that critical thinking is nourished by a logical-formal process in its underlying structure, which incorporates different levels of reasoning for the analysis, be it deductive or inductive (Saiz, 2002). However, and like Halpern, accompanying the argument, it includes the ability to make decisions using arguments evaluated and validated through reasoning, as an effective way to find solutions to problems that occur in everyday life (Saiz and Rivas, 2008b).

It should also be noted that, in the contemporary perspective on critical thinking, space is given for emotional characteristics, beyond the cognitive, such as motivation and attitudes. Critical thinking, according to López (2012):

It is also distinguished by the dispositions that each person contributes to a task of thought, such as mental openness, the attempt to be well and sensitivity to beliefs, feelings and knowledge of others and the way they face the challenges of life (p. 41).

Ennis (2011), on the other hand, classifies these emotional and cognitive skills into separate categories within critical thinking. These are: dispositions (being empathetic and open-minded) and capabilities
(analyzing, making criticisms). The emotional factor is a great actor in learning and it is also for any process that requires complex reasoning. As can be seen, with the passage of time, more factors have been added to this concept that is so difficult to explain, for example, in certain cases it is spoken not only of dispositions and skills, but of certain characteristics of critical thinking. However, the consideration of emotional factors is still poorly integrated to the models that evaluate or promote this ability, sometimes generating different instruments to measure the cognitive components and the dispositional components that are related to the emotional and motivational (Valenzuela and Nieto, 2008). This primacy of the cognitive over the emotional in the explanation of thought processes may be due to the philosophical and scientific tradition presented by psychology, especially from the cognitivist perspective, which has permeated historically the study of thought (Subía and Gordón, 2014).

Interpretations of the concept of critical thinking

Despite the varied definitions of the concept of critical thinking, there is a kind of common framework that is tied to the general interpretation of the concept. In general terms, it can be defined according to Lipman (1998) as “a conceptually rich, coherently organized and persistently exploratory thought” (p.62). With this definition it can be pointed out that there are, at least, four requirements that are key in this type of thinking: complexity, depth, coherence and curiosity; the critical thinker reasons in a profound way, is consistent with his thinking and acting, and thirsts for greater knowledge or understanding.

It should also be noted that, in addition to achieving this deep reasoning, it is also necessary to reflect on it in order to evaluate it and learn from it, as explained by Valenzuela and Nieto (2008): “Critical thinking involves evaluation or judgment, both the result of thought and the process, with the aim of providing a useful and accurate feedback that serves to improve it” (p.2).

Such a broad concept brings with it multiple interpretations, which do not always come close to reality and can confuse those who believe they understand what critical thinking is. Paul, Binker, Martin, Vetrano and Kreklau (1995) state that, in many cases, students and teachers understand critical thinking as a negative concept, similar to being constantly “carping”; in other words, to misjudge, to comment without
coherent arguments or to criticize constantly. In other cases, the beliefs are more accurate, but very vague: Paul and Elder (2005) explain it as a list of skills without connection to each other, that is, people can list a list of characteristics, but fail to integrate them in a useful in daily life; they limit themselves to defining critical thinking as a good thought or as a logical thought, without major foundations. Díaz-Barriga (2001) mentions that many teachers include critical thinking as part of their learning objectives, but unfortunately, they do not explain what they understand by critical thinking or how to encourage it in students. On the one hand, teachers and students are not very clear on how to define critical thinking in a satisfactory way, but, on the other hand, they seem to be right in that there are numerous general skills that make it up. Authors such as Quellmalz (1987), Kurfiss (1988), Swartz and Perkins (1990), Justicia (1996), Halpern (1998) and Bruning, Schraw and Ronning (1999) describe these skills in the following way:

Chart 1
Common skills of critical thinking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge:</th>
<th>Inference:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is essential for critical thinking.</td>
<td>It is about creating connections between the knowledge that is possessed, related or not to each other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It serves as a basis for logical reasoning.</td>
<td>It moves from knowing to understand and relate facts and make judgments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It facilitates the organization of the information that is received.</td>
<td>It can be deductive or inductive.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation:</th>
<th>Metacognition:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>He has sub-skills such as making value judgments, weighing, critiquing, etc.</td>
<td>It is thinking about thinking, as well as capabilities and limitations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is influenced by the experience, values, and skills of the previous categories.</td>
<td>Regulates the cognitive system, increasing awareness and thought control.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors

However, by moving away from the educational level, critical thinking is part of daily life when making good decisions or analyzing a series of events. It is difficult for ordinary people to reflect on this, however, Facione (1990) shows a brushstroke of day-to-day actions that require critical thinking (figure 2).
Figure 2
Definitions of critical thinking in everyday life

- Curiosity for a wide range of issues.
- Concern about being and staying well informed.
- Be alert to use critical thinking.
- Confidence in the process of reasoned inquiry.
- Confidence in one’s reasoning abilities.
- Open mind to consider points of view diverging from one’s own.
- Flexibility to consider alternatives and opinions.
- Understanding the opinions of other people.
- Fairness in the evaluation of reasoning.
- Honesty to face one’s own prejudices, stereotypes, egocentric or sociocentric tendencies.

Source: Facione, 1990

Materials and method of the study

Within qualitative studies, the present investigation is circumscribed in the logic of a case study, since it examines the conceptualizations about critical thinking held by students of pedagogical majors at a Chilean university, as an exploratory way to deepen the concept in question from the perspective of the participants involved, for whom critical thinking constitutes a transversal competence that they must develop as professionals in education and a competence that they must promote in their own students during the pedagogical process.

The participants of the study were 20 Chilean students from different majors of pedagogy of a regional public university that trains teachers for the education system. The inclusion criteria for this study were: being in the fourth year of a total of five years and being up to date or at least not having more than a year of delay in the training process.

To carry out this study, the focused group strategy was used, with semi-structured questions, in order to identify the subjective representation, in terms of their perception and judgment, regarding the concept of critical thinking.

To analyze the qualitative data, the inductive content analysis strategy was used, which allowed to generate descriptive categories of the process, as well as constant comparisons about whether differences in the concept of critical thinking were observed. For this, the Atlasti software was used, which allowed the organization, segmentation and coding of the data, in a first stage, to then move on to the processes of categorization and subcategorization. To guarantee the reliability of the results, the
data was triangulated by three researchers, who analyzed the data, first individually, and later agreed on the existing divergences, to achieve the definitive lifting of the categories.

Analysis and results

Once the semi-structured questions of the focus group were transcribed, a content analysis was carried out processing the data with the QDA Miner Lite v2.0.2 qualitative computer analysis program. For this, a coding procedure was established assigning them categories.

From a total of 49 responses from the interviewees, 26 sentences were selected that were a conceptual contribution to the concept of critical thinking, distributed by title (chart 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant responses of the interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significant responses to the concept of critical thinking</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Titles</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Concept** | 1. Know the different points of view, favorable and unfavorable.  
2. Ability to debate, through which behavior changes can be achieved.  
3. Having a defined objective.  
4. Analyze what is thought to handle the theoretical foundations and express opinions.  
5. Discern what information is used to reach a result.  
6. Apply cognitive tools such as texts, opinions, and knowledge to interpret ideas.  
7. Ability to reason, measure consequences and effects of events.  
8. Identify the individual and collective perspective for decision making.  
9. Ability to analyze or reflect on their own experiences or events. It is the realization that is not the same being critical or carper. |
| **Critics or carpers?** | 10. A critical person perceives opinions or beneficial actions individually or collectively. A carper person has a negative or contrary attitude towards the group.  
11. To be carper is to be a negative person, act with malice.  
12. Being carper indicates being a non-conformist person, instead a critical person looks for the different positive and negative points of view, through different strategies and chooses the most favorable to face a problem situation.  
13. To receive criticism is necessary to have a broad mentality. An acceptance and resilience capacity is required. |
When analyzing chart 2 it is evident that, for the participants, the concept of critical thinking includes cognitive processes related to analysis, reflection, argumentation, interpretation and updating of own knowledge. A critical stance entails the foundation of one’s own point of view and the anticipation of the consequences of sustaining a personal point of view. Critical thinking involves key cognitive processes, but also involves attitudinal actions of the subject, both individually and collectively. It also has a purpose related to a change or the resolution of a problem.

During the process of categorizing the data, two keywords were assigned for each category (chart 3).
Next, the obtained results derived from the categorization carried out by means of key words are presented, representing their distribution of frequencies and percentages in chart 4 and in figure 3.

**Chart 4**

*Frequency distribution by categories*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No category</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Analizy</td>
<td>Reflect</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analizy</td>
<td>Interpret</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Opinion</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opinion</td>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Principles</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Principles</td>
<td>Reality</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Individual behavior</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Group behavior</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Problem</td>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Problem</td>
<td>Decision-making</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the authors
According to chart 4 and figure 3, it is observed that category #1 (analyze) is the most frequent with a total of 21 sentences related to critical thinking, which amount to an important 50%. The repeated use of this term in relation to critical thinking demonstrates a correct vision on the part of students, being -effectively- this idea one of the 15 critical thinking skills described by Ennis (2011), who also presents concepts and related skills with reflection and interpretation, concepts that are also identified by the students during the interviews (see figure 1).

This is followed by category 4 (change) with 21%, corresponding to nine sentences issued by the interviewees and category 5 (problem) with 11.9%, which equals five sentences. This shows that the interviewed pedagogy students are aware that being a critical thinker is not just about thinking - as the name may wrongly indicate - but about an effective thinking. The main component of this formula is the analytical and reflexive capacity, and, in this sense, the participants understand that the important thing of being a critical thinker is to put into practice their knowledge and create something new from what is reflected.

This practical approach to critical thinking is not something new or experimental, but part of the root of the concept. McPeck (1990), Tsui (1999), Facione (1990), Piette (1998), among others, explain the undeniable connection between critical thinking and the two concepts provided by students: the resolution of problems and the introduction of changes and im-
The concept of critical thinking according to Chilean preservice teachers

El concepto de pensamiento crítico según estudiantes chilenos de pedagogía

evelopments to the known reality. López (2012) explains the close relationship that exists between being a teacher and a critical thinker, given that he/she is an agent of change, who must constantly confront different problems and manage to produce positive changes in the thinking of the students.

More generally, participants defined critical thinking as the ability to analyze, reflect or reason about a topic, content or problem, in order to base their perspective or personal opinion, measure consequences and effects of the facts, achieving a change of individual and collective behavior. To this is added a series of elements such as the ability to listen to the opinions of others, the ability to interpret the evidence to reach conclusions, the empathy to understand the other, the ability to debate and freedom of expression. It is evident, then, that these future teachers know well what it means to be a critical thinker and are able to give a satisfactory conceptualization regarding what is indicated in the literature known so far.

Regarding categories No. 2 (opinion) and No. 3 (principles), a total of 5.5% and 7.2% were obtained, respectively, corresponding to four and three responses from the interviewees. According to them, the participants of this study point out that, in contrast to the collective level indicated above, to be a critical thinker, on the individual level, it is necessary to have a disposition to modify individual ideas and behaviors or maintain an opinion according to own ideals, to act autonomously and consistently according to moral principles and ethical values. Bruning (et al., 1999) and Beltrán and Pérez (1996), in this regard, indicate that the role of the critical teacher-thinker is to promote values such as truth, open mind, empathy, rationality, autonomy and self-criticism.

The use of critical thinking can be related to linguistic competences that account for the level that people have achieved, according to seven universal standards for thought:

**Chart 5**

**Universal standards for thought**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clarity: Mode in which the proposal is expressed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy: Degree to which the structure used is consistent with the material to be undertaken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision: The construction or proposal must be adjusted to the knowledge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonging or relevance: Environment in which the subject is treated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth: When the level of analysis, research and explanation is sufficiently careful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amplitude: Extension of the approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic: Argumentation according to the rules.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Paul and Elder, 2005, p. 23
Next, the most outstanding answers given by the participants are presented, which include in a sentence the concept of critical thinking. It is worth noting the quality of each of the responses of these students, according to the standards of thought indicated above:

- “Know the different points of view, favorable and unfavorable. Ability to debate, through this, behavior changes can be achieved.” This response can be related to the idea of precision delivered by the participants, since it is important to analyze all points of view before acting.
- “Have a defined objective. Analyze what is thought to handle theoretical foundations and express opinions.” This response is related to the depth standard, with the quality of the analysis being an essential element.
- “Discern what information serves to reach a result. Apply cognitive tools such as texts, opinions, knowledge to interpret ideas.” This point is related to the relevance or relevance of the information, complementing the opinion with various sources of information.
- “Ability to reason, measure consequences and effects of the facts.” This response encompasses the ideas of clarity and logic based on how to do things, why they should be so and what are their consequences.
- “Identify individual and collective perspective for decision making.” This idea is related to the pertinence and logic, since the sense of community and the norms established by it are taken into account.
- “Ability to analyze or reflect on their own experiences or events. The idea is that it is not the same to be critical or carper.” This response is related to the amplitude, being important not only knowledge, but also other aspects such as experience and known empirical evidence.

Among the questions, the one that had the greatest difficulty in being answered by the participants was the following: Is there a difference between a critical or carper person? Obtaining the following assertions:

- A critical person perceives opinions or beneficial actions individually or collectively. A carper person has a negative or contrary attitude towards the group.
- To be carper is to be a negative person, act with malice.
• Being carper indicates being a non-conformist person, instead a critical person looks for the different positive and negative points of view through different strategies and chooses the most favorable to face a problem situation.
• To receive criticism is necessary to have a broad mentality, capacity for acceptance and resilience.

In this case, the student’s descriptions are somewhat vaguer and less accurate than those previously seen, reaffirming how difficult it was for them to answer the question. However, there is much truth in what they proposed, since the fact of being a critical person, according to José (2000) “alludes to a type of person who possesses certain abilities to make intelligent judgments, founded, contextualized, pertinent, creative and act accordingly “(p. 45). Therefore, collecting the statements of the interviewees, together with what the related literature says, what makes the difference between being critical and carper is both the intention or purpose of the criticism as well as the quality of it, always taking care of the elements mentioned by José (2000), which are strictly related to the standards of Paul and Elder (2005), previously presented.

Regarding the role of the teacher, the students participating in the study indicated that the way to learn to be critical thinkers involves information and analysis of reliable reference information, communicate with the other -which is necessary for feedback-, be aware and consequent, be realistic to understand the real events and be willing to listen to others and reflect on the different positions. Finally, the interviewees indicated that the purpose of developing critical thinking is to achieve behavioral changes, solve problems, break down barriers and consolidate one’s opinion.

It is important to highlight that the interviewees are very clear about the different dimensions that encompass critical thinking, and can be divided into two main trends:

1. Inclusion of both cognitive and social and emotional skills, standing out, for example:
   • Cognitive skills: inform oneself responsibly, be realistic, reflect, be open-minded.
   • Social skills: communicate and contribute to the whole, be aware and consistent, and listen to others.
2. On the other hand, there is a tendency to include both the personal and collective areas, namely:
   • Personnel: consolidate one’s opinion, inform oneself and analyze sources, and be realistic.
• Collective: accept feedback, reflect on different positions and achieve changes in behaviors and interpersonal relationships.

Conclusions

By way of summary, it can be concluded that the interviewees demonstrate to be competent in terms of the necessary knowledge, both to be and to train critical thinkers. Consistency was found between what the participants said and what is stated in the known theoretical plane, from the oldest research to the most recent studies on the subject. Participants understand the importance of developing critical thinking and demonstrate the desire to reflect that in their future students. It is also noted the ability to take critical thinking beyond thought, to action, talking about the critical thinker as an agent of change and a person who makes decisions relevant to the given situation. There is also talk of someone who shares and questions his own thinking.

A logical order is observed between the aspects or characteristics that are mentioned as part of critical thinking. First, we talk about a more reflective level, where the interviewees mention aspects such as “analyze” and “interpret”, giving way to aspects related to personal beliefs and those of the human being, such as “opinions” and “principles”. Then, it is mentioned the importance of being informed and using other opinions, but at the same time being realistic, discerning and discriminating information. Finally, after this series of processes, more concrete actions are mentioned, such as decision-making and problem solving.

One of the most crucial aspects as educators is, as López (2012) points out: “Try to get the student to acquire intellectual autonomy. This can be achieved by attending to the development of higher order skills such as critical thinking” (p. 41). It should also be noted that participants emphasize that achieving this intellectual autonomy requires attention to the various levels mentioned above, such as the personal and collective plans. Regarding the latter, the interviewees explain how being critical is not synonymous with egoism or misuse of intellectual power, but on the contrary, it is closely related to the teaching profession, whose fundamental objective is to share knowledge and have high expectations, both intellectual and social and ethical, of the learners. It is mentioned that a good critical thinker also takes into account the contributions of others, values opinions and ideas and at the same time is always informed of the events that are making changes in society. It is widely recognized not only
the theoretical importance that the interviewees give to the subject, but also their deep desire and willingness to train critical thinkers.

One of the limitations of this study was not having relevant information regarding the source of knowledge that the interviewees had on the subject. Given the very satisfactory responses of the students to the concept of critical thinking, as well as the level of knowledge they presented -contributing in a great way to this study-, the question remains as to whether they were formally instructed on the subject, if they were self-taught when researching about it or if simply their outstanding answers are the result of their own thoughts, influenced by what they have learned in their respective trajectories. For future research, it is recommended to inquire more about how the interviewees know what they know, to identify if their statements come from the theory -which in this case would explain the great connection that was revealed when analyzing the interview- or if it was born naturally of their conceptions as future professionals of education -which would have led them to coincide in large part with the well-known literature-.

Taking into account the importance of critical thinking for any human being who calls himself a educated, it would be an interesting proposal to carry out this type of study with other groups of professionals in training, belonging to different areas. Critical thinking is one of the most mentioned skills both in the profiles of graduates in different university careers and in the professional profiles desired for different jobs of various kinds. Having obtained very positive results in this research with future teachers, there remains the great question of whether these results would be repeated with a different group of professionals in training.

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Document receipt date: March 28, 2018  
Document review date: May 10, 2018  
Document approval date: August 17, 2018  
Document publication date: July 15, 2019
EXISTENTIAL COMMITMENT WITH TEACHING
Compromiso existencial con la enseñanza

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Abstract

The ‘existential commitment with teaching’ is one of the major findings stemming from a hermeneutic study at Mar del Plata State University, Argentina. With the intention of delving into the ethic dimension of university teaching, the narratives and practices of a Philosophy professor were analyzed. This teacher had been singled out by her students as an example of good teaching and had thus come to be regarded as a memorable professor in the context of academic production of the Research Team on Education and Cultural Studies (GIEEC). Existential commitment is indeed present in this professor’s practices and narratives and embedded in a ‘model of recognition’, whose ethic component manifests in the regard of the student as an anthropological peer, the exercise of hospitality and the presence of generosity and empathy in the pedagogical bond. This study discusses materials produced in the methodological articulation of biographic narrative research and ethnographic research in education.

Keywords
Higher teaching, commitment, recognition, pedagogical practice.


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Introduction

The ‘existential commitment with teaching’ is an *in vivo* macrocategory developed in the study called *Ethical dimension of teaching. An interpretative study of the practices of memorable professors of the Faculty of Humanities of the National University of Mar del Plata.* The mentioned study constitutes the doctoral thesis written for the Doctorate in Humanities and Arts with minor in Educational Sciences of the National University of Rosario, Argentina.

The interpretative study was methodologically supported in the narrative research articulating the biographical-narrative approach with ethnographic research techniques in education. This articulation allowed to weave the imports and meanings coming from the biographical narratives of memorable teachers with a diversity of materials obtained during the field work carried out during all the classes of a semester. Among the preexisting materials, there are contributions from the GIEEC (Research Group on Education and Cultural Studies, based in the Faculty of Humanities of the National University of Mar del Plata, Argentina) from the research carried out during successive projects through the narrative biographical approach applied to the study of didactics in the Higher Level. In the interpretative framework, categories previously constructed by the group are revisited and resignified and new ones are constructed based on the findings, within a particularly philosophical conceptual framework.

The methodology of the research is qualitative-interpretative. It allowed to enter the personal world of the subjects and to seek objectification in the field of meanings, as Reynaga Obregón (2003) says about this...
type of methodological approach “emphasizes understanding and interpretation from the subjects and their process of meaning in concrete educational contexts, with their beliefs, intentions and motivations” (p 116). The narrative approach in educational research is linked to philosophical hermeneutics because it interprets linguistic experiences and because it aims to achieve an understanding of the subjects’ experiences that are always intersubjective, not transcendental but concrete and spatially and temporally situated.

The overall objective of the research aimed to understand the ethical dimension of the teaching of teachers highlighted by students in previously-carried out surveys, as examples of good teaching. Since among the particular objectives we sought to articulate the discursive with the praxis, that is, what the protagonists expressed in their narratives when being interviewed, with the dynamics of action in the teaching practices of the teachers. For this, the ethnographic techniques were pertinent, on the other hand, the research was democratized by including various subjects involved in the classroom, such as students, ascribed, scholarship holders, members of the teaching teams. Methodological monism was also avoided by articulating narrative research with educational ethnography and the following instruments: biographical-narrative interview with the six professors, focus group with the six memorable teachers, focus interviews, flash interviews both with teachers and students at the end of classes, survey open to students, interviews with members of the career, focus group embers of the career, observation records, audio and video records, self-records, field journal. The treatment of the abundant obtained material allowed the progressive construction of categories that express investigative findings around the ethical dimension of university education that have nurtured several publications.

In this opportunity, we present findings related to the narratives and teaching practices of Cecilia, a ‘memorable’ teacher in charge of the theoretical classes of the subject Introduction to Philosophy in the Majors of Teaching and Degree in Philosophy of the Faculty of Humanities of the National University of Mar del Plata.

The macro-category ‘existential commitment to teaching’ appears initially in Cecilia’s narrative in this way:

Education as an ethical-political fact is part of an urgent task: to rethink the very place of installation, to rethink the existential commitment to sustain a praxis of high social impact, as is the teaching task; rethinking knowledge and action as a resistance to the des-subjective, individualistic and narcotizing model, which tends to cross the current anthropo-
logical situation based on the vulnerability of the collective, in which we are all immersed. (Cecilia, 2013)

This way of understanding education can be considered constitutive of the ethical dimension of education because it involves axiological and deontic issues that overlap in the practices.

Next, the meanings of commitment are addressed in the context of the study. Then the ‘recognition model’ that constitutes the core of the teacher’s existential commitment is explained. This part of the article presents the four dimensions that according to the findings of the study make up this model: the student as an anthropological peer, hospitality in teaching, generosity as a moral value made effective in teaching practices and the role of empathy as vital aspect of recognition.

Meaning of existential commitment with teaching

In general, commitment can be understood as contractual obligation contracted as a duty established by professional practice, however, the meaning of ‘existential commitment’ widely exceeds the limits of this type of duties. Regarding the origin of commitment, in a sociological sense it is estimated that it may arise from some incident in which the subject is part in an occasional manner; however, as will be seen later, in Cecilia’s teaching practices the commitment is not merely occasional.

The commitment according to Giraud (2013) can be understood taking into account its two action logics that account for a questioning or evidence. As for the first logic, it is a questioning position that points both to knowing and acting, in this sense it is a constitutive part of being in the world. The questioning position is not a grammatical question, it is a philosophical question linked to some problem, also philosophical, that is, that worries over time and has had and has multiple answers, none closed and satisfactory in such a way that solves the problem.

The second logic links social evidence and commitment, understanding by ‘social evidence’ the set of beliefs that are shared as facts, that could not be doubted because they are shared by others and constitute an orientation for life, beliefs that do not seem to be questioned for being based on good reasons; in the order of knowledge, a social evidence is a doxa that is sustained in the reception and positive adherence to ‘what is said’. These two ‘logics’ of commitment have provoked reflection around two questions that are linked to teaching: to. How and why the question related to a problem is located at the origin of commitment in the edu-
cational field? b. How and why are beliefs as ‘social evidence’ at the origin of that commitment?

The formulation of these questions involves the challenge of facing that the practices in the educational field are social, contextual and complex. Assuming this complexity means taking into account that these are subjective practices that require dialogue with the unique situations presented by the practice, it also means taking into account that these situations require interventions by teachers, linked to their commitment to their teaching role.

The complexity also comes from the fact that there is no educational practice that is not political and that there is no educational practice without ethics, as Freire (2009) says. It is interpreted that Cecilia’s existential commitment means assuming the aforementioned complexity through an ethical and political positioning that is neither occasional nor contractual.

Bearing in mind that commitment to teaching is complex because it is social, cultural, ethical and political, when thinking about the questions that are at the ‘origin’ of commitment, the ethical questions par excellence are presented: What is valuable in life? and what should I do?

If, as Castoriadis (1997) says, the question: What should I do? It is essentially political and if politics is the lucid and reflective activity that interrogates about the institutions of society and aspires to transform them, to consider the overlap between ethics and politics is a necessary condition to understand the existential commitment of Cecilia with teaching.

Then, the questions that are at the origin of the commitment, according to how the teacher interprets them and according to how they act in this regard, can have an effect on what Giroux and McLaren (1998) call “emancipatory authority” and that as such it is carrier of a critical knowledge, rules and values through which articulates and problematizes her relationship with students, her subject and the community. The authority of Cecilia as a teacher is inscribed both in this register and in the order of what Fallilone (2017) calls ‘community education’, consisting of practices that address ‘otherness’ and are actively committed and responsible with the freedom of students.

Regarding the question exposed as b, the ‘beliefs’ that are at the origin of the commitment that in a sociological sense are assumed as ‘social evidence’ (Giraud, 2013), are not assumed as evidences by Cecilia, her ‘installation model’ in teaching excludes the hegemonic power of crystallized beliefs. Facing the conflict between the instituted and the
instituting, or in other words, between conservation and realization (as antagonistic polarities) her decision is to remove the naturalized by common sense or the opinion of many and carry out counterhegemonic practices for the benefit of her students. It is not by inertia or by force of the instituted that Cecilia is committed to teaching and therefore to her students. As an emancipatory authority, her awareness of certain elements that at the university level threaten the subjectivity of students allows her to transform adverse conditions in the classroom.

The number of students that make up the group (more than 80) does not prevent her from fighting the anonymization or the coldness that generally characterizes the pedagogical bond when the group is so numerous in theoretical classes; the tradition that characterizes the theoretical classes as expository, does not prevent her from establishing a community where the discourse circulates freely and each student is a participant of the class by means of different interventions because her teaching constitutes that, which from the findings of the research, has been called ‘model of recognition’.

Then, at the origin of Cecilia’s commitment, the questions are ethical-political and beliefs are not common or subject to the force of the established. The questions with which the presentation of the existential commitment begin with teaching alluding to the ‘origin’ of the commitment, but in this study explaining an origin would be to practice reductionism limited to causes, in addition the findings widely overflow that aspect because they allow to understand how that commitment materializes in teaching practices.

The model of recognition: core of meaning of existential commitment with teaching

During the interpretive work the framework of materials allowed deepening the meanings of commitment in university teaching, then the questions expressed before: a and b were modified, contextualized, resignified and deepened from the polyphonic configuration of the findings, since the subjects signify and give meaning to the world and its life in a narrative way. The questions that follow, are those that emerged after material revisions and allowed to guide the construction of this macrocategory: to. What are the meanings of a memorable teacher’s existential commitment to teaching? b. What meanings entails a pedagogical bond where the recognition of otherness is part of the existential commitment? c. What
meanings does the power-knowledge relationship involve as a configu-
urator of subjectivities within the framework of existential commitment?

When asking the memorable teacher how she understands the ex-
istential commitment to teaching, she said:

The task goes through the recognition model: to be able to see the other,
to attend to his word turned into presence, to listen to his claim, to trust
in his poietic possibilities, this is to trust in his possibilities of action.
(Cecilia interview).

From her narrative a central subcategory emerges for the under-
standing of her commitment: the recognition model, which consists of
four dimensions, ‘the student as an anthropological peer’, ‘hospitality in
teaching’, generosity and empathy.

The student as an anthropological peer

The inclusion of all subjects in the existential territory that is the class, is
a goal of the teacher. Cecilia said in an interview corresponding to this re-
search that for her teaching is a ‘bonding act’ and seeks to gestate a ‘bond
warp’ in which all are included. In this regard she clarifies:

Managing a bonding weft (...) is a principle of ethical installation, there-
fore, generating a bonding space does not mean a demagogic gesture, it
means the true recognition of the other as another. Affection is built on
that first perception of the student as a peer, as an anthropological peer.
(Cecilia interview)

The consideration of the student as an anthropological peer helps
to avoid the laxity of indifference and the atomization of what Cecilia
calls ‘the current anthropological conjuncture’.

The otherness of the students affects Cecilia existentially, because
as she explained in a focus interview, her conception of ‘life’ does not
refer to living isolated events, life is not a sum of anecdotal facts without
a cohesive sense; she understands life in the Aristotelian sense, the bios as
the practice of life in the sense of true continuity, that bios is not ‘biologi-
cal’ life but life as existence. In the existential sense, life is a relation to the
world and to others, therefore it can be interpreted that there is the most
powerful meaning of her expression ‘existential commitment’.

As has been shown before, Cecilia considers the students as ‘an-
thropological peers’, that ‘first instance of mutual recognition’ “(as she
said at another moment of the interview) constitutes the ontological and
ethical network of the bonding weft. These considerations are closely
linked to her ‘passionate teaching.’ When asked in a flash interview about the meaning that passion in teaching has for her, she answered:

Passion conjures the narcotic effects of some contemporary issues. To feel passionate, affected, recognition of the other is necessary. You cannot teach with passion if there is no recognition of the other as another. You have to discover the other. We are in a hurry, I do not know if we are really communicating, to recognize the other is a way to stop time, to co-manage a conviviality space to affect each other. The classroom is a space for transformation and to mutually affect each other; there has to be mutual recognition. (Flash interview, Cecilia)

According to Cecilia, recognition is a condition for the possibility of passionate teaching. If one takes into account that for her life is true continuity, it can be noticed that her ‘didactic installation model’ (of which she spoke in the biographical interview and in some subsequent interviews) involves her existential commitment to teaching and to the subjects students, which does not mean in any way neglecting the academic rigor in terms of teaching the object of study, as she herself clarified in an interview. Commitment also means taking responsibility for acting in the current situation of her students.

Facing the ways of being of the students, negativized by a spread negative collective vision, Cecilia decides to get rid of ‘what is said’ about them and value them without prejudice. This decision is both emotional and rational. In relation to what has been said, Cecilia clarifies:

There is an initial presupposition, which to my liking is of an ethical and political nature. It is ethical because I think it is returning a model of installation in teaching, it is ethical as a way of being, a way of being that returns to a practice model, of professional praxis. And it is political because there is a power game between students and teachers, a power game that sustains the praxis itself, which generates transformations in the students and the teacher. (Cecilia interview)

Cecilia’s previous insights can be better understood by resorting to foucaultian thought, especially considering that the teacher has dedicated to the study of his work for decades (this is expressed in the biographical interview and is explicit in her classes). For Foucault (2006) it is necessary to think about the current situation in which one is immersed, which implies dealing with three areas: how beings have been constituted as subjects of knowledge, as subjects that exercise or support power relations and as moral subjects. This thinking would be like an ethos, where the critique of the limits that are imposed includes the possibility of ex-
ceeding them. But the philosopher also points out that practical systems come from three major domains related to each other: that of relations of control over things (the axis of knowledge), that of relations of action over others (the axis of power), and that of relationships with oneself (the axis of ethics). According to the research findings, Cecilia takes this triple relationship into account when thinking about teaching.

The framework of power, knowledge and ethics (in the Foucaultian sense) is visibilized and taken into account by Cecilia in a critical manner. In her teaching model she does not position herself as the one wielding power, she is critical of certain ‘dissymmetries’ that usually appear in the practices of some teachers:

One does not know exactly who hat teacher is talking to when he does not show gestures tending to build bridges of understanding with the student. (...) It seems to me that there is something that contains desires that the other will not be able to know what I know. Some dissimme-
tries that the teaching practice usually present, and that have to do precisely with power games, are those which position teachers and students in highly crystallized roles. (Cecilia interview)

This narrative makes it possible to allude to the metaphor of the bridge and the wall, to build ‘bridges of understanding’ is a facilitation of access, an invitation to admission, it is a hospitable gesture to the new-
comer. The wall is the border that prevents entry and positions teachers in a protected space, away from the other, protected from the need to strive for understanding and protected in its halo of academic solemnity as if their authority were at risk if the stranger calls for them.

For Cecilia ‘building bridges of understanding’ does not mean rep-
resenting the fiction that she does not know more about the subject than her students, the sense of ontological parity is not in denying her traject-
ory and practical wisdom, the aim is overcoming prejudices in around students as ignorant or inferior, because according to her, her knowledge does not position her at a superior level:

To consider the student as an anthropological peer does not dissolve the initial hierarchies in the sustaining of the practice, undoubtedly I know more philosophy than those that I have in front of me, which does not imply that the first positioning is not the recognition of those students as peers, as peers in their condition of subjects, without prejudice (...). (Ceci-
lia interview)

This position favors a good relationship with the students. If, as Sarason (2002) says, an obligation of good teachers is the relationship...
with the students because teaching entails the need to establish the empathy that enables the bond and thus the teacher assumes a commitment to the possibility of moving the other. One way to move the other is the model of recognition that allows Cecilia to confirm that commitment, to be moved and to move in the educational relationship.

With the very brief exposition of the category ‘the student as an anthropological peer’ (as one of the constitutive dimensions of the recognition model), an attempt has been made to answer one of the initial questions: What meanings does a pedagogical bond imply where recognition of otherness is it part of the existential commitment?

The complexity of the question leads to another constitutive dimension of the recognition model: ‘hospitality in teaching’.

The student as a guest: hospitality in teaching

Recognition and hospitality are concepts of relationship, that is why the narrative of the teacher, the narrative of the students and the class registers (understood as narratives) are articulated in their exposition, and in the interpretation the main recourse is the ethics of relationships.

The ‘hospitality’ according to Innerarity (2008) is an ethical category that is revealed mainly as the openness to the other and the others, is to be accessible and attentive to the requirements of others and the world, in that sense it would be the “basic ethical competence” (p. 19). This ‘competence’ is understood as ‘encounter’ with the other, it is a host-guest dialectic, completely removed from a self-sufficient subjectivity.

It has been shown that for Cecilia there is no self-sufficient subjectivity, since she is not independent of otherness, who would claim such independence would fall into what she calls ‘narcissistic return’, which attempts against coexistence.

Hospitality is not considered by the teacher as a competence but as a condition of teaching:

To teach you have to be able to pronounce ‘you’ and manage the space’ between’ which means an almost homeric reciprocity gesture. We must welcome the other, grant their emotional space as a guest. (Flash interview. Cecilia)

Cecilia does not attempt existential self-affirmation by fabricating a self-confirming choreography through recognition, her way of practicing recognition is inscribed in the guest-host dialectic where the interpellation of the other is a primordial feature.
She moves away from the modern conception of the omnipotent and exalted self in a Cartesian sense, as it has been seen that existential interdependence makes each subject confirm his own being in the relationship with the other. This added to her conception of life as a continuum (as Aristotelian bios) that highlights human temporality and therefore human finitude, forms a position that in the sense of Innerarity (2008) can be considered existentially as “the ambiguous experience of feeling interpellated and knowing oneself finite at the same time, which is the threshold by which one access to a type of duties that no longer uses the imperative language of power but that of the request” (p. 26).

This experience of those who feel interpellated and use the language of the request is in accordance with a peculiar conception of commitment. According to Giraud (2013): “Commitment for the benefit of a cause such as hospitality rests on a militant conviction that makes space a common territory for all” (p. 133). This experience of those who feel interpellated and use the language of the request is in accordance with a peculiar conception of commitment. According to Giraud (2013): “Commitment for the benefit of a cause such as hospitality rests on a militant conviction that makes space a common territory for all” (p. 133).

This territory common to all, in the context of this study, is the classroom. It is the space of appearance and is the space of the meeting, but to be it, it must be managed, we must hospitably inhabit it, because: “The classroom is a space of transformation and to affect each other there must be mutual recognition” (Flash interview, Cecilia).

According to Mêlich (2006) education is mainly transforming and transforming oneself into the educational event, which as a pedagogical relation, is an expression of human relationship in a broad sense and “one of the effects of every commitment is the transformation of oneself and of the relationship with others” as explained by Giraud (2013, p.184). In this sense, transformations take place within the framework of horizontal- ity of the pedagogical bond, in the sense of ontological parity. A student respondent says: “Cecilia is professional because she demonstrates her commitment to her profession. First of all, her knowledge does not show arrogance in the student-teacher relationship (...)” (Student Survey 40).

Ethics, as a request addressed to the person who is different from oneself, as non-indifference, is a dis-interest that breaks the obstinacy of being, which inaugurates the order of the human. As Levinas (2001) says in this human investment of the in-oneself and the for-oneself, of the each for oneself in an ethical self, in the priority of the for-another, there is a substitution of the for-oneself of the ontological obstinacy by a self that is a responsible, non-transferable and irrecusable choice, in a radical inversion that occurs in the “encounter with the face of the other” (p.250). Within the framework of this study it is estimated that there is no need to defend the primacy of being as opposed to the primacy of the ethical
relationship in the Levinasian sense. The complementarity between ontology and ethics is not resigned, it is not believed that an ‘origin’ must be based on the human relationship, posing an infertile confrontation between what was ‘before’. Although for the philosopher the encounter with the face of the other takes place before the ontology, the convergence between the ontological equality and the presence of the other as another is entered in such a way that both are inseparable when interpreting the teaching of Cecilia.

**Generosity in the recognition model**

A relevant ethical aspect of Cecilia’s existential commitment to teaching is the presence of ‘generosity’ as a moral value constitutive of her teaching practices.

Generosity is one of the moral values that make up the ethos, it encompasses the diversity of human activity and also the convictions, beliefs and attitudes with which that act is judged. Since, as Maliandi (2004) says through language, values of ethos are learned in words such as commitment, generosity, trust, responsibility, in Cecilia’s teaching these words make sense, what she calls “recession of the word” does not take place. In addition, the findings about generosity show the existence of what Terrones Rodríguez (2017) calls ‘common ethos’ that is constructed from the perspective of the recognition of the collective, in an intersubjective way and not inscribed in instrumental rationality. Next, the presence of generosity in relation to time and the vital energy of the teacher is made explicit.

Cecilia maintains an attitude predisposed to collaboration and support for the possible requirements of students during all classes by answering all questions and queries, although this means spending a lot of time in class on these issues. But in addition, generosity expresses itself in peculiar ways. In the first class, Cecilia writes on the board her name, email address, telephone number and times when students can find her and tells them: “You can call me as many times as you want, these things are not ornamental. You can call me as many times as you need and here is my mail, which of course, you can also use it “(Registration Class1-IF).

Her generosity adopts the mode of offering her personal time to the service of the students. This request before the other that exceeds the time limit of the class clearly shows her existential commitment to teaching, the temporality of the educational event is inscribed in the record of one’s life as a continuum, the subjects with whom she constructs what
she calls the ‘contract with the affections’ are included in the subject, they are ‘incorporated’ into the order of the discourse as the teacher’s intention but they also enter into the intersubjective relationship between ontological peers that transcends the professional barrier and overlaps the vital space.

In another class (Class Record 4) prior to a partial test, when a student asks a question, she responds and then adds:

All right. Of course, you can count on me. The other day someone called me on the phone to ask me a question. Perfect! Like that. He called me to Buenos Aires! Someone who was studying... When you study, you can call me if you need. He will have spent his good twine calling! (Generalized laughter) (Class 4-IF Record)

The teacher is aware that her first-year students are beginners in university life. In the survey made to the students, the mention of the generosity of the teacher (at the point where they were asked to characterize her teaching) is highlighted. Students also use analogous concepts such as ‘service’, ‘availability’, ‘openness’, which they then explain in narratives such as the following: “The teacher is open and receptive to the needs of the students and always willing to cooperate with them.” (Student Survey 14).

Cecilia is generous with the time of her class when she interrupts her explanations to devote herself to receiving the ‘guest’ (the student), even if the student’s arrival is unexpected, that is, outside of the established schedule. During a class (Class 5-IF record) the teacher was explaining what in philosophy is called ‘cosmogonic stage’ when a student enters. Cecilia stops explaining and speaks to her: “Hello dear...” The student looks for a place to sit, Cecilia looks for empty chairs at the back and says pointing to the chair occupied with her belongings: “Look, here you can also sit. It’s uncomfortable there... “ She approaches the chair where she had left her personal belongings and begins to remove them saying: “Look, here... (Noises). It does not bother me! Put your stuff here. Do not put the wallet on the ground, it seems that the money is gone, the dollars, the wealth, the private property are lost, on the ground... Better put it here”. (She laughs and generalized laughter occurs). When the student finally sits Cecilia says with the same kind tone: “Very good. Are you good here, dear? (Class 5-IF Record). This is one of the many situations in which the teacher does not hesitate to dedicate time to who enters the classroom, because the dedicated minutes are not lost, there is no ‘waste’ of time when the student is a guest.
She is also generous with the eight assistants; she gives half of the last four classes so that they can present their subject and start on the path of teaching. The gestures of generosity in the class and the generosity in the space of her private life can be interpreted in a Spinozist sense and in a sense of ‘prodigality’ which is an expenditure of energy, but it is not understood as a merchandise that is donated.

Regarding the first sense, the philosopher says that by generosity he understands “the desire for which each one strives to help other men and unite them to themselves for friendship” (Spinoza in Tatián, 2012, p.44). In the Spinozist way of understanding generosity, reason and affection complement each other, it is an active affect, a desire guided by reason towards others, it is a productive force of friendship. According to Tatián (2012), it is explained as “force that pursues the conservation of the other, because perseverance in being (conatus) has a collective dimension that does not disregard others, but includes them” (p. 45).

Cecilia does not manage her assets, her life, her existence (neither her knowledge nor her time) as an economist, as an owner, as a merchant seeking rewards for the given, or as a compassionate donor who sympathizes with ignorance and need of the students. According to Onfray (2014) “prodigality is an artist’s virtue” (p.107). In this sense, generosity (understood as prodigality) is lavish and has to do with disproportion, it is a Dionysian behavior in which spending is a celebration, it is opposed to the position of those who treasure time and existence in pursuit of order and the immobility that gives them security and ignore the passion, dynamism, laughter, the flashing existence that corresponds to the artist. Thus understood, generosity offers the possibility of interpreting that virtue as an artist is inherent in the recognition model, characteristic of the existential commitment to teaching.

The ‘spending’ of prodigality in this perspective is aesthetic, generosity is typical of an aesthetic of existence that seeks care for oneself and others. But also, the generosity thus understood is ethical because if ‘passionate teaching’ causes potentiating conditions, the expense of time and energy entails what Onfray (2014) calls ‘deployment logic’ where prodigality (the gift), would correlate the sum of strength to the forces. This generosity is then contrary to the ‘logic of withdrawal’ to which these teachers could inscribe, in addition to not ‘building bridges of understanding’, as Cecilia said, they stay affectionately distant from their students and dissociate mind and body.

Generosity also involves the ‘spending’ of body energy.
Class records show that during each of the classes Cecilia walks, moves, never sits or adopts a body posture of relaxation, except for moments when she narrates some funny anecdote or makes a joke. The teacher is fervently opposed to this logic of withdrawal that reserves energy, time, words of affection, when she says:

I believe that there is something of the body that teaches. There is something about the body that captivates attention. A kind of vigor, passion, pathos in the Greek sense of affection. Do not skimp on the human feeling of feeling affected by the class. I believe that there is something there, that operates as a form of contagion, as an enthusiasm to show enthusiasm, I think it can be a tool that excites, in addition to becoming an element that holds attention. (...) In ideas there is something dead. In ideas and concepts, I believe that in this Nietzsche was right, there is something static, there is something crystallized. (Cecilia interview)

From this narrative can be understood the notion of ‘spending’ as generosity (prodigality) of bodily energy, as an excess of physical effort that vitalizes ideas and concepts that lose their crystallized character to become ideas in movement, a display that excites and affects everyone in the class. There is no reserve of energy, there is a desire that everyone remain included in the class through all the available ‘tools’, and one of them is the effort of the teacher. As Cecilia said already in the biographical interview: “The effort... I give my life and the boy understands” (Biographical interview).

This commitment combines bodily effort in the sense of movement, movement through the classroom, modulation of the voice, writing on the blackboard, attentive listening to the students’ voices and pertinent responses that lead to openness to dialogue, involving the movement of ideas, that is, it is the combination of his observable behavior and her unobservable behavior that gives full meaning to her expression (cited above) that alludes to ‘giving her life’ in the classroom.

This giving of oneself as outpouring of her vitality, is a continuity in the narrative of Cecilia, it is not random or anecdotal elements, the persistence of prodigality in that sense is present in the first interview (biographical), in the interview during the stage of fieldwork in the classroom and in the focus interview.

The pedagogical value of the effort, of the prodigality of Cecilia’s own body energy is of the existential register and its meaning is deepened in the following narrative piece of a focus interview:
I believe that the teaching work is a form of giving oneself, of that emotional giving oneself. And it seems to me that the giving oneself goes all the way, you put out everything you have. Then it also puts the body, puts other elements than just the pure concatenation of ideas. (Focal Interview 1. Cecilia)

This belief of the teacher regarding the ‘teaching work’ as a ‘form of giving oneself’ is realized through generosity in the forms explained above and through empathy in a philosophical sense.

**Empathy in the recognition model**

The deployment of energy during the classes, according to Cecilia can generate an adhesion, a contagion of enthusiasm (a form of harmony) if a common space has been achieved where the affections circulates:

It seems to me that where energy is deployed there can be contagious adhesion, if the conditions of possibility of empathy can be generated. If it is possible to fertilize a common space where affection circulates, (...) it seems to me that these environments are contagious. Empathy is a way of meeting, a way of being in the same wave length with the other. If the conditions of possibility of a teaching practice are reached where energy, the affection, understanding of the object that has been cut circulates, there is pleasure. There is pleasure. It is a pleasant experience. And it is happening. I see students infected with enthusiasm. Because the climate of contagion has been generated. Through contact one gets what the other has to offer. (Focal Interview 2. Cecilia)

According to the research findings Cecilia achieves that ‘the conditions of possibility of empathy’ occur, as well as the ‘contagion’ understood by her as ‘the possibility of convergence’, as ‘form of meeting’, as ‘way of being’ in a similar situation. Up to this point, dimensions of the recognition model have been developed, but the approach to empathy in teaching is missing since it is a dimension of recognition that allows deepening the sense of intersubjectivity in the existential commitment of the teacher. The interpretation of empathy requires taking into account especially that Cecilia’s narrative point out that for her empathy and ‘contagion’ of enthusiasm and passion do not mean the same thing.

To deepen the meaning of empathy, it is initially worth mentioning that the term houses a semantic plurality that needs to be clarified. In current times, sympathy (in the Humean sense) has been differentiated of empathy and this has been considered as an epistemological concept, as an ethical concept, and as a concept with political derivations, but it is
not only a ‘concept’, it can also be understood as a social emotion, more precisely, as what Elster (2002) calls ‘emotion of interaction’, since the subject experiences the concept, that is, the experience of empathy is lived experience and as such is cognitive-affective.

Empathy can be understood as the result of an overestimation of the similarity between the observer and the observed so that this overestimation is a condition for empathy to occur, empathy in turn requires some control in order not to conceive others as similar, so, as Breithaupt (2011) affirms, “the challenge of empathy consists in producing non-similarity” (p.87).^10

Empathy does not occur because it overestimates similarities or involves the challenge of producing non-similarity. The ontological equality alluded to by Cecilia is not an ‘overestimation’ but the recognition of parity between living subjects, it is ontological parity. There is always some difference that acts as a limit, but diffuse and permeable, between two equal but different beings that affect each other, because it is in the interference of the other where the unexpectedness of the alterity is injected into the yes. In the encounter with the other there is a mismatch of being in the detection of otherness, empathy is not a misleading or homogenizing perception.

In the intersubjective relationship empathy produces neither similarity nor difference, what it produces is an ‘alteration’ of the relationship. Empathy is a call for reciprocal attention, it is an ‘openness’ of one’s self towards the other, it is an inclusive attention, an entrance to otherness. That is, to think that empathy is an emotional contagion would be reductionist and simplistic. It is estimated that it can also be a form of knowledge of the other, because it is also ‘suffering’ with the other, is feeling affected by the affections of the other, but as we said, is an entrance to otherness, not as epistemic violence but as inclusive attention.

A classroom situation (Class 3 Record), added to the narrative of Cecilia in the oriented interview, regarding the multiplicity of meanings of empathy, to prioritize the meaning of it as ‘inclusive attention’. Cecilia told the students:

And then, in my opinion, this communication is in the sense of recognition of the other, but there is no communication of any kind, if the other is lost sight of, it is because I am too distracted or too concentrated in a narcissistic return that I do not see the other. From communities of men to countries, from the micro to the macro what I am saying. This has to do with Ethics (Class 3-IF Record).
For the teacher, it is necessary not to become self-absorbed and to ‘see’ the other. That look refers to empathy as inclusive attention since the receptivity of alterity moves the subject away from what Cecilia calls “narcissistic return”, that is, from the return to what for Innerarity (2008) in ethic of hospitality is “the natural tendency to self-redundancy, to resemble oneself too much” (p. 21).

Cecilia offers in her narrative her way of understanding the relationship between empathy and teaching as a pedagogical and ethical event that involves the position of the teacher, the presence of students and the discourse:

In the classes, it seems to me that something intense happens. Why? Because something touches them, something brushes them. There is, by the dynamics of the classes, something of the order of the empathy that is generated. There is something of the order of groups of students who remain years and years near the major, as if the subject became a place of contention, of learning. So, what I see happening, what I see coming is something new, something good, something that enriches from that perspective there is advent, there is an event. There is something that is generated between the discourse and the position of the teacher and those who are there waiting and willing to give. (...) Many spaces of freedom are generated without losing one thing, in any case, very precise in what refers to the transmission of knowledge and others; but they occur in a climate of rigor, but of affection. Of rigor, but at the same time of relaxation. (Focal Interview 1. Cecilia)

Empathy as a call to reciprocal attention and as an opening to otherness is reflected in Cecilia’s experience as something ‘intense’ that happens through the dynamics of classes, since the presence of affection generates an environment of ‘relaxed bonding’. This environment entails a strong pedagogical sense of empathy, what Mèlich (2006) calls ‘compassion’, a term understood by the philosopher of education as ‘compassion’ that is not pity for the other but ‘shared passion’, in such a way that does not remain impassive before the feelings of the other, either of anguish, suffering, joy or happiness. Then through empathy the teacher does not remain impassive either to other feelings of the students that could generate an environment of bonding tension. This is another sense of empathy consistent with hospitality in teaching.

For reasons of space, the numerous narratives of classes where empathy is expressed in the use of colloquial language, the appeal to humor to sustain attention and maintain a relaxed atmosphere, the inclusion
of examples of daily life, repetition of concepts to facilitate the taking of notes and careful listening are not transcribed here.

Empathy is expressed as pedagogical sensitivity that it to generate the environment conducive to the ‘relaxed bonding’ and understand how students feel when they first hear expressions of philosophical language, because as we said in the interview, they think that who cannot order of discourse ‘feels ignored’.

The teacher responds to the call of the other who expects to know, tending ‘bridges of understanding’ as she also said when interviewed, because she thinks that we should want the other to get to know. Then, empathy can be interpreted as opening one’s self to the other and as a shared passion, it can be included among the “tools at the service of the incorporation of the student to the class, to the project, to the program, to the career” (Interview Cecilia).

Another meaning of empathy complements those exposed above, Sennet (2012) understands empathy as ‘form of involvement’. Empathy generates bonds that allow the advent of ‘something new, something good’, as Cecilia says, that novelty and benefit come about because the openness to otherness enables attention to the other and subjective involvement to occur, then the class becomes the meeting space, because as Sennet (2012) says “both sympathy and empathy transmit recognition and both generate a bond, but one is an embrace, while the other is an encounter” (p. 40).

The empathy in the ‘affective weft’ installs a common experiential platform and compromises the implication, thus contributing to the resistance against the ‘des-subjective, individualistic and narcotizing model, which usually crosses the current anthropological juncture’ as Cecilia says in the narrative snippet with which the approach of the ‘existential commitment with teaching’ begins.

As a conclusion

The understanding of the ethical dimension of university education is favored by the macro-category ‘existential commitment to teaching’ that is specified in ‘the model of recognition’ and includes the consideration of the student as an anthropological peer and hospitality in teaching that entails generosity and empathy.

The model of recognition involves teaching practices aimed at achieving the effective inclusion of students in the dynamics of the class,
through the peculiar characteristics that Cecilia manages to imprint on the pedagogical bond as a joint construction, based on an ethical position that does not exclude the epistemological, that assumes the student’s subjectivity as someone whose ontological quality is the same as who teaches. It is not about any homogenization that would subsume the other in a sameness, but includes the students in the same bonding weft without hierarchical stratification that disparages them.

Recognition translates into committed involvement with otherness, where others are not mere alter ego but beings who by their very presence summon those who, as a teacher, are willing to feel summoned because they are aware that in educational institutions the bonds with the subjects can constrain the possibilities of recognition.

Life in the classroom is imbued with hospitality, in analogy with hospitality in other human relationships it entails a rationality that is not identified with domination but with openness and receptivity. Hospitality involves the order of the affection, not only to act but also to suffer with the other. That is, it implies enough sensitivity to accept the interpelation of alterity, in a complex interplay between affection and intellect, that bonding weft contrasts with the hostility of practices that exclude and belittle students as subjects.

Generosity as a constitutive moral value of the ethical dimension of education is presented as prodigality and is combined with empathy that allows the consolidation of a peculiar pedagogical link that affects the subjective experiences of students. Both empathy and generosity are values of actions, that is, non-abstract moral values but actualized (put into action) in Cecilia’s teaching practices.

The findings that have been explained contribute to understand the multiplicity of meanings of the ethical dimension of teaching and encourage us to continue this investigative path in search of knowledge of what the best teachers think, feel, say and do in their classrooms.

Notes

1 Doctoral thesis written by Graciela Flores, directed by Dr. Luis Porta, publicly defended in April 2018 at the National University of Rosario, Argentina, rated with 10 and publication recommendation. The mentioned study constitutes the doctoral thesis written for the Doctorate in Humanities and Arts with minor in Educational Sciences of the National University of Rosario, Argentina.

2 The particular objectives of the study were the following: Identify continuities and ruptures between “the discursive” of the (auto) biographies of the memorable teachers and the dynamics “of the action” of the practice itself. Analyze the characte-
ristics of the ethical dimension of university education in the teaching practices of teachers designated as memorable by their students in the Faculty of Humanities of the National University of Mar del Plata. Analyze categories associated with the ethical dimension of the teaching practice of memorable teachers from the ethnographic record in the classrooms.

3 Numerous publications of the members of the GIEEC give account of the genesis of this category that comes from more than a decade ago, briefly we clarify that the ‘memorable teachers’ are those chosen by advanced students of teaching careers as examples of good teaching and diverse traits peculiar to their practices have been highlighted by students in a timely manner.

4 The narrative piece corresponds to the recording of Cecilia’s participation in the “VII National Conference on Teacher Training” held in September 2013 at the National University of Mar del Plata, organized by the GIEEC (Research Group on Education and Studies Cultural) in the panel called “Conversation with four voices: Life, passion and teaching.”

5 “Installation model” is an expression of Cecilia that appears in the biographical interview and also in the in-depth interview when she alludes to her pedagogical style, her way of understanding teaching and her way of teaching.

6 This category was addressed in depth in: Porta, L. and Flores, G. (2014). “The teaching practices of memorable university professors. The student as an anthropological peer “in Journal for Educators, Teachers and Trainers, Vol 5 (2), 60-73. Spain, University of Granada. We offer here a very brief resignification.

7 “Passionate teaching” is a macro-category of interpretive study that is not addressed in this space.

8 The category that was addressed in Porta, L. and Flores, G. (2017) is briefly resignified. “Hospitality in memorable university professors” in REXE Journal of Studies and Experiences in Education, Vol. 16 No. 30, 15-31. Chile, Catholic University of the most Holy Conception.

9 In the interpretative study, this idea is valid for the micro-space of the class, although the sociologist refers to the commitment with causes linked to the refugees, with situations of violation of rights, that is, he makes a generalization on a world scale.

10 According to Breithaupt (2011), the discovery of mirror neurons gives weight to the hypothesis of intersubjective similarity as the foundation of empathy (p.59).

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Document receipt date: December 15, 2018
Document review date: February 20, 2019
Document approval date: April 25, 2019
Document publication date: July 15, 2019
Editorial guidelines / Normas editoriales
1. General Information

«Sophia» is a scientific publication of the Salesian Polytechnic University of Ecuador, published since January 2006 in an uninterrupted manner, with a fixed biannual periodicity, specialized in Philosophy of Education and its interdisciplinary lines such as Epistemology, Deontology, Aesthetics, Critical Studies, Hermeneutics, Axiology, Ontology, Philosophical Anthropology, Sociology, Philosophical Analytics, among others, all linked to the field of Education.

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2. Scope and policy

2.1. Theme

Original contributions in Philosophy of Education, as well as related areas: Epistemology, Deontology, Aesthetics, Critical Studies, Hermeneutics, Axiology, Ontology, Philosophical Anthropology, Sociology, Philosophical Analytics,... and all interdisciplinary related disciplines with a philosophical reflection on education

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Manuscripts must be submitted only and exclusively through the OJS (Open Journal System), in which all authors must previously register. Originals sent via email or other interfaces are not accepted.

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For those works that are empirical investigations, the manuscripts will follow the IMRDC structure, being optional the Notes and Supports. Those papers that, on the contrary, deal with reports, studies, proposals and reviews may be more flexible in their epigraphs, particularly in material and methods, analysis, results, discussion and conclusions. In all typologies of works, references are mandatory.

A. Empirical research

Its purpose is to contribute to the progress of knowledge through original information, following the IMRDC structure: Introduction (objectives, previous literature). Materials and methods, Analysis and Results, Discussion, integration and conclusions. Following the criteria set by UNESCO, it is these types of scientific texts are also called as: “original memories”

The recommended structure, especially in works that include empirical research, is the following:

1) Title (Spanish) / Title (English): Concise but informative, in Spanish on the first line and in English on the second. A maximum of 85 characters with spaces are accepted. The title is not only the responsibility of the authors, changes being able to be proposed by the Editorial Board.

2) Identification data: Of each of the authors, organized by priority. A maximum of 3 authors will be accepted per original, although there may be excep-
Editorial guidelines
Normas editoriales

3) Abstract (Spanish) / Abstract (English): It will have a minimum length of 210 and a maximum of 220 words in Spanish; and 200 and maximum 210 words in English. The abstract will describe concisely and in this order: 1) Justification of the topic; 2) Objectives; 3) Methodology; 4) Main results; 5) Main conclusions. It must be impersonally written “This paper analyzes...”. In the case of the abstract, the use of automatic translators will not be accepted due to their poor quality.

4) Keywords (Spanish) / Keywords (English): A maximum of 6 keywords must be presented for each language version directly related to the subject of the work. The use of the key words set out in UNESCO’s Thesaurus and of the journal itself, located in the following link: https://sophia.ups.edu.ec/tesauro_sophia.php, will be positively valued.

5) Introduction and state of the issue: It should include the problem statement, context of the problem, justification, rationale and purpose of the study, using bibliographical citations, as well as the most significant and current literature on the topic at national and international level.

6) Material and methods: It must be written so that the reader can easily understand the development of the research. If applicable, it will describe the methodology, the sample and the form of sampling, as well as the type of statistical analysis used. If it is an original methodology, it is necessary to explain the reasons that led to its use and to describe its possible limitations.

7) Analysis and results: It will try to highlight the most important observations, describing them, without making value judgments, the material and methods used. They will appear in a logical sequence in the text and the essential charts and figures avoiding the duplication of data.

8) Discussion and conclusions: Summarize the most important findings, relating the observations themselves with relevant studies, indicating contributions and limitations, without adding data already mentioned in other sections. Also, the discussion and conclusions section should include the deductions and lines for future research.

9) Supports and acknowledgments (optional): The Council Science Editors recommends the author(s) to specify the source of funding for the research. Priority will be given to projects supported by national and international competitive projects. In any case, for the scientific evaluation of the manuscript, it should be only anonymized with XXXX for its initial evaluation, in order not to identify authors and research teams, which should be explained in the Cover Letter and later in the final manuscript.

10) The notes (optional) will go, only if necessary, at the end of the article (before the references). They must be manually annotated, since the system of footnotes or the end of Word is not recognized by the layout systems. The
numbers of notes are placed in superscript, both in the text and in the final note. The numbers of notes are placed in superscript, both in the text and in the final note. No notes are allowed that collect simple bibliographic citations (without comments), as these should go in the references.

11) References: Bibliographical citations should be reviewed in the form of references to the text. Under no circumstances should references not mentioned in the text be included. Their number should be sufficient to contextualize the theoretical framework with current and important criteria. They will be presented alphabetically by the first last name of the author.

B. Reviews

Literature reviews are based on the analysis of major publications on a given topic; its objective is to define the current state of the problem and to evaluate the investigations carried out. Its structure responds to the phases of the theme/problem, contributions of researchers or teams, changes in theory or main theoretical currents; unsolved problems; current and future trends (Giordanino, 2011). According to UNESCO, this type of work is also known as “recapitulative studies”

1) Title (Spanish) / Title (English): Concise but informative, in Spanish on the first line and in English on the second. A maximum of 85 characters with spaces are accepted. The title is not only the responsibility of the authors, changes being able to be proposed by the Editorial Board.

2) Identification data: Of each of the authors, organized by priority. A maximum of 3 authors will be accepted per original, although there may be exceptions justified by the topic, its complexity and extent. Next to the names must follow the professional category, work center, email of each author and complete ORCID number. Aspects that must be included in the Cover Letter, must also be uploaded to the OJS system of the journal, in the Metadata section and/or in a word document attached to the file containing the work proposed for the evaluation.

3) Abstract (Spanish) / Abstract (English): It will have a minimum length of 210 and a maximum of 220 words in Spanish; and 200 and maximum 210 words in English. The abstract will describe concisely and in this order: 1) Justification of the topic; 2) Objectives; 3) Methodology; 4) Main results; 5) Main conclusions. It must be impersonally written “This paper analyzes...” In the case of the abstract, the use of automatic translators will not be accepted due to their poor quality.

4) Keywords (Spanish) / Keywords (English): A maximum of 6 keywords must be presented for each language version directly related to the subject of the work. The use of the key words set out in UNESCO’s Thesaurus and of the Journal itself will be positively valued.

5) Introduction: It should include a brief presentation of the topic, the formulation of the purpose or objective of the study, the context of the problem and the formulation of the problem that is proposed, the presentation
of the idea to be defended, the justification explaining the importance, the relevance of the study; the methodological framework used, and finally, a brief description of the structure of the document. In the justification it is necessary to use bibliographical citations as well as the most significant and current literature on the subject at national and international level.

6) **Body or development of the document**: It implies putting into practice throughout the text, a critical attitude that should tend towards the interpellation, in order to attract the attention of the topic and the problem treated. The writer must generate in the reader the capacity to identify the dialogical intention of the proposal and to promote an open discussion.

7) **Conclusions**: Objectively state the results and findings. Offer a vision of the implications of the work, the limitations, the tentative response to the problem, the relations with the objective of the research and the possible lines of continuity (to fulfill this objective it is suggested not to include all the results obtained in the research). The conclusions should be duly justified according to the research carried out. The conclusions may be associated with the recommendations, evaluations, applications, suggestions, new relations and accepted or rejected hypotheses.

8) **Bibliography**: It is the set of works used in the structuring of the scientific text. It should include only the reference of the works used in the research. Bibliographical references should be ordered alphabetically and conform to the international APA standards, in their sixth edition.

### 3.2. Guidelines for references

**PERIODIC PUBLICATIONS**


**BOOKS AND BOOK CHAPTERS**


**DIGITAL MEDIA**


It is prescriptive that all quotations that have DOI (Digital Object Identifier System) are reflected in the References (can be obtained at http://goo.gl/gfruh1). All journals and books that do not have DOI should appear with their respective link (in their online version, if they have it, shortened by Bitly: https://bitly.com/) and date of consultation in the indicated format.

Journal articles should be presented in English, except for those in Spanish and English, in which case it will be displayed in both languages using brackets. All web addresses submitted must be shortened in the manuscript, except for the DOI that must be in the indicated format (https://doi.org/XXX).

3.3. **Epigraphs, Figures and Charts**

The epigraphs of the body of the article will be numbered in Arabic. They should go without a full box of capital letters, neither underlined nor bold. The numbering must be a maximum of three levels: 1. / 1.1. / 1.1.1. A carriage return will be established at the end of each numbered epigraph.

The charts must be included in the text in Word format according to order of appearance, numbered in Arabic and subtitled with the description of the content.

The graphics or figures will be adjusted to the minimum number required and will be presented incorporated in the text, according to their order of appearance, numbered in Arabic and subtitled with the abbreviated description. Their quality should not be less than 300 dpi, and it may be necessary to have the graph in TIFF, PNG or JPEG format.

4. **Submission Process**

The receipt of articles is permanent, however, considering that the publication of the Sophia Journal is bi-annual, the manuscripts must be sent at least one period before the date stipulated in the corresponding Call.

The manuscripts must be sent through the OJS (Open Journal System) system of the journal, for which it is necessary that the author previously registers in
the respective space (enter in the following link: http://sophia.ups.edu.ec/index.php/sophia/user/register, complete the form and follow each of the suggested steps).

The two documents that must be sent are:

1) **Presentation and cover** (Use official model), which will appear:
   **Title.** In Spanish in the first line, in letter Arial 14, with bold and centered, with a maximum of 85 characters with space. In English in the second line, in letter Arial 14, in italics and bold.
   **Full names and surnames of the authors.** Organized in order of priority, a maximum of 3 authors are accepted per original, although there may be exceptions justified by the topic, its complexity and extent. Each name must include the name of the institution in which he/she works as well as the city, country, email and ORCID number.

   **Abstract (Spanish)** It will have a minimum length of 210 and a maximum of 220 words. It must include 1) Justification of the topic; 2) Objectives; 3) Methodology; 4) Main results; 5) Main conclusions. It must be impersonally written “The present paper analyzes...”

   **Abstract.** Summary with all its components, translated into English and in cursive. Do not use automatic translation systems.

   **Keywords (Spanish):** 6 standardized terms preferably of a single word and of the UNESCO and the Journal's Thesaurus separated by commas (,).

   **Keywords.** The 6 terms above translated into English and separated by comma (,). Do not use automatic translation systems.

   In addition, a statement must be included (using a template called: Presentation) in which it is explained that the submitted manuscript is an original contribution, not sent or being evaluated in another journal, confirmation of the signatory authors, acceptance (if applicable) of formal changes in the manuscript according to the norms and partial transfer of rights to the publisher. This document must be signed and recorded through the OJS system, in the section: “Complementary files”.

2) **Manuscript** totally anonymized, according to the guidelines referred in precedence.

   All authors must register with their credits on the OJS platform, although only one of them will be responsible for correspondence. No author can submit or have in review two manuscripts simultaneously, estimating an absence of four consecutive numbers (2 years).

5. **Publication interval**

   The interval between receipt and publication of an article is 7 months (210 days).
Normas de Publicación en «Sophia»

ISSN: 1390-3861 / e-ISSN: 1390-8626

1. Información general

«Sophia» es una publicación científica de la Universidad Politécnica Salesiana de Ecuador, editada desde junio de 2006 de forma ininterrumpida, con periodicidad fija semestral, especializada en Filosofía de la Educación y sus líneas interdisciplinares como Epistemología, Deontología, Estética, Estudios Críticos, Hermenéutica, Axiología, Ontología, Antropología Filosófica, Sociología, Analítica Filosófica... vinculadas al ámbito de la educación.

Es una revista científica arbitrada, que utiliza el sistema de evaluación externa por expertos (peer-review), bajo metodología de pares ciegos (doble-blind review), conforme a las normas de publicación de la American Psychological Association (APA). El cumplimiento de este sistema permite garantizar a los autores un proceso de revisión objetivo, imparcial y transparente, lo que facilita a la publicación su inclusión en bases de datos, repositorios e indexaciones internacionales de referencia.

«Sophia» se encuentra indexada en Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI) de Web of Science; en Scientific Electronic Library Online (SciELO); en el Sistema de Información Científica (REDALYC); en el directorio y catálogo selectivo del Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (LATINDEX), en la Matriz de Información para el Análisis de Revistas (MIAR), en Clasificación Integrada de Revistas Científicas (C.I.R.C), en Academic Resource Index (Research Bible), en la Red Iberoamericana de Innovación y Conocimiento Científico (REDIB), en el Portal de difusión de la producción científica (Dialnet); en Bibliografía Latinoamericana en Revistas de Investigación Científica y Social (BIBLAT); en el Directorio de Revistas de Acceso Abierto DOAJ y en repositorios, bibliotecas y catálogos especializados de Iberoamérica.

La revista se edita en doble versión: impresa (ISSN: 1390-3861) y electrónica (e-ISSN: 1390-8626), en español y en inglés, siendo identificado además cada trabajo con un DOI (Digital Object Identifier System).
2. Alcance y política

2.1. Temática

Contribuciones originales en materia de Filosofía de la Educación, así como áreas afines: Epistemología, Deontología, Estética, Estudios Críticos, Hermenéutica, Axiología, Ontología, Antropología Filosófica, Sociología, Analítica Filosófica,... y todas aquellas disciplinas conexas interdisciplinarmente con una reflexión filosófica sobre la educación.

2.2. Aportaciones

«Sophia» edita estudios críticos, informes, propuestas, así como selectas revisiones de la literatura (state-of-the-art) en relación con la Filosofía de la Educación, aceptando asimismo trabajos de investigación empírica, redactados en español y en inglés.

Las aportaciones en la revista pueden ser:

- **Revisiones**: 10.000 a 11.000 palabras de texto, incluidas tablas y referencias. Se valorará especialmente las referencias justificadas, actuales y selectivas de alrededor de unas 70 obras.
- **Investigaciones**: 8.000 a 9.500 palabras de texto, incluyendo título, resúmenes, descriptores, tablas y referencias.
- **Informes, estudios y propuestas**: 8.000 a 9.500 palabras de texto, incluyendo título, resúmenes, tablas y referencias.

2.3. Características del contenido

Todos los trabajos presentados para la publicación en «Sophia» deberán cumplir con las características propias de una investigación científica:

- Ser originales, inéditos y relevantes
- Abordar temáticas que respondan a problemáticas y necesidades actuales
- Aportar para el desarrollo del conocimiento científico en el campo de la Filosofía de la Educación y sus áreas afines
- Utilizar un lenguaje adecuado, claro, preciso y comprensible
- No haber sido publicados en ningún medio ni estar en proceso de arbitraje o publicación.

Dependiendo de la relevancia y pertinencia del artículo, se considerarán como contribuciones especiales y ocasionalmente se publicarán:

- Trabajos que superen la extensión manifestada
- Trabajos que no se correspondan con el tema objeto de la reflexión prevista para el número respectivo

2.4 Periodicidad

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Print ISSN: 1390-3861 / Electronic ISSN: 1390-8626, pp. 307-351.
«Sophia» tiene periodicidad semestral (20 artículos por año), publicada en los meses de enero y julio; y cuenta por número con dos secciones de cinco artículos cada una, la primera referida a un tema Monográfico preparado con antelación y con editores temáticos; la segunda, una sección de Misceláneas, compuesta por aportaciones variadas dentro de la temática de la publicación.

3. Presentación, estructura y envío de los manuscritos

Los trabajos se presentarán en tipo de letra Arial 12, interlineado simple, justificado completo y sin tabuladores ni espacios en blanco entre párrafos. Se separarán con un espacio en blanco los grandes bloques (título, autores, resúmenes, descriptores, créditos y epígrafes). La página debe tener 2 centímetros en todos sus márgenes.

Los trabajos deben presentarse en documento de Microsoft Word (.doc o .docx), siendo necesario que el archivo esté anonimizado en Propiedades de Archivo, de forma que no aparezca la identificación de autor/es.

Los manuscritos deben ser enviados única y exclusivamente a través del OJS (Open Journal System), en el cual todos los autores deben darse de alta previamente. No se aceptan originales enviados a través de correo electrónico u otra interfaz.

3.1. Estructura del manuscrito

Para aquellos trabajos que se traten de investigaciones de carácter empírico, los manuscritos seguirán la estructura IMRDC, siendo opcionales los epígrafes de Notas y Apoyos. Aquellos trabajos que por el contrario se traten de informes, estudios, propuestas y revisiones sistemáticas podrán ser más flexibles en sus epígrafes, especialmente en Material y métodos; Análisis y resultados; Discusión y conclusiones. En todas las tipologías de trabajos son obligatorias las Referencias.

A. INVESTIGACIONES EMPÍRICAS

Su objetivo es contribuir al progreso del conocimiento mediante información original, sigue la estructura IMRDC: Introducción (objetivos, literatura previa), Materiales y métodos; Análisis y Resultados; Discusión, integración y conclusiones. Siguiendo los criterios planteados por la Unesco, es este tipo de textos científicos se llaman también como: “memorias originales”

La estructura recomendada, especialmente en trabajos que incluyen investigaciones empíricas, es la siguiente:

1) Título (español) / Title (inglés): Conciso pero informativo, en castellano en primera línea y en inglés en segunda. Se aceptan como máximo 85 caracteres con espacio. El título no solo es responsabilidad de los autores, pudiéndose proponer cambios por parte del Consejo Editorial.

2) Datos de Identificación: Nombres y apellidos completos de cada uno de los autores, organizados por orden de prelación. Se aceptarán como máxi-
mo 3 autores por original, aunque pudieren existir excepciones justificadas por el tema, su complejidad y extensión. Junto a los nombres deberá incluirse, el nombre de la institución en la que trabaja así como la ciudad, el país, el correo electrónico y número completo de ORCID de cada autor aspectos que deberán constar de modo obligatorio en la Carta de Presentación, además deberán ser cargados en el sistema OJS de la revista, en la sección Metadatos y/o en un documento word adjunto al archivo que contiene el trabajo que se propone para la evaluación.

3) Resumen (español) / Abstract (inglés): Tendrá como extensión mínima de 210 y máxima de 220 palabras en español; y de 200 y máximo de 210 palabras en inglés. El resumen describirá de forma concisa y en este orden: 1) Justificación del tema; 2) Objetivos; 3) Metodología y muestra; 4) Principales resultados; 5) Principales conclusiones. Ha de estar escrito de manera impersonal “El presente trabajo analiza...”. En el caso del abstract no se admitirá el empleo de traductores automáticos por su pésima calidad.

4) Descriptores (español) / Keywords (inglés): Se deben exponer máximo 6 términos por cada versión idiomática relacionados directamente con el tema del trabajo. Será valorado positivamente el uso de las palabras claves expuestas en el Thesaurus de la UNESCO y en el de la propia revista localizado en el siguiente enlace: https://sophia.ups.edu.ec/tesauro_sophia.php

5) Introducción y estado de la cuestión: Debe incluir el planteamiento del problema, el contexto de la problemática, la justificación, fundamentos y propósito del estudio, utilizando citas bibliográficas, así como la literatura más significativa y actual del tema a escala nacional e internacional.

6) Material y métodos: Debe ser redactado de forma que el lector pueda comprender con facilidad el desarrollo de la investigación. En su caso, describirá la metodología, la muestra y la forma de muestreo, así como se hará referencia al tipo de análisis estadístico empleado. Si se trata de una metodología original, es necesario exponer las razones que han conducido a su empleo y describir sus posibles limitaciones.

7) Análisis y resultados: Se procurará resaltar las observaciones más importantes, describiéndose, sin hacer juicios de valor, el material y métodos empleados. Aparecerán en una secuencia lógica en el texto y las tablas y figuras imprescindibles evitando la duplicidad de datos.

8) Discusión y conclusiones: Resumirá los hallazgos más importantes, relacionando las propias observaciones con estudios de interés, señalando aportaciones y limitaciones, sin redundar datos ya comentados en otros apartados. Asimismo, el apartado de discusión y conclusiones debe incluir las deducciones y líneas para futuras investigaciones.

9) Apoyos y agradecimientos (opcionales): El Council Science Editors recomienda a los autor/es especificar la fuente de financiación de la investigación. Se considerarán prioritarios los trabajos con aval de proyectos competitivos nacionales e internacionales. En todo caso, para la valoración científica del manuscrito, este debe ir anonimizado con XXXX solo para su evaluación ini-
cial, a fin de no identificar autores y equipos de investigación, que deben ser explícitos en la Carta de Presentación y posteriormente en el manuscrito final.

10) Las notas (opcionales) irán, solo en caso necesario, al final del artículo (antes de las referencias). Deben anotarse manualmente, ya que el sistema de notas al pie o al final de Word no es reconocido por los sistemas de maquetación. Los números de notas se colocan en superíndice, tanto en el texto como en la nota final. No se permiten notas que recojan citas bibliográficas simples (sin comentarios), pues éstas deben ir en las referencias.

11) Referencias: Las citas bibliográficas deben reseñarse en forma de referencias al texto. Bajo ningún caso deben incluirse referencias no citadas en el texto. Su número debe ser suficiente para contextualizar el marco teórico con criterios de actualidad e importancia. Se presentarán alfabéticamente por el primer apellido del autor.

B. REVISIONES

Las revisiones de literatura se basan en el análisis de las principales publicaciones sobre un tema determinado; su objetivo es definir el estado actual del problema y evaluar las investigaciones realizadas. Su estructura responde a las fases del tema/problema, aportes de investigadores o equipos, cambios en la teoría o las corrientes teóricas principales; problemas sin resolver; tendencias actuales y futuras (Giordanino, 2011). De acuerdo con la UNESCO, este tipo de trabajos se conocen también como: “estudios recapitulativos”

1) Título (español) / Title (inglés): El título del artículo deberá ser breve, interesante, claro, preciso y atractivo para despertar el interés del lector. Conciso pero informativo, en castellano en la primera línea y en inglés en la segunda línea. Se aceptan como máximo 85 caracteres con espacio. El título no solo es responsabilidad de los autores, también los Miembros del Consejo Editorial puede proponer cambios al título del documento.

2) Datos de Identificación: Nombres y apellidos completos de cada uno de los autores, organizados por orden de prelación. Se aceptarán como máximo 3 autores por original, aunque pudieren existir excepciones justificadas por el tema, su complejidad y extensión. Junto a los nombres deberá incluirse, el nombre de la institución en la que trabaja así como la ciudad, el país, el correo electrónico y número completo de ORCID de cada autor aspectos que deberán constar de modo obligatorio en la Carta de Presentación, además deberán ser cargados en el sistema OJS de la revista, en la sección Metadatos y/o en un documento word adjunto al archivo que contiene el trabajo que se propone para la evaluación.

3) Resumen (español) / Abstract (inglés): Tendrá como extensión mínima de 210 y máxima de 220 palabras en español; y de 200 y máximo de 210 palabras en inglés. El resumen describirá de forma concisa y en este orden: 1) Justificación del tema; 2) Objetivos; 3) Metodología; 4) Principales resultados; 5) Principales conclusiones. Ha de estar escrito de manera impersonal “El presente trabajo ana-
liza...". En el caso del abstract no se admitirá el empleo de traductores automáticos por su pésima calidad.

4) **Descripciones (español) / Keywords (inglés):** Se deben exponer máximo 6 términos por cada versión idiomática relacionados directamente con el tema del trabajo. Será valorado positivamente el uso de las palabras claves expuestas en el Thesaurus de la UNESCO y en el de la propia revista.

5) **Introducción:** Deberá incluir una presentación breve del tema, la formulación del propósito u objetivo del estudio, el contexto de la problemática y la formulación del problema que se propone enfrentar, la presentación de la idea a defender, la justificación que explica la importancia, la actualidad y la pertinencia del estudio; el marco metodológico utilizado, y finalmente, una breve descripción de la estructura del documento. En la justificación es necesario utilizar citas bibliográficas así como la literatura más significativa y actual del tema a escala nacional e internacional.

6) **Cuadro o desarrollo del documento:** Implica poner en práctica a lo largo de toda la exposición, una actitud crítica que deberá tender hacia la interpelación, a efectos de concitar la atención del tema y el problema tratados. El escritor deberá generar en el lector la capacidad de identificar la intención dialógica de la propuesta y propiciar en él una discusión abierta.

7) **Conclusiones:** Expone de manera objetiva los resultados y hallazgos; ofrece una visión de las implicaciones del trabajo, las limitaciones, la respuesta tentativa al problema, las relaciones con el objetivo de la investigación y las posibles líneas de continuidad (para cumplir con este objetivo se sugiere no incluir todos los resultados obtenidos en la investigación). Las conclusiones deberán ser debidamente justificadas de acuerdo con la investigación realizada. Las conclusiones podrán estar asociadas con las recomendaciones, evaluaciones, aplicaciones, sugerencias, nuevas relaciones e hipótesis aceptadas o rechazadas.

8) **Bibliografía:** Es el conjunto de obras utilizadas en la estructuración del texto científico. Deberá incluir únicamente la referencia de los trabajos utilizados en la investigación. Las referencias bibliográficas deberán ordenarse alfabéticamente y ajustarse a las normas internacionales APA, en su sexta edición.

### 3.2. Normas para las referencias

**PUBLICACIONES PERIÓDICAS**


**Artículo de revista (hasta seis autores):** Ospina, M.C., Alvarado, S.V., Fefferman, M., & Llanos, D. (2016). Introducción del dossier temático "Infancias y juventudes: violencias, conflictos, memorias y procesos de construcción de paz" [Introduction of the thematic dossier "Infancy and Youth: Violence, Con-


**LIBROS Y CAPÍTULOS DE LIBRO**


**MEDIOS ELECTRÓNICOS**


Es prescriptivo que todas las citas que cuenten con DOI (Digital Object Identifier System) estén reflejadas en las Referencias (pueden obtenerse en http://goo.gl/gfruh1). Todas las revistas y libros que no tengan DOI deben aparecer con su link (en su versión on-line, en caso de que la tengan, acortada, mediante Bitly: https://bitly.com/ y fecha de consulta en el formato indicado.

Los artículos de revistas deben ser expuestos en idioma inglés, a excepción de aquellos que se encuentren en español e inglés, caso en el que se expondrá en ambos idiomas utilizando corchetes. Todas las direcciones web que se presenten tienen que ser acortadas en el manuscrito, a excepción de los DOI que deben ir en el formato indicado (https://doi.org/XXX).

### 3.3. Epígrafes, tablas y gráficos

Los epígrafes del cuerpo del artículo se numerarán en arábigo. Irán sin caja completa de mayúsculas, ni subrayados, ni negritas. La numeración ha de ser como máximo de tres niveles: 1. / 1.1. / 1.1.1. Al final de cada epígrafe numerado se establecerá un retorno de carro.
Las tablas deben presentarse incluidas en el texto en formato Word según orden de aparición, numeradas en arábigo y subtítuladas con la descripción del contenido.

Los gráficos o figuras se ajustarán al número mínimo necesario y se presentarán incorporadas al texto, según su orden de aparición, numeradas en arábigo y subtítuladas con la descripción abreviada. Su calidad no debe ser inferior a 300 ppp, pudiendo ser necesario contar con el gráfico en formato TIFF, PNG o JPEG.

4. Proceso de envío

La recepción de artículos es permanente, sin embargo, considerando que la publicación de la Revista Sophia es semestral, el envío de los manuscritos deberá efectuarse al menos un período antes de la fecha estipulada en la Convocatoria correspondiente.

Los manuscritos deberán remitirse a través del sistema OJS (Open Journal System) de la revista, para lo cual es necesario que el autor se registre previamente en el espacio respectivo (ingrese en el siguiente link: http://sophia.ups.edu.ec/index.php/sophia/user/register, complemente el formulario y siga cada uno de los pasos que se sugieren).

Los dos documentos que deben ser enviados son:

1) **Carta de presentación o Cover letter** (usar modelo oficial), en la que aparecerán:

   **Título.** En castellano en la primera línea, en letra Arial 14, con negrita y centrado, con un máximo de 85 caracteres con espacio. En inglés en la segunda línea, en letra Arial 14, en cursiva y con negrita.

   **Nombres y apellidos completos de los autores.** Organizados por orden de prelación, se aceptan como máximo 3 autores por original, aunque pudieren existir excepciones justificadas por el tema, su complejidad y extensión. Junto a cada uno de los nombres deberá incluirse, el nombre de la institución en la que trabaja así como la ciudad, el país, el correo electrónico y número de ORCID.

   **Resumen.** Tendrá como extensión mínima 210 y máxima 220 palabras. El resumen describirá de forma concisa y en este orden: 1) Justificación del tema; 2) Objetivos; 3) Metodología; 4) Principales resultados; 5) Principales conclusiones. Ha de estar escrito de manera impersonal “El presente trabajo analiza...”.

   **Abstract.** Resumen con todos sus componentes, traducido al inglés y en letra cursiva. No utilizar sistemas de traducción automáticos.

   **Descriptores.** Máximo 6 términos estandarizados preferiblemente de una sola palabra y del Thesaurus de la UNESCO y de la propia revista, separados por coma (,).

   **Keywords.** Los 6 términos antes referidos traducidos al inglés y separados por coma (,). No utilizar sistemas de traducción automáticos.
Además, se deberá incluir una: Declaración (usar modelo denominado: Presentación) en la que se explica que el manuscrito enviado es una aportación original, no enviado ni en proceso de evaluación en otra revista, confirmación de las autorías firmantes, aceptación (si procede) de cambios formales en el manuscrito conforme a las normas y cesión parcial de derechos a la editorial. Este documento deberá ser firmado y consignado a través del sistema OJS, en la sección: “Ficheros complementarios”.

2) Manuscrito totalmente anonimizado, conforme a las normas referidas en precedencia.

Todos los autores han de darse de alta, con sus créditos, en la plataforma OJS, si bien uno solo de ellos será el responsable de correspondencia. Ningún autor podrá enviar o tener en revisión dos manuscritos de forma simultánea, estimándose una carencia de cuatro números consecutivos (2 años).

5. Intervalo de publicación

(El tamaño y estilo de la letra tal como se encuentra el numeral 4 (Proceso de envío)

El intervalo comprendido entre la recepción y la publicación de un artículo es de 7 meses (210 días).
Indications for External Reviewers of «Sophia»

The Board of External Reviewers of «Sophia» is an independent collegiate body whose purpose is to guarantee the excellence of this scientific publication, because the blind evaluation - based exclusively on the quality of the contents of the manuscripts and carried out by experts of recognized International prestige in the field - is, without a doubt, the best guarantee for the advancement of science and to preserve in this header an original and valuable scientific production.

To this end, the Board of External Reviewers is made up of several scholars and international scientists specialized in Education, essential to select the articles of the greatest impact and interest for the international scientific community. This in turn allows that all the articles selected to publish in «Sophia» have an academic endorsement and objectifiable reports on the originals.

Of course, all reviews in «Sophia» use the internationally standardized system of double-blind peer evaluation that guarantees the anonymity of manuscripts and reviewers. As a measure of transparency, the complete lists of reviewers are published on the official website of the journal http://Sophia.ups.edu.ec/

1. Criteria for acceptance/rejection of manuscript evaluation

The editorial team of «Sophia» selects those that are considered more qualified in the subject of the manuscript from the list of reviewers of the Board of Reviewers. While the publication requires the maximum collaboration of reviewers to expedite the evaluations and reports on each original, acceptance of the review must be linked to:

a. **Expertise.** Acceptance necessarily entails the possession of competences in the specific theme of the article to be evaluated.

b. **Availability.** Reviewing an original takes time and involves careful reflection on many aspects.

c. **Conflict of interests.** In case of identification of the authorship of the manuscript (despite their anonymity), excessive academic or family closeness to their authors, membership in the same University, Department, Research Group, Thematic Network, Research Projects, joint publications with authors... or any other type of connection or conflict / professional proximity; The reviewer must reject the publisher’s invitation for review.

d. **Commitment of confidentiality.** Reception of a manuscript for evaluation requires the Reviewer to express a commitment of confidentiality, so that it cannot be divulged to a third party throughout the process.
In the event that the reviewer cannot carry out the activity for some of these reasons or other justifiable reasons, he/she must notify the publisher by the same route that he/she has received the invitation, specifying the reasons for rejection.

2. General criteria for the evaluation of manuscripts

a) Topic

In addition to being valuable and relevant to the scientific community, the topic that is presented in the original must be limited and specialized in time and space, without excessive localism.

b) Redaction

The critical assessment in the review report must be objectively written, providing content, quotes or references of interest to support its judgment.

c) Originality

As a fundamental criterion of quality, an article must be original, unpublished and suitable. In this sense, reviewers should answer these three questions in the evaluation:

- Is the article sufficiently novel and interesting to justify publication?
- Does it contribute anything to the knowledge canon?
- Is the research question relevant?

A quick literature search using repositories such as Web of Knowledge, Scopus and Google Scholar to see if the research has been previously covered, may be helpful.

d) Structure

Manuscripts that refer to «Sophia» must follow the IMRDC structure, except those that are literature reviews or specific studies. In this sense, the originals must contain summary, introduction, methodology, results, discussion and conclusion.

- The title, abstract, and keywords should accurately describe the content of the article.
- The review of the literature should summarize the state of the question of the most recent and adequate research for the presented work. It will be especially evaluated with criteria of suitability and that the references are to works of high impact - especially in
WoS, Scopus, Scielo, etc. It should also include the general explanation of the study, its central objective and the followed methodological design.

• In case of research, in the materials and methods, the author must specify how the data, the process and the instruments used to respond to the hypothesis, the validation system, and all the information necessary to replicate the study are collected.

• Results must be clearly specified in logical sequence. It is important to check if the figures or charts presented are necessary or, if not, redundant with the content of the text.

• In the discussion, the data obtained should be interpreted in the light of the literature review. Authors should include here if their article supports or contradicts previous theories. The conclusions will summarize the advances that the research presents in the area of scientific knowledge, the future lines of research and the main difficulties or limitations for carrying out the research.

• Language: It will be positively assessed if the language used facilitates reading and is in favor of the clarity, simplicity, precision and transparency of the scientific language. The Reviewer should not proceed to correction, either in Spanish or English, but will inform the Editors of these grammatical or orthographical and typographical errors.

• Finally, a thorough review of the references is required in case any relevant work has been omitted. The references must be precise, citing within the logic of the subject at study, its main works as well as the documents that most resemble the work itself, as well as the latest research in the area.

3. Relevant valuation dimensions

For the case of empirical research articles, «Sophia» uses an evaluation matrix of each original that responds to the editorial criteria and to compliance with the publication guidelines. In this sense, the reviewers must attend to the qualitative-quantitative assessment of each of the aspects proposed in this matrix with criteria of objectivity, reasoning, logic and expertise.
If the original is a review of the literature (status of the matter) or other type of study (reports, proposals, experiences, among others), the Editorial Board will send to the reviewers a different matrix, including the characteristics of Structure of this type of originals:

### STUDIES, REPORTS, PROPOSALS AND REVIEW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valuable items</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01. Relevancy of the title (clarity, precision and with a maximum of 85 characters).</td>
<td>0/5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03. Introduction (brief presentation of the topic; formulation of the problem; it designs to defending or hypothesis to demonstrating; I target; importance of the topic; current importance; methodology; structure of the document).</td>
<td>0/5</td>
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<td>04. Review of the bibliographical foundation (Beside using current bibliography to consider the incorporation of Sophia's documents).</td>
<td>0/10</td>
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<tr>
<td>05. Structure and organization of the article (argumentative capabilities, coherence and scientific redaction).</td>
<td>0/10</td>
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<tr>
<td>06. Original contributions and contextualized analyses.</td>
<td>0/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07. Conclusions that answer to the topic, to the problem and to the raised aim.</td>
<td>0/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08. Citations and references of agreement to the regulation and to the format requested by the magazine (Any document and author who consists in the section of bibliography must consist in the body of story and vice versa).</td>
<td>0/5</td>
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Maximun total 50 points

### RESEARCHES

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### Editorial guidelines

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05. Structure and organization of the article (argumentative capabilities, coherence and scientific redaction). Analysis and results of investigation with logical sequence in the text. Presentation of tables and figures without duplicity of information.</td>
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<td>0/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50 points</strong></td>
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### 4. Ethical issues

- **Plagiarism**: Although the journal uses plagiarism detection systems, if the reviewer suspects that an original is a substantial copy of another work, he must immediately inform the Editors citing the previous work in as much detail as possible.
- **Fraud**: If there is real or remote suspicion that the results in an article are false or fraudulent, it is necessary to inform them to the Editors.

### 5. Evaluation of the originals

After the quantitative-qualitative evaluation of the manuscript under review, the reviewer may make recommendations to improve the quality of the manuscript. However, the manuscript will be graded in three ways:

- **Rejection** due to detected deficiencies justified and reasoned with quantitative and quantitative assessment. The report should be longer if a score of less than 40 of the 50 possible points is obtained.
- **Acceptance without review**
- **Conditional acceptance** and therefore review (greater or lesser). In the latter case, it is necessary to clearly identify which review is necessary, listing the comments and even specifying paragraphs and pages suggesting modifications.
Indicaciones para revisores externos de «Sophia»

El Consejo de Revisores Externos de «Sophia» es un órgano colegiado independiente cuyo fin es garantizar la excelencia de esta publicación científica, debido a que la evaluación ciega —basada exclusivamente en la calidad de los contenidos de los manuscritos y realizada por expertos de reconocido prestigio internacional en la materia— es la mejor garantía y, sin duda, el mejor aval para el avance de la ciencia y para preservar en esta cabecera una producción científica original y valiosa.

Para ello, el Consejo de Revisores Externos está conformado por diversos académicos y científicos internacionales especialistas en Filosofía de la Educación, esenciales para seleccionar los artículos de mayor impacto e interés para la comunidad científica internacional. Esto permite a su vez que todos los artículos seleccionados para publicar en «Sophia» cuenten con un aval académico e informes objetivables sobre los originales.

Por supuesto, todas las revisiones en «Sophia» emplean el sistema estandarizado internacionalmente de evaluación por pares con «doble ciego» (doble-blind) que garantiza el anonimato de los manuscritos y de los revisores de los mismos. Como medida de transparencia, anualmente se hacen públicos en la web oficial de la revista (www. http://Sophia.ups.edu.ec/) los listados completos de los revisores.

1. Criterios de aceptación/rechazo de evaluación manuscritos

El equipo editorial de «Sophia» selecciona del listado de evaluadores del Consejo de Revisores a aquellos que se estiman más cualificado en la temática del manuscrito. Si bien por parte de la publicación se pide la máxima colaboración de los revisores para agilizar las evaluaciones y los informes sobre cada original, la aceptación de la revisión ha de estar vinculada a:

a. **Experticia.** La aceptación conlleva necesariamente la posesión de competencias en la temática concreta del artículo a evaluar.

b. **Disponibilidad.** Revisar un original exige tiempo y conlleva reflexión concienzuda de muchos aspectos.

c. **Conflicto de intereses.** En caso de identificación de la autoría del manuscrito (a pesar de su anonimato), excesiva cercanía académica o familiar a sus autores, pertenencia a la misma Universidad, Departamento, Grupo de Investigación, Red Temática, Proyectos de Investigación, publicaciones conjuntas con los autores... o cualquier otro tipo de conexión o conflicto/cercanía profesional; el revisor debe rechazar la invitación del editor para su revisión.

d. **Compromiso de confidencialidad.** La recepción de un manuscrito para su evaluación exige del Revisor un compromiso expresado de
confidencialidad, de manera que éste no puede, durante todo el proceso, ser divulgado a un tercero.

En caso que el revisor no pueda llevar a cabo la actividad por algunos de estos motivos u otros justificables, debe notificarlo al editor por la misma vía que ha recibido la invitación, especificando los motivos de rechazo.

2. Criterios generales de evaluación de manuscritos

a) Tema

La temática que se plantea en el original, además de ser valiosa y relevante para la comunidad científica, ha de ser limitada y especializada en tiempo y espacio, sin llegar al excesivo localismo.

b) Redacción

La valoración crítica en el informe de revisión ha de estar redactada de forma objetiva, aportando contenido, citas o referencias de interés para argumentar su juicio.

c) Originalidad

Como criterio de calidad fundamental, un artículo debe ser original, inédito e idóneo. En este sentido, los revisores deben responder a estas tres preguntas en la evaluación:

• ¿Es el artículo suficientemente novedoso e interesante para justificar su publicación?
• ¿Aporta algo al canon del conocimiento?
• ¿Es relevante la pregunta de investigación?

Una búsqueda rápida de literatura utilizando repositorios tales como Web of Knowledge, Scopus y Google Scholar para ver si la investigación ha sido cubierta previamente puede ser de utilidad.

d) Estructura

Los manuscritos que se remiten a «Sophia» deben seguir la estructura señalada en las normas de publicación tanto para las investigaciones empíricas como para revisiones de la literatura o estudios específicos. En este sentido, los originales han de contener resumen, introducción, metodología, resultados, discusión y conclusión.

• El título, el resumen y las palabras clave han de describir exactamente el contenido del artículo.
• La revisión de la literatura debe resumir el estado de la cuestión de las investigaciones más recientes y adecuadas para el trabajo presentado. Se valorará especialmente con criterios de idoneidad y que las referencias sean a trabajos de alto impacto —especialmente en WoS, Scopus, Scielo, etc. Debe incluir además la explicación general del estudio, su objetivo central y el diseño metodológico seguido.

• En caso de investigaciones, en los materiales y métodos, el autor debe precisar cómo se recopilan los datos, el proceso y los instrumentos usados para responder a las hipótesis, el sistema de validación, y toda la información necesaria para replicar el estudio.

• En los resultados se deben especificar claramente los hallazgos en secuencia lógica. Es importante revisar si las tablas o cuadros presentados son necesarios o, caso contrario, redundantes con el contenido del texto.

• En la discusión se deben interpretar los datos obtenidos a la luz de la revisión de la literatura. Los autores deberán incluir aquí si su artículo apoya o contradice las teorías previas. Las conclusiones resumirán los avances que la investigación plantea en el área del conocimiento científico, las futuras líneas de investigación y las principales dificultades o limitaciones para la realización de la investigación.

• Idioma: Se valorará positivamente si el idioma utilizado facilita la lectura y va en favor de la claridad, sencillez, precisión y transparencia del lenguaje científico. El Revisor no debe proceder a corrección, ya sea en español o inglés, sino que informará a los Editores de estos errores gramaticales u ortotipográficos.

• Finalmente, se requiere una profunda revisión de las referencias por si se hubiera omitido alguna obra relevante. Las referencias han de ser precisas, citando en la lógica de la temática a estudiar, sus principales obras así como los documentos que más se asemejen al propio trabajo, así como las últimas investigaciones en el área.

3. Dimensiones relevantes de valoración

Para el caso de artículos de investigaciones empíricas, «Sophia» utiliza una matriz de evaluación de cada original que responde a los criterios editoriales y al cumplimiento de la normativa de la publicación. En este sentido los revisores deberán atender a la valoración cuali-cuantitativa de cada uno de los aspectos propuestos en esta matriz con criterios de objetividad, razonamiento, lógica y experticia.
Para el caso de artículos reflexivos, estudios, revisiones de literatura (estado de la cuestión) u otro tipo de estudio (informes, propuestas, experiencias, entre otras), el Consejo Editorial remitirá a los revisores una matriz distinta, comprendiendo las características propias de estructura de este tipo de originales:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESTUDIOS, PROPUESTAS, INFORMES Y EXPERIENCIAS</th>
<th>Puntaje</th>
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<td>Ítems valorables</td>
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<td>01. Pertinencia del título (claridad, precisión y con un máximo de 85 caracteres)</td>
<td>0/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03. Introducción (breve presentación del tema; formulación del problema; idea a defender o hipótesis a demostrar; objetivo; importancia del tema; actualidad; metodología; estructura del documento)</td>
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<td>0/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05. Estructura y organización del artículo (capacidad argumentativa, coherencia y redacción científica)</td>
<td>0/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06. Aportaciones originales y análisis contextualizados</td>
<td>0/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07. Conclusiones que respondan al tema, al problema y al objetivo planteado</td>
<td>0/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08. Citaciones y referencias de acuerdo a la normativa y al formato solicitado por la revista (Todo documento y autor que conste en la sección de bibliografía debe constar en el cuerpo del artículo y viceversa)</td>
<td>0/5</td>
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<td>Total máximo</td>
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<td>0/10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
05. Estructura y organización del artículo (capacidad argumentativa, coherencia y redacción científica). Análisis y resultados de investigación con secuencia lógica en el texto. Presentación de tablas y figuras sin duplicidad de datos. 0/10

0.6. Aportaciones originales y análisis contextualizados de los datos. 0/5

0.7. Discusión, conclusiones y avances que respondan al tema, al problema y al objetivo planteado. 0/5

0.8. Citaciones y referencias de acuerdo a la normativa y al formato solicitado por la revista (Todo documento y autor que conste en la sección de bibliografía debe constar en el cuerpo del artículo y viceversa). 0/5

Total máximo 50 puntos

4. Cuestiones éticas

a. Plagio: Aunque la revista utiliza sistemas de detección de plagio, si el revisor sospechare que un original es una copia sustancial de otra obra, ha de informar de inmediato a los Editores citando la obra anterior con tanto detalle cómo le sea posible.

b. Fraude: Si hay sospecha real o remota de que los resultados en un artículo son falsos o fraudulentos, es necesario informar de ellos a los Editores.

5. Evaluación de los originales

Una vez realizada la evaluación cuanti-cualitativa del manuscrito en revisión, el revisor podrá realizar recomendaciones para mejorar la calidad del original. Sin embargo, se atenderá a la calificación del manuscrito de tres maneras:

a. **Rechazo** debido a las deficiencias detectadas, justificadas y razonadas con valoración cualitativa y cuantitativa. El informe ha de ser más extenso si obtiene menos de los 30 de los 50 puntos posibles.

b. **Aceptar sin revisión.**

c. **Aceptar condicionada** y por ende con revisión (mayor o menor). En este último caso, se ha de identificar claramente qué revisión es necesaria, enumerando los comentarios e incluso especificando párrafos y páginas en las que sugieren modificaciones.
Protocol of Manuscript Evaluation for External Reviewers

Instructions

- The fulfillment of each one of the articles will be valued in agreement to the following protocol.
- The total sum of the articles will determine the approval or rejection of the article.
- The minimal puntaje in order that the article is approved will be of 44/50.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Details</th>
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<td>Date of submission for evaluation:</td>
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<td>Title of the article to be evaluated:</td>
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**SECTION: REPORTS, STUDIES, PROPOSALS AND REVIEWS**

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<tr>
<td>04.-</td>
<td>Review of the bibliographical foundation (Beside using current bibliography to consider the incorporation of Sophia’s documents).</td>
<td>Value from 0 to 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 05.- Structure and organization of the article  
(argumentative capabilities, coherence and scientific redaction) | Mandatory comments: |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value from 0 to 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.- Original contributions and contextualized analyses</td>
<td>Mandatory comments:</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Value from 0 to 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.- Conclusions that answer to the topic, to the problem and to the raised aim</td>
<td>Mandatory comments:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value from 0 to 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.- Citations and references of agreement to the regulation and to the format requested by the magazine (Any document and author who consists in the section of bibliography must consist in the body of story and vice versa)</td>
<td>Mandatory comments:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value from 0 to 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBTAINED PUNCTUATION</td>
<td>Of the total of 50 predictable points, this assessor grants:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REDACTED OPINION**
More detailed if the work does not get 44 points, to inform the autor (s).

This text is sent verbatim to the autor (s) anonymously

**RECOMMENDATION ON HIS PUBLICATION IN SOPHIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validation criteria</th>
<th>Result</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01. Widely recommended</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02. Recommended only if his quality is improved attending to the totality of the suggestions realized by the revisers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03. His publication is not recommended</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **PROPOSED CHANGES**  
(In case of “Yes, with conditions”) |     |                    |    |
Protocolo de evaluación de manuscritos para revisores externos

Instrucciones

- El cumplimiento de cada uno de los ítems será valorado de acuerdo al siguiente protocolo.
- La suma total de los ítems determinará la aprobación o rechazo del artículo. El puntaje mínimo para que el artículo sea aprobado será de 44/50.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Datos del artículo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fecha envío evaluación:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Título del artículo a evaluar:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECCIÓN: ESTUDIOS, PROPUESTAS, INFORMES Y REVISIONES**

| 01.- Pertinencia del título (claridad, precisión y con un máximo de 85 caracteres) | Comentarios obligatorios: |
| Valore de 0 a 5 |

| 02.- Resumen (En un solo párrafo y sin epígrafes, mínimo/máximo: 210-220 palabras). | Comentarios obligatorios: |
| Valore de 0 a 5 |

| 03.- Introducción (breve presentación del tema; formulación del problema; idea a defender o hipótesis a demostrar; objetivo; importancia del tema; actualidad; metodología; estructura del documento) | Comentarios obligatorios: |
| Valore de 0 a 5 |

| 04.- Revisión de la fundamentación bibliográfica (Además de usar bibliografía actual considerar la inclusión de documentos de Sophia) | Comentarios obligatorios: |
| Valore de 0 a 10 |

| 05.- Estructura y organización del artículo (capacidad argumentativa, coherencia y redacción científica) | Comentarios obligatorios: |
| Valore de 0 a 10 |
## Editorial guidelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Número</th>
<th>Tema</th>
<th>Comentarios obligatorios:</th>
<th>Valore de 0 a 5</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06.</td>
<td>Aportaciones originales y análisis contextualizados</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.</td>
<td>Conclusiones que respondan al tema, al problema y al objetivo planteado</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.</td>
<td>Citaciones y referencias de acuerdo a la normativa y al formato solicitado por la revista (Todo documento y autor que conste en la sección de bibliografía debe constar en el cuerpo del artículo y viceversa)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Puntuación obtenida

Del total de 50 puntos previsibles, este evaluador otorga:

### Opinión redactada

(Más detallada si el trabajo no tiene 44 puntos, para informar al autor/es)

Este texto se remite textualmente al/los autor/es de forma anónima

### Recomendación sobre su publicación en Sophia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publicable</th>
<th>Resultado</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Sí, con condiciones</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

01. Ampliamente recomendado

02. Recomendado sólo si se mejora su calidad atendiendo a la totalidad de las sugerencias realizadas por los revisores

03. No se recomienda su publicación

### Modificaciones propuestas

(En caso de «Sí, con condiciones»)
# Checklist prior to sending the manuscript

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. CHECK OF THE MANUSCRIPT, PRIOR TO SENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To facilitate the process of evaluation of the manuscript and to accelerate the report of its possible publication, a final self-review of the manuscript is advised, checking the following questions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## COVER LETTER

- Title of the manuscript in spanish (maximum 85 characters).
- Title of the manuscript in english (maximum 85 characters).
- The two versions of the title of the manuscript are concise, informative and collect as many identifiable terms as possible.
- The abstract in spanish is included, in a single paragraph and without epigraphs (minimum / maximum: 220/250 words).
- The abstract in english is included, in a single paragraph and without epigraphs (minimum / maximum: 210-220 words).
- Abstracts in spanish and english respond in order to the following issues: justification of the subject, objectives, study methodology, results and conclusions.
- It includes 6 descriptors (in english and spanish) (only simple words, not phrases or combinations of words), with the most significant terms, and if possible standardized.
- The texts in english (title, abstract and descriptors) have been written or verified by an official translator or expert in this language (The use of automatic translators is prohibited).
- All the identification data of the authors are included in the order stipulated in the norms: identification and correspondence data, professional affiliations, last academic degree...
- The first and last name of the authors has been normalized.
- Each author is identified with their ORCID code.
- The maximum number of authors is three, with the exception of those works that justify a higher but limited number of authors.
- The author(s) have duly signed the letter of presentation of the article, which includes the partial transfer of rights and the declaration of conflict of interest.

## MANUSCRIPT

- It includes title of the manuscript, abstract, and keywords. All in spanish and english.
An introduction is included that in order contains: brief presentation of the subject; problem formulation; Idea to defend or hypothesis to prove; objective; Importance of the theme; relevance; methodology; structure of the document.

The text is within the minimum and maximum extension:
In the Review sections: 10,000/11,000 words of text (including references).
In the research section: 8,000/9,500 words of text (including references).
Reports, Studies: 8,000/9,500 words of text (including references).

In case of research, the manuscript responds to the structure required in the guidelines (IMRDC).
In the case of a report, study or review, the manuscript respects the minimum structure required by the guidelines.

The review work includes three citations from three previous issues of Sophia Journal.

The manuscript explicitly cites and cites the used sources and materials.

The methodology described for the research work is clear and concise, allowing its replication, if necessary, by other experts.

The conclusions follow on objective and problem raised are supported by the results obtained and presented in the form of a synthesis.

If statistical analyzes have been used, they have been reviewed/contrasted by an expert.

The citations in the text are strictly in accordance with the APA 6 regulations, reflected in the instructions.

In case of use of final notes, it has been verified that these are descriptive and cannot be integrated into the general citation system. Footnotes are not acceptable.

The final references have been rigorously reviewed and only those that have been cited in the text are included.

The final references conform in style and format to the international standards used in Sophia.

The number of references is according to the theoretical basis of the study carried out.

DOIs have been included in all References that carry it in the following format: doi: https://doi.org/XXXXXX

All web addresses of references have been shortened with Google Url Shortner.
If figures and charts are included, they should provide additional and not repeated information in the text. Their graphic quality has been verified.

The number of charts and / or figures does not exceed 6

If the case, financial support is declared.
### ASPECTOS FORMALES

- The rules have been strictly observed in the use of bold, capital letters, italics and underlines.
- Arial font, size 12 has been used.
- A single line spacing (1) has been used without tab.
- The epigraphs have been properly and hierarchically numbered in Arabic.
- Double spaces have been deleted.
- The typographic quotes « » (with alt + 174 and alt + 175 for opening and closing) have been used.
- Word dictionary for surface spelling has been used.
- The text has been supervised by external staff to ensure grammar and style.

### PRESENTATION

- Attached is a cover letter indicating originality, novelty of the work and section of the journal to which it is addressed, and if appropriate, informed consent of experimentation.
- The cover letter includes an attachment signed by all authors, being responsible for the authorship and giving the copyright to the publisher.
- The manuscript is uploaded to the platform in Word format and without authors identification.

### ANNEXED DOCUMENTS

- Attached are the two attached documents: the cover letter and the manuscript.
- The accompanying documents and annexes have been published with Figshare.
Chequeo previo al envío del manuscrito

1. CHEQUEO DEL MANUSCRITO, PREVIO AL ENVÍO

Para facilitar el proceso de evaluación del manuscrito y acelerar el informe de su posible publicación, se aconseja una autorevisión final del manuscrito, comprobando las siguientes cuestiones.

**DOCUMENTO PORTADA (Cover Letter)**

- Se incluye título del manuscrito en español (máximo 85 caracteres).
- Se incluye título del manuscrito en inglés (máximo 85 caracteres).
- Las dos versiones del título del manuscrito son concisas, informativas y recogen el mayor número de términos identificativos posibles.
- Se incluye resumen en español, en un solo párrafo y sin epígrafes (mínimo/máximo: 220/250 palabras).
- Se incluye abstract en inglés, en un solo párrafo y sin epígrafes (mínimo/máximo 210-220 palabras).
- Los resúmenes en español e inglés responden ordenadamente a las siguientes cuestiones: justificación del tema, objetivos, metodología del estudio, resultados y conclusiones.
- Se incluyen 6 descriptores (en español e inglés) (sólo palabras simples, no sintagmas o combinaciones de palabras), con los términos más significativos, y a ser posibles estandarizados.
- Los textos en inglés (título, resumen y descriptores) han sido redactados o verificados por un traductor oficial o persona experta en este idioma (Se prohíbe el uso de traductores automáticos).
- Se incluyen todos los datos de identificación de los autores en el orden estipulado en la normativa: datos de identificación y correspondencia, filiaciones profesionales, último grado académico.
- Se ha normalizado el nombre y apellido de los autores.
- Cada autor está identificado con su código ORCID.
- El número máximo de autores es tres, a excepción de aquellos trabajos que justifiquen un número mayor limitado.
- El autor/es ha firmado debidamente la carta de presentación del artículo, en la que consta la cesión parcial de derechos y la declaración de conflicto de intereses.

**MANUSCRITO**

- Se incluye título del manuscrito en español, inglés, resumen, abstract, descriptores y keywords.
Se incluye una introducción que en orden contiene: breve presentación del tema; formulación del problema; idea a defender o hipótesis a demostrar; objetivo; importancia del tema; actualidad; metodología; estructura del documento.

El trabajo respeta la extensión mínima y máxima permitidas:
Sección de Revisiones: 10.000/11.000 palabras de texto (incluidas las referencias).
Investigaciones: 8.000/9.500 palabras de texto (incluidas referencias).
Informes, Estudios: 8.000/9.500 palabras de texto (incluidas referencias).

En caso de investigación, el manuscrito responde a la estructura exigida en las normas (IMRDC).

Si se trata de un informe, estudio o revisión, el manuscrito respeta la estructura mínima exigida en las normas.

En los trabajos de revisión se incluyen tres citas de tres números anteriores de la Revista Sophia.

El manuscrito explícita y cita correctamente las fuentes y materiales empleados.

La metodología descrita, para los trabajos de investigación, es clara y concisa, permitiendo su replicación, en caso necesario, por otros expertos.

Las conclusiones responden al objetivo y al problema planteados, se apoyan en los resultados obtenidos y se presentan en forma de síntesis.

Si se han utilizado análisis estadísticos, éstos han sido revisados/contrastados por algún experto.

Las citas en el texto se ajustan estrictamente a la normativa APA 6, reflejadas en las instrucciones.

En caso de uso de notas finales, se ha comprobado que éstas son descriptivas y no pueden integrarse en el sistema de citación general. No se aceptan notas a pie de página.

Se han revisado rigurosamente las referencias finales y se incluyen solo aquéllas que han sido citadas en el texto.

Las referencias finales se ajustan en estilo y formato a las normas internacionales utilizadas en Sophia.

El número de referencias está de acuerdo a la fundamentación teórica del estudio realizado.

Se han incluido los DOI en todas las Referencias que lo lleven con el siguiente formato: doi: [https://doi.org/XXXXXX](https://doi.org/XXXXXX)
Todas las direcciones web de las referencias han sido acortadas con Google Url Shortner

Si se incluyen figuras y tablas éstas deben aportar información adicional y no repetida en el texto. Su calidad gráfica se ha verificado.

El número de tablas y/o figuras no sobrepasa las 6.

En su caso, se declaran los apoyos y/o soportes financieros.

**ASPECTOS FORMALES**

Se ha respetado rigurosamente la normativa en el uso de negritas, mayúsculas, cursivas y subrayados.

Se ha utilizado letra Arial, tamaño 12.

Se ha usado un interlineado sencillo (1) y sin tabulaciones.

Se han numerado los epígrafes en arábigo de forma adecuada y jerárquicamente.

Se han suprimido los dobles espacios.

Se han empleado las comillas tipográficas « » (con alt+174 y alt+175 para apertura y cierre).

Se ha utilizado el diccionario de Word para corrección ortográfica superficial.

Se ha supervisado el trabajo por personal externo para garantizar la gramática y el estilo.

**PRESENTACIÓN**

Se adjunta carta de presentación indicando originalidad, novedad del trabajo y sección de la revista a la que se dirige, así como, en su caso, consentimiento informado de experimentación.

La carta de presentación incluye un anexo firmado por todos los autor/es, responsabilizándose de la autoría y cediendo los derechos de autor al editor.

El manuscrito se sube a la plataforma en formato Word y sin identificación de autores.

**DOCUMENTOS ANEXOS**

Se adjuntan los dos documentos anexos: la carta de presentación y el manuscrito.

Los documentos complementarios y anexos han sido publicados con Figshare.
Cover Letter

Section (Mark)
Monographic Dossier ___
Miscellaneous ___

Title in Spanish: Arial 14 bold and centered.
Maximum 85 characters with spaces
Title in English: Arial 14 cursive. Maximum 805 characters with spaces

Name author 1 (standardized)
Professional category, Institution, Country
Institutional email
ORCID

Name author 2 (standardized)
Professional category, Institution, Country
Institutional email
ORCID

Name author 3 (standardized)
Professional category, Institution, Country
Institutional email
ORCID

Abstract (Spanish)
Minimum 210 and maximum 220 words. It must include 1) Justification of the topic; 2) Objectives; 3) Methodology; 4) Main results; 5) Main conclusions. It must be impersonally written “The present paper analyzes...”

Abstract (English)
Minimum 200 and maximum 210 words. It must include 1) Justification of the topic; 2) Objectives; 3) Methodology; 4) Main results; 5) Main conclusions. It must be impersonally written “The present paper analyzes...” Do not use automatic translation systems.

Keywords (Spanish)
6 standardized terms preferably of a single word and of the UNESCO Thesaurus separated by commas (,).
Keywords

The 6 terms referred to in English separated by commas (,). Do not use automatic translation systems.

Financial Support of Research (optional)

Entity:
Country:
City:
Subsidized project:
Code of the project:
PRESENTATION
Cover Letter

Mr. Editor of «Sophia»

Having read the regulations of the journal «Sophia» and analyzed its coverage, thematic area and approach, I consider that this journal is the ideal one for the dissemination of the work that I hereby attach, for which I beg you to be submitted for consideration for publication. The original has the following title “_______________________________”, whose authorship corresponds to ________________________________.

The authors(s) certify that this work has not been published, nor is it under consideration for publication in any other journal or editorial work.

The author(s) are responsible for their content and have contributed to the conception, design and completion of the work, analysis and interpretation of data, and to have participated in the writing of the text and its revisions, as well as in the approval of the version which is finally referred to as an attachment.

Changes to the content are accepted if they occur after the review process, and also changes in the style of the manuscript by the editorial process of «Sophia».

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It is also declared that they have respected the ethical principles of research and are free from any conflict of interest.

In ____ (city), by the____ days of the month of ______ of 201_

Signed. (By the author or in the case, all the authors)
Author first and last name
Identification document

Signature

Author first and last name
Identification document

Signature

Note: Once saved the completed and signed document, it must be register through the OJS system in the section “Complementary Files”.
Cover Letter

Sección (Marcar)
Dossier Monográfico ___
Miscelánea ___

Título en español: Arial 14 negrita y centrado.
Máximo 85 caracteres con espacios

Title in English: Arial 14 cursiva. Máximo 85 caracteres con espacios

Nombre autor 1 (estandarizado)
Categoría profesional, Institución, País
Correo electrónico institucional
ORCID

Nombre autor 2 (estandarizado)
Categoría profesional, Institución, País
Correo electrónico institucional
ORCID

Nombre autor 3 (estandarizado)
Categoría profesional, Institución, País
Correo electrónico institucional
ORCID

Resumen

Mínimo 210 y máximo 220 palabras. Debe incluir 1) Justificación del tema; 2) Objetivos; 3) Metodología; 4) Principales resultados; 5) Principales conclusiones. Ha de estar escrito de manera impersonal “El presente trabajo analiza...”

Abstract


Descriptores

6 términos estandarizados preferiblemente de una sola palabra y del Thesaurus de la UNESCO separados por coma (,).
Keywords

Los 6 términos referidos en inglés separados por coma (,). No utilizar sistemas de traducción automáticos.

Apoyos y soporte financiero de la investigación (opcional)

Entidad:
País:
Ciudad:
Proyecto subvencionado:
Código de proyecto:
PRESENTACIÓN
Cover Letter

Sr. Editor de «Sophia»

Leída la normativa de la revista «Sophia» y analizada su cobertura, área temática y enfoque, considero que esta revista es la idónea para la difusión del trabajo que le adjunto, por lo que le ruego sea sometida a la consideración para su publicación. El original lleva por título “____________________________”, cuya autoría corresponde a ________________________________.

El/los autor/es certifican que este trabajo no ha sido publicado, ni está en vías de consideración para su publicación en ninguna otra revista u obra editorial.

El/los autor/es se responsabilizan de su contenido y de haber contribuido a la concepción, diseño y realización del trabajo, análisis e interpretación de datos, y de haber participado en la redacción del texto y sus revisiones, así como en la aprobación de la versión que finalmente se remite en adjunto.

Se aceptan la introducción de cambios en el contenido si hubiere lugar tras la revisión, y de cambios en el estilo del manuscrito por parte de la redacción de «Sophia».

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El/los autor/es abajo firmante/s transfiere/n parcialmente los derechos de propiedad (copyright) del presente trabajo a la editorial Abya-Yala (Ecuador) (RUC: 1790747123001), para las ediciones impresas.

Se declara además haber respetado los principios éticos de investigación y estar libre de cualquier conflicto de intereses.

En _____(ciudad), a los ____ días del mes de ______ de 201_

Firmado. (Por el autor o en su caso, todos los autores)
Nombre y apellido del autor
Documento de Identidad

Firma

Nombre y apellido del autor
Documento de Identidad

Firma

Nombre y apellido del autor
Documento de Identidad

Firma

Nota: Una vez haya guardado el documento cumplimentado y firmado, deberá consignarlo a través del sistema OJS en la sección “Ficheros Complementarios”.
Sophia 28
Philosophy, technology and innovation in education

Descriptors: Philosophy of technology; Philosophical foundations of technology; Philosophy of educational innovation; Philosophy and educational theories for the network society; Innovation and educational technology; Computational thinking; Pedagogical theories of computational thinking; Of connectivity to critical thinking; New technologies and creativity in education; Video games and education; Successful pedagogical experiences with communicative technology; Educational innovation with emerging communicative devices (Smartphones and Tablets).

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts: July 15, 2019
Publication date of this issue: January 15, 2020

Sophia 29
Complex thinking and the sciences of complexity in education

Descriptors: Paradigms of complexity and transdisciplinarity; Philosophy of knowledge and learning from complexity; Complex thinking and learning; Problem of method in complex thinking; Contributions of the complex thought for education; Education and complex thinking; Criticisms of the complexity paradigm; Complex thinking, critical thinking and education; Complex thinking and creativity in education; The being and the existence in the paradigm of the complexity.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts: December 15, 2019
Publication date of this issue: July 15, 2020
Sophia 30
Philosophy of the cognitive sciences and education

Descriptors: Philosophy and cognitive science; Philosophical debate on the cognitive sciences; Philosophical foundation of cybernetics; Epistemological foundations of cognitive theory; Philosophical foundations of connectionist theory; Current trends in cognitive science; Theory of mind and cognitive sciences; Evolutionary psychology and education; Relations between cognitive sciences and education sciences; Contributions of the cognitive sciences for education.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts: July 15, 2020
Publication date of this issue: January 15, 2021

Sophia 31
The problem of truth in the sciences and in the pedagogical practice

Descriptors: Conceptions of truth in the history of philosophy and its implications in educational processes; Philosophical, psychological and pedagogical foundations of truth; Truth, fact and science; Truth in the social sciences; Truth in the natural sciences; Truth in the exact sciences; Truth in the human sciences; Truth in the sciences of information and communication; New trends, approaches and perspectives on truth; The truth in education.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts: December 15, 2020
Publication date of this issue: July 15, 2021

Sophia 32
Philosophical reflection on the quality on education

Descriptors: Analysis of the concept of “quality” in education; Philosophical, psychological and pedagogical fundamentals of quality in education; Quality and comprehensive and inclusive educational models; Philosophical basis of complex competences in education; Quality and skills in education; Approach of the capacities and educational quality.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts: July 15, 2021
Publication date of this issue: January 15, 2022
Announcements 2019 - 2025

Sophia 33
Philosophy of the mind and education

Descriptors: Effects and causes of mental states; The nature of mental states and their importance in education; Monistic responses to the mind-body problem; Theories about the philosophy of mind; The philosophy of mind at the present; Philosophy of mind and its relationship with other sciences; Foundation of mental activity and behavior; Relationship of the philosophy of mind with psychology; The power of the mind in education; Pedagogical strategies for the development of the mind; Concept of disability or mental dysfunction: implications and proposals in education.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts: December 15, 2021
Publication date of this issue: July 15, 2022

Sophia 34
Philosophy, anthropology and education

Descriptors: Philosophical foundations of ethnography; Philosophical basis of cultural theories; Contributions of cultural and social anthropology to education; Interculturality, multiculturalism and education; The task of philosophy in intercultural dialogue; The thought of diversity and its educational importance; Global citizenship, cosmopolitanism and education; Ecosophy, culture and transdisciplinarity.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts: July 15, 2022
Publication date of this issue: January 15, 2023

Sophia 35
Philosophical currents and their impact on pedagogical orientations

Descriptors: Philosophy as the fundamental basis of pedagogical orientations. Idealism as the basis for the generation of pedagogical orientations; Rationalism as the foundation of pedagogical orientations; Empiricism as the basis of educational realism; Illustration as support of educational enlightenment; Other philosophical currents as the basis of theories or pedagogical orientations throughout history; Philosophical foundations of the new pedagogies; Philosophy of technology in the educational field; Philosophical basis of constructivism and other pedagogical theories; Ethical thinking and pedagogy;
Philosophical critique of current educational models; Philosophy of dialogue and education; Hermeneutics and their contributions to the current pedagogy.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

**Deadline for receipt of manuscripts:** December 15, 2022  
**Publication date of this issue:** July 15, 2023

**Sophia 36**  
**Philosophical approach to learning as a cognitive process**

**Descriptors:** Philosophical basis of learning; Learning as a cognitive process; Learning as a product and as a process of knowledge; Philosophical foundation of learning theories; Psychological and pedagogical foundations of learning; Philosophical foundations of multiple intelligences and education; Emotional intelligence and its impact on educational processes; Science and philosophy of human emotions: educational repercussions; Sense and meaning of cognitive processes; Memory, thought and language as the main cognitive processes of the human being; Cognitive processes and meaningful learning.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

**Deadline for receipt of manuscripts:** July 15, 2023  
**Publication date of this issue:** January 15, 2024

**Sophia 37**  
**Physics, metaphysics and education**

**Descriptors:** Philosophical reflections on the interpretation of physics; Metaphysics in the twenty-first century; History of physics and its educational approach; Relations between conceptions of physics in the history of philosophy; Problem of sense and truth in the philosophy of physics; Nature and implications of thermodynamics; Epistemology and guiding principles of current physical theories; Philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics; Philosophical implications of quantum theory; Philosophical implications of Newtonian physics; Philosophical implications of the theory of relativity; Pedagogical strategies in the teaching-learning of physics; Educational proposals to boost the understanding of physics; Philosophical implications of current theoretical physics.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

**Deadline for receipt of manuscripts:** December 15, 2023  
**Publication date of this issue:** July 15, 2024
Sophia 38

The inductive method in the humanities and pedagogy

**Descriptors:** Scientific activity and reflection on the method of knowledge; The inductive method in the social sciences; Induction, experience and action as the foundation of pedagogy; The methods of knowledge and learning in the humanities; Value and limits of the experimental method in the human sciences; Value and limits of pedagogical positivism; Reflections on the scientific method and implications in the learning processes; Applications of the inductive method in education; Usefulness of the inductive method for psychology; Pedagogical proposals of an inductive character in the human sciences.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

**Deadline for receipt of manuscripts:** July 15, 2024

**Publication date of this issue:** January 15, 2025
Sophia 28
Filosofía, tecnología e innovación en la educación

Descripciones: Filosofía de la tecnología; fundamentos filosóficos de la tecnología; filosofía de la innovación educativa; filosofía y teorías educativas para la sociedad red; innovación y tecnología educativa; pensamiento computacional; teorías pedagógicas del pensamiento computacional; de la conectividad al pensamiento crítico; nuevas tecnologías y creatividad en la educación; videojuegos y educación; experiencias pedagógicas exitosas con tecnología comunicativa; innovación educativa con dispositivos comunicativos emergentes (Smartphones y Tablets).

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de julio de 2019
Fecha de publicación de esta edición: 15 de enero 2020

Sophia 29
El pensamiento complejo y las ciencias de la complejidad en la educación

Descripciones: Paradigmas de la complejidad y la transdisciplinariedad; filosofía del conocimiento y el aprendizaje desde la complejidad; pensamiento complejo y aprendizaje; problema del método en el pensamiento complejo; aportes del pensamiento complejo para la educación; educación y pensamiento complejo; críticas al paradigma de la complejidad; pensamientos complejo, pensamiento crítico y educación; pensamiento complejo y creatividad en la educación; el ser y la existencia en el paradigma de la complejidad.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de diciembre de 2019
Fecha de publicación de esta edición: 15 de julio de 2020
Convocatorias 2019 - 2025

Sophia 30
Filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas y educación

Descripciones: Filosofía y ciencia cognitiva; debate filosófico sobre las ciencias cognitivas; fundamentación filosófica de la cibernética; fundamentos epistemológicos de la teoría cognitivista; fundamentos filosóficos de la teoría conexiónista; tendencias actuales de la ciencia cognitiva; teoría de la mente y ciencias cognitivas; psicología evolutiva y educación; relaciones entre ciencias cognitivas y ciencias de la educación; aportes de las ciencias cognitivas para la educación.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de julio de 2020
Fecha de publicación de esta edición: 15 de enero de 2021

Sophia 31
El problema de la verdad en las ciencias y en la práctica pedagógica

Descripciones: Concepciones de verdad en la historia de la filosofía y sus implicaciones en los procesos educativos; fundamentos filosóficos, psicológicos y pedagógicos de la verdad; verdad, hecho y ciencia; la verdad en las ciencias sociales; la verdad en las ciencias naturales; la verdad en las ciencias exactas; la verdad en las ciencias humanas; la verdad en las ciencias de la información y de la comunicación; nuevas tendencias, enfoques y perspectivas sobre la verdad; la verdad en la educación.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de diciembre de 2020
Fecha de publicación de esta edición: 15 de julio de 2021

Sophia 32
Reflexión filosófica sobre la calidad en la educación

Descripciones: Análisis del concepto de “calidad” en la educación; fundamentos filosóficos, psicológicos y pedagógicos de la calidad en educación; calidad y modelos educativos integrales e inclusivos; bases filosóficas de las competencias complejas en la educación; la calidad y las competencias en la educación; enfoque de las capacidades y calidad educativa.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de julio de 2021
Fecha de publicación de esta edición: 15 de enero de 2022
Convocatorias 2019 - 2025

Sophia 33
Filosofía de la mente y educación

Descriptores: Efectos y causas de los estados mentales; la naturaleza de los estados mentales y su importancia en educación; respuestas monistas al problema mente-cuerpo; teorías sobre la filosofía de la mente; la filosofía de la mente en la actualidad; filosofía de la mente y la relación con otras ciencias; fundamento de la actividad mental y de la conducta; relación filosofía de la mente con la psicología; filosofía de la mente y educación; el poder de la mente en la educación; estrategias pedagógicas para el desarrollo de la mente; concepto de discapacidad o disfunción mental: implicaciones y propuestas en educación.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de diciembre de 2021
Fecha de publicación de esta edición: 15 de julio de 2022

Sophia 34
Filosofía, antropología y educación

Descriptores: Fundamentos filosóficos de la etnografía; bases filosóficas de las teorías culturales; aportaciones de la antropología cultural y social a la educación; fundamentación filosófica del diálogo entre culturas; interculturalidad, multiculturalidad y educación; el quehacer de la filosofía en el diálogo intercultural; el pensamiento de la diversidad y su importancia educativa; ciudadanía global, cosmopolitismo y educación; ecosofía, cultura y transdisciplinariedad.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de julio de 2022
Fecha de publicación de esta edición: 15 de enero de 2023

Sophia 35
Corrientes filosóficas y su incidencia en las orientaciones pedagógicas

Descriptores: La filosofía como base fundamental de las orientaciones pedagógicas. El idealismo como base para la generación de orientaciones pedagógicas; el racionalismo como fundamento de orientaciones pedagógicas; el empirismo como sustento del realismo educativo; la ilustración como apoyo del iluminismo educativo; otras corrientes filosóficas como base de teorías u orientaciones pedagógicas a través de la historia; fundamentos filosóficos de las nuevas pedagogías; filosofía de la tecnología en el ámbito educativo; bases filosóficas del constructivismo y de otras teorías pedagógicas; pensamiento éti-
Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

**Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos:** 15 de diciembre de 2022
**Fecha de publicación de esta edición:** 15 de julio de 2023

**Sophia 36**
*Enfoque filosófico del aprendizaje como proceso cognitivo*

Descripciones: Bases filosóficas del aprendizaje; el aprendizaje como proceso cognitivo; el aprendizaje como producto y como proceso del conocimiento; fundamento filosófico de las teorías del aprendizaje; fundamentos psicológicos y pedagógicos del aprendizaje; fundamentos filosóficos de las inteligencias múltiples y educación; la inteligencia emocional y su incidencia en los procesos educativos; ciencia y filosofía de las emociones humanas: repercusiones educativas; sentido y significado de los procesos cognitivos; memoria, pensamiento y lenguaje como principales procesos cognitivos del ser humano; procesos cognitivos y aprendizajes significativos.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

**Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos:** 15 de julio de 2023
**Fecha de publicación de esta edición:** 15 de enero de 2024

**Sophia 37**
*Física, metafísica y educación*

Descripciones: Reflexiones filosóficas acerca de la interpretación de la física; la metafísica en el siglo XXI; historia de la física y su planteamiento educativo; relaciones entre concepciones de la física en la historia de la filosofía; problema del sentido y de la verdad en la filosofía de la física; naturaleza y implicaciones de la termodinámica; epistemología y principios rectores de las teorías físicas actuales; fundamentos filosóficos de la mecánica cuántica; implicaciones filosóficas de la teoría cuántica; implicaciones filosóficas de la física newtoniana; implicaciones filosóficas de la teoría de la relatividad; estrategias pedagógicas en la enseñanza-aprendizaje de la física; propuestas educativas para dinamizar la comprensión de la física; implicaciones filosóficas de la física teórica actual.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.
Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de diciembre de 2023
Fecha de publicación de esta edición: 15 de julio de 2024

Sophia 38
El método inductivo en las humanidades y en la pedagogía

Descriptores: La actividad científica y reflexión sobre el método de conocimiento; el método inductivo en las ciencias sociales; inducción, experiencia y acción como fundamento de la pedagogía; los métodos de conocimiento y aprendizaje en las humanidades; valor y límites del método experimental en las ciencias humanas; valor y límites del positivismo pedagógico; reflexiones sobre el método científico e implicaciones en los procesos de aprendizaje; aplicaciones del método inductivo en la educación; utilidad del método inductivo para la psicología; propuestas pedagógicas de carácter inductivo en las ciencias humanas.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de julio de 2024
Fecha de publicación de esta edición: 15 de enero de 2025