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The editorial board is pleased to present number 25 of Sophia: Philosophy Collection of Education. The central axis of this volume is the reflection on one of the main problems of knowledge: the relation subject-object of knowledge. In this sense, some pending questions already mentioned are stated in the number 13 of the same collection, which focused its attention on the construction of knowledge from the philosophical, psychological and pedagogical approach and that has now allowed to take a retrospective look at some of those questions that have emerged:

… a reference part for the opening of new conceptual ways to rethink the problem of knowledge and to redirect the educational processes in order to promote a true construction of knowledge that effectively values its protagonists and contributes with the subjective tools that are necessary to achieve an authentic social transformation (Aguilar-Gordón, 2012, p. 14).

Within the extensive field of philosophy the questions related to the theory of knowledge as well as the processes and relations that it implies are very important in the current academy by arising philosophical questions that are always in force as: what is the existing nature, essence and relationship between the subject that knows and the object of knowledge?

In the subject-object relationship, which of these elements is more important? What factors are involved in the knowledge process? How does the subject-matter relationship affect the processes of knowing, learning and building science? Is it the subject who learns the properties of the objects or is the object that is presented to the subject? Is it the subject that fits to the object in the knowledge process or is the object that fits to the structures of the subject? How does the understanding of the knowledge phenomenon contribute to the processes of educational research? Questions like:

... what is the influence of the world view on the construction of knowledge? How does the historical, social, political and cultural context affect the construction of knowledge?..... What are the limits of objective reality? What are the limits of the subjective reality and about the theories built by humans? What are the changes that arise in the
The subject-object relationship of knowledge

configuration of knowledge societies? How is knowledge built in the educational process?... (Aguilar-Gordón, 2012, p. 13).

These questions seek to find their answer in this publication, and also propose to think on the role of subjection and subjectivity in the current cognitive and educational processes in different contexts; it analyzes what is the role of the subject in philosophy, in the philosophy of education, in the construction of science and social transformation? What is the function of intellection, perception and subjectivity in the construction of knowledge?

Thus, the approach of the subject is carried out in a subjective way taking as a starting point the person who knows, or objectively whose starting point is what is known; it is undeniable that there can be no knowledge without the dynamic relationship between cognoscente subject and cognoscible object.

To talk about the subject-object relationship of knowledge implies thinking on the very essence of knowledge, and involves a rethinking of the function and importance of these factors in the knowledge process. Johannes Hessen in Theory of Knowledge (1981), established with success that at least three main macro responses arise on this problem, some of pre-metaphysical type in which they are inserted

On one side, the objectivity which considers:

...the object is decisive between the two members of the cognitive relationship. The object determines the subject. This has to be governed by that... objects are something given, something that presents a structure... which is rebuilt by the cognoscente consciousness (Hessen, 1981, p. 36).

From objectivism, the subject takes the properties and characteristics of the object to simply reproduce them. The object is presented as something given to the consciousness of the subject.

On the other hand, subjectivism aims to found knowledge in the subject that produces it; in terms of Hessen (1981) it places the world of ideas, the principles of knowledge in a subject in which everything depends on himself/herself.

Likewise, from the gaze of Hessen (1981) about the problem of the knowledge essence in terms of the subject-object relationship of knowledge, other metaphysical responses have arisen in which are located realism¹, Idealism² and phenomenalism³; and others that are theological, in which are located the mono-monotheistic and dualistic-theistic tendencies, which according to Hessen (1981) refer to the last principle of reality, the absolute⁴.
Human knowledge is a multidimensional problem that encompasses various spheres of human endeavor and its relations with oneself, with others and with the context in general. In this sense, the starting point for the reflection of this publication is to analyze the role of the subject as an active agent in the knowledge process.

Without subjective pretensions, it is necessary to understand that the subject is decisive in every cognitive process; it is the subject who questions, relates, informs, processes and builds the new knowledge; the subject, through his/her conscience acts, interacts with himself/herself, with others and with the environment to understand the reality. Thus, the subject in his/her attempt to capture and interpret the world creates the dialectical relationship with the object, where the synthesis of the process is taken to the phenomenon of knowledge. This confirms the Kantian proposition that the most important questions of philosophy and the different problems must be formulated from the subject. This allows understanding that at the gnostic level, the starting point and the arrival point is the man. In this way, the main Kantian questions emerge: what is the man?

Historically, the gaze has always been on the cognoscente subject; there are several philosophical theories that support the concern for the man, for the knowledge and for the problems that arise from man. To mention some examples, when the rationalist approach held the human reason as the sole basis of knowledge, it was paying special attention to the subject and was generating a clear dependence relationship of the object in relation to the cognoscente subject. Likewise, the postulates formulated by approaches of thought like the dialectic materialism, considered that objects have an independent existence of the subject conscience, admitting that even though the object and the outside world are determinants for the subject to build knowledge, it is the subject who must transform all his/her processes, the world and life.

The following lines expose the different manifestations of human thought on some of the filo-gnostic problematic already mentioned.

The article *The transhumant subject of modern philosophy and the transformations of the real* by Javier Corona Fernandez, explores the modern paradigm of subject conception in the time; the aim is to show a panoramic view of the subject, his/her theoretical and practical problems that demonstrate his/her action in the socio-historical, political and moral context. The document is developed in two moments: the first deals with the emergence of the subject in modernity, it raises the “defining phases” at conceptual level and establishes those that the author considers...
the decisive junctures that made him/her the main center of philosophy; the second analyzes the subject and the transformations of the real, also the outcome of modern philosophy in the first decades of the twentieth century; it designs the task of philosophy by transforming the sense of reality and the reference that made possible the linkage between the subject and the object as the fundamental basis of knowledge.

For its part, the article *The redefinition of the cognitive subject: the act of intellection as knowledge* by Edwin Fabricio Obando Olaya; Norma Gabriela Villagrán Venegas and Edson Leonardo Obando Olaya, analyzes the intentionality of the human being as a cognoscente subject and as a main factor in the reaffirmation of his/her way of being, and in the knowledge of the environment that it relates. To justify their approach they cited Lonergan, Husserl, Scheler and Locke. The article argues that the human being cannot separate from his/her immanent character to come to the knowledge of objects that are initially strange to his/her way of existence and that will gradually be learned by the human intellect.

Likewise, the article *subject-object relationship in the Kantian conception of science*, by Alfonso Chaves-Montero and Walter Federico Gadea Aiello, presents an analysis of the Kantian proposal and its transcendental idealism as a critical mediator philosophy between the dogmatism of rationalism and the skepticism generated by sensual empiricism. In this sense, the work makes a brief summary of the judgments that make up the different forms of human knowledge; recognizes the current and worth of Kantian thought throughout history; presents the complex Kantian relationship between reason and its practical uses; performs a cross-examination of idealism and realism by using hermeneutics tools and analysis of dialectical philosophical discourse. Finally, the authors raise the difference between theory and praxis in the field of science and ethics, and see the need to understand scientific objectivity and ethical subjectivity as diverse forms of human knowledge.

Advancing in this reflection process, the article *The phenomenological fact of the subject and the object in learning* by Luis Xavier Solís Sotomayor aims to analyze the evolution and emergence of human thought in order to determine the structure of knowledge through the various processes experienced over the time. The author sees the knowledge phenomenon from a systemic and reflective point of view, as a construction of learning and as a generation of meanings. Its foundation is the Piaget theory, the current thinking reality which allows forming new knowledge and decoding the scientific-technical world, considering the new langua-
The phenomenon of knowledge as a problem in educational research by Paulina Morales Hidalgo, José Ángel Bermúdez García and Jean Carlos García Zechariah, in which the authors believe that the problem of knowledge is one of the main themes of contemporary philosophical reflection that has exposed the serious epistemological crisis of scientific research in both its ontological and anthropological voids when it comes to understanding reality. The authors argue that the experiences of the educational researchers reveal that the Cartesian and positivistic thinking of modern discourse have undermined the production processes of knowledge that generate in and through the educational research. In this sense, the article tries to find new reflection keys that promote a type of discourse and a scientific praxis of experiential and human type.

After the reflections that emerged from the main topic posed for the structuring of Sophia 25, a series of approaches are presented that aim to understand the subjects in realities and particular contexts; in this sense, a set of interesting contributions are generated about the subject, the subjectivity, the neoliberal episteme and the dialectic of plurinationality. The following is a brief explanation of the main guidelines that guide this new group of documents.

The article The subjection in the educational panorama after the “end of history” by Luis López-Rocho, analyzes the end of the history in Hegel, Kojéve and in Fukuyama and its repercussions in the present time. In addition, it presents some criticisms made by Butler and Cadahia about the domination mechanisms. It reflects on the framework of the previous subject, emphasizing its implications within the educational field and taking as reference the approaches of Foucault and Freire. Subjectivity will play an important role in the shaping of a contemporary educational subject.

The article Subjectivity and authoritarianism in Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy of education by Gustavo Matías Robles, discusses the relevance and the topicality of the philosophical reflections of Theodor W. Adorno on education. It shows that the focus of what could be considered the philosophy of Adorno’s education is the concern for authoritarian forms of subjectivity and its undemocratic potential of the recent German past. The author argues that this “twist to the subject”, that Adorno proposes as a slogan of a critical pedagogy, must be understood in relation to the empirical works on the authoritarianism that the same
author carried out in the 50s and with certain proper motivations of his philosophy, such as the idea of experience crisis, his criticism to the idea of the autonomous subject and his unconformity concept of critique. The article is based on a critical and interpretative reading of Adorno’s texts on education, and reflects on the role of education in the formation of an appropriate subjectivity for a democratic life and to combat expressions of social authoritarianism.

For its part, the manuscript *Thinking the enigma of subjectivity through diversity* by Jonathan Cepeda Sánchez, develops a bibliographical exploration that aims to analyze how the enigma of subjectivity can be thought from a framework of attention to diversity, in which recognition of the other as a particular being is meant to be preserved. The author considers that diversity is a multifaceted construct, that must direct its gaze to the subjective aspect of human nature, and its essence deserves to be analyzed from different approaches, represented in the philosophy, psychoanalysis and social sciences foundations. With the foregoing, is opened a scenario that calls the history and the subjective constitution of teachers and students in general, emphasizing the social role that the school has as a producer of subjectivities. The manuscript presents some keys that allow restating the teaching/student experience in these times of globalization and consumerism.

Continuing this reflection process, the article *The neoliberal episteme and the emancipatory student repolitization in Brazil and Chile* by Héctor Marcelo Rodriguez Mancilla, Marcela Eliana Betancourt Sáez and René Antonio Varas González proposes a critical analysis linked to the relationship between the ideological foundations that are generated at the base of a neoliberal positioning episteme, the profound consequences of the increasing privatization in recent decades of formal education in Latin America and the mass student emancipatory mobilizations in countries such as Chile and Brazil. The authors consider that the trend towards privatization experienced in the education field is visualized, as well as the precariousness cause of the relational conditions and the learning from the perspective of the internal functioning of the school. At the same time that the student experiences situations of depoliticization, the emancipatory mobilizations to an inherited system repoliticize the student question by claiming the idea that education is and should be understood socially as a fundamental human right and as an important space for building citizenship in connection with different democratic projects.

Finally, the dialectical manuscript *Dialectics of plurinationality as criticism of the state-nation liberal* by Holger Rodrigo Díaz Salazar, studies
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the dialectic as a way of investigating the plurinationality and the ancient Ecuadorian monoethnic state-nation. The author investigates what is the ontological basis of plurinationality, and why plurinationality as a socio-political approach denies the homogeneity of the liberal nation state and the external-internal colonialism. The document argues that the ontological basis of plurinationality is in the community society (or social being) and that its socio-political praxis denies the fetishization of the liberal nation state, determined as an external-internal colonialism instrument of the society. The article concludes that the dialectic comprises the category of totality and is useful for the analysis and explanation of the society as a whole, of the parties to all and everything to the parties, in mutual universal interrelation; and community society is an ontological objectivation of plurinationality and manifests itself in the ethnic-cultural diversity of Ecuador, with different historical times, and opposes to colonial and republican economic-social formation; and the fetishization of the liberal nation state as an instrument of the external and internal colonialism of Ecuadorian society is still in force and continues to fulfill the same function through the processing of the power coloniality, the ontological invisibilization of the other (alter) and the racist colonial differentiation.

To conclude, it is expected that the ideas presented in this volume will create new questionings and new proposals that energize the philosophy work of education and the work of human thought in general.

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Notas

1 Understood as the epistemological position according to which there are real things independent from consciousness. This position admits different positions: naive, natural and critical (Hessen, 1981, pp. 38-39).

2 There are different meanings; the one referred here is the idealism in the epistemological sense, which argues that there are no real things independent from consciousness. Hessen (1981) mentions two forms of idealism: the objective or psychological idealism (all reality is enclosed in the conscience of the subject; things are nothing more than content of consciousness, their existence is reduced to the perception made by humans, in this sense when they are not perceived they cease to exist, since they do not have an independent being of the conscience); and the objective or logical idealism (the content of this consciousness is the sum of thoughts, judgments, everything is logically ideal, it is a lattice of judgments (Hessen, 1981).
3 It is the theory that refers that we do not know things as they are, but as they seem to us. According to phenomenalism, there are real things, but we cannot know its essence, we can only know “that things are”, but we cannot know “what they are” (Hessen, 1981, p. 44).

4 These answers arise according to how “the absolute is conceived, either as immanent or as transcendent to the world, coming to a monist and pan-theistic solution or to a dualistic and theistic solution” (Hessen, 1981, p. 47).

References

AGUILAR-GORDÓN, Floralba

HESSEN, Johannes
Tenemos el agrado de presentar el número 25 de Sophia: Colección de Filosofía de la Educación. El eje central de este volumen es la reflexión acerca de uno de los problemas capitales del conocimiento, la relación sujeto-objeto del conocimiento, en tal sentido, se replantea algunas cuestiones pendientes ya aludidas de modo ligero en el número 13 de la misma colección, mismo que en su momento concentró su atención en la construcción del conocimiento desde el enfoque filosófico, psicológico y pedagógico y que ahora ha permitido realizar una mirada retrospectiva hacia algunos de esos cuestionamientos que han seguido constituyéndose en:

...un bloque referencial para la apertura de nuevas vías conceptuales para repensar el problema del conocimiento y para re-direccionar los procesos educativos con el fin de propender hacia una verdadera construcción del conocimiento que valore efectivamente a sus protagonistas y que contribuya con las herramientas subjetivas necesarias para lograr una auténtica transformación social (Aguilar-Gordón, 2012, p. 14).

Dentro del extenso campo de la filosofía las cuestiones referentes a la teoría del conocimiento, así como los procesos y relaciones que ello implica, toman gran importancia en la Academia actual sacando a flote interrogantes filosóficas siempre vigentes como: ¿Cuál es la naturaleza, esencia y relación existente entre el sujeto que conoce y el objeto del conocimiento?.

En la relación sujeto-objeto, ¿cuál de estos elementos es más importante? ¿Qué factores intervienen en el proceso del conocer? ¿Cómo influye la relación sujeto objeto en los procesos de conocer, de aprender y de construir la ciencia? ¿Es el sujeto quien comprende las propiedades de los objetos, o por el contrario, el objeto el que se presenta al sujeto? ¿Es el sujeto el que se adecúa al objeto en el proceso del conocer o, al contrario, es el objeto el que se adecúa a las estructuras del sujeto? ¿Cómo aporta la comprensión del fenómeno del conocimiento a los procesos propios de la investigación educativa?. Preguntas como:

...¿cuál es la influencia de la visión del mundo en la construcción del conocimiento?; ¿cómo incide el contexto histórico, social, político y cultural en la construcción del conocimiento?.....¿cuáles son los límites de la realidad objetiva?; ¿cuáles son los límites de la realidad subjetiva y de las teorías que construimos?; ¿cuáles son los cambios que se suscitan en la configuración de las sociedades del conocimiento?; ¿cómo se
construye el conocimiento en el proceso educativo?... (Aguilar-Gordón, 2012, p. 13).

Pretenden encontrar su respuesta en esta publicación, además se propone reflexionar sobre el papel de la sujeción y de la subjetividad en los procesos cognoscitivos y educativos actuales en contextos diversos; analiza ¿cuál es el papel del sujeto en la filosofía, en la filosofía de la educación, en la construcción de la ciencia y en la transformación social?; ¿cuál es la función de la intelección, de la percepción y de la subjetividad en la construcción del conocimiento?

Así, sea que el abordaje de la temática se realice de modo subjetivo tomando como punto de partida al sujeto que conoce, o de modo objetivo cuyo punto de partida es lo que se conoce, es innegable que no puede existir conocimiento sin la relación dinámica entre sujeto cognoscente y objeto cognoscible.

Hablar de la relación sujeto-objeto del conocimiento conlleva reflexionar acerca de la esencia misma del conocimiento, conlleva un replanteamiento acerca de la función y la importancia de estos factores en el proceso del conocimiento, ya Johannes Hessen (1981), en Teoría del Conocimiento, establecía con acierto que sobre esta problemática surgen al menos tres respuestas macro fundamentales, unas de carácter pre-metafísico en donde se insertan:

Por una parte, el objetivismo, mismo que considera que:

...el objeto es el decisivo entre los dos miembros de la relación cognoscitiva. El objeto determina al sujeto. Este ha de regirse por aquel... los objetos son algo dado, algo que presenta una estructura... que es reconstruida por la conciencia cognoscente (Hessen, 1981, p. 36).

Desde el objetivismo, al sujeto le queda tomar las propiedades y características del objeto para simplemente reproducirlas. El objeto se presenta como algo dado a la consciencia del sujeto.

Y, por otra parte, el subjetivismo pretende fundar el conocimiento en el sujeto que lo produce, para esto, en términos de Hessen (1981) coloca el mundo de las ideas, el conjunto de los principios del conocimiento en un sujeto de quien depende todo.

Así mismo, desde la mirada de Hessen (1981) en torno al problema de la esencia misma del conocimiento, en cuanto a la relación sujeto-objeto del conocimiento, se desprenden otras respuestas de carácter metafísico donde se ubican el realismo, el idealismo y el fenomenalismo; y unas últimas, de carácter teológico, en las que se ubican las tendencias
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monista-panteísta y dualista-teísta, mismas que se remiten, a decir de Hessen (1981) al último principio de la realidad, lo absoluto⁴.

El conocimiento humano es un problema multidimensional que abarca a varias esferas del quehacer humano y de sus relaciones consigo mismo, con los otros, con el contexto en general. En tal sentido, el punto de partida para la reflexión de esta publicación de Sophia es analizar el papel del sujeto como agente activo en el proceso del conocimiento.

Sin pretensiones subjetivistas, es necesario entender que el sujeto es decisivo en todo proceso cognoscitivo, es él quien se cuestiona, se relaciona, se informa, procesa y construye el nuevo conocimiento; es él quien a través de sus actos de conciencia interactúa consigo mismo, con los demás y con el medio para comprender y captar su realidad. Así, el sujeto en su intento por captar e interpretar su mundo da paso a la relación dialéctica con el objeto, en donde la síntesis del proceso se traduce en el fenómeno del conocimiento. Con ello se ratifica la proposición kantiana de que las grandes preguntas de la filosofía y las diversas problemáticas deben ser formuladas desde el sujeto. Esto permite comprender que a nivel gnoseológico, el punto de partida y el punto de llegada es el hombre. De este modo se hace eco de la pregunta fundamental de la filosofía kantiana: ¿qué es el hombre?

Históricamente, la mirada siempre ha estado en el sujeto que conoce, varias han sido las corrientes filosóficas que respaldan la preocupación por el hombre, por el conocimiento y por los problemas que de él se derivan. Por citar unos ejemplos, cuando la corriente racionalista sostenía como único fundamento del conocimiento a la razón humana, estaba poniendo especial atención en el sujeto y estaba generando una clara relación de dependencia del objeto en relación al sujeto cognosciente. Así mismo, cuando desde los postulados formulados por corrientes de pensamiento como el materialismo dialéctico, se consideraba que los objetos tienen una existencia independiente de la conciencia del sujeto, se admitía que a pesar de que el objeto y el mundo exterior son determinantes para que el sujeto construya el conocimiento, éste, el sujeto es quien en última instancia debe transformar todos los procesos de sí mismo, del mundo y de la vida.

En las siguientes líneas se exponen las diferentes manifestaciones del pensamiento humano en torno a algunas de las problemáticas filognoseológicas antes anunciadas.

Abre el camino de reflexión del presente volumen, el artículo El sujeto trashumante de la filosofía moderna y las transformaciones de lo real, de Javier Corona Fernández. El autor explora el paradigma moderno de
la concepción de sujeto en el tiempo; se propone mostrar una visión panorámica del sujeto, sus problemas teórico-prácticos que evidencian su accionar en el contexto socio-histórico, político y moral. El documento se desarrolla en dos momentos: en el primero, aborda la irrupción del sujeto en la modernidad, plantea las “fases definitorias” a nivel conceptual y establece las que el autor considera las coyunturas determinantes que lo convirtieron en el centro de gravedad de la filosofía; en el segundo, reflexiona acerca del sujeto y las transformaciones de lo real, analiza el desenlace de la filosofía moderna en el contexto de las primeras décadas del siglo XX, diseña la tarea de la filosofía al transformarse el sentido de la realidad y el referente que hizo posible la vinculación existente entre sujeto y objeto como base fundamental del fenómeno del conocimiento.

Por su parte, el documento La redefinición del sujeto cognoscente: el acto de intelección en cuanto conocimiento, elaborado por Edwin Fabricio Obando Olaya; Norma Gabriela Villagrán Venegas y Edson Leonardo Obando Olaya, analiza la intencionalidad del ser humano como sujeto cognoscente y como factor preponderante en la reafirmación de su modo de ser y en el conocimiento del entorno con el que se relaciona, para justificar sus planteamientos se apoya entre otros en Lonergan, Husserl, Scheler, Locke. El artículo defiende que el ser humano no puede prescindir de su carácter inmanente de llegar al conocimiento de los objetos que inicialmente le resultan extraños a su modo de existir y que paulatinamente serán aprehendidos por el intelecto humano.

Así mismo, el manuscrito La relación sujeto-objeto en la concepción kantiana de la ciencia, estructurado por Alfonso Chaves-Montero y Walter Federico Gadea Aiello, presenta un análisis de la propuesta kantiana y de su idealismo trascendental como una filosofía crítica mediadora entre el dogmatismo propio del racionalismo y del escepticismo generado por el empirismo sensualista; en tal sentido, el trabajo realiza una breve reseña de las formas del juicio que conforman las distintas formas del conocimiento humano; reconoce la actualidad y valía del pensamiento kantiano a través de la historia; presenta la compleja relación kantiana existente entre razón y sus usos prácticos; utilizando herramientas de la hermenéutica y del análisis del discurso filosófico dialéctico, realiza un análisis comparativo entre idealismo y realismo; finalmente, los autores plantean la diferencia existente entre teoría y praxis en el ámbito de la ciencia y la ética; y ven la necesidad de comprender a la objetividad científica y a la subjetividad ética como formas diversas de conocimiento humano.

Avanzando en este proceso de reflexión, se presenta el artículo El hecho fenomenológico del sujeto y el objeto en el aprendizaje, elaborado por
Luis Xavier Solís Sotomayor; este documento tiene como objetivo analizar la evolución y aparecimiento del pensamiento en el ser humano para determinar la estructura del conocimiento a través de los diversos procesos experimentados en el tiempo. El autor ve el fenómeno del conocimiento desde el punto de vista sistémico y reflexivo como una construcción de aprendizajes y como generación de significaciones. Toma como base la teoría piagetiana, la realidad pensante actual que permite la formación de nuevos conocimientos y decodificaciones del mundo científico-técnico y sobre todo considera los nuevos lenguajes y las nuevas formas de pensar en el mundo conforme al contexto socio cultural en el que surgen.

Para cerrar el bloque de artículos referidos a la temática central, se presenta el manuscrito, *El fenómeno del conocimiento como problema en la investigación educativa*, elaborado por Paulina Morales Hidalgo, José Ángel Bermúdez García y Jean Carlos García Zacarías, quienes consideran que el problema del conocimiento es uno de los temas fundamentales de la reflexión filosófica contemporánea que ha dejado al descubierto la grave crisis epistemológica de la investigación científica en tanto a sus vacíos ontológicos y antropológicos a la hora de comprender la realidad. Los autores plantean que las experiencias de los investigadores educativos revelan que las categorías de pensamiento cartesiano y positivista del discurso moderno mantienen minados los procesos de producción del conocimiento que se generan en y a través de la investigación educativa. En tal sentido, a decir de sus autores, el artículo pretende encontrar nuevas claves de reflexión que promuevan un tipo de discurso y una praxis científica de carácter vivencial y humana.

Luego de las reflexiones surgidas como consecuencia de la temática central planteada para la estructuración de Sophia 25, se presenta una serie de enfoques que pretenden comprender a los sujetos en realidades y contextos singulares; en tal sentido, se genera un conjunto de interesantes contribuciones acerca de la sujeción, la subjetividad, la episteme neoliberal y la dialéctica de la plurinacionalidad respectivamente. A continuación, se explica brevemente los lineamientos fundamentales que orientan a este nuevo grupo de documentos.

Así, el artículo *La sujeción en el panorama educativo después del “fin de la historia”*, estructurado por Luis López Morocho, se propone analizar el fin de la historia en Hegel, en Kojève y en Fukuyama y sus repercusiones en la época actual; además, presenta algunas críticas realizadas por Butler y Cadahia acerca los mecanismos de dominación. Reflexiona en torno al marco de la sujeción anterior, enfatizando en sus implicaciones dentro del campo educativo tomando como referencia los planteamientos...
tos de Foucault y de Freire. La sujeción jugará un papel importante en la conformación de un sujeto educativo contemporáneo.

Sigue el artículo *Subjetividad y autoritarismo en la filosofía de la educación de Theodor W. Adorno*, planteado por Gustavo Matías Robles, mismo que se propone discutir la relevancia y la actualidad de las reflexiones filosóficas de Theodor W. Adorno sobre educación. En ese contexto muestra que el centro de lo que podría considerarse la filosofía de la educación adorniana es la preocupación por formas de subjetivación autoritarias y su potencial antidemocrático a la luz del pasado reciente alemán. A partir de allí, argumenta que este “giro al sujeto”, que Adorno propone como lema de una pedagogía crítica, debe ser comprendido en relación con los trabajos empíricos sobre el autoritarismo que el mismo autor llevó a cabo a partir de los años 50’s y con ciertos motivos propios de su filosofía, tales y como la idea de crisis de la experiencia, su crítica a la idea de sujeto autónomo y su concepto anticformista de crítica. El artículo se basa en una lectura crítica e interpretativa de los textos adornianos sobre educación, reflexiona sobre el papel de la educación en la formación de modos de subjetivación apropiados para una vida democrática y para combatir expresiones de autoritarismo social.

Por su parte, el manuscrito *Pensando el enigma de la subjetividad a través de la diversidad*, construido por Jonathan Cepeda Sánchez, desarrolla una exploración bibliográfica que tiene como objetivo, analizar cómo el enigma de la subjetividad puede pensarse y reflexionarse desde un marco de atención a la diversidad, en donde lo que se pretende salvaguardar es el reconocimiento por el otro como ser singular. El autor considera que al ser la diversidad un constructo multifacético, ésta debe dirigir su mirada al plano intersubjetivo de la naturaleza humana y su esencia merece ser abordada desde un andamiaje interdisciplinario, cuyo basamento sea representado por la filosofía, el psicoanálisis y las ciencias sociales. Con lo anterior, se abre un escenario que interpela por la historia y por la constitución subjetiva del corpus docente y del estudiantado en general, destacando la función social que tiene la escuela como productora de subjetividades. El manuscrito presenta algunas claves que permiten resignificar la experiencia docente/alumno en estos tiempos de globalización y consumismo.

Continuando con este proceso de reflexión, el artículo *La episteme neoliberal y la repolitización estudiantil emancipatoria en Brasil y Chile*, elaborado por Héctor Marcelo Rodríguez Mancilla, Marcela Eliana Betancourt Sáez y René Antonio Varas González se propone realizar un análisis crítico vinculado a la relación entre los fundamentos ideológicos que
se generan a la base de una episteme de posicionamiento neoliberal, las profundas consecuencias que ha tenido la creciente privatización de la educación formal acontecida en las últimas décadas en Latinoamérica y las multitudinarias movilizaciones emancipatorias estudiantiles, ocurridas recientemente en países como Chile y Brasil. Los autores consideran que se visualiza la tendencia a la privatización vivenciada en el ámbito de la educación, la causal de la precarización de las condiciones relacionales y el aprendizaje desde la perspectiva de funcionamiento interno de la escuela. A decir de los autores, al mismo tiempo en que el estudiante vivencia situaciones de despolitización, las movilizaciones emancipatorias a un sistema heredado repolitizan la cuestión estudiantil, al reivindicar la idea de que la educación es y debe ser comprendida socialmente como un derecho humano fundamental y como un importante espacio de construcción de ciudadanía en vinculación con diferentes proyectos democráticos.

Finalmente, el manuscrito *Dialéctica de la plurinacionalidad como crítica del Estado-Nación liberal*, elaborado por Holger Rodrigo Díaz Salazar, estudia la dialéctica como camino de indagación de la plurinacionalidad y su contraparte el vetusto estado-nación monoétnico ecuatoriano. El autor indaga ¿cuál es el fundamento ontológico de la plurinacionalidad? y ¿por qué la plurinacionalidad como planteamiento socio-político niega la homogeneidad del estado-nación liberal y su correlato el colonialismo externo-interno?. En el documento se plantea que el fundamento ontológico de la plurinacionalidad se halla en la sociedad comunitaria (o ser social) y que en su praxis socio-política niega la fetichización del estado-nación liberal, determinado como instrumento del colonialismo externo-interno de la sociedad. El artículo concluye que la dialéctica comprende la categoría de totalidad y es útil para el análisis y explicación de la sociedad en su conjunto, de las partes al todo y del todo a las partes, en mutua interrelación universal; y, la sociedad comunitaria es una objetivación ontológica de la plurinacionalidad y se manifiesta en la diversidad étnica-cultural del Ecuador, con temporalidades históricas distintas, y en contraposición a la formación económico-social colonial y republicana; y, la fetichización del estado-nación liberal como instrumento del colonialismo externo e interno de la sociedad ecuatoriana aún está vigente y continúa cumpliendo esa misma función a través del procesamiento de la colonialidad del poder, la invisibilización ontológica del otro (alter) y la diferenciación colonial racista.

Hasta aquí las propuestas realizadas en torno a *La relación sujeto-objeto del conocimiento*. 

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Se espera una vez más que las ideas aquí expuestas se conviertan en semilleros para la generación de nuevos cuestionamientos y nuevas propuestas que dinamicen el quehacer de la filosofía de la educación en particular y el quehacer del pensamiento humano en general.

**Floralba del Rocío Aguilar Gordón**

**Notas**


2. Existe diversos sentidos, aquí nos referimos al idealismo en sentido epistemológico, mismo que sostiene que no hay cosas reales independientes de la conciencia. Hessen (1981) diferencia dos formas de idealismo: el idealismo objetivo o psicológico (toda realidad está encerrada en la conciencia del sujeto; las cosas no son nada más que contenidos de la conciencia, su existencia se reduce a la percepción que realizamos nosotros, en tal sentido en el momento que dejamos de percibirlos dejan de existir; pues no tienen un ser independiente de nuestra conciencia) y el idealismo objetivo o lógico (el contenido de esta conciencia es la suma de pensamientos, juicios, todo es lógicamente ideal, es un entramado de juicios (Hessen, 1981).

3. “Es la teoría según la cual no conocemos las cosas como son en sí, sino como nos aparecen. Para el fenomenalismo hay cosas reales, pero no podemos conocer su esencia. Sólo podemos saber “que” las cosas son, pero no “lo que” son” (Hessen, 1981, p. 44).

4. Estas respuestas surgen de acuerdo a cómo “se conciba lo absoluto, sea como inmanente o como transcendente al mundo, se llega a una solución monista y panteísta o a una solución dualista y teísta” (Hessen, 1981, p. 47).

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THE TRANSHUMANT SUBJECT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY
AND THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE REAL
El sujeto trashumante de la filosofía moderna
y las transformaciones de lo real

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Abstract

This article explores the modern paradigm of the subject that as a traveller goes abroad on a time capsule, crosses over different eras and contexts. Ove the time, it has been the theme of reflections of all kinds, which also projects it to an open consideration of the future by declaring its death at the present time or by tossing it back to the past to recall its formative stages. Thus, the objective of the article is to provide an overview of the philosophical category of the subject that marked the ways on thinking about the reality in areas as diverse as knowledge, moral life, historical development, social revolutions, political structures and artistic creation, among other theoretical and practical problems. The article considers two different moments. The first section called “The irruption of the subject in Modernity”, focusses on some of the defining phases at conceptual level and the determining junctures that made it the center of gravity for the philosophy. The second one is entitled “The subject and the transformations of the real.” It outlines the outcome of modern philosophy in the context of the first decades of the twentieth century, when the task that corresponds to the philosophy is set as the sense of reality changes, as well as the canon that made the relation between subject and object to be the axis of thought.

Keywords
Modern philosophy, humanism, idealism.

Resumen

Este artículo explora el paradigma moderno del sujeto que atraviesa, como el viajero que aborda la cápsula del tiempo, épocas y contextos distintos. En su larga trayectoria, ha sido tema de reflexiones de todo tipo, que de igual modo lo lanzan a una consideración abierta al futuro, que declaran su muerte en el momento presente o lo regresan al pasado a rememorar sus etapas formativas. El objetivo es mostrar una visión panorámica de la categoría filosófica del sujeto que marcó los modos de pensar la realidad en ámbitos tan diversos como el conocimiento, la vida moral, el devenir histórico, las revoluciones sociales, las estructuras políticas y la creación artística, entre otros problemas teóricos y prácticos. La exposición se desarrolla en dos momentos: el primer apartado, “La irrupción del sujeto en la Modernidad”, plantea algunas de las fases definitivas a nivel conceptual y las coyunturas determinantes que lo convirtieron en el centro de gravedad de la filosofía; la segunda parte lleva por título “El sujeto y las transformaciones de lo real”, que esboza el desenlace de la filosofía moderna en el contexto de las primeras décadas del siglo XX, en donde se diseña la tarea que a la filosofía corresponde al transformarse el sentido de realidad y el canon que hizo de la vinculación entre sujeto y objeto el eje central del pensamiento.

Palabras claves

Filosofía moderna, humanismo, idealismo.

Introduction

The reflections on the gnoseologic process and the various links between the subject and the object have existed for many centuries, and sometimes it seems that the concepts have been refined and have integrated the theories; in other moments it seems the opposites, that the postures have been radicalized and the convictions blurred, until approaching to the contemporary science, with the evanescent principle of uncertainty like an approach or possible elucidation of the reality. In turn, in the link of the subject with the object within the ethical-normative space, it is firmly believed that in this area is built the identity of the subject, but then it is assumed that after an extended path through the ages, and the passage of a long time of acting with caution and fear, the definition of the accidental and contingency of individual existence has created; finally, in the aesthetic articulation between the subject and the object at the end of traversing the ages in history and knowing what the thinkers have exposed about the beauty as harmony of the symbols is herd the idea that the artistic form is at the same time the sign of chaos. By cracking the unscathed rigidity around the form and the beauty, is also approached to the meaning of social transformation, artistic and cultural creation. Castoriadis (2008) says “The artistic form is at the same time form of the chaos and form that flows directly into the chaos. It is step and opening into the abyss. This shaping chaos is what constitutes the katharsis of art” (p. 84).
Thus, in the outcome of these three trajectories that has followed the philosophical reason; the contemporary thought gets to a kind of unfathomable complexity in the subject-object theming and in the senses that run about them. In the dilated becoming of humanity, the resources to know and produce spaces of certainty have led to elaborate different conceptions of the world (object) in the desire to maintain and orient the diverse nuances of the existence (subject). With greater or lesser difficulty and with different scopes, the philosophical arguments around the sphere of knowledge, of the inner life of human and of his/her astonishing creative capacities, are today in the midst of a multiplicity of language game that roll on the ground all the beliefs that arise the modern time.

Indeed, the modern individual started elaborating his/her own narrative by appropriating the prudential knowledge, which according to Aristotelian ethics, explains the meaning of life towards a purpose, which is happiness. However, the apparent caution of the ancient world changed in modernity by an open discernment towards the challenges that the future poses, a variant that constitutes perhaps the most radical transformation undertaken hitherto in the horizon of ethics. Additionally, the perception of the human being with regard to its own nature also suffers a mutation; it is no longer the substantial unit of matter and form that exists in a world ruled by necessity, cosmos in which each sensitive or intelligible substance occupies a certain place; on the contrary, from the Renaissance the ontological condition of the individual is required according to the awareness of his/her accidentality in a world composed of moving matter. In classical Greece, although there is no concept of subject, there is the construction of an identity that is generated in the ethical-normative space. However, beyond this signal, it can be affirmed that the germination moment of the subject is located in the modern era, and agrees with the splendor of philosophy as a cultural form and with the beginning in the economy of a flourishing period that figures its expectations in the attainment of abundance, the organization of society according to the principle of freedom and the personal yearning for happiness.

Modernity will become a hegemonic pattern in the European model to follow, with its optimistic vision that contrasts with the torn world of these days, in which the number of starving people —counted in millions— continues to increase. The system ravages of organization and productivity that have privileged scientific knowledge about the formation of personality, which has promoted the replacement of finalism, the replacement of a creator and almighty God by impersonal systems and processes is presented to humans as the price to be paid in exchange
for a rational explanation that banishes fear and uncertainty. Under this continuous mutation that breaks old schemes, facticity accounts for the positivity and performance demanded in a research. It is a fact that, in the contemporary culture —characterized by the search for efficiency and profitability— philosophy has lost its hegemonic role because is reproached for its unproductive nature in the era of innovation and competitiveness; consequently, it has become marginal, and has been even displaced by science. Meanwhile, within the sphere of the willingness that marks the existence humans live a narcissistic individualism, but also have longing for the subject as a self-conscious and creative actor who faces the construction of personal history and bears in parallel several lives and environments.

For its part, the market allows everything but does not fix anything; the metropolis of the 21st century — its best creation — are paradoxically explained by the social vacuum, the power without center, the fluid economy. Among the contradictions of abundance, economists regret that humans live today in a society of exchange and services rather than production. On the political level, coexistence is defined by almost zero participation, despite the fact that sociological discourse insists on talking about social actors. However, if thought of the conceptual elucidation in the contrast of theoretical sites that take place in the midst of the relations between modern philosophy and contemporary reflection, it is seen that the theoretical perspective of complex thought has arisen to understand the new subject-object relationships, surpassing the reductionism of the simplicity principle in the subject and projecting the implication, diversity and constellation in the object. For these reasons, this text aims to show that philosophy cannot make a tabula rasa of the past, on the contrary, bringing to the discussion those layers of growing complexity of history must expose the centrality of their training moments and the relationships of the subject with his/her world in a lattice that can only be understood from an intersubjective dimension that remains until today; hence the concept of subject has been analyzed and re-examined, despite its apparent expiration.

Thus, this article recovers certain reflective lines in the relation approach of the subject with an externality that is presented nuanced by the concepts of the cognitive reason, by the expectations of an autonomous willingness or by the plasticity of the symbolic language. It constitutes a historical journey through the discussions that animated the philosophical reflection during the classical modernity, from Descartes and his conception of subject as a substance, to the post-kant notions of
late modernity where subject and object are totalized in the concept of subjectivity. To this end, the essay has been structured in two moments with the intention of approaching the development of the philosophical category of the subject in a panoramic way, and his/her path in a world he/she owns in multiple ways. The first section, “The emergence of the subject in modernity” exposes some of his/her determining phases of training and junctures, in which undertakes his/her own definition in view of the reductionism of the laws by which nature is objective, here are addresses some concepts, ideas and authors that laid the foundations of the modern world; the second entitled “The subject and the transformations of the real” raises the problematic constituted around these terms in the context of the first decades of the twentieth century, all from theoretical constellations that have been paradigmatic in this topic, which outlines the outcome of modern philosophy; it is designed the task that philosophy corresponds to the transformation of the sense of reality and the canon that made the link between subject and object as the central axis of thought. Finally, in the conclusions are proposed some elements that define the contemporary thought, mentioning the critiques of the scientific reason, the fracture of the knowledge theory and the derivation of the society by converting the technology reason in a political basis.

The emergence of the subject in modernity

Too far had I entered, flying, in the future:
A shiver of fright seized me.

When I looked around, my only contemporary was time.
then I went backwards, towards the hearth, and today I
am again with you, men of the present,

The philosophical category of the subject is mainly formed in the modern era. However, despite its long journey through the centuries, today it does not cease to arouse reflections from very varied approaches, which makes it appear among the philosophical problems of more scope since its initial formulation. Even though, it has been tried to be annulled by being considered an incurrent subject or a concept pertaining to a long dead stage, it is clear that contemporary thinking cannot obviate its presence and treatment, whether by performing studies that gravitate around the historical aspects that outline the subject’s configuration as an irreplaceable element in the formation of the present; that the classical
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figure of the metaphysical subject be debated and criticized as substrate and foundation of all knowable; that it is discussed about the perceptive subject facing a wide range of stimuli from the most succulent rudeness to the subtle expressions of avant-garde art, or the initiatives germinated in a moral and political being in moments of social disintegration and generalized crisis as those marks in the beginnings of the 21st century. In all the constellations, it is undeniable the relevance of a modernity paradigm like this, which has given rise to multiple questions about consciousness and its relationship with reality.

Even though it is not difficult to accept this obvious main role of the concept of subject, at the same time it is not easy to sketch in a few lines the reasons why this presence has originated and its treatment in this time, since there are many discursive aspects that originate from this platform. As a starting point for this analysis, is the conviction that modernity is identified with the spirit of free research that collides with the regulations of the power apparatus, an impossible struggle to carry out without the intervention of a being that exerts a principle of activity from itself.

But modernity is also a historical moment which in the dialectics of social forces inaugurates the protagonism of the state and the individualism that drives industrialization. Under the sign of a regulation of knowledge from an episteme validated by the new developments of the mathematical science, the concept of subject creates the conception of the universe which is structured beginning with a mechanistic scheme, which removes mysteries and reduces the explanation from nature to quantitative criteria. At the same time, with modernity emerges art as an autonomous sphere of culture and, at the level of practical reason, the idea of autonomy, freedom of belief and the right to private life as a safeguard to social controls set up a germination moment of values and senses for human existence. Modernity is also a rupture of traditions and beliefs, which brings with it the gradual abandonment of particular attitudes and the opening of the universalism of the age of reason, where the education of the subject has a link with the conceptualization of a world governed by rational laws that are fully intelligible to thought.

Classical modernity

In the itinerary of modern philosophy it is feasible to distinguish the great themes that characterize it and the moment of its emergence in a plain and summarized division in two periods: classical modernity, which
corresponds to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and late modernity, spanning the nineteenth century, Friedman (1986). According to this concise characterization, modern classical philosophy poses an optimistic thought structured according to the idea of progress, which at the same time emerges as a basic category that explains the progress of civilization in history, as the Gradual maturation of the human race and the harmonious movement of the world.

At this juncture of early modernity, philosophy formulates its conviction that reason governs the world; consequently, the civilization lies in the development of the reason, which has in the scientific investigation the device that discovers the natural laws that govern the nature, including the principles that make possible the social contract. Under this systemic universe, the place of the human being is another determining factor for the sense of reality that is being scarcely enunciated, since the propensity to take as a foundation a transcendent and mysterious entity is abandoned, originating the immanent humanism, which takes as reference the sense of the Earth. Israel (2012), in its deep study *The radical illustration*, realizes the tone that followed the political and intellectual revolutions that occurred in this general context called modernity, and it does so following the Spinoza philosophy:

Everything that happens necessarily happens; there is no “contingent thing” and nothing can be in a different way than it actually is. Therefore, there are no miracles or divine commandments. “Good” and “evil” are not absolute moral values and do not exist in nature, but are purely relative notions concerning humans. Spinoza promulgates his “geometric” doctrine of passions and exposes his theory that knowledge is based on sensations and builds upon perceptions of what is true and what is false, through proportions and mathematical relationships, so if we make mistakes and often believe things that are not true, we cannot believe so erroneously that the truth cannot be demonstrated [...] The eternal and unwavering link between ideas and reality is such that all our notions are true in some sense, so that they are adequate and inadequate rather than strictly true or false. Spinoza introduces the apparent paradox that human is necessarily determined, however, possesses freedom through reason, which is intrinsic to his/her conatus, or struggles to preserve his/her being. Finally, the existence of separate body spirits and apparitions, including Satan and demons, is categorically ruled out (p. 211).

As a free subject, human has the power to be in charge of himself/herself; according to this idea, the task of civilization is that human gets an age when he/she can drive his/her life rationally. Modernity is first and
foremost emancipation; here the concept of person came to specify the image of a subject who recognizes himself/herself as a future that faces freedom as his/her full realization. In the meantime, science education forms it in the learning of rational thinking, with the ability to resist or overcome the natural inclinations—as it cannot be nullified—and to the routine habit that often loses it in an abyss of disconcerts.

In the mentality of rupture is found one of the main channels that have given continuity to the subject as a matter of reflection that, over the time, registers renewed reaches, which come to circumscribe the character of what delimits the human experience in this context. A validity element is the esteemed faculty of self-management, since here lies the configuration of a subject in a world in which the subject is responsible for himself/herself and in front of society, which is not only seen for the human as the scenario of his/her personal fulfillment, but mainly as the framework in which objective reality becomes meaningful. Charles Taylor (1996), who has deeply studied the conformation of the self and his/her identity, says:

The idea that emerged at the end of the eighteenth century is that each individual is different and original, and that this originality determines how to live. Of course, the notion of the original difference is not new. Nothing is more obvious or more banal. The new thing is that it really makes a difference about how we are called to live. Differences are not simple variations without importance within the same basic human nature, nor do moral differences between good or bad individuals. Rather, they imply that each of us has an original path that must be lived; they impose on each one of us the obligation to live according to our originality (p. 396).

However, if in the volitional aspect the idea of originality in the subject is the one that gains ground, in terms of knowledge it is defined by the separation of the subject and the object and by a common trait that pervades the different positions in debate—beyond the way in which is raised the gnoseologic mechanism—rationality is the flagship faculty that articulates the problem of knowledge. Indeed, it could be say that the philosophy of the classical modernity is in principle rationalist, because an apparently position as discordant as empiricism maintains that same attitude because it considers history and culture as progressive developments of reason; power that has eradicated the subjugation of the human being to external forces that until then guided their destiny. The difference between rationalism and empiricism lies in its position on the source of knowledge and the role and importance played by intelligence.
and sensitivity, respectively; but in both directions, the characteristic of modernity is concentrated in science as a paradigm of rationality, as a cultural formation that allows the material and moral liberation of human in the history, which is conceived no longer as a fall derived from error, but as an open project towards the future, in which the category of progress gives meaning to human life, where there is no place for the feeling of guilt for the supposed expulsion of paradise.

Science has shaped itself to be the progress paradigm of the reason and also the paradigm of the knowledge; this positioning is achieved because the modern science breaks with the medieval dichotomy of revealed truth and human discourse; as opposed to the metaphysical essentialism of the Aristotelian system that for centuries tried the hegemony of thinking, modern science is homogeneous, quantitative, it does not seek to know what is real, but how it behaves. There is a new logic in which the revealed truth is replaced by the discursive truth. The veracity of modern science does not base its congruence on the prestige and recognition of those who support it, it is not linked to the influence of the one who enunciates it; therefore, it is not a dictum, nor does it rely on the principle of authority as does medieval science. So the modern scientific discourse perceives as truth the method, not the power.

Thus, both Descartes (1981) and Hume (1994) agree by proposing that knowledge will only be true if it results from a method, that is, if statements can be controlled independently of the subject that formulates them. What makes knowledge scientific is that a set of rules is available to account for a certain outcome. Knowledge is de-hierarchical, rather it consists of a methodical proceeding where the reasonable is not the true, but what can justify its proceeding. There is a new subjectivity that is outside the medieval values that to access to revealed truth demanded certain qualities (high spirituality, exemplary moral life, etc.).

In the counterpart, the modern science universalizes the knowledge and delineates with all forcefulness the separation of subject and object in the cognitive explanation. Metaphysics Aristotelian-Thomistic, which linked the sense of reality and oriented knowledge, is replaced by a new paradigm: the prototypical discipline is now physics. This created a model of science that is going to extend to all areas of life. Reality consists of a set of phenomena explained by the laws of the movement. At this time the scientific reason is mechanistic, strengthened by the new developments of the mathematics that abandons the metaphysical essentialism of the preceding formation.
Due to this objectification device of reality, the representation of human as a developed being in the society consists in the certainty that any individual can represent the Human archetype, regardless of his/her particular circumstances. The discovery of a homogeneous dimension of reality means that the idea that human nature is universal is applied. With the disenchantment of the world, enlightened philosophers say that science is not the only safe path to knowledge, but, by virtue of this access potentiality to the truth that has been attributed to scientific knowledge, the emancipation path that allows human to constitute himself/herself as such is also there.

Late modernity

But the modern time was not only defined by the success obtained in the instrumental reason, or by the increasing domination of the nature thanks to the rise of the science and the technique; parallel to those skills, the human subject emerged as a creation, as an existential initiative of a subjectivity that opens the horizon to understand history, whose moment of maturation takes place in the second stage of modernity, which is defined here as late modernity and which occurred during the nineteenth century. According to Eduardo Álvarez (2007), its profile can be described as:

[...] Modernity must be understood as a form of western culture that develops a new model of understanding the human beings: the model of the subject. Its fundamental philosophical principle, as stated by Hegel, is «the free thought that lies on itself»: the autonomy of the thought as activity of a subject which is not willing to accept another criterion of truth and another norm of validity other than those emanating from the sovereign power of his/her conscience. According to this idea, experience is a subject-object relationship in which modern philosophy has distinguished by the way —repeating the terms used by Habermas— two fundamental forms: on the one hand, the one that corresponds to the cognoscente subject (cognitive experience) and gives rise to the philosophy of reflection, which privileges knowledge according to the model of self-consciousness; and on the other, the one that corresponds to the agent subject (practical-technical experience) and originates the philosophy of praxis in a broad sense, which privileges the action that refers to the others and the world in general according to the model of externalization. In both cases the activity of the subject is assumed as an original principle that operates on the reality to own it or to recreate it (pp. 9-10).
Throughout the study, it is usually accepted that modern philosophy has different characteristics, but are attributed to a similar and complementary orientation. However, in the deployment of the subjectivity that distinguishes it, there is also a place for self-criticism that, beyond visible achievements, warns in modernity a bleak side, a background of barbarism marked by the eagerness of dominion that animates the enlightened breath.

In principle, late modernity opposes to the optimistic vision of enlightened thought, a pessimistic stance that emphasizes the negative effects of the development of reason and puts in the view the outcome of the French Revolution, terror, forms of exploitation and the new slavery, which are the jewels that crown a society inundated equally with gold and greed. Philosophical thinking cannot close human eyes to violence and the shock that permeates social life at a time in history in which, ironically, freedom, equality and fraternity are promoted, and the ideals of a seemingly fair cause. In the theoretical plane, there is a shift of perspective, as against the current of the philosophical systems of the previous stage, in the spirit that exposes Kant work (2013), philosophy is shown as a critical function, not as a founding knowledge of the principles, values and categories that systematize their discourse.

Kant modifies the philosophy task, leaves aside the foundation work and pointed out to itself as a critical function with regard to the knowledge and the specialized science, and also as valuation of the reason development in the social aspect. A new humanism arises, which explains the human as an entity that, by being natural and rational—that is, biological and cultural—has an ontological position that, while tying its corporeity to the laws of natural occur, places him/her in a specific condition of autonomy, as a being that can start from himself/herself a new causality and think life as an end, as a sense that crystallizes in time. In the late modernity is opened a new horizon of understanding of human reality, which has in history the stage of his/her realization and where rationality is conceived not only with an optimistic and edifying trait, but from the negativity that originates social life. Following the approaches of Theodor Adorno (1983), with the Kantian system a concept has derived from the reflection:

The theory of knowledge must be the theory of that unifying and active principle, in which subject and object separate and unite again, me and not me. That is why such a theory of knowledge does not have the pretense of simply ruling on the validity of isolated scientific judgments, but intends to be the doctrine of the absolute, precisely because everything is assumed and because it is the absolute identity, outside there
is nothing. In Kant this is intentional and negative, because the reason criticizes itself and, therefore, reflects on itself. This reflection is in the criticism method of the pure reason... (p. 67).

If it is accepted that the classical modern reason is mechanistic and deterministic, then in some sense it is also ahistorical, since the natural laws formulated by Newton (1997) are conceived as something constant that is verified in an absolute space and time. However, late modernity surpasses such reductionism. The German idealism transcends the mechanism illustrated and carries out the critique of the reason in front of itself, and does it by discerning that, in front of the natural reality, which is quantitative, there is a human reality that is irreducible to natural laws. The German idealism showed the nature of the subject by postulating that human should be understood as a historical being, as a concrete individual who has no universal certainty whatsoever; on the contrary, in the becoming of his/her existence all the convictions that abridges are created step by step, at every moment of his/her life. In the introspective analysis of this self that has declared the death of the gods and the disenchantment of the world, the subject does not have a given nature in advance, but it is formed from the negativity. History is no longer governed by the maxim of progress, which leads to metamorphosis, negativity and destruction. The principle of mutation that animates its course is problematic, here the transformation is not necessarily progress; therefore, the trace of continuous improvement has been diluted. Prosperity and upward impulse are no more the tendencies that once filled humans with optimism. In the course of history nothing is resolved or concluded, but neither unfinished or incomplete; in this aspect the being essentially is tendency, becoming. Similarly, if accepted that self-consciousness or reason is historical, it should be noted that it is dialectical, contradictory, in permanent transformation; this means that the subject is of his/her negativity and dynamism. But the negativity is not only referred to the history, it is also a quality of the conscience that Königsberg exposed in the Critique of the pure reason, specifically in the synthetic judgement, in which is given a peculiar relation between subject and object.

As known, the function of understanding is to carry out the mediation of the multiplicity of material that is given in sensible intuition, and then elevate it to the universality of the categories. Here negativity is nothing but the subject. The I think that, when accompanying each of the representations, is the possibility condition of the synthesis of all of them; thus, it is the transcendental unity of consciousness that thinks such diversity. In this way is seen the subjectivation process of the object, since
this is a representation in the subject as he/she intuits and conceptualizes. The transcendental Kantian idealism is precisely this moment in which the self moves in the abstract element of thought and from there configures the cognitive map of the experience. The next moment consisted in showing the ontological display of consciousness in the world and not just its cognitive constitution. At this stage of its development, the German idealism proposed the abandonment of the abstract identity of the thought, since the idealism objective had to go through the phase of the non-identity and to overcome it, then to project the profiles of a categorical knowledge in the face of the thinking possibilities of absolute identity. However, before that result, the philosophical reason had to problematize the non-self and open the door of the history, which is the door to the intersubjectivity.

Fichte (1975) considers in principle that the previous philosophy —the one of the philosophical systems of classical modernity— had fallen into the illusion of basing science, making it the only model of rationality. With such guidance, philosophy became complicit in the objectification of human reality and, by overpowering natural science, made human life seen as a natural phenomenon and human as a more object of physics. To face this, philosophy would have to develop a science according to the human condition. That is precisely Fichte’s intention in the doctrine of science, in which he affirms that the self is the absolute form of reflection, the foundation and root of all knowledge. So, if all knowledge is followed from this deep root which is the spirit, the absolute self or the self-consciousness do not develop the mechanistic rationality of the nature, but instead a rationality of the human. In Fichte’s appreciation, human’s knowledge is separated from the knowledge of nature by a radical ontological distinction; human is not in nature, but as an individual, he/she recognizes nature in him/her. A new humanism is created, characterized by assuming an anti-enlightenment posture. Fichte’s thought penetrated the reaches and faculties of the active power of the self and, from there he proposed to carry out the logical-ontological deduction of the reality in the act of a subjectivity which transcends the objects of the experience, at the same time that makes this experience possible.

Late modernity is the period in which is formulated the profile that defines the human, the individual and the fully constituted subject. According to Touraine (1994) the semantic deployment of this concept begins its long journey here:

The individual is only the particular unit where life and thought, experience and consciousness are mixed. The subject means the passage
from it to the self, means the control exerted on the experience so that there is a personal sense, so that the individual becomes an actor that is inserted in social relations to which it transforms, but without identifying itself completely with some group, with some collectivity. Since the actor is not the one who works according to the place he/she occupies in the social organization, but the one that modifies the material and above all social environment, in which is placed when transforming the division of labor, the decision criteria, the domination relations or cultural orientations (pp. 207-208).

Within the conceptual constellation of German idealism, when Hegel (1988) considers negativity in the aspect of the inmanement of being, he carries out a resignification of the problem of the absolute and does so not from a petrified, positive identity, undifferentiated and immediate, but from a subject-object relationship that is a constant moving identity, which must be understood as differentiation, mediation and negativity. It is the self that has become in humans as unity of diversity in the plot of the moments lived. A new category and a new panorama of comprehension loom in the idealistic philosophy forged by Hegel by introducing the theme of the full overcoming of the subject-object duality as a result of an experimentation of moments depending on the implications that bring with it a new location: life. In fact, the certainty that the reality of consciousness cannot be placed beyond time is the assumption that its being is its experience, not its isolation. This introspective turn allows abandoning the dualism and the withdrawal of the subject in its abstract ideality; now it has turned to the world, its reality is not limited to what is structured in the limits of individuality, but self-consciousness is time as it has become what it is from its own potentiality. If human’s ontological condition is different from that of any other being, this is due to his/her practical activity. The experience of the real has two moments: one alludes to the cyclical nature governed by the chronology; the other is linked to the spirit world, which is essentially temporality. The latter is the world of human reality, which is defined as a real, lived rationality, which is being formed historically. In the existence of the human race nature is made history. As a result, human reason also has a historical determination.

The elements of this coming reality —from this merger of subject and object— are found in the formative deployment of consciousness, whose stages, as Ernst Bloch suggests (1983) find their vanishing and returning points in that fascinating work of Hegel which is the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*.
Three reasons of social and ideological origin converge in phenomenology (published in 1807). The first is the revolutionary self, taken from the French Revolution, which emerged in measure of all things. The second, the reason for the mathematical sovereign creation of the content of knowledge; from Galileo, Hobbes and Descartes to Kant, this was the pride of a rigorous and methodologically pure scientificity. Finally—as opposed to the previous two—the reason for the incipient historical school (p. 60).

The Hegelian philosophy surpasses the division between subject and object once it has assimilated such caesura as a phase in the development of consciousness, as a necessary formative moment that allowed to deepen in the investigation on the natural world and, at the same time, it gave rise to the maturation of consciousness by raising the search for truth in the world, conceptualized as a No-Self. However, for Hegel, such division is unsustainable, since concept and world merge in the same reality called subject, self-awareness and spirit. Hegel rejects the postures that take the absolute as if it were an unknowable reality, an unquestionable starting point or a totality captured by intuition. Hegelian approach is a spiral that preserves the previous formative moments, but surpasses them by delineating the phases in the formation of the concept, from otherness to self-consciousness. Following Bloch (1983) approach, the truth of a thought, of a theory or of the whole science has a supraindividual nature:

Hegel, in phenomenology, remains constantly faithful to the subject’s starting point: it is the individual consciousness, the historical consciousness of humanity and the spirit of the world at the same time. It develops in contact with the objects, makes them theirs, is alienated and rectified in them, and in them it manifests and reveals in the growth process. Where, in the end, the subject no longer behaves before the objective as something strange to him/her (p. 61).

The voyage of consciousness has reached the present time, but in the finding of its collective identity there is no room for isolation, the life of consciousness has to overturn itself on the materiality where the conditions of realization are found, that by being intersubjective, are also intercausal.

After Hegel’s vast influence on the German philosophical culture, a reaction is aroused against him from different ways. This moment of the second half of the nineteenth century is crossed by currents of thought that assume the end of the metaphysical systems and channel the investigation from scientific criteria that emerge from disrupted societies by a nascent economic structure that ultimately left behind the bucolic world and is prepared to live the conflicts of the metropolis. The trans-
formations of the real go in escalation. It is now suggested that it is the concrete reality—not the absolute spirit—the dimension that summons the turning points for any theoretical elaboration or conception of praxis. Negativity and the development of subjectivity are placed on other bases; one of them is precisely in Marxism, which affirms the productive characteristic of the human being, the creative subject, the *homo faber*. According to this assessment, human does not adapt to the medium, but adapts the environment to himself/herself. In the subversion that Marx approach (1984) outlines in relation to idealistic thinking, human, as a generic being, self-produces from his/her own activity, transforms nature by transforming himself/herself. The concept of subject has released the entire string of its reel; the world that explains subjectivity comes to be the base on the explanatory basis of human behavior that is governed by the consciousness, generated in the exchange with nature that allows productive work. In fact, everything that the human being has achieved over the time in the deployment of his/her practical activity—which is essentially transformative—explains the development of the subject as the actor who occupies the center of the political scene, precisely because of the invocation to freedom and the impulse of rationality conceived for the flourishing of life itself. In this sense, Plamenatz (1986) groups the configuring lines of the subject that has reached certainty about his/her own reality and defines the human being as follows:

Human is his/her own instrument, and for this reason is also his/her own end. Because human knows he/she has skills and uses them deliberately, human has control of himself/herself, he/she is his/her own master. Not only does human use his/her skills but have also acquired skills deliberately; has made himself/herself the kind of person he/she needs and wants to achieve. Human is a producer of things in a sense that other animals are not, and is also a maker of himself/herself, as other animals are not (p. 104).

Marx can enunciate the materiality of a transformative and creative activity of new conditions, because the idealistic thinkers of the classical German philosophy had made of the self-consciousness the touchstone of their systems, but Marx formulates a radical demarcation to the conclusions of idealistic systems. In the context in which Marx lives, biology as emerging science, will situate things in parameters of unprecedented explanation, which accounts for the development of life as a core category in both nature and society. Darwin’s systematic exposure of (1981) found in *The origin of the species by the natural selection*, was followed by
the acceptance of the evolution as a fact, both within the scientific com-

munity and in much of what is called public opinion. A complementary 
exhibition to the one undertaken by Darwin is found in the text of Engels 
(1977) on *the origin of the family, private property and the state*. With the 
new perspective on nature and society, the definition of the human and 
the subjectivity that has allowed him/her to make the story of his/her 
own history, they also had an important turn. In this way, the first thing 
to affirm is the existence of real human beings who develop the faculties 
of their spirituality thanks to the plasticity of their corporeal condition, 
which is extraordinarily expressive and unique in an individual, but as 
agents of this expressiveness, individuals have been formed into a large 
network of social implications in which they are also their creators, “The 
subject is the willingness of an individual to act and to be recognized as 
an actor” (Touraine, 1994, p. 207).

According to this, modern philosophy is the past and present of the 
subject category. It is throughout its classical texts in which it has raised 
and resolved its initial confrontation and subsequent synthesis with the 
object in the most winding edges of thought, from ontology to gnoseol-
ogy, from logic to epistemology, from morality to art, from politics to 
culture, from nature to society in its details and in its more general con-
cepts. The possibility of doing on all these aspects is given by the experi-
enced Auriga, the transhuman form embodied in each individual, who in 
various fields works according to his/her will, and openly defines himself/ 
herself as a subject, as a being formed in practice and in reflection, which 
is also the custodian of the talents forged by the various civilizations in 
its historical development, which has shown in the recount of its training 
phases in the world.

However, at the end of the nineteenth century the critical language 
of philosophy recognizes the costs to be paid for the effects of civilization 
processes. In late modernity philosophy opens a new facet that is closer to 
the human condition in its daily becoming, a barely explored dimension 
that coincides with the beginning of the social crises of capitalism. After 
dominating nature, science has been destined to dominate man. The new 
humanism of late modernity begins to see the dark side of rationalization 
that is intolerant and repressive in the face of everything that resists the 
“triumph of reason”, productivity, order and progress. Indeed, the work 
has undergone a radical transformation: it is not more the creative activ-
ity that would allow personal growth, but a highly profitable instrument 
of production that in turn has become merchandise. In the critical di-
agnosis of this reflective posture, a consumer society has emerged that
The transhumant subject of modern philosophy and the transformations of the real

El sujeto trashumante de la filosofía moderna y las transformaciones de lo real

is indifferent to the deterioration that produces progress, both in nature and in society.

The subject and the transformations of the real

There is an old illusion that is called good and evil. The wheel of that illusion has turned, until today, around soothsayers and astrologers.

In another time it was believed in soothsayers and astrologers: So it was believed that everything was fatality: «You must, since you cannot avoid it!» But then illusion distrusted with astrologers and soothsayers, and then it was believed that all was freedom: «You can do it because you want to do it!»

Oh, brothers! About what the stars are and the future, there have only been illusions, but not knowing! And so on good and evil there have been but illusions, but not knowing! (Nietzsche, 1983, p. 247).

Philosophy in the twentieth century begins with a traumatic situation. All the currents and schools that arrive strengthened or shaky at the turn of the century face a limit situation: the Crisis of metaphysics and the reflective possibilities that philosophy has in the face of the descriptive power of science. In this scenario, the category of subject will receive interpretations, modifications and critiques of its definition and conceptual structure, to its historical-philosophical status. There is a system crisis, so philosophy has become incidental, contextual. To the extent that philosophy leaves metaphysics behind, it cannot continue to make systems. In the twentieth century, there are two main aspects that can be identified by the position they keep with respect to philosophy and their inheritance: the first one proposes to rethink the whole of the philosophical problems; the second is dedicated to dismantling all their problems. Depending on the direction chosen, philosophical thinking is located in two contexts: the antimetaphysical twist in the first half of the twentieth century and the linguistic turn in the second half. In this scenario there is no philosophy but philosophical projects, its research trajectory is not unambiguous.

The anti-metaphysical twist is a widespread trend in which, from different positions, all the philosophy of the twentieth century is declared contrary to the philosophical system elaborated in the forging of the German idealism. But it should be pointed out that this does not necessarily mean that the whole perspective of reflection is renounced. Another important feature is the great diversity of currents of thought and research that converge here, and the incommensurability that keep the different
philosophical positions and languages with each other. For the phenomenologist, the neopositivism is a logical structural administration of science; thus, implanting a new absolute in the logic and the investigation lies in a metaphysical posture. For the neopositivists, phenomenology seeks in the background to vindicate metaphysics by retaking transcendental subjectivity and seeking access to essences. For its part, for Marxism, the antimetaphysical is praxis, an instance where the scope and consequences of a theory are verified. Positivism, Marxism and phenomenology are among the most outstanding currents of thought, as protagonists of the antimetaphysical turn of the second half of the nineteenth century, which extends until the first decades of the twentieth; movement that in principle questions the subject’s proposal as an absolute entity.

Just as Marx did in reorienting research on human reality in times of scientific rationality, Husserl (1984), for his part, believes that philosophy has reached a dead end: it cannot remain metaphysical in the sense of developing a system of the absolute; on the other hand, the traits of scientificism are not a better alternative. Scientificism conceives Knowledge as the development of science based on causal and expressible quantitative explanations.

In the face of it, the phenomenological posture proposes that philosophy should not promote science, but to counteract the absolutization in which it has fallen. What is required is to develop a new discourse that allows understanding that philosophy must deal with discerning how the world is opened to human. Contemporary philosophy proposes to rethink the problem of the real, to replace the metaphysical by the ontological, to try a new monism that surpasses the series of dualistic proposals that have polarized, in the terms of subject and object, understanding the most urgent problem for the human race: the problem of sense and the lack of sense of its existence. This reflection cannot be done more from a conceptual framework that always prepares the escape towards the transcendence of the absolute. On the contrary, when returning to the things themselves, thought is immersed in the world of life as a whole. Phenomenology recovers philosophical problems from an immanent perspective. The posture that recovers the philosophical tradition is presented and proposes a resignification of concepts and categories, but with a different location; this is what creates phenomenology.

Indeed, for Husserl philosophy is ontology, comprehension of the real, unlike the proposal which is pronounced by dismantling the problems of philosophy reducing with a matter of language—which for phenomenologists it represents the end of philosophy--; for Husserl philosophy is reoriented and assumes a firm position, evaluating the historical
moment in which it is registered. While science provides knowledge, philosophy does not. Philosophy is strictly reflective, and this characteristic is the one that leads to make a distinction between the typical tasks of each one of the theoretical disciplines: an activity is to think and another work is to know. The work of philosophy is to think of the problem of the real. It is not about questioning: what is the world or what is human, what is the subject and the object; with such a question being assumed that this or that is something, one thing. The question is what is reality? It is the following answer: Reality is... such a thing. For Husserl, this is a wrong question. For him, the problem of the real or human or the world cannot be taken as a thing. For the founder of phenomenology, in philosophy the question is not to define what are the subject and the object, but to reflect how the world opens to humans. The world of life is conceived as a multiple event, quite the opposite of what metaphysics has traditionally done by converting the problem of the real into the question about an entity, which is a mistake. When thinking about the real, the idea is not to turn this into a question about a thing, a substance or an entity. The world and humans do not exist as such; what exists, the real, is the event. The event consists in the fact that the world presents to the human, and the human and the world are elements of the event. The world is then the temporal event. This may seem new because reality is normally seen as if it were a combination of entities or things in the background or outcome of the world. Husserl seeks a transformation of philosophy which recovers its basic problems, but by placing them beyond metaphysics, that is, avoiding the postulation of absolutes or dualistic schemes. A trait of metaphysical conceptions is its dualism, since they pose bipolar and dichotomous relationship, in which a part is the founding element (subject) and the other part is conceived as a founded dimension (object). In the phenomenological proposal, philosophy is human perspective, it participates in the destiny of the human; therefore, it is immanent, not transcendent like religion, nor of facts like science. The work of philosophy is inscribed in the world of life; there is no need of administering the absolutes and embrace the earthy leaving aside metaphysics.

In the counterpart, from the second half of the twentieth century a different trend arose, another direction equally leading which was defined as a linguistic turn, consisting of a clear pronouncement favorable to the deconstructivism of the philosophical problems and its tradition. The inclination that characterizes this site is that it considers that the problem of the real, of the subject and the object is a false problem, because it derives from an inappropriate use of the language. What is conducive is
to dismantle the problem of the real and to show that metaphysics is only a symptom of the situation that human occupies in each case. Metaphysics does not provide truths and, however, has remained in the theoretical discussion over the centuries; Wittgenstein (1997) observes this voyage and formulates a question that is answered as follow:

Why is philosophy so complicated? After all, it should be entirely simple. Philosophy detangles the knots of our thinking that we have generated in an absurd way; but to achieve that, philosophy must make movements that are as complicated as knots. Therefore, although the result of philosophy is simple, its reaching method cannot be. The complexity of philosophy lies not in its theme, but in our tangled understanding (p. 42).

For Wittgenstein (1975) the task of philosophy is to undertake the logical analysis of all languages. Consequently, philosophy is not knowledge it is rather an activity whose function lies in examining in what logical conditions a statement makes or does not make sense. The problems faced by the theory are seen from language. Thus, in the language the problems of philosophy will be aired, since all of them are questions that in the background refer to the language. For Wittgenstein, the limits of the world are the limits of the language that seeks to access it. The problem of being can only be raised within the language. In a perspective defined as neopositivism — which sought to follow the line of the Tractatus author—, what it is all about is to base knowledge on rigorously empirical bases through a unified language. In the line of the typical verificationism of this guideline, a proposition is meaningful if it can be justified empirically or formally. There is in this position of discourse an open rejection of metaphysics as a set of meaningless propositions; the alternative proposal is, on the other hand, the use of analytical techniques from mathematical logic.

In the twentieth century, new logics emerge that are not Aristotelian, because they are not founded on reasoning, but in mathematical science. The monolithic definitions of subject and object have no longer fit. Language, like mathematics, is a set of signs that are articulated by certain rules. But this is not entirely new, in the seventeenth century Leibniz (1992) conceives a combinatorial art where he formulates a mathematical logic, arguing that the words can be applied in the same scheme as the numbers; it is not the scheme of reasoning, but the scheme of propositions. The assertion then is to accept that a statement is equal to a mathematical proposition; therefore, Leibniz exhorts to think of the statements as relationships between quantities to obtain an alphabet of
human thought that, through permutations and combinations, any word can be acquired and from simple concepts and fundamental to reach all the truths derived from those relationships. Following the same trajectory opened by Leibniz, another factor that propitiates this transformation in the contemporary thought is the development of the symbolic logic, which pursues a universal syntax, a unified language. All scientific statements could be understood and translated from this universal logical syntax. Language ceases to be an instrument of thought; it ceases to be a means, to occupy now the central position: the thought is linguistic.

According to this approach, the elaboration process of an idea is already linguistic. Therefore, language is the intelligibility condition of the real. Gestures and attitudes are language; even the genetic code is a structure that is read and interpreted as a linguistic dimension. Then, language is not a mere epiphenomenon, but a horizon of so broad significance that consists of multiple edges, one of them, which matters most to this analytical orientation is that of knowledge, for which a statement is cognitively significant if it has a method of empirical verification, or if it is analytical. Only the statements of empirical science meet the first requirement, and only the statements of logic and mathematics comply with the second. The typically philosophical statements do not meet either of the two requirements, so philosophy, must go from being a supposed body of propositions to a method of logical analysis of science enunciations.

But if the analysis of language radically modified the meaning attributed to the concepts of subject and object, the tangible and measurable world was also blurred in an abstract discourse that the knowledge of what is, of the real, does not drive to the threshold of what it should be. If philosophy requires a timely clarification of its concepts, such a measure could not be entirely conclusive. Wittgenstein also accepted that the meaning of some propositions can only be understood from the language games that refer to the most concrete: the forms of life that give them sustenance, because in the end the language is the space where the human is carried out. The objective knowledge of the real has its scopes, but also its limits, this makes philosophy a form of fundamental thinking for a culture and a time of crisis. No doubt science has allowed access to the objective knowledge for the achievement of certain ends, but in the words of Einstein (1983), the meaning of existence goes another way:

Objective knowledge gives us powerful tools to achieve certain ends, but the ultimate goal itself and the yearning to achieve it must come from another source. And I do not think it is necessary to even defend the thesis that our existence and our activity only acquire meaning by
the persecution of such a goal and corresponding values. Knowing the truth is wonderful, but its usefulness as a guide is so scarce that it cannot even prove the justification and the value of aspiration towards that very knowledge of the truth. We are confronted here, therefore, with the limits of the purely rational conception of our existence (pp. 230-231).

Seconding this perspective of a man like Einstein, who lived directly the devastating power of nuclear energy, it is clear that in understanding the social and political problems of this time, the scientific reason critique occupies a central place by signaling not only the limit of rational conception with regard to human becoming, but the irrational outcome of scientific knowledge as an aberrant mixture of understanding and oppression. This originated the expression of mistrust about the true contributions of scientific work, but also opened the door to summary trials that made it guilty of all the ills that humanity has suffered since the first decades of the twentieth century. However, in a position free from prejudice, it would not be a question of being against the science or the technique in themselves as if they were autonomous entities; on the contrary, in the questioning of the instrumentalization of the reason what is intended is to redefine its use and to take the discussion to the critique processes of the societies themselves.

Conclusions

Beyond the asymmetric profiles seen in the debate between the conservation and resignification of the main questions of classical philosophy on the one hand, and the liquidationist opinion on the other—in which was either announced the end of all the ideals of culture, or it was proposed the analytical reduction of the statements to determine those that make or do not make any sense—humans are at a stage that stands above the so-announced end of history, the death of art or summary judgment about the cancellation of philosophy and its problems. To affirm the foregoing, an unmistakable signal is presented: after the dismantling of the metaphysics of the subject and the unsuccessful search for alternatives to replace it, the philosophical reflection is presented in its best forms than never, and this is obvious to the extent that the theoretical possibilities to represent the phenomena of the contemporary world have not been able to get rid of the conceptual device that philosophy has generated, and the prerogatives that a perspective of totality bestows. But philosophy is still current for
another reason, because it has not been realized, because the postulates for the emancipation of the human being are still a pending task.

The old dichotomies in which the understanding of the world has been outlined, namely: Subject-object, essence-existence, matter-spirit, or more recently, theory-praxis, require a kind of reasoning that can understand the tension and codependency involving each of these polarities. It is required a form of critical thinking that does not conform to proposing the transfer or subordination of one term to another and vice versa, but that can raise the qualitative leap both in the light of an idea that understands the complexity that the opposition represents in the dialectic development of philosophy. So the contradictions are conceived not as mere antagonism, but within a dynamic field of forces that transforms and nourishes the determinations of an intersubjective constellation that expands within the framework a certain historical moment.

In this line of analysis, the broad spectrum of scientific knowledge and technological development that has been achieved in today’s societies, places humans on the fringes of opulence and extreme poverty, which evidences the limits of a purely rational existence, so that once again the ontology of the present demands the critical exercise of reasoning to thread the fragments of a life destroyed by the maelstrom of production and excessive consumption, by the devastation of nature and the obliteration of individual existence.

Instrumental rationality in imperial dominion has made science no longer seen as the source of truth as it was defined in modern thought, now it is something different: scientific research is essentially a dynamic event with high energies that have knocked down the ancient certainties and shown the destructive capacity they possess; the old science that studies matter and bodies is no longer able to formulate the most urgent questions to a possible experience and, for its part, nature is also not obliged to answer them. But there is also a basic questioning; science has neglected the most urgent problems of humanity, those who interrogate the sense of existence as such. Thus, to the extent that the critique of scientific knowledge and its devastating effects is developed, the idea that the error that has propitiated this civilizational drift is realized is to have enthroned knowledge as the aspect of greater cultural significance, marginalizing other spheres of human experience.

This means that knowledge is not alien to the interests that deprive at a certain time, the difference is that this phenomenon of interweaving between knowledge and power is seen as an outcome that can be traced genealogically throughout its different moments, and was done do from
a micrological device that at the same time unmasks it, Foucault (1992). Knowledge=Power is the new equation that finances scientific research on uranium, there is nothing more to say; In the monopoly on nuclear reactors, the scientific research at the end of the 21st century is encrypted. Who can obtain uranium and enrich it, has in their hands plutonium, perhaps the binomial that today makes that object of knowledge the most useful and dangerous of all. Pedro Bravo (2012) makes an interesting note on the subject:

Knowledge is not neutral to historical, political, and economic formations. Recognizing the possibility conditions that have been organized from the hegemonic power does not imply a relativistic or skeptical abandonment with respect to science, on the contrary, in the recognition of these limits are present the possibilities of elaborating subversions, resistances, and epistemic alternatives (p. 156).

The indisputable priority acquired by the theory of knowledge with its conceptual partner of subject and object, made gravitate around it all the expectations and successful results obtained in the material and spiritual planes, relegating to a second term the sphere of practical reason, based on the efficiency criteria and social profitability and political life; even the creative dimension was absorbed by an industry that produces cultural goods for mass consumption.

The loss became already the sign of this time, and it is because humans have accepted in all naturality that they are not going anywhere, and even though there is no longer space for optimistic and edifying expectations that give cohesion to the everyday life, it is also true that reality must be assumed as a categorical fatality that cannot be transformed; it would be enough to remember that philosophy was born from astonishment, not from marasmus or discouragement, not apathy or fainting. If this is so, then it is time to liberate independent thinking from the historical continuum, it is time to warn against negative globalization and against this investment of values that has caused the transformation of technological reason on political grounds.

The topicality of the critical philosophy for a time of crisis like this would then find itself in the interstices of a praxis which makes its sense of resistance and, in its movement, can tense the dialectic of civilization to examine whether it can still reverse that propensity of the present society that has undergone a singular mutation: the personification of things and the objectification of people. This is a phenomenon that shows the metamorphosis of the subject in the object, and the object in subject. It is
not, of course, *the absolute spirit of Hegel*, but of a concrete mutation, the form of merchandise that has reified the lives of individuals. This cultural crisis accounts for the crumbling of the society representation and the subjectivity that was its access key.

If the subject is conceived not as a static category or as a concept reified over the centuries, but as a network of meanings that receives from the objective world the characters of the story that defines it, then, would it be possible to have a new community in which the link of coexistence without fear is restored? In other words, can humans accommodate the existence of a true society inhabited by emancipated people as something achievable? For Marcuse (1981) the answer is affirmative, since the line that critical philosophy has marked is that of social transformation and cultural creation. The philosophical objective of the background is to recover the echoes of Orpheus as the voice that does not order but sings, like the power of emancipation that gives the possibility of doing, without saying what to do.

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Abstract

This work analyzes the intentionality of human beings as cognoscente subjects, a preponderant factor to reaffirm their way of being and the knowledge of the environment in which they establish relationships. Afterwards, there is a twist as there is the intention of reaffirming this nature, which in some cases results in something alien, that is to say, human beings are at a crossroads where they leave their modal character aside and can end up becoming an object in the midst of objects, losing all capacity for intellection and, therefore, falling into pointlessness. The methodology is framed in an analytical-reflective and historical-critically process, in contrast to practical questioning; the educational process as one of the factors where people fulfill themselves, from stances taken by some authors who have made significant contributions among which are: Lonergan, Husserl, Scheler, Locke (classical thinkers), and taking into account documents and articles that complement their contributions, as well as the connotations of different thoughts, where some analogies are made regarding the proposed topic. Finally, the conclusions have to do with the first approach: human beings cannot dispense with their immanent nature of reaching the knowledge of the objects, which are alien to their way of existing and which can be comprehended by the human intellect.

Introduction

This paper focuses its attention on the importance of identifying a subject-object of knowledge, that is, as a thinking being able to abstract the elements of the environment to make an apprehension of the observed.

Every intellection act executed by the human being leads him/her to be aware of an apprehension process of the reality, from which is enriched both the object and the subject. In addition, in this act of knowledge intervenes the senses that are in function of the human being and are part of the knowledge process; the human being is who acquires the knowledge of the different manifestations that are presented to him/her in a voluntary way to consciousness—it is understood as voluntary the objects that exist independently to the consciousness of the human being, that remain in an immanent and intentional way—it is the temporal space where the interpretation of these elements occurs. There are some sciences involved in the problem of knowledge (psychology, physiology, sociology, etc.), that have somehow managed to reproduce a part of that process. However, its definition and approach to the human being has not been entirely accurate, as soon as it identifies a subject of knowledge.

According to Ansenbacher (1993): “It is fascinating all what physicists, physiologists, chemists and also psychologists and sociologists can say of...
such empirical connections. [...] One thing is sure: that none of these empirical sciences will ever be able to explain what knowledge is” (p. 23). Therefore, the redefinition of the subject, as it is known, becomes necessary, and is the aim of this manuscript.

The objective of this work is to determine the importance of the reaffirmation of the cognoscente subject from a theoretical-reflective and historical-critical perspective that allows the reader to identify himself/herself as a being able to affirm his/her existence as a subject of knowledge.

On the other hand, the existing analogy with logic is also taken into account, not strictly in terms of the formulation of valid statements, but rather as a necessity for the construction and conceptualization of the object’s apprehension, its modal attitude and the different existence ways of beings.

According to the aforementioned, the cognoscente character of the subject is reaffirmed as makes use of his/her acts to reach the knowledge of what is unknown or alien to his/her existence.

The methodology used is historical-bibliographic, analytical and critical. It is historical-bibliographic because a search of the information is done from the perspective of several thinkers who have mentioned this topic; it is analytical and critical because the manuscript proposes an analysis of the collection of the information and presented results not only from philosophizing, but in its adequacy to the educational act; it highlights the contributions of education to identify a subject of education and not the reverse, otherwise, it would contribute to the denaturalization, dehumanization, decontextualization and uprooting of the consideration as subject to apprehending the reason of the elements. The study developed in the proposed methodology is that it is able to identify subjects of education and not as an object more immersed in this process that has to be driven by mechanical means to desirable results.

Some questions have been raised in the present topic, is human a cognoscente being? How can the knowledge of different elements reach on the human being? What are the processes that the human being does to seize or to reach the knowledge of the objects? Is it possible to identify a subject of knowledge? These are questions that want to be answered throughout this work.

At first, an approach is made of the intellection act as it relates to the knowledge and activity that is carried out by the human being, knowledge that must be desired and that emphasizes the interest that arouses the object when projected in the mind of the cognoscente subject. In addition to certain conditions that must be fulfilled to reaffirm
The redefinition of the cognitive subject: the act of intellection as knowledge

The character of being as a cognoscente subject. In a second moment, is stated how this knowledge becomes conscious and it is the task of the conscience to carry out the apprehension processes of what is managed to abstract, an accentuation is also made on the different modes in which the consciousness, one does not replace the other, on the contrary, an intellection process is performed to have a logical and orderly sequence. Then, an assertion is made to reaffirm the condition of the cognoscente subject. Later, this subject is seen from the educational aspects and his/her relationship with the surrounding environment. Finally, other sciences intervene, as is the case of semiotics, for the construction of an anthropological human being.

The main postulates or contributions that can be identified in the document are oriented to: it is not possible for human beings to separate from his/her nature as cognoscente being, even less to relegate this activity to another being different from it; similarly humans cannot be seen as another object in the midst of objects, because his/her existence is different from that of the rest of the beings with whom he/she coexist; education should not treat the human being as a passive being that must be subject to modification of his/her cognitive structures.

These are approaches that try to be clarified in this article of study with the purpose of decrypting the information contrary to what is stated in the aforementioned document. Finally, in the conclusions are proposed some topics for new research studies.

The redefinition of the cognoscente subject:
The act of intellection in knowledge

The human being by having the abstraction capacity of a certain object becomes a being able to reach the knowledge of the elements that conforms that object; however, it is worth highlighting that it is not a purely experiential fact, it involves intelligence, apprehension and the attraction existence (interest) on the part of the subject to know what seems unknown to him/her and is presented involuntarily to the sensitive organs. Saint Thomas Aquinas (1943) mentions: “everything the human wants, is wanted for a purpose, [...] all what the human wants is wanted for a good, if good is not the final purpose then the desire must be guided to the perfect good, [...]” (p. 32). That is, this ability to abstract the constituent elements that make up the object observed, is an activity of intellection that allows the subject to determine the characteristics of the element.
observed, are not attributions granted by the subject, neither alterations added by the subject, instead are the characteristics of the object, which make it a thing and not another different.

All intellecation activity implies that the human being has the availability to take over the characteristics of the object as a result of the abstraction according to the known, without giving different attributes of what he/she manages to perceive. Therefore it is important to decode the object by its parts. In addition, Lonergan (1999) mentions that to establish this intellecation activity is required the fulfillment of certain conditions:

1. A conditional.
2. A nexus between the conditional and its conditions.
3. Compliance of the conditions (p. 385).

Once these conditions are fulfilled it will be possible to establish the character of the cognoscente subject who will carry out the intellecation process, because it is not enough to consider that it is the person who has the ability to reach knowledge; in fact, the person has the necessary skills to reach the knowledge of what is unknown for him/her. In addition, the subject is endowed with the necessary qualities to discover the surrounding environment through the abstraction process.

Apprehension of the qualities that an object possesses is an activity that is done consciously, and it is in the conscience where the character of the subject is affirmed as soon as he/she knows it by the acts performed. According to Lonergan (1999) the acts carried out by the subject are: “feeling, perceiving, imagining, investigating, comprehending, reflecting, apprehending, unconditioning and affirming” (p. 385).

Bearing in mind these elements is affirmed the concrete character of the human being to carry out complete processes of comprehension and knowledge of the structures of the different objects to his/her way of existence.

With regard to the different ways of existence, the idea is to include the manifestations of being here and now, that is to say, a person cannot come to consider another human being like an object fruit of a study or observation, with the intention of reifying it, this has possibility (probability-given) with inert beings that require an understanding, conceptualization, definition, extrapolation, comparison and serve as a utility for the development of an activity or complement its development. Sartre (1966) mentions: “That woman that I see walking towards me, that man who passes by the street, the beggar that I hear singing from my window, are objects for me” (p. 76). The term object is not applicable for human beings because people are not subjects of study or manipulation. The hu-
man being cannot be seen from an experimental state, but experiential, that is, experience events and moments that reaffirm it according to his/her conscious act. As stated by De Zubiría (2009): “The three universal functions of the human brain are to know, value and decide” (p. 20). The human being by possessing this capacity to abstract the different elements found within the reality becomes a being able to define himself/herself, to determine and to project himself/herself according to the interests and even more important the way that makes him/her a being able to obtain the knowledge of such elements or components. For this reason, humans cannot be considered as an object in the midst of others, since it would be removing this faculty, that is, the three dimensions mentioned above.

Consequently, the relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge is given as soon as the first one realizes an understanding of the second, by means of the conceptualization, explanation of what is known. Seen from this point of view, is affirmed the inalienable character of the subject who knows, at the time of carrying out an action within the faculties that were attributed to him/her. However, this does not mean that a person who fails to carry out this abstraction activity loses part of his/her qualities granted, on the contrary, it becomes more evident the fact of being directed intentionally to carry out involuntary comprehension processes, and even without noticing the activity raised, by the fact of being part of his/her way, of being person and of possessing the proper qualities of a thinking being.

The proposed inclination reaffirms the question posed of being a cognoscente subject, because it is its way of being, it is the quality that defines humans and makes them different from the rest of the beings. According to Moreno (2014) “knowledge is the interaction between the learning person and the object of study, as well as the interactions between human beings” (p. 201).

Of the above, it is important to mention that this process of intellection, abstraction, and conceptualization is not possible without consciousness. Therefore, all what human beings perceive and formulate are within the conscious processes that are part of their way of being. The fulfillment of the exposed conditions show that condition is based on the affirmation of the act performed, to which the approach is fulfilled; in the case of the relationship (nexus) between the conditioned, it is an assertion of a significant. Finally, these conditions must be met, so it is necessary to define what is understood by consciousness and compliance with the conditions, when referring to the person who knows.

The capturing process of the reality object-subject or the cognoscente person is framed in the complexity of what is perceived, becoming
determinant the knowledge and its epistemological acts of the knowledge process. From the relationship created in the observation process, the cognoscente subject has to get rid of his/her subjectivity to seize the qualities of the object. Obtaining the information implies that the subject performs a whole intelligible process that allows him/her to know the essence of the object. According to Briceño & Sáez (2012): “The individual, using the filter of his/her senses, builds a model of reality based on the perception of his/her environment” (p. 156).

Through the senses, the human being manages to capture the information of the surrounding environment, then performs the process of internalization, adequacy, contextualization to associate it with his/her cognitive system; it is important the perception obtained what was captured taking the most objective of reality, avoiding subjectivity and judgments of value that may arise.

What is said is the distinguishing activity from being cognoscente that orientates the elements that are perceived, that is, objects remain immanent, oblivious to the existence of being. Therefore, the latter exist no matter if the person thinks or stops doing this process; it is in the act of knowing where is given a resignification of what is perceived, but is really what it is the object known? Is it an appreciation of the cognoscente human? Or is the object difficult to know for the same being who has to comply with observing, defining, conceptualizing, apprehending and explaining what he/she manages to know?

Therefore, it is evidenced that the act of knowing is a self-activity of being in which its way of being acquires meaning, in function of reaching the knowledge of what seems unknown to him/her. It gains consciousness in the cognitive process in a conscious and necessary way.

**What is understood by conscience**

In the affirmation search of the cognoscente subject, it is clearly identified that it exerts certain acts (of knowledge) by means of this activity, at the same time the subject can be affirmed like a person able to reach the knowledge of things. However, this process carried out by the person is not an isolated act from his/her way of being, nor is it an involuntary activity that performs; for that reason, it is considered that the procedure performed is product of consciousness that is oriented to the act of knowing, is to confront the presence of different element (an object);
therefore, this way of knowing allows considering what is known to in relation to the particular object from which its characteristics are extracted.

With this first statement is stated that consciousness is not a species of inner gaze, knowledge is to know something, to realize the presence of a foreign entity or different to the being that provokes the confrontation of the idea that the individual has perceived.

Consciousness is part of the person’s being and it cannot be seen as something different from its way of being, but in complete complementarity and that is why is affirms the character that is somehow an inner gaze.

On the other hand, the role of consciousness in the objective problem is also crucial—knowledge is understood as the perceived element or object—since the intellection act reaffirms the specific character of the person who is directed to the knowledge of what is perceived, in such a way that being aware that he/she can get to know an object makes him/her realize that possesses the power to abstract the qualities of the observed. In this process, it is the person who exercises the act of self-affirmation as a cognoscente subject.

A second assertion, consciousness is presented as a warning of what may become known, in other words, is warning in cognitive processes. The interest is established not only by affirming the consciousness, but in the cognitive process in which a series of acts intervene. Affirming the existence of the acts is also necessary to infer that these are different from those who are involuntary or unconscious; for Lonergan (1999): “The metabolism of our cells, the conservation of our organs, the multitude of processes that we know thanks to the study of contemporary medical science” (p. 387).

Hence, knowledge is presented as a relationship between the consciousness and the object, between the subject and the object. This relationship is of correspondence or correlation, since the two are needed, that is, the subject is subject to the object because it manages to abstract the qualities (peculiarities) of what is known: likewise the object needs the subject because is understood by the subject, and it is the subject who can say something about what has perceived. According to Hessen (2013): “The function of the subject consists in apprehending the object, and the one of the object is to be apprehensible and apprehended by the subject” (p. 13). This postulate is presented at the first moment on the part of the subject who manages to immerse in the knowledge of the perceived object, it is who (the subject) apprehends the qualities that the object projects, while the object remains in a transcendent way. The second moment from the perspective of the object is the transfer of this
knowledge so that the subject manages to abstract the properties that the mentioned object projects. In such a virtue, the object is determinant for the subject, and the knowledge is the determination of the subject on the part of the object.

**Cognitive process: three types of consciousness**

The knowledge process allows the realization of a warning that is presented to the human in a conscious way. It has been mentioned earlier that consciousness is a kind of inner look, which allows discovering the *raison d’être* of things, therefore, it involves the self as soon as it manages to apprehend the reality of things.

However, in view of this perspective it is essential to clarify the process the person makes to reach knowledge and that has to do with the intervention of the different acts. At first, the empirical consciousness, related to the senses, is presented in a natural way to the act of knowing as something already given. In addition, there is an intelligent consciousness that allows investigating, abstracting and questioning. In this second moment of consciousness the idea is get to know what is paramount to the subject, avoiding a simple repetition of what he/she learned, is to formulate some concepts according to what the subject apprehends and gives reason for them. Finally, there is a third level that involves understanding and judgment and has to do with rational consciousness, which is the law of sufficient reason that explains and bases everything that is perceived, because happens the relation of the thought object with the observed or intelligible reality.

The three moments in which consciousness is presented, is done in function of the unit of the being, that is, none of these forms of observing the reality works in an isolated way to the existence of the own being, but in a way where there is a relation with it by providing new information to which an intellection process has been carried out. It is in this process where is reaffirmed the cognoscente character of the self and its way of being oriented to discover something new, and here is emphasized the structure of thought from a logical rationality. According to Cárdenas (2016): “Such a structure cannot be directly manipulated, since thought is not material, but must be focused on what is directly related to the process of thought, language” (p. 87). It requires all the functions that the person has in order to establish ordered processes and with a correct reasoning, where logic comes into play and reaffirms the cognoscente character of the subject.
The self-affirmation of the cognoscente subject

Previously, it has been stated that it is the subject who has the predisposition to obtain the knowledge of what is unknown to him/her, the subject participates in a reality, which becomes surrounding since it is from there that the subject recognizes himself/herself not as another object but as the one with the faculty to determine the environment. According to Scheler (1962): “It consists of the fact that philosophy is knowledge and the philosopher is a cognoscente subject” (p. 10). The human seeks to know the essence of things where the theoretical is joined with morality and knowledge with the experience of the apprehended.

From such a process (Intellection act) is reaffirmed the intentionality of the being as a person in the process of discovering reality, such a process is a faculty that the person has to leave the sphere — as the person dissociates from the knowledge of his/her being in order to delve into the knowledge of something new — and incline to the act of knowing different elements in their way of existence. As Enciso says (2004): “All that is done and created in life, from the most basic to the most difficult, comes from a constant brain activity, which manifests itself first in the mind and then in reality” (p. 93).

Although it is true that the being can reach the knowledge of the elements (objects) that it found in its environment, the human being does not reduce to a habitual condition; such behavior will depend on the circumstances that can induce to maintain such an attitude or such behavior. Consequently, the human being is self-determined, defined and oriented to an intentionality and way of acting in a concrete way.

By saying that the person is a self-determined being, is not reaffirmed the character of being defined, finite beings and without any possibility of perfecting. On the contrary, it wants to reaffirm its mode of action, that is, its determination is based on the actions it performs. According to Skinner (1972): “Does man sin because he/she is sinful, or is sinful because he/she sins?” (p. 42). If it is stated that human is sinful because he/she sins, it would be falling into affirming the functionality that induces the person to commit such an act; while when saying that sin because he/she is sinful is mentioned an attitude that has to do with the behavior. Both cases limit the decision capacity of the human being, making an unintentional being, warning the inexistence of willingness as a mediator in the decision making to commit or not an act, inducing the tendency that the being is directed to reproduce a controlled act (kind of destiny) from which he/she cannot adopt another alternative. With these
two statements it is not claimed that the human being is directed to have a sinful attitude in a constant way, it would depend on the circumstances that lead the subject to commit or not such an act.

Without any doubt, the human being is intentionally attached to the knowledge that comes out of his/her way of being voluntarily, in complete dependence of this. What the human being seeks is to arrive to the knowledge of things, in most cases the person only gets to capture some characteristics of the observed by means of the senses in the abstraction process, also intervening the logical structuring that allows the person to reach knowledge and, in particular, identify himself/herself as a cognoscente being capable of apprehending the unconditioned.

Can the human being by his/her own means claim to be a subject of knowledge? What does it depend on getting to know the essence of things? Where is the subject reaffirmed as a cognoscente being? What is the demonstration process or the act where is evidenced as a subject who can get to know the essence of things? Or would it be better to say that it is a limited being? The idea of the questions is not to discover a being who knows, but how the person can claim to have the qualities of self-determination as a being that gives meaning to things by the apprehension of them. This peculiarity is what makes humans different from the rest of the living beings, being endowed with intelligence, being able to decide what, when, and by what means to reach the knowledge of the phenomena that are unknown to him/her, is a process of self-determination that as mentioned before involves all its way of being: experiential, intelligent and rational that are part of the logical structure.

However, the aforementioned approaches have their denotation in the emission or conceptualization of the known when it is done by means of language, in the formalization of the apprehended. According to St. Martin (2017): “Each one has its structure work. The instinctive reacts immediately and is intrinsic to the subject. The affective depends on the external and the cognitive is an external and internal construction and is not immediate” (p. 57). Through conceptualization –using language– it is like the human being completes its intellection process (knowledge) of the objects that get to comprehend, with this denotation is said that the person uses the logical structures to reach the knowledge of the phenomena that are strange or alien to their existence.

When mentioning the self-affirmation of the cognoscente subject is established the existence of a law that cannot be separated from, that is, a type of immanent law, can humans get to know the essences of all things? If being aware in formulating this question, it is logical that in
fact a rational process involving knowledge is being created, being an affirmative answer (yes) means that the ability to reach the knowledge of things is affirmed, on the contrary if the answer is negative (no) in the same way the person is aware of his/her reality, so it is not possible to think of a question and have the answer of something unknown. For Lonergan (1999) an answer like “I don’t know, is incoherent. Because, knowing that the person does not know the answer is a reflection of a cognoscente subject” (p. 397). It is correct as an approach, because establishing a questioning is being aware of its status as a cognoscente subject, so the person cannot respond something that is not known. All factual judgment has its foundation in the experiential component of what is known, in saying “I am a rational person, I am reasoning”, in fact is a reasoning fact itself.

The contingent is not in the formulation of questions, nor in the ignorance of what is asked, that depends on the circumstances that induce to ask questions, because when raised the answers are known by doing an intellection process.

From the phenomenological theory, according to Bolio (2012): “It is not intended to contemplate the object itself, but the way in which it is captured by the subject from his/her intentionality and put in temporal space perspective” (p. 22). It is mentioned that the knowledge is in complementarity with the circumstances that are presented to the subject, in the conscious experiences that make the subject be observed as someone who knows everything that surrounds him/her. Simple phenomenology—observing to observe— does not cause any impression in the cognoscente subject, but finding some element that attracts the individual will help be interested and takes the individual out of his/her comfort zones to investigate the qualities of the observed.

Bolio (2012) says: “The subject knows and is known as object of knowledge, by his/her own consciousness. Is not exhausted in it, the subject is always something more than his/her own consciousness: is inserted in a history preceding his/her conscious being” (p. 23). It is the reaffirmation of the consciousness and in that reaffirming the conscious being is identified like a cognoscente subject that transcends its own being by means of the experiences that carries out in the reality. Therefore, this action is considered important because it allows not only to reach knowledge, but to reaffirm its immanent character by which it is constituted, to give meaning to its existence, at the last moment in which things acquire an understanding and a new meaning by means of the apprehension of intellection. From the experiences the subject does not follow procedures
that are in his/her interior: inmanement, innate and universal; likewise is a participant in a global reality and is coexisting with other beings, so is called upon to pass the barriers of the purely contingent and attaining the autotranscendence, according to Husserl (1988) “Transcendental Intersubjectivity” (p. 49).

Despite Husserl’s contribution to transcending owns existence to reach knowledge, there are those who think that human beings have no innate ideas and acquire them through their own experience, which have their origins in terms of two alternatives of sensations and reflection, being a subject lacking of some of the senses will not be able to correctly reproduce a concept that accurately adjusts to the object. According to Locke (2002):

From where it is followed: first, every time an individual lacks of any of the senses, the person will always lack the ideas pertaining to that sense. Humans born deaf or blind are proof of that. Second, if someone could imagine a person devoid of all the senses, then this person would also lack of all ideas. Since there would not be anything that could provoke a connection in him/her and therefore would have no ideas of feeling, because the external objects would have no way to provoke them by some sense, or ideas of reflection, since the mind would not know how to use them (p. 37).

The contribution made by the philosopher with regard to the lack of one of the senses or in all of them, is somehow real if seen from the perspective that the person cannot generate a representation that adjusts to an exact way of the projected reality. However, this idea would indicate: only people who have all their senses can make exact representations of what they perceive? It would not also be worth saying that all humans project an image (idea of the perceived) that is the result caused by the object known in the person? If considering these questions as valid, then it would indicate that all people did not come to the real knowledge of the object observed, but are left with some of its qualities, because the same object is found difficult to transcend.

It is considered that the assertion made is somehow correct, as not having the faculties that cause in the mind of the individual any reaction that will lead him/her to know, that has no reason to be —this applies to people who have lost all their senses and therefore do not possess the qualities to produce idea — does that disable them from being considered a cognoscente person? By lacking a dimension (meaning) enables them to develop other skills? Not having one of the senses does not make them less, because knowledge can reach to them by other ways, and even
the certainty to establish that these people possess some innate ideas, or
to think about the genetic inheritance transmitted from its origins leads
him/her to reproduce certain ideas, that is, some incident had to be given
that provided the individual with information that he/she could not re-
ceive directly. Indeed, the educational processes previously considered
people did not come with innate ideas, but should be filled with informa-
tion, contents and structural schemes; this idea has been modified and
is consider that humans come with innate ideas, and it is the task of the
training process to draw that information and adapt it to reality. Accord-
ing to Guyton (2001):

Cell reproduction is another example of the ubiquitous role that the
genetic-DNA system plays in all life processes. The genes and their regu-
laratory mechanisms determine the characteristics of cell growth, and also
the time when they will be divided or if they will do so to give rise to
new cells. In this way, the genetic system, of extraordinary importance,
controls every stage of human development, from the fertilized ovum
to the human body in total functioning. Therefore, if there is a central
theme in life, this is the genetic-DNA system (p. 37).

The advances of the medical sciences also provide in large part sus-
tenance to the subject raised with regard to the innate abilities by which
each person is expressed. However, it is not a completely finished issue,
because this issue for several reasons it is not entirely clarified, the above
article can serve as a matter of studies for future work.

Self-affirmation of the cognoscente
subject in the educational process

Throughout the proposed work has been mentioned the importance of
recognizing a being with knowledge. Kant expresses in a document quot-
ed by Sarramona (2000): “Human is the only being susceptible to educa-
tion, human cannot become a person but by education. And is observed
that human receives that education from another person who in turn
has received from another one” (p. 13). With regard to the educational
processes, some moments have been established that have led to the con-
sideration of the person by means of different parameters, like a being
that must be driven by means of a tutor, without possibility of own ideas
(innate), which must be instructed. With postmodernity is recognized
its rational character, with qualities, and is emphasized rationality as a
determining factor. The human being is filled with a past, present and
future, so he/she cannot put aside those moments that lead him/her to live different experiences, according to these moments is that all human activity takes place. Therefore, it is not possible to take the human being as a solitary and uprooted person of a temporal space and if it is not located within this parameter the person will lose all advances of his/her human development process. As Llinás says (2003):

That is why it is so urgent to promote a good education that teaches to think clearly through concepts and not mere memorization of data. It must be understood the difference between knowing (knowing the parts) and understanding (putting them in context). For example, a parrot can speak, but does not understand anything (p. 103).

It is in the identification of people subjected to an education process -not as an object of education- when makes sense the act of being educated. Martí (1975) says: “There are no monsters greater than those in which intelligence is divorced from the heart” (p. 70). In many cases, education is the medium that, instead of being an aspect of humanization processes, leads the human being to its own denaturation. It is necessary to identify people in education processes in all the educational processes, and from there everything makes sense for the human being, in other words, it is the human being the only one that can be educated, the other things can be used (in the case of the objects) and trained (in the case of irrational animals), with this it is clear that it is not appropriate to see the human being as an object in this process, much less try to train him/her, because that would imply taking away the freedom that by nature is in the depths of his/her acts as a person.

The idea is that the educational process humanizes the person. Therefore, education is the means by which the human being acquires new behaviors throughout his/her life and there is no other person in the world than the person who is most in need of acquiring such behaviors. On the contrary, if started from the principle that education must fill the expectations of learners, then it would be falling into a view of education as a simple breeding ground for the structures established by society. Education is not just a repetition of concepts or theories. But, on the contrary, the more a person is educated, the more the need for acquiring or appropriating a concept. According to Mounier (1976):

A person is a spiritual being constituted as such by a form of subsistence and independence in his/her being; it maintains this subsistence with the adherence to a hierarchy of freely adopted values, assimilated and lived in a responsible commitment and in a constant conversion; thus
unifies all the activity in freedom and develops impulses of creative acts, the singularity of his/her vocation (p. 59).

It is essential to recover the person within this new postmodern era, where confusion is found or where the person is conceived as another animal, as a natural being and as another object. It is required to establish a configuration of their way of being based on their own identity, that is, that each person is seen as a being able to transcend his/her own existence, which is proposed from within to be a better human being.

In the same way, it is imperative to restructure the educational processes, where a holistic education is advocates favoring the annealing of the person as subject of education and not like that person who must be instructed, because it has been observed that the education processes often remain in a classroom formation, but what happen when the student leaves the classroom? The student continues living his/her life.

For this reason, the way students are conceived must change. This holistic education must be as the guiding teacher, not as the professor who provides knowledge and says what must be done; for this reason this educational model should not alienate the human being, much less make of the person a spectator at the time of teaching. That is why an education based on the demands of each person must be proposed and provided without imposing a structure to recover the person.

The philosophy of education is in charge of helping the person relate with others (another human being) in a climate of communicating his/her way of being, that is, that each of the human beings acting within this process could reflect their characteristic cultural part of each one of them, without pretending that this relationship is affected or limited by the phenomenon of poor fluctuation of information. The concern arises: is it possible to educate in the culture from this new vision of the world that is becoming somewhat “incomprehensible” even for the same education? For this reason, it cannot remain unmoving, as it would be left to luck a very important aspect of the human being towards a reconstruction of his/her way of being a person. For this reason, any educational proposal must lead to a dynamic expression of the way of being, for this reason the philosophy of education cannot seem indifferent to such a supposition. According to Vásquez (2004): “Humans are born among codes and socialize through them” (p. 37).

The inscription of the human being in a world laden with “patterns” that enable or make feasible their communication not only with their similar, but with all their surrounding environment, caused that the philosophy of the education communicate culture, but not the reigning
culture, but the culture that makes people be human, the culture that projects to a humanizing relationship. Facing this initiative to promote an education that allows to develop the feeling of a culture, is the slogan of falling into a rethinking of the imposition of the current cultural models, for this reason must be avoided to fall into reductions to find some types of cultures.

The scope of semiotics for the formation of an anthropological human

The philosophy of education is considered as the one responsible for “building” a historical subject, in which are found authentic values that promote their field of development, as people responsible for their acting and their projection in the society. For that reason, semiotics must be used as the one that “regulates” such dynamism of understanding its condition in relation to the means of meaning. According to Vásquez (2004): “Semiotics would help the evaluation to be formative and non-sanctioning, would contribute to a follow-up of the process rather than a finding of the results” (p. 90). For this reason, the philosophy of education would be forming a free human being, in that the traditional schemes are discarded from the educational institutions, and concentrates on making the citizen a true social actor able to define himself/herself as human. This would be the ideal of any educational approach; however, is seen that the philosophy of education has lost sight of its field of development, and has been left with a purely informative interest on what it is to educate, has been left with what is already given, for this reason is that it is essential to see education as an adventure, as something that is built together with the human being; thus, it can become an integral part of the subject to form a person with responsibility and balance to act in a responsible and conscious way within the social.

Conclusion

Throughout the work developed, emphasis has been placed on the affirmation of the person as a cognoscente subject, about how the knowledge is presented in an intentional way to the cognitive structures of the human being and how the person performs an apprehension process of the reality in which is immersed. However, this postulate is evident because it is the human being who has been attributed the characteristics of con-
science, insufficiency and sufficient reason, not like in a purely contingent state, nor in dependence of the action of another being.

They are conscious states result of the self-activity, because is the person who can give sense, orientation and determination to the elements when presented involuntarily to his/her cognitive structure. It is a process of intellection, comprehension, conceptualization and explanation of the observed reality, the subject is who is defined and affirmed in the processes (acts) that performs, it is a cognoscente being in the midst of a set of beings and each one has its way of being that characteristic of the way of existence; the conscious acts differ from the involuntary ones which after having been developed become conscious, before they cannot be understood, but are completed once the person notices them (accidents) produced in his/her being.

Finally, the affirmation process cannot only refer to the cognoscente subject as a being who has no innate ideas; in fact, these ideas are also supported by genetic inheritance as a preponderant factor to reach the Knowledge.

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The subject-object relationship in the Kantian conception of science
La relación sujeto-objeto en la concepción kantiana de la ciencia

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Abstract

This research presents the Kantian proposal of transcendental idealism as a mediating critical philosophy between the dogmatism proper to rationalism and the skepticism generated by sensualist empiricism. This work makes a brief presentation of the forms of judgment that make up the different forms of human knowledge. It is of great importance to recognize and take into account, when studying current philosophical thought, the profound relevance that Kant has had in history and in the development of contemporary thought. It is also presented the complex relationship that Kant establishes between reason in its theoretical uses and reason in its practical uses. A comparative analysis between idealism and realism is introduced, using a hermeneutic methodology and an analysis of the dialectical philosophical discourse in terms of conceptual antithesis. Finally, is proposed the difference between theory and praxis in the field of science and ethics, and the need to understand scientific objectivity and ethical subjectivity as diverse forms of rigorous human knowledge.

Keywords

Scientific knowledge, ethics, philosophy of science, idealism.

Introduction

Kant’s theory changed all the philosophical thought, generating a revolution compared with the revolution provoked by Copernican’s theory. With the theory his objective was to discover the necessary conditions for the knowledge and, from there, the validity or not of the metaphysical speculation. His philosophical system is mainly exposed in his Critique of Pure Reason, and then from it, in other books such as the Critique of Practical Reason, criticism of judgment, religion within the limits of reason, and other works that were
published until the end of his days. He divides these judgments into two classes basically: those call analytical and those call synthetics.

In this article some aspects of Kantian thought will be presented concerning the approach of knowledge, epistemology and the relationship between theory and practice. The central focus of the epistemological discussion was the emphasis on the problem of what was the most appropriate means of knowledge. Rationalism is the most appropriate means of knowledge; while empiricism holds that the most appropriate means is experience because it is the origin of all the contents of knowledge. The opposition is established between the terms reason/experience or theory/empirea. Kant turns the axis of the discussion towards the opposition theory/practice, where theory is synonym of passive contemplation and practice of transforming activity.

Kant makes a union between the subjective and the objective, between the phenomenon and the noumenon, and asks if there are modes of knowledge, and which are. According to Friar (1976) for Kant there are three: sensitivity, discursive understanding and reason.

The subject-object relationship has traditionally been recognized as a key element in the different theories of knowledge. Whereas, starting from Kant, the relationship is raised in terms of a subject constructing the object, with Hegel and then dialectic materialism, the mentioned relation is seen in such a way that the object of knowledge is inseparable from the activity of the individuals. According to Ferrater-Mora (1971) both approximations served as a point of support for subsequent theoretical elaborations in branches such as psychology, epistemology, philosophy and sociology, interested in understanding the development of knowledge.

According to García-Gómez (1988) the Kantian examination recognized three ways in which subject and object could enter into relation. The first is in terms of the conformity of the object with the representation that the subject is made from it (power of knowledge); the second is according to the causal relationship between the subject and the object (power of desire); the third is according to the intensity in which the object affects the subject (power of feeling pleasure or grief).

Initial approach

The idea is to start from the problem posed by Kant, by formulating two questions: the first question according to Bahamon (1982) would be as follows: Metaphysics: In what way would a scientific metaphysics be
possible? It can be seen that it is not a question of existence or reality, but of a possibility. What does metaphysics mean here? Aristotle grouped two concepts the “fysis” (nature) entitled “physical”, known as first philosophy and titled “Metaphysics”, which is what is found after physics. The first philosophy is science that deals with the first causes and principles of all that it is as it is.

According to García-Yebra (1990) the concept of metaphysics combines the twofold meaning of the treatises located in the books on “fysis” and the books that have their object in what is beyond the sensible, outside the experience. With what the word coincides the external ordination of the Aristotle’s work with the internal problems.

According to Hegel (1979) as Christianity expanded, a dualistic conception of being spread which differs from the monist conception of the Greeks. Christians distinguish two radically different forms: being God and the being of the created. Among the created entities, they distinguish one that has the capacity to understand the others and it consists on the capacity of the human being.

According to Guerra (1980) the Christian metaphysics differentiates three entities (God, the Created universe and the man) and two ways of being (God creator and creatures).

During modern times, the foundations of medieval theology were changed, departing from God’s revelation in history and scripture. Modern Science seeks an autonomous foundation of authority and tradition and is found in reason. With Kant, metaphysics is divided into a general metaphysics (ontology), which deals with the first causes and principles of all that is, and a special metaphysics, which deals with the three entities differentiated by the Christian tradition. As seen in Broekman (1974):

• Rational Theology: The object is the supreme entity (God) and the subjects are the nature and attributes of God, the evidence of his existence and the possibilities that man has to know him.
• Rational Cosmology: It deals with the totality of the created entities, and the problems are whether the world is infinite or finite, whether there is freedom or is determined, whether it is created or is eternal.

Grenet (1980) defined rational psychology as: The object is the soul as a principle of perception and will, with special attention to its nature and immortality.

According to Barragán-Linares (1983) the results of the discussions between the different philosophical schools about the possibility
of a metaphysical science are unfruitful and seem to show the inability of metaphysics to be constituted in science.

As expressed by Blonde Saracen (1973), for Kant the problems for metaphysical to be science are as follows:

- a. There is no rigorous method, but a continual receding to start another path.
- b. There is no body of knowledge, but after a thousand provisions it is stopped at the time of reaching an end. Philosophers do not consider as a coherent and accepted doctrine what the previous thinkers have expressed, nor build from the foundations that the tradition implanted.
- c. It is not possible to put in line with the various collaborators on how to achieve an end. Each philosophical system is autonomous with respect to others, which closes the possibilities of dialogue in interrelation even among contemporary thinkers.

It is concluded that it is necessary to be convinced that metaphysics is far from having entered the second path of science. According to Anzenbacher (1984) this conclusion is not intended to answer the initial question posed by the possibility of a scientific metaphysics, on the contrary, it is related to the fact that metaphysics is not a science.

Science: Descartes characterizes philosophy as the study of wisdom, a perfect knowledge of all the things that the person can know by his/her behavior and by the conservation of the health and the invention of all the arts; and for this knowledge to be necessary it must be deduced from the first causes.

Rationalism, is universal and cannot be based on experience, it will be called “a priori”. The most correct instrument in knowledge is the reason; it is the only one capable of apprehending the essences, to the things as they are in themselves. Rationalism holds that science can dispense with the sensible as a source of knowledge. According to Cassirer (1979) the relationship between the subject and the object is possible on the basis of a conviction common to all the rationalism: the order and the connection of the ideas is the same as the order and the connection of the things. Parallelism between the structure of reason and the structure of nature, reason can apprehend the essence of things without mediation, by an intellectual intuition in which the essence of the thing is presented in an evident way.

Unlike rationalist postures, the truth for empiricism is the knowledge that derives from experience, the resulting truth cannot be but
particular and contingent; it will be called “a posteriori”. The source of knowledge for empiricism is experience and reason receives its data and derives from the senses. According to Copleston (1986) the method is inductive or associative: the information is attached and generalizes from the association laws in the imagination. Hume makes a critical construction of the ideas of the cartesianism and shows that they are inadmissible since the data are supplied to by the senses.

According to Herrera-Restrepo (1986) so that knowledge is scientific, it must meet three conditions: a) must be able to achieve the truth as a result. b) should develop a method. c) should allow a progress in the knowledge.

According to González-Álvarez (1992): What is the really scientific knowledge? How does science make to meet these conditions to become scientific? How have they been able to constitute a methodical knowledge, able to get to know the truth and at the same time to obtain new knowledge?

Carrillo (1986) said that Aristotle’s logic has become science and derives the truth from the final reflections of reasoning, from the truth of its premises. It is a formal and deductive knowledge, universal and necessary, but that does not provide any knowledge about objects.

According to Hessen (1996) mathematics is a long period that started with Egyptians and reached the rank of science with the Greeks. This discipline builds its objects from previous concepts. As logic, it does not deal with real objects but of constructed figures, and as logic, its developments are universal and necessary.

Dartigues (1975) said that physics constituted a strict and rigorous science in modernity with Galileo. Physics, unlike logic and mathematics, deals with objects, but knows them from the previous foundation of nature, which is universal and necessary.

Following Fernandez (1976) the second question derived from Kant’s though is: How are the synthetic a priori judgments possible? This occurs because Kant assumes that such judgments are possible. What is his explanation? It is answered because these exist in the mathematical principles of Newton’s philosophy of nature. The fundamental principles of Newtonian physics are both empirical and aim to have a universal and necessary validity. When it is explained that all the bodies are attracted to each other with a force directly proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to the square of their distance, a universal judgment is being formulated a priori. The question of Kant is to know how such judgments are possible.
Classification of judgments

According to Hirschberger (1982) a judgment is a relationship between concepts through copulation. It is known that only judgments are true or false. The concepts may have a proper definition or not, but they are never true or false. Nor is the reasoning true or false, but good or poorly constructed, valid or invalid.

According to Husserl (1976) the trials have traditionally been divided into analytical and synthetic. An analytical judgment is one in which the predicate does nothing but make explicit what is contained in the concept of the subject. The following judgments are set as an example, “God is good.” The predicate “being good” is implicit in the concept of God, since God is understood as a perfect being, and a perfect being is an omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, and good being. Another example: The triangle has three sides. The predicate “to be trilateral” is contained in the concept of triangle. The triangle according to its concept is that of a figure, which has three sharp angles, and three sides. Analytical judgments do not add anything new to what is already known or clarified. To analyze means to separate something complex into its simple elements. These judgments are called analytical, while they separate something complex in its simple elements. James (1985) said that judgments are called analytical, as they separate the simple elements contained in the concepts. How is it known when an analytical trial is true? when it does not imply any contradiction, when it agrees with the logical principles and is deduced from obvious truths. The demonstration is developed by means of analytical propositions or judgments.

A synthetic judgment is one in which the predicate is not contained in the subject’s concept. The judgment: the leaf is green, “being green” is not implicit in the concept of leaf, since leaves can be of many colors. Following Hume’s thought, most of the trials that make up the knowledge are the trials explained above, those that allow people to advance in the knowledge of science, contributing to new elements not known before. Synthesis means to put together. According to Jolivet (1916): How is it known when a synthetic trial is true? It can only be known by putting it in confrontation with experience. If it were not possible to experience what the trial claims, it cannot be known whether or not it is true.

Based on this traditional division, all analytical judgments are a priori, since their truth is universal and necessary. According to Kant (1978) the same tradition, the synthetic judgments are all a posteriori because are empirical and their truth derive from the experience. Kant’s
question deepens, therefore, about how empirical trials are possible, the truth of which cannot be derived from experience.

Power analysis within the knowledge of the science

To answer the questions posed it is necessary to develop an analysis of the knowledge process. Following Müller & Halder (1976) to analyze means to separate something complex in its elements, the goal of the analysis is to separate what in reality is united, which in the knowledge process is given together and at the same time. What are the necessary conditions for knowledge in science?

a) Kerning (1975) said that the sensitive faculty according to Kant follows the results obtained by Hume’s studies and states that all knowledge begins with people’s own experience. This condition is necessary in the knowledge, an ability to be affected, which is called sensitivity. If lacking of sensitive, people will not be able to receive any data from things.

Kant refers to sensibility the power of intuitions. It is thus distinguished from Cartesian rationalism, because the direct or immediate captures by knowledge mainly belong to sensitivity. Kirk & Raven (1981) said that there are no intellectual intuitions, because it is not possible to directly capture any data with our understanding or intelligence. For Kant sensibility is a receptive faculty and is the unique source of the contents of knowledge.

b) Kierkegaard (1985) said that something that affects people: for example, that the subject has the ability to be affected, but at the same time there was nothing to affect him/her, or that the attendant things did not affect the sensibility.

As an example:

According to Luypen (1967) imagine that the subject is an AM radio receiver. It has the necessary means to receive waves of a certain frequency. In those conditions it could not receive any broadcast on FM. If only these types of waves were being emitted, and even if the receiver worked properly, nothing would be received. But it could happen that there would be no transmitter transmitting in that particular place and moment, in that way nothing would be received.

This radio example illustrates the conditions referred to: (1) having an ability to receive certain frequencies, which is operating. According to Marias (1970) this condition imposes a limit on the reception of knowledge: people can only receive frequencies that match their recep-
tion capacity (higher or lower frequencies could not be received by that radio). Some existing things, which could not be captured by the abilities of the subject, cannot be known. (2) Marías (1976) said that there is something that can affect people in that AM station that is transmitting at that time and place, would affect them.

c) Nietzsche (1984) defines the power of understanding as: the next necessary condition for knowledge is the ability to bind, to unify the data that is received by sensitivity. Kant says that understanding is the power of terms. The terms are link or unit functions. Unlike innate ideas, the terms do not have any content. The material that the terms bind and unify is provided by the sensitivity. The only data of knowledge come from sensitive intuitions.

Returning to the previous example of the radio, a radio receiver consists of certain elements that allow the reception of waves and other elements that translate or decode those transforming waves into audible and meaningful language. According to Noxon (1973) the function of understanding transforms sensitive material, which itself is chaotic and blind, giving it an intelligible structure.

Are things in themselves sorted out? in agreement with Kant, is unknown what is the order that things have in themselves, it can only be known what is ordered according to the abilities or faculties.

Everything explained above can be seen in this scheme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power of Sensitivity</th>
<th>intuitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conditions of knowledge</td>
<td>Something that affects people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power of Understanding</td>
<td>Concepts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sensitivity and understanding are irreducible to each other, but complementary, since if one is missing there is no knowledge.

According to Ortega & Gasset (1938) by nature, intuition cannot be more than sensitive; it only contains the way humans are affected by objects. Understanding is understood as the power to think the object of sensible intuition. None of these properties are preferable to the other. Without sensibility objects would not be given, and without understanding, none would be thought of. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. This is why it is so important and necessary to sensitize the concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot barter their functions. Understanding cannot perceive and the senses cannot think of anything. Only when they unite, knowledge emerges.
The determination of pure elements

There are empirical elements as pure elements in both sensitivity and understanding. Empirical elements derive from experience. The pure elements are the ways in which the powers order the data from the experience.

According to Passmore (1981) the understanding is not a faculty that has the capacity to provide material to the knowledge, an immediate, indirect faculty. The empirical intuitions are the contents of the sensibility, the sensations corresponding to each sense. They are always sensitive, singular and present. Pure intuitions are only two: space and time.

Space is the way that sensitivity commands empirical intuitions, and that is expressed in the syntax in terms like the following: “Next to”, “Down”, “up”, “behind”, “in front of”, etc. The space corresponds to what Hume called association by contiguity, whereas for this one it was an association of ideas in the imagination, for Kant it is a way of ordering the empirical intuitions by the sensibility.

According to Van Peursen (1982) time is the way that sensitivity commands its empirical intuitions, and that it is syntactically expressed in turns like: “After”, “before”, “after”, etc. The time form corresponds to what Hume called association for cause and effect, with the same similarities and differences as in the previous case.

According to Politzer (1987) pure intuitions are forms of the sensibility and, therefore, are subjective; these belong to the structure of the sensitive faculty of the subject. Does this mean that there is no one thing called space and a thing called time? Space and time are not existing things, nor relationships between things. These are subjectivities in the sense that they belong to the forms of the sensibility to which the subject receives the impressions of the environment. It is not necessary to understand subjective in the sense of individual. These forms do not vary from one individual to another, they are characteristic of all the subjects that possess these capacities or powers, they will perceive their objects in the same way, according to the same forms, analogous as the different receivers of AM Radio, receive the same transmissions in one place and moment.

Understanding is the power of concepts. The concepts are functions of link or unit, that lack of own content and differ from the innate Cartesian ideas. Kant says that the concepts without intuitions are empty that they are nothing more than modes of ordering or a link, but that the ordered or linked is not provided by the understanding.

According to Ponce-de León (1984) the empirical concepts are those that come from a generalization of the data of the experience. They
correspond to what Hume called “ideas”. For example, the concepts of “dog”, “animal”, “man”, “machine”, are empirical. The pure concepts are called by Kant categories, following Aristotle. Category means predicates or attribution.

If the categories are binding functions, all possible link forms can be found, classifying all the forms of predicates that are in the judgments. Each possible form of judgment will correspond to a category, if taking the job of classifying all possible forms of judgment, is obtained a total of twelve to which correspond equal number of categories.

For example, according to the number of subjects linked in the predicate, there are only three possible kinds of judgments: A) those where the subject has a unique member: the singular judgments. B) Those in which the subject covers all possible subjects: the universal subjects. C) Those in which the subject includes only a part of the whole: the individuals. As there are only three possible subjects with respect to the quantity in the trials, there will be three possible link functions or categories: singularity, totality and peculiarity.

Here are emphasized two categories: substance and causality, since these have been developed as elements of rationalism and empiricism. For Descartes, substance and causality are innate ideas; they are ideas of reason whose content is rational, so the senses do not have to be used to know them. Hume says that substance and causation are ideas; weaker and less lively perceptions deriving from the experience as individuals and contingents sustained in the belief by habits. According to Quintana (1985) for Kant, substance and causality are pure categories or concepts a priori; they are forms of understanding, the way in which understanding commands the data that compose the material of knowledge, and which are supplied by sensitivity.

Intuitions.......... empirical.......... data of the senses (matter)
................... pure.................. space and time (form)

Concepts......... empirical.......... generalization of experience (matter)
............... pure................. categories (form)

Idealism and Copernican revolution

To answer the questions: How are a priori synthetic judgments possible? Kant begins the introduction of the critique of reason saying that even though all knowledge begins with experience, not all knowledge comes from it. Since all the knowledge material comes from the sensible expe-
rience, it is understandable that most of the knowledge is developed by means of synthetic judgments. The pure elements of knowledge do not come from experience, but from the structure of the subject’s powers.

According to Quiles (1967) the only thing that can be known is what can affect the sensibility. It cannot be known what things are in themselves. Those things that do not fit the faculties remain unknowable and what we know of things is only what is molded to the faculties. Kant shows that until now all the conceptions of science had supposed that the subject was limited to reflect in the language, through his/her powers, what things are. Rationalism, supposed that the structure of reality is rational, considered that the task of science is to find a basis for building the full content of reason. This system of reason can only coincide with reality, which is itself rational. The rational capacity of the subject reflects the order of the real.

Empiricism, by arguing that all the ideas derive from sensitive impressions, characterized the role of the subject in knowledge as a reflection of the experience in which it originates.

According to Rodríguez (1997) both perspectives share the assumption that all our knowledge should be regulated by the objects, is the object that determines the subject in the relationship of knowledge. The role of the subject is passive: it reflects reality. They differ in that rationalism holds that the most appropriate means to reflect a rational reality is reason, while empiricism holds that the most appropriate means is experience.

Kant warns that the existence of a priori synthetic judgments is only possible if assumed that it is not the object that determines the subject in the relationship of knowledge; the subject is the one that determines the object. What does it mean to determine it? It means that things can only be the subject of knowledge as long as they conform to the forms that the subject has to know. Things themselves are not objects and cannot be. It is only the subject that complies with the faculties of the subject.

Copernicus realized that if assuming that an observer on Earth was still or fixed, certain movements of the stars were inexplicable and that such movements could only be explained if the observer was supposed to move as well; Kant warns that for a priori synthetic judgments are possible, is needed to assume that the subject conforms things with objects of knowledge, not being a mere reflection, but determining them through their forms of knowledge.

According to Salazar-Ramos (1995): what is the Copernican revolution in the field of knowledge? It is the search for the possibility condi-
tions of the knowledge in the subject, which projects its own demands on the objects. The subject is active, builds the scope of objectivity, the horizon from which objects are constituted and can be conformed to be known. This scope of objectivity is made possible by the own structures of the subject, which are not derived from the experience, but are a priori. The whole of these structures is the system of pure reason.

The result opens a revolution in the foundation of science; it establishes what the limits of knowledge are: only the phenomenon is known. What things are in themselves is unknowable; what is beyond the possible experience is unknowable; the absolute, the unconditioned is unknowable.

In response to the first question, is metaphysics possible as a science? The answer is negative, because, it refers to the special metaphysics. It can be said that it is not possible to know God, neither the soul, nor the world; because these things should not affect the senses.

Kant does not argue that it is not possible to believe in God, but that there can be no technological science, there can be no theoretical knowledge of God. Their interest is not to fight the faith, but to limit the attributions of reason, so that the field of faith is not invaded by reason.

Realism vs. Idealism

In accordance with Severini (1961) realism is the theory of knowledge that considers there is an external reality to the mind or to the knowledge capacities of the subject, and that the function of the subject is limited to reflecting such reality, the gnoseologic conception in which the relationship between the subject and the object is determined by the subject. All the philosophical conceptions of the greek-roman antiquity, both Plato and Aristotle and the Christian Middle Ages are realistic, and assume that there is a reality out of mind. Aristotle calls the reality explained above substance, while Plato called it idea. On the other hand, Descartes and Hume are realistic in this sense, because they believe that science does nothing but reflect the external real to the mind.

For its part, idealism indicates that any gnoseologic posture that part of the assumption contrary to the previous case refers that there is no reality outside the subject. This does not mean that there is nothing outside the representations. All idealistic postures are modern. Some idealistic currents are differentiated: (a) Berkeley argued that there was no reality out of mind, but not from the mind, but from the mind of God.
(b) Kant argued that the real thing called the object was the product of a synthesis between the pure forms of the subject and the content given in the experience.

Idealism holds that the subject determines the object in the relationship of knowledge; it can only be known that it adapts to the subjective ways of knowing. This posture is called idealist, because it holds that it is the thought or idea that constitutes things as objects of knowledge.

Idealism is the posture that holds that the subject is free, autonomous and not dependent on the thing, but determines it as he/she knows it.

What grants validity to science from the Kantian perspective? There is in the subject of science a previous content, but it is not put by God in the person as proposed by Descartes, nor is the empirical result of inductions, nor are merely useful habits. In the subject there are no truths a priori, but there are, on the other hand, rules that regulate all knowledge. The rules are neither true nor false, they just are. They constitute the system of norms regulating the synthesizing activity of the subject.

The validity of a priori synthetic judgment can be determined, showing that it is deduced from some of these supreme rules of “I”.

According to Urdanoz (1975) the question now is, how is the validity of these rules determined? For rules to legitimize an action or knowledge, it is necessary, as established in the Pure Theory of Law, that they are supported by a supreme standard whose validity is unquestionable for that rational subject.

The rules of understanding are deduced from the notion of I think. Every synthesis is possible from the original synthesis of apperception: self-awareness is the unification of the diversity of consciousness, which is what allows an “I”. It is not a substance that unifies the diversity of accidents, but an activity of appropriation of the various representations by which the representations become own. The theoretical knowledge of science is based on action, on the practice of a free subject. Freedom is not synonymous of arbitrariness, but the opposite of the natural. The subject is free not because he/she lacks of laws but because he/she gives them to himself/herself.

Why does the subject need to be given a law? Because otherwise he/she could not exercise freedom, because would be in a struggle with others. Thomas Hobbes tells that the necessary consequence to presuppose the arbitrariness of individuals is the war of all against all. Unlike Hobbes, Kant does not believe that the only way to set limits (laws) to arbitrariness is the constitution of an outside power (state), but he thinks that freedom is to grant himself/herself the law. According to Valverde (1983) it is not
about a law outside, but inside, a law in which “reason” gives itself autonomously. It is not a coercive, merely negative, limiting law that prevents, restricts or represses, but is a universal formal law. Such is the moral law.

**Moral or practical reason**

Kant says that reason can establish two types of relation with its object: either to determine the object and its concept, or to convert it into reality. According to Vélez-Correa (1959) the first relationship constitutes the theoretical knowledge of reason; the second, practical knowledge. It has been shown how reason determines the relationship of knowledge.

In the practical relationship it is no longer a question of determining a material that is given to reason by means of intuitions of sensibility, but of producing or creating something real from the concept. What is created? An action, a behavior. And Kant observes that behavior is regulated by moral norms, but how is this possible? If people behave as mere natural objects, they would be subjected to the very laws of nature, which determine the movements of all bodies. But there are moral standards, so it is necessary to assume that the behavior of people is not subject to such laws; they are free. It is not a scientific truth that tells how things are, since it is not possible to have experience of the soul or its freedom; but a truth of another kind, for which is known how behaviors should be. The structure of the understanding determines the objectivity of the objects of knowledge, establishes the conditions of the science of nature. Since there is no determination of the behavior, the function of reason is to see the rational demands of the behavior: the “must be”. The moral subject is above nature, since behavior is not determined or conditioned by nature, but only by duty. Duty is an unconditioned, absolute, categorical imperative. It does not even depend on the results of the work done. Morality is to follow duty by the own duty. Thus, Kantian morality separates from rationalist dogmatism which intended to determine the content of the actions and not only the form.

According to Verneaux (1985) practical reason is moral as long as it only accepts as a behavior guide a categorical, absolute imperative: duty by duty. Kant distinguishes and separates the plans: (a) The theoretical, unique field where there is scientific knowledge of objects, whose objectivity is determined by the structures of reason; and (b) the practical field, where there is no science, but where a rigorous knowledge of another order is possible: the must be.
The field of science is that of the universal and necessary laws, it is that of the determination; the realm of morality is that of the formal universal moral law, it is that of freedom. Science knows the determinations that govern the phenomena; and moral rules the free actions of the subjects. Whereas the moral law (duty) has a subjective aspect (respect) and an objective aspect (obligation), the natural laws do not admit this scission. For example, it makes no sense to say that if I losing the chalk it must fall; only, if I loosen the chalk, it will fall.

Conclusions

Knowing Kant’s thinking is essential in order to overcome the false relativism that is collapsing the society, by determining that the objects of the world are as rigorously thought out as the moral actions of the people. Therefore, Kant’s thinking introduces the importance of the subject in the relationship of knowledge, and the way in which this subjectivity operates is what allows understanding the relationship between theory and practice in a non-mechanical or dogmatic way. Understanding Kant’s thinking brings closer to moral universalism and away from dogmatic rationalism. Against the current cultural fashion that dismisses any form of rigorous understanding of the practical (ethical) actions, the thought of the author opens a door to the need to think ethics with universalist rigor or, to put it in the contemporary form, with the rigor of the forms that could attain some kind of universalization. What is wanted to highlight of the Kantian work is not the repetition of insoluble problems, but the perspective that can open the door to current problems. If there is only one kind of rigorous science that only speaks of objects of the world, then everything is permissible. In other words, how can the value of actions be rigorously judged or the possibility of arguing reasonably in ethical or political terms? The relationship between theory and practice is essential in order to overcome the positivist antagonism that reduces scientific thinking to the field of objects, as the only area of rigorous scientific reflection. Kant shows another way, though debated but still important to the extent that the reduction of the daily praxis is not accepted to the field of absolute irrationality. It must be thought about praxis (freedom) with intellectual rigor, trying to make values somehow universal. The opposite would be to fall into skepticism and naive relativism, concepts that are deeply dangerous when it comes to justifying and defending human rights and democracy.
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The subject-object relationship in the Kantian conception of science

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THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL FACT OF THE SUBJECT
AND THE OBJECT IN LEARNING

El hecho fenomenológico del sujeto
y el objeto en el aprendizaje

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Abstract

The present work aims to analyze from the point of view of the evolution and appearance of thought in the human being and its structure of knowledge, its different developments in the stages of humanity and its history. The fact of the subject and the object in the relationship of learning as a systemic and reflective form that is acquiring ways of meanings, until reaching an advance where thought seeks to reinterpret and decode the ideas of the world and man (object and subject) of a more structured way, based on a form of equilibration and adaptability taking into account the Piagetian theory, as well as the current thinking reality, of how people form the new knowledge and decodifications, their true meanings for this scientific-technical world, open to a new language and a new way of thinking in the world. The ontic characteristics of the human being allows seeing that is a being of options and that is open to different ways to acquire and decode knowledge, among which stand out at first: “culture and education”; it is the culture that enriches, the one that puts the different forms of transmission of knowledge, orally, in writing and in other ways in which our brain knows how to decode its realities from the primordial elements that only it knows.

Keywords

Adaptation, cognition, coordination, balance, learning process.


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Resumen

El presente trabajo, tiene el objetivo de realizar un análisis desde el punto de vista de la evolución y aparición del pensamiento en el ser Humano y su estructura de conocimiento, sus diferentes desarrollos en las etapas de la humanidad y su historia. El hecho del sujeto y el objeto en la relación de aprendizaje como forma sistémica y reflexiva que va adquiriendo maneras de significaciones, hasta llegar a un avance donde el pensamiento busca reinterpretar y decodificar las ideas del mundo y del hombre (Objeto y Sujeto) de una manera más estructurada, con base a una forma de equilibración y adaptabilidad tomando en cuenta a la teoría Piagetiana, así como la realidad pensante actual, de cómo vamos formando los nuevos conocimientos y decodificaciones, sus verdaderos significados para nuestro mundo científico-técnico, abierto a un nuevo lenguaje y a una nueva forma de pensar en el mundo Las características ónticas del ser humano nos hacen ver es un Ser de opciones y que está abierto a las diferentes formas para adquirir y decodificar el conocimiento, entre las que se destacan en un primer momento son: “cultura y educación”; la cultura es la que enriquece, la que pone las diferentes formas de transmisión del conocimiento, en forma oral, escrita y de otras maneras en las que nuestro cerebro sabe decodificar sus realidades a partir de los elementos primordiales que solamente ella conoce.

Palabras claves

Adaptación, cognición, coordinación, equilibrio, proceso de aprendizaje.

Introduction

From the new trends in education around the world, where there are countries that do not present the traditional ways of performing the learning process, but instead have democratized the school, an assessment of the didactic processes where the protagonists are both the educator and the educating.

This is where the problem of abstract analytical logical thought appears, for which it is necessary to make a retrospective to the principles of the human being, as being that it is becoming rational; Where does this start to have memories, to have meanings and meanings that are well defined and decoded in order to face the everyday realities of the work of their existence?

The objective of this article is to analyze the significance realities that human beings have in order to reach knowledge and decode actions according to the needs, making education a tool for life.

The learning importance of the subject around the codification of the object is part of the thought evolution of the human being that has occurred for millions of years; the same that made this species call it (human-wise), since in human is presented the whole manifestation of the existence until reaching to knowledge and then to be a creator of culture where the process of education begins, which is transmitted from generation to generation up to the present day. The adventure perhaps started with a species (Homo Habilis), collecting information in order to make instruments, manipulate ideas, which helps to confront the most
adverse realities of everyday life; human has a pre-language that helps communicating his/her needs and make safe the species. According to Coopens (2014), it is only from there that human evolves biologically and culturally, because it gives the spirit of conquest, which achieves unimaginable prospects for humanity and that no one can stop.

The term *Homo sapiens-sapiens* refers to the rational human being in the evolutionary process, leaving traces that inform about the capacity of the thought evolution, until reaching an abstract and well defined forms with capacities of analysis, synthesis, composition of more structural reasoning to which the logic is subjected, and even the Mathematics, as the famous phrase of “Cogito-ergo-sum” of Descartes (2012a). It is the reality that shows the true path of the interpretation of the world, the shaping of ideas in the mind that transcends the mere primitive forms to structure critical thinking.

**Thought development and the relationship subject and object of knowledge in the human history**

In the philosophy, the evolution of the human thought took at the beginning almost ten centuries to renew itself, from Plato and Aristotle (s. V BC) to Descartes and the English empiricism (S. XVI, AC). It is No stranger to the possible objection according to which during the Middle Ages there would have been philosophy. And then it would be worth mentioning Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas as the most exalted figures. Properly speaking, from a strictly philosophical point of view, the most prominent work during the Middle Ages —from the patristic to the 14th century— was without doubt logic. As Maldonado refers (2015) the next rotation of philosophical thought was in Kant and Hegel (XVIII and XIX century), as can be seen, the elapsed time is much shorter. Subsequently, Husserl, Wittgenstein and Heidegger constitute three singular milestones of renewal of philosophical thought, and the two first marks the philosophy of the twentieth century in favor or against. The authors who would follow, cover (independently of the philosophical appreciations and tastes) increasingly short and tight swathes of time.

Since the human being has had the capacity to think and reason, it gives him/her the forces that have been able to capture this historical world. There is a very specific question: are the ideas that make history or are the historical circumstances that produce ideas to its needs? Their reflection and response is made by each reader.
Ancient times

All the answers that were given in humanity were channeled and systematized by the west on the physical and metaphysical realities, some of the times were erroneous and nevertheless they are counted as logical-critical thought and as knowledge.

Mythology is a conception of countersetting philosophy (logic) to a symbolic explanation of the world, this way of seeing reality implies a wide decoding of knowledge.

However, in relation to the myth in recent studies on its role and value, there is no intrinsic contradiction between myth and logos, but are two expressions of the same thing but with a different logic.

Myth: It is a comparative imaginative manifestation of the deepest questions of human existence. So also the myth has a rational nucleus that is discovered through the analysis of the symbolic language that is decoded by the subject and that create culture.

The first thinkers to be able to demystify the reality had to decode new knowledge; they held the idea of a primitive substance that was the basis of all the reality giving rise to the 5 fundamental elements (water-fire-earth-air-ether), born from the nature philosophers, as named by Aristotle in his metaphysical work.

This is the clearest relationship that can occur between object and subject of knowledge.

The same sages and thinkers saw in mathematics and geometry a special contribution to refute and argue the different lines of thinking and the work of the human being with ethics and morality.

Plato (2015), shows in his dialogues, Socrates as a very critical thinker with all the reality of his time, also attacked the behavior of the society. It was adjusted to the fact of logic and reason, but its inner voice, its “daemon”, kept it away from moral nihilism.

Plato’s disciple sees in logical reasoning a measure of the ideal world and those innate ideas that we share in forms of reminiscence.

For Aristotle, the reality that surrounds people is not an appearance but a fullness to be investigated and known (cognoscente object). It often departed from the etymologies by attempting through logical analysis and a conscious crumbling of the concepts to get to the knowledge of things, so, it served like a tool of the cognitive criticisms and of the logic; Aristotle (2012) was its true creator, his theory of deductions, which was the first steps of a symbolic and mathematical critical reasoning, gained real importance.
The fact of the universal use made it appear a methodology for the abstraction of the knowledge, the deduction that goes from the general to the particular one; knowledge was structured on the basis of laws of the logic and of the Porfirio’s tree. This system remained as a gnoseologic up to the modern age.

Modern age

Sciences begin in mathematics and can only be refuted with evidence that is adhere to the laws of logic, this thought is more critical, and the cosmic image of the Pythagoreans was based on the number and the proportion, and they saw in the sphere the consummate form of the universe; since then, the astronomical sciences were studied, and the thoughts and the mathematics were giving consistency and an approach to the truth; Johanes Kepler, showed with her studies the new laws of the movement, that provided new knowledge to the previous ones and today are still being used.

From Descartes’s (2012b) mathematical logic is developed Spinoza’s mystical concept of the substance. His view was based that the only objective in nature was mathematics and that matter was a projection for him, the sciences were measurement and mathematics.

From it for the first time throughout the history of critical thinking, he straightened analytical thinking about his own spirit. From Descartes’s method realities are seen differently, since he proposes that there is no nucleus of knowledge. The image of knowledge is characterized by a continual sequence of perceptions and reflections, for him all perceptions are subjective (Asimov, 1999 p. 20).

From Descartes, creator of analytical geometry, many philosophers have also been mathematicians, fact that have helped to give an interpretation of reality, of the world from the intellectual and real truths to reach a “pre-established harmony”.

The value of experience is taking shape and Locke in his writings on education and pedagogy shows that understanding is forming, and that knowledge and criticism are only acquired from experiences in the form of sensory perception, this shows a new way of reaching knowledge.

But the limits of reason are recognized and their conditions are analyzed, from which arises the new idealism, where the thought becomes critical for the first time; it is to try to unify the rationalism and the empiricism so that the knowledge can decode the reality. In the Critique of Pure Reason the last step is shown, the object of it:
All knowledge that occupies a reasoning... not of the objects but of our knowledge of the objects, as this is possible *a priori* analytical, that is, decoded by the reason and through the synthetic judgements of knowledge, we assure that they are a reality knowable to the intellect and becomes a truth (Kant, 2012, p. 204).

With this term is understood as previous thought all experience and that neither can be demonstrated nor refuted with it, to which it is called transcendentalism. It is also necessary to remember that with Kant, a new logic and new postulates and categories of thought are given.

Since the earliest times, logic has traveled throughout a safe path, it can be seen from the fact that since Aristotle’s time it has not taken a single step backwards. What is even more remarkable about the logic is that so far it has also not been able to take a single step forward, and therefore it seems to be all but completed and complete (Kant, 2012, p. 234).

Leticia Correa, it helps demonstrating that the thought and its development is a capacity of the human being, and says:

Addressing the development of thought from a philosophical standpoint means transcending the biological, psychological, and cultural categories that have been conventionally established to understand the way a person knows. Thus, it is to define how the knowledge of the reality influences my knowledge and vice versa, seeking to build goal knowledge and a consciousness that allows the transformation of this reality (Correa, 2012, p. 74).

Nowadays, the comparison between the computer and the brain is among the clearest images for all and yet it lacks of evidence. In a new step of knowledge has been raised the question of whether it is human understanding the one that possesses access to the world of ideas or if on the contrary, the only true world is that of things. So Bertrand Russell, who at first defends a platonic idealism, leads a radical turn towards realism and new logic. This new realism was founded by G.E. Moore and deepened by Russell joined to the Cartesian line by saying:

Mathematics is the only useful key to open knowledge. True, logic is now developing in a new intellective sphere. According to rationalists, only statements about relationships can be made and not about things itself... The world is composed of sensory data logically linked to each other. The sensory data of different objects would constitute the spirit of the observer, the sensory data of an object observed by several people, would be the reality of a matter – unprovable (Russell, 1969, p. 124).
Ludwing Wittgenstein belongs to the same group; he is professor in Cambridge and looks at logical thinking from the language. It makes seeing that that there are languages that lack syntax, that is, logical concatenation in its phrases and that provide a differentiated expression on the world, and do not have less possibilities of combination than the common languages that are spoken In Europe and America. In his work *Tractatus* he presents a reality about the fact of knowledge and its form of codification:

The judgments are the functions of the truth on concrete statements, that is, logical derivations of the facts; logic nothing says about the reality, because I can never capture it, its nature is altogether tautological= it is limited to express something that is already defined but in a different way (Wittgenstein, 1946, p. 58).

Among the main theories about knowledge, this thinker finds the admission that the statements are realities that reproduce other realities of equal structure, the same object without experiencing any mutation offers a totally different image if are contemplated differently.

A few years ago, the mathematical logic made a real advance of the specialists, today it belongs to the world of cybernetics, of the symbolic and fixed language of the affirmations. The logic of thought is a function requirement of this time. The logic language according to Husserl (2015), lacks of interest; the substance and depth of the meaning of words do not mean anything, which cannot be translated into the binomial principle (with binary signs 0 and 1), because it does not even exist; the boundaries of both phenomenology and functional mathematical thinking are visible, so both spheres need reciprocal complementarity in order to decode and situate in reality.

Wittgenstein in his approach does not reject the ostensive definition, because he values its contributions as a training technique to learn the meaning of the words, so he prefers to call it (ostensive teaching of words); what he is rejecting is the understanding of it, as the means through which the linguistic terms come to have meaning. As far as the ostensive definition is concerned, it says that this, understood as a mere naming of objects, is not enough, it is not sufficient on its own to instruct someone about the use or meaning of a word. For him, the ostensive definition can only be understood by someone who knows the denomination of the term, that is, someone who knows the function that meets the word in the game of language:
Referring to the symbols and the codes to form the new knowledge, in the field of a computerized culture, Andrés Hermann helps locating in a very appropriate context:

This means that in the computerized societies the speeches not only represent codes and symbols that allow the dialogue between subjects, but it allows the naturalization and legitimation of contents and knowledge that are in function of a dominant class exercising control (Hermann, 2013, p. 240).

The knowledge process as a form of culture from the constructivist perspective

Jean Piaget’s theory on knowledge has changed the conception of how to obtain and organize information in the daily learning.

For Piaget (1963), cognitive development assumes much more than the addition of new facts and ideas to an information store, the birth to maturity for the thinking processes change from very radical way, albeit slowly, because is continuous; people strive to impose a sense of the world. How to continue learning? Piaget identified four principles (bio-
logical maturation, activity, social experience and equilibrium) the first three are examined to then stop in equilibrium.

Maturation. Is the exhibition of biological changes that are genetically programmed from conception; very little can be done in this aspect of cognitive development, except to ensure the nourishment to the child and the care needed to be healthy.

Activity. With physical maturation increases the ability to act and learn about the environment. When a child’s coordination is reasonably developed, he or she can discover the principles of balance when playing with a swing. It is probable to modify his/her thinking processes, at the same time as acting on the environment, that is, when he/she explores, tests, observes and at some point organizes the information.

Social transmission. Development also relates to the people around so learning from others is an influence. Without the baggage of knowledge created, people will have to reinvent knowledge that the cultures already possess. What people can learn from social transmission varies depending on the stage of cognitive development in which they are located.

Balance. Although assimilation and accommodation are invariant functions when present throughout the evolutionary process, the relationship between them is changing so that intellectual evolution is the evolution of this assimilation/accommodation relationship.

According to Piaget (1963), the balance process of assimilation and accommodation is established in three more complex levels:

1. Balance is established between the subject’s schemas and the external events.
2. Balance is established in the own schemas of the subject
3. Balance translates into a hierarchical integration of differentiated schemes.

But there is a new concept of importance in the balance process: What happens when balance set in any of those three levels breaks? That is, when either external schemes or schemes contradict with each other. There would be a cognitive conflict that is when the cognitive balance is broken. The organism permanently seeks the equilibrium and seeks answers, raises questions, investigates, discovers,... etc., until getting to the knowledge that makes it return to the cognitive balance again.

These four principles operate together in order to influence the cognitive development of every human being. As a result of his first biological research, Piaget concluded that all species inherit two basic tendencies or functions:
The first is towards the organization. Human beings are born with the tendency to organize their thinking processes in psychological structures or systems to understand or relate to the world. Simple structures are continually combined and coordinated to improve and be more effective.

Very young children can look at an object or catch it when it is at their fingertips, but they do not coordinate both actions at the same time. However, when developing they can organize these two behavioral structures into a coordinated top-level structure of looking, reaching and taking the object. Of course they can also take those same structures separately (Ginsburg, 2013, p. 129).

Figure 2
Coordination between subject and object of knowledge

Source: own elaboration

Piaget called these structures “schemes”, and in his theory they are the maximum blocks of thought building; that is, organized systems of action or thoughts, that allow making mental representations, to think about the objects and events of the world.

But any knowledge organization, whether it is natural thinking or highly elaborated scientific theories, implies a transformation of the universe to which we have access... what was once a miracle or contingency now becomes a causality problem, what was mystery or metaphysics now becomes a resolute but still undecided question, in a nutshell the foreigner is now the neighborhood nearby and we see in him some problems, contradictions and inconsistencies that were not distinguished before (Greco, 1967, p. 270).

“Nothing is more serene, more organized than the cognitive space of a five-year-old child, if the school does not torment him in excess” (Gadamer, 1982, p. 210). A year or two later the specific demands begin to appear, and the difficulties will also begin.

Heinz Von Foerster (2002), cybernetics professor at the University of Illinois USA, performs the studies of organization of logical knowledge by means of the theory of J. Piaget. And he mentions that: sensory-
motor interactions and also central processes: cortical-cerebellum-spinal, cortical-thalamic-spinal and other neural junctions, are conceived as something of essentially circular or more exactly recursive nature. The recursion goes into these considerations each time a creature’s feelings are explained by his/her movements \((s_j S(mk))\), and his/her movements by the feelings \((mk M(s_j))\). When these two explanations are taken together, they form “recursive expressions”, that is, expressions that determine the states —movements, sensations— of the system — the creature — in terms of these same states \((s_j S(M(sj)) SM(sj); mk M(S(ml)))\).

What is referred to as “objects” (what faces ahead) in an epistemology that excludes the “lineal-open” observer, appears in an epistemology that includes the “circular-closed” observer as collateral for stable behaviors, or if using theory terminology of recursive functions, as “guarantee of the own functions. This can be seen in Piaget (1978) on the Recursive fact on page 63 of “Balancing cognitive structures”.

\[
\text{Obs. } O \rightarrow \text{Obs. } S \rightarrow \text{Coord. } S \rightarrow \text{Coord. } O \rightarrow \text{Obs. } O \rightarrow \text{etc…}
\]

This is a report for the observer of an interaction between a subject (S) and an Object (O) or a set of objects. The symbols used in this expression mean:

- Obs. S: “Relative observable to the action of the subject”
- Obs. O: “Relative observable to objects”
- Coord. S: “Inferential coordination of the actions or operations of the subject”
- Coord. Or: “Inferential coordination between objects”

If compressing the preceding symbolism even more, composing all that is observed, that is, Obs. O and Obs. S, in a single variable and composing the coordinating operations executed by the subject, that is, Coord. S and Coord. O, in a single operator “Coord”. This signifier transforms, recomposes, modifies, etc., the forms, the arrangements, the behaviors, etc., observed in a given movement, initially called \(\text{Obs}_o\), the primary argument, in others observed at another time \(\text{Obs}_t\). The result of this operation is expressed by means of the equation: \(\text{Obs}_t = \text{COORD} (\text{Obs}_o)\).

It is possible that some rational structure is lost in this understanding, but on the other hand some easiness has gained to express the progression of events.
The phenomenological fact of the subject and the object in learning

El hecho fenomenológico del sujeto y el objeto en el aprendizaje

By allowing the operator COORD operate on the preceding results is obtained:

\[
\text{Obs}_2 = \text{COORD} (\text{Obs}_1) = \text{COORD} (\text{COORD} (\text{Obs}_0))
\]

And after \(n\) phase:

\[
\text{Obs}_n = \text{COORD} (\text{COORD} (\text{COORD} (\ldots, (\text{Obs}_0)))\ldots),
\]

\(n\) times

Summarizing:

\[
\text{Obs}_n = \text{COORD}(n) (\text{Obs}_0).
\]

With this observation is suggested that the functional sequence is:

Growing without limits (\(n \to \infty\)):

\[
\text{Obs} \to \lim_{n \to \infty} \text{COORD}(n) (\text{Obs}_0)
\]

\[
\text{Obs} \approx \text{COORD} (\text{COORD} (\text{COORD} (\text{COORD} (\text{COORD} \ldots)))
\]

It can be observed that:
1.- In the independent variable \( \text{Obs}_0 \), the primary argument has disappeared, which can be considered as a sign that the simple connection between the independent variables has been lost in an infinity of recursions, and that such expressions take a different meaning.

\[
\text{Obs}^\infty \text{COORD (COORD (COORD (COORD (COORD...}}
\]

2.- Since \( \text{Obs}^\infty \) expresses an infinite recursion of the operators COORD on the operators COORD, all infinite recursion in the interior of this expression could be replaced by \( \text{Obs}^\infty \): \( \text{Obs}^\infty \text{COORD (COORD (COORD (COORD (COORD...}} \)

3.- Thus,

\[
\text{Obs}^\infty \text{Obs}^\infty \\
\text{Obs}^\infty \text{COORD (Obs}^\infty) \\
\text{Obs}^\infty \text{COORD (COORD (Obs}^\infty)) \\
\text{Obs}^\infty \text{COORD (COORD (COORD (Obs}^\infty)))
\]

Note that under this form the *horror infinitatis* of the expression has disappeared, all COORD expressions are infinite and a new feature has emerged, namely the dependent variable \( \text{Obs}^\infty \) and also, the “dependent self” or “self-defining “or also” auto reflective “, thanks to the COORD operator.

If there are values \( \text{Obs}^\infty 1 \) that satisfy the equations, these values are called, eigenvalues \( \text{Obs}^\infty 1 - \text{Obs}2; \) or own functions, own operators, following the control of the Obs; These eigenvalues are indicated by putting the first letter in capital letters.

Note in the expressions of the form \( \text{Obs}^\infty \):

1. That the “eigenvalues” are discrete, although the domain of the primary argument \( \text{Obs}_0 \) is continuous. This is because any infinitesimal disturbance \( \pm \) from the “eigenvalue” \( \text{Obs}_1 \), that is \( \text{Obs}_{\pm} \), disappears like all other “values” of Obs, except those for which \( \text{Obs} = \text{Obs}_1 \); Obs will be replaced either in \( \text{Obs}_2 \) “stable eigenvalue”, or in some other eigenvalue \( \text{Obs}_1 \) “unstable eigenvalue”.

In other words, the eigenvalues represent equilibrium and according to the chosen domain of the primary argument, these equilibriums can be equilibrium values, “fixed points”, functional equilibrium, operational equilibrium, structural equilibrium.

2. Also note that the eigenvalues \( \text{Obs}_1 \) and its operators COORD maintain with each other a complementarity relationship, since one implies the other and vice versa; here the \( \text{Obs}_1 \) represent the external observable manifestations of the calculations “cognitive-accessible operations by COORD introspection”. 

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3. That the eigenvalues, due to their self-defining or self-generative nature imply a topological “closing” (circularity).

Figure 5
Types of observer

![Diagram of observer types]

Source: own elaboration

This state of things authorizes a symbolic reformulation of the expression:

\[
\text{Obs} \to \lim_{n \to \infty} \text{COORD}(n) \ (\text{Obs} \to)
\]

That is, knowledge calculating its own knowledge.

To the extent that thoughts processes and new schemes are organized, behavior becomes more complex and adapts to the environment.

**The second is adaptation.** In addition to tending to organize their structures, people are also usually inherited to adapt to their environment. Adaptation involves two basic processes: assimilation and accommodation.

**Assimilation.** It takes place when people use the schemes they have to make sense of the world’s events: it includes trying to understand something new and adjusting it to what is already known, sometimes people can distort the new information in the attempt to adjust it to the one known, is the case of many children who see a skunk but call it kitten, in an attempt to adapt the new experience to the scheme they have for the identification of animals.

**Accommodation.** It happens when a person has to change the schematics, which he/she has to respond to a new situation. If it is not possible to run the data to any of the schemas, then it is necessary to establish more appropriate structures. Instead of adjusting the information to fit the thinking, thinking is adjusted to adapt to the new information. Children show accommodation when they add the scheme to recognize the
skunks to the systems they already have to identify the animals. From there, the coordination operations COORD, seem to coordinate the whole, that is, the composition of the parties.

\[
\text{Acom} \rightarrow (\text{Op}_1 \ast \text{Op}_2) = \text{Acom} \ (\text{Op}_3) = \text{Data} \ (\text{COORD} \ (\text{obs}_1))
\]

A manifestation of the accommodation can take place at the same time of the assimilation of the new logical thinking structures to recognize the reality.

Considering the observer (obs) and the operator (Op) or linear transformations in the knowledge and its fusion with the experience (exp) and applying this recursively to \(X_0 \ X_1\) and its continuity \(x^\infty\), whose domains are the real numbers, is chosen an initial \(X_0\) (4) as:

\[
\begin{align*}
X_0 &= 4 \\
X_1 &= \text{Op}_1 \ (4) = 4/2+1 = 2+1 = 3; \\
X_2 &= \text{Op}_1 \ (3) = 2500 \\
X_3 &= \text{Op}_1 \ (2500) = 2250 \\
\ldots & \ldots \\
X_{10} &= \text{Op}_1 \ (X_{10}) = 2001 \\
X^\infty &= \text{Op}_1 \ (X^\infty) = 2000
\end{align*}
\]

This form shows how knowledge is adapting and accommodating to the circumstances of each environment with its experiential form.

To adapt to environments of increasing complexity people use the schematics they have, as long as they work (assimilation) and modify and increase their schemes as in the previous equation, when something new is required (accommodation). In fact, both procedures are required, even the use of an established pattern, such as taking a covered or carve may require some accommodation if the shape or size of it differs from the known type. If been in a gala dinner and the forms of cutlery, cups or dishes are not at home, the person will need to add a new skill to the eating scheme. Each time new experiences are added to a scheme, it grows and modifies, so the simulation necessarily implies some accommodation.

There are other times when assimilation and accommodation are not used, people can ignore something if they find it too strange, the experience is filtered to fit the kind of thinking that the person presents at a given time.

Today, many problems that could not be analyzed in mathematical terms, because uncertainty or chance was the variable, are being posed in term of the probability theory, from economists, psychologists, educators, sociologists, these are structured in the form of probability in the
study and analysis of the human situations. Apostel (1977) proposes that this is equal to the accommodation of the knowledge, because in it there is not the chance but the probability of accommodation of the knowledge to structure appropriate answers to the environment and to the problems that seem unchangeable.

The permutations help structuring the knowledge and accommodation to cope with any dispersion of agents involved in the problem, this is how accommodation is done:

\[ A = \{0, 1, 2\} \text{ and } B = \{7, 8\} \]

Can the number of different ordered pairs be found, \((a, b)\), in which the first component of the couple is an element of \(A\) and the second component is an element of \(B\)? For each of the three ways in which can be chosen the first accommodation or component in an orderly pair, there are two ways in which the second component or accommodation is chosen. Thus, the whole of all these ordered couples or mental accommodations is: \{\((0, 7)\), \((0, 8)\), \((1, 7)\), \((1, 8)\), \((2, \_ )\), \((2, \_ )\}\}

Containing \(3 \cdot 2 = 6\) elements. The set of such ordered pairs is called a Cartesian product of \(A\) and \(B\) and is represented as: \(A \times B\). This example illustrates the fundamental way of ordering ideas and counting and transmitting:

If an \(A\) set contains \(r\) elements, and a finite \(B\) set contains \(s\) elements, then there are \(rs\) different ordered pairs \((a, b)\), where \(a \in A\) and \(b \in B\) (that is, \(A \times B\) contains \(rs\) elements).

This principle can be extended to any form of accommodation or component and applied to many knowledge situations or also rationality counting. The following is a mathematical example of knowledge adaptability:

How many pairs of natural numbers exist that have a three-digit numeral?

As a help to reason about this type of problem a diagram like this can be made: \(6:____ ____ ____\). The hundreds numbers are either one of the nine elements of, \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9\}; Therefore, 9 is written in the first space. The digits of the dozens is an element any of \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9\}, so 10 is written in the second space. The digit of the unit is any of the five of \{0, 2, 4, 6, 8\}, then 5 is written in the third space.

The fundamental principle tells that there are \((9 \times 10)\) ways to choose the figures of the hundreds and the dozen; therefore, there are \((9 \times 10) \times 5\), that is, 450 different natural pairs numbers that have three digits.

Since the union of \{0, 1, 2\} and \{7, 8\}, is the set \{0, 1, 2, 7, 8\}, can be observed that the number of elements is the union in the sum of
the numbers of elements in the given sets: $5 = 2 + 3$. On the other hand, the union of $\{0, 1, 2, 7, 8\}$ and $\{2, 7\}$, only has four elements $\{0, 1, 2, 7\}$, since number 2 is element of the two given sets, that is: $\{2\} = \{0, 1, 2\}$

$$(1 + x)^n = 1 + \frac{n x}{1!} + \frac{n(n-1)x^2}{2!} + \cdots \{2, 7\}$$

$$\exists x \left( \text{Persona}(x) \land \forall y (\text{Tiempo}(y) \rightarrow \text{Objeto}(x, y)) \right)$$

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} e^{-opx^2} \text{COORD} = \left[ \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} e^{-opx^2} \text{Coordinación} \right]^{1/2}$$

$$= \left[ \int_{0}^{2\pi} e^{-\tau^2 \text{sujeto} \, d\theta} \right]^{1/2} = \left[ \pi \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-u \text{sujeto} + \text{objeto}} \right]^{1/2} = \sqrt{\pi}$$

This shows that knowledge is circular or coiled and experimental in the different stages of adaptation and organization, as in the evolution process (see Figure 5)

$$e^x = 1 + \frac{opx}{\text{obs1}!} + \frac{opx^2}{\text{obs2}!} + \frac{opx^3}{\text{obs3}!} + \cdots, \quad -\infty < x < \infty$$

Accommodation ways of knowledge

$$f(\text{observador}) = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{f(\text{observador})(a)}{n!} (cd(y)-a)^n$$

It is seen how the already remembered constants and previously learned are equal to the sum of COORD in both the frequencies of (a) and (OBS). This can be called knowledge growth and adaptability.

It is a modified logistical equation to reach the understanding, to capture the object, although this is abstract or metaempirical, but it is a phenomenon that the subject abstracts to be able to decode it and to refer to the reality of the object in a process to be known.
The third is the balance of knowledge. Organizations of assimilation and accommodation can be seen as a kind of complex act of weighting; the changes in the thought are given through the equilibrium process which is the search of the balance, supposing that to obtain it, people test the properness of their thinking processes.

In a short way, it can be said that the equilibrium process works like this: there is equilibrium if applying a particular scheme to an event or a schema situation, it works; but if the scheme does not produce a satisfactory result, then there is equilibrium and the person feels uncomfortable; the discomfort motivates people to seek for a solution through assimilation and accommodation, to which the thinking changes and advances. To balance the understanding of the world and the data it provides, people continually assimilate new information through schemes and accommodate thought as long as the unfortunate attempts of analysis produce equilibrium.

As seen in reality, there are equilibrium phenomena, the imbalance and the rebalancing or in other words, the relationship between continuous changes and the discontinuous changes that operate by jumps and that correspond to the transit of a structure to another. It is a general problem of all evolution, as has been repeatedly pointed out by Hegel towards Marx, and to treat it in all its extend should be taken into consideration the propositions and use the concepts of dynamic topology.

The cognitive systems provide an equilibrium typology that can be classified:

Incremental equilibrium: The one that corresponds to the mastery of the compensatory regulations, and therefore, regular and continuous, which corresponds to the mastery of the compensatory regulations and the one that raises the creation by reflective abstraction of the regulation mechanism with transit to a higher or composed level. The discussion has shown that the mechanisms described imply, even in a special way, a mechanism of discontinuous jumps, especially by a decrease in the range behavior, with the aim of describing a discrete “gait” (Halbwachs, 1964, p. 87).

The structures that reach the dominion frontier, in which the disturbances \( \text{cond}(\gamma \cdot a) \)\(^n\), can still be integrated or absorbed, are immersed in a zone of disorder and chaos, from which arises a new zone of equilibrium through a determination process, but not predictable. This radical type of imbalance and rebalancing causes bigger problems in each specific domain, by showing only the analogy, in a domain fairly close to the one discovered by Piaget, the mastery of the history of science, which
is also a cognitive domain. The most important moments in the history of a science are those developmental crises called scientific revolutions.

It can be said that Piaget’s typology can be applied quite well to these revolutions, which in the background are jumps from one theoretical structure to another. If wanted to understand the dynamics of these jumps, must be understood how thinking structures its cognitive development according to adaptability and balance.

A good example is provided by the origin of relativity \((E=mc^2)\). As known, it is about determining the velocity of the earth in relation to the space, seat of luminous undulations. The experiences offered a speed value of light \((300000\text{Kn/s})\), which was paradoxically the same for different references in motion; these results constituted a disturbance in relation to the dominant theory. It started ignoring this result or at least simply to mention it without regard. According to Lord Kelvin, the basic system of the fundamental notions of physics was already definitively established in the fact of the rotation.

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
    U(t) \\
    V(t) \\
    W(t)
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
    1 & 0 & 0 \\
    0 & \text{Objeto } Rt & -\text{Sujeto } Rt \\
    0 & \text{Sujeto } Rt & \text{Objeto } Rt
\end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix}
    U(0) \\
    V(0) \\
    W(0)
\end{pmatrix}
\]

And it was totally satisfying except for the different black dots, which is now known as dark matter or irradiation law of dark particles and the negative result of that experience.

Thus, considering this analogy can be stated that in the mathematical logical knowledge, is given equally the exceptions to produce a true balancing and revival of the interpretation.

It should also be said that the first experiences were at the limit of the precision of measures, although this precision was increasing from year to year, which amounted to an insistent disturbance increasingly strong, it was an alpha-type behavior.

Subsequently the contraction of the intangible rules, which automatically compensated the disturbance: beta-type behavior, which comes to introduce the emission model. Not only did the source not deposit the luminous undulation in space once and for all, but it remained in relation to the source, which remained the center of the expanding spherical wave.

It is the behavior of a set of knowledge, like projectiles launched, at the same time by an object, and that throughout the movement remain located in a sphere whose center is joined to the emitter object, this conception is united fundamentally to the theory that knowledge and
adaptability in the human brain is generated at the speed of light, which characterizes a range-type theory.

Einstein proposes in his studies, that the comparison in moving lengths and the similarity in two different places does not have an absolute sense but relative, in dependence of the reference to which the observer is attached. It is the same situation that makes the reference of a point in its system of spatial axes, to change when the system of axes is changed, as it requires the three-dimensional character of the system of the physical space. Additionally, Einstein extends this spatial relativity to the time, which is equivalent to considering a dimensional space time, in which a change of axes, corresponding to a change of movement of the referential produces a correlative change of the references space and time, preserving at all times the speed of light as a fundamental invariant. This process, which rests on reflective abstraction and which leads to a qualitatively new balanced system, seems to correspond to the second type of incremental balancing or rebalancing.

The support of intellectual language
in the structuring of knowledge

The spectacular development of the technique has shifted from the point of view of the humanistic development forged from the Renaissance to the modernity.

Science and humanism, deep down, have a unique support for progress: the intellectual. The development of the ideas, either from the speculation or the analysis of the nature, is produced by the reflection of the intellect on the mind. This reflection of knowledge on knowing is the inexhaustible source that generates the accumulation of knowing, whether it is called science or culture.

It may seem that intellectual action is simple or almost spontaneous in humans, but it is not. The real intellectual act that generates progress is only the one that is creative, that is, the one that does not remain in the contemplation of the knowledge but generates a new idea that increases the whole of the related ideas. To contemplate and to reflect on the knowledge is to learn, and although this implies a progress of the personal acquis, it does not increase the cultural heritage of humanity.

The contribution of creative intellectual acts in turn does not imply real progress if they do not correspond to the contribution of a truth. Only true knowledge is enriching for science; although it is not easy for
the intellect to distinguish the characteristics of the error. The intellectual progress, therefore, is continually debated in the contrast of the conditions of truth of each new discovery.

There are many external supports for intellectual development, the fundamental is cultural heritage; possibly followed by the system, that is, of the structure of work, where is emphasized the work of group and the teamwork.

Perhaps the most important supports for intellectual progress are the personal ones, those who support the professional work of each intellect. Although teamwork is fundamental, it corresponds to a set of intellects whose creative work, ultimately, is a personal affirmation. Only the individual mind generates the idea that is enriched or perfected in the contrast of collective work.

Being so important the personal intellectual work, its supports will be fundamental for all progress. At this level, perhaps, the essential supports are two: self-criticism and analytical capacity.

The analytical capacity consists of the mind disposition by system to analyze the different elements that constitute an intellectual proposition. To the extent that the elements that make up a reality are analyzed, the reality itself can be evaluated according to the criteria of truth that each element contributes. What is evident in science, with the detailing up to the atom, the cell, the genes, etc., in the analysis of the humanistic reality is not given in such a general way, so that many intellectuals assert without the previous rigor of the analysis and detailed contrast of the constituent elements. This analysis capacity that some minds have by nature is their best weapon or support for the real contribution to the common intellectual heritage.

A second support is the capacity of self-criticism. Those who formalize in the personal security the fundamental element of the disposition of progress, usually soon realize the wrong course of the performance. The capacity of self-criticism, which has its origin in the experience of the error itself, constitutes one of the most valid supports for the recognition of the conditions of truth of the developed work. To the extent that one is its maximum critic, it accepts and computes the foreign criticisms as constructive elements correctors of the thought itself, facilitating the verification processing, which constitutes the best ways of security for the progress.

The difficulties of the knowledge study throughout history are due to the possible and different perspective that is acquired from the theory of knowledge according to which is considered priority in a subjective way, of the person who knows, or in an objective way, what is known.
Both perspectives are necessary for knowledge, subject and object, since nothing could be known if there was not a being with the capacity to know, and nothing could be known if there was no reality with possible objects of communicating as cognoscente beings.

The metaphysics of being and idealistic philosophies have prioritized one or another perspective of the knowledge entity without giving a formally coherent response of the multiple implication of the subject and the object to enable knowledge, especially when they have to deal with intellectual knowledge, because sensitive knowledge responds to a simpler process and, therefore, more accessible to define. Intellectual knowledge offers the peculiarity of knowing that knows, and therefore the act of knowledge manifests itself as subject and object.

A turning point in the development of philosophy on human knowledge can be admitted in the rationalism of Descartes, when categorizing the existence according to the thinking subject who perceives it. From this intellectual moment the subject of knowledge, who thinks, transcends his/her subjectivity to be configured, at the same time, as the object of knowledge, the one that exists.

If the cognitive process is considered as a linear transfer of information from the object to the subject, the relationship between the two ends of the process is marked by the suitability of elements to be compatible in the encryption process, transmission, decoding and retention. Each party presents its own process, the object through the accidents of its matter that make it knowable, and the subject through the processes that allow him/her to know.

When considering the nature of the intellectual knowledge, the problem is complicated because it is identified with a reflection act by which the information of the object does not come from a group of imputable external signals but from a mental immaterial content, whose entity lies in the same subject who thinks. This procedure composed of intellectual knowledge presents a double articulation by which the object has to be psyched in the subject so that it can be the subject of the new act of knowledge of the same subject that makes the reflection possible.

This double articulation of the intellectual knowledge establishes a new form of relation between the object and the subject, since the object of the knowledge is no other than the same subject and its sensitive capacity to know that relates to the external reality. When the object of knowledge is the subject who knows, is when he/she knows himself/herself, and therefore establishes an intimate convergence relationship between the subject and the object, from which the act of intellectual knowledge follows the intuitive perception of the own existence.
As Ruben Bravo says, the crisis disarticulates the very existence of human beings:

This disarticulation is also caused by the heterogeneity of the movement, especially in the process of changing the period. Not only is the movement unequal, in the interior of the world, the logics that govern these movements are also diverse, the movement in the spaces of accumulation is more accelerated, its time is the time of the progress and the richness; on the other hand, the time of the education, which is the space of knowledge and culture is slower (Bravo, 2008, pp. 72-73).

When the double articulation of intellectual knowledge is ignored as a form of human knowledge, and the process of sensitive and intellectual knowledge is postulated as simple and unique, the interpretation of existence is carried out from the consideration of object or subject, and as considered one and another perspective will be concluded in a materialistic or idealistic philosophy. If it is accepted that all the knowledge is followed by a totally objective process of the external perception, there will be no way to justify the self-consciousness by which each person knows himself/herself, reaching an accidental knowledge of the characteristics of the matter itself and of the acts, which are followed by its way of being: one knows how it is, but one cannot obtain a knowledge of what one is. When knowledge is considered an activity without taking into consideration the double articulation of the knowledge of the relation between object and subject, one cannot preach the reality of the external to the own subject that it knows, which more or less radically affects to constitute an idealistic philosophy, conceived from the reality of the act of knowing without being able to assure the reality of the known object.

Conclusions

In the knowledge and mathematics there is a superior level of thought to the one of the concrete operations, but is still debated the question about how universal is the thought of the formal operations, though these are linked to the physical environment, they can be the product of experience and practice in solving hypothetical problems and using formal scientific reasoning. These capacities tend to be valued and taught in different cultures.

All adults use thoughts, formal operations in some areas where they have more experience or interest, sometimes humans find alternative routes to manage problems.
An important implication is the problem of adequacy, which must keep the imbalance at the right point, to create situations that lead to error and finally be guided in the conflict between what think will happen and what actually happens, they are obliged to reconsider their understanding, which allows the development of new knowledge.

The active experience of building knowledge should not only remain in the manipulation of sensitive objects, but must also include the mental reasoning of ideas and numbers that help forming thought, so it is an interaction with the social structure as the basis of meaningful learning, putting the education actors as ends of the teaching-learning process, but in a guided form, to form stimulating educational contexts to enhance the aptitudes and attitudes of each one of the students in the learning process.

Note

1 In this equation can be observed that both the accommodation or organization of thoughts with reality, allow finding more appropriate ways to reach a management of brain functions; Based on the experience of both the sensitive and the cognitive, which leads to look at the knowledge phenomenon in evolutionary processes.

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THE PHENOMENON OF KNOWLEDGE
AS A PROBLEM IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH

El fenómeno del conocimiento como problema en la investigación educativa

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Abstract

The problem of knowledge is one of the fundamental themes of contemporary philosophical reflection, it has exposed the serious epistemological crisis of scientific research due to its ontological and anthropological gaps when it comes to understanding reality. The experiences of educational researchers reveal that the Cartesian and positivist thought categories of modern discourse undermine the processes of knowledge production that are generated in and through educational research. The purpose of the dissertation is to find, in the substantive experiences of thinkers and educational researchers, new reflection keys that promote a more experiential and significantly human type of discourse and scientific praxis. The method used is the systematization of experiences (Barrera, 2010). From the collected experiences emerged two fundamental theoretical keys for the reflection of the problem of knowledge in the context of university education, which are: (a) renewed scientific thought; (b) from the methodology to the scientific methodology. The phenomenon of knowledge emerges from experiences as a questioning idea that introduces us in a new way into the epistemological reflection of scientific praxis, from new perspectives that project the path towards a scientific research with an awareness character, that is, taking into account the fundamental dimensions of the human condition, that within objective research they would not have reason for scientific validation.

Keywords
Research, education, science, epistemology, experience and methodology.

Introduction

The dissertation of this scientific article is part of the research project titled: “Humanist and scientific epistemological theory of educational research through the systematization of experiences”. Systematized experiences express that the problem of knowledge in educational research
emerges as one of the fundamental constituents to access the new emerging scientific narrative; this is the essential configurator element of the anthropo-gnoseo-epistemological systematization axis in the comprehension processes entailed in the investigation.

The new narrative is qualified by the contemporary essayists as postmodern (Lyotard, 1987), where their main contribution is the delegitimization of the modern science discourse, to give way to one that address reflection and research processes with a conscious and experiential character, through new categories of thought that make the new ways of accessing human’s understanding and his/her ways of relating to the world.

In this sense, the problem of knowledge constitutes one of the fundamental elements of the theoretical reflection of the experience systematization, which raises the search for the human and epistemological meanings of the Socio-educational scientist research praxis. Systematized experiences suggest the need for a new scientific narrative that asks for the meaning of existence to continue advancing in the contemporary scientific efforts of the epistemological shift.

Systematized experiences refer to the problem of knowledge as one of the fundamental themes of the reflection and praxis of research in the transition effort of a modern rationality to a postmodern to cause a hermeneutic turn. The academic and scientific experiences of the socio-educational thinkers and researchers are daily found with the scientific discourse and instrumentalist practice of the nineteenth rationality. Science has been colonized by modern discourse (Diaz, 2015). It is a problem and a difficulty to overcome to think, understand and experience reality, to catch its meaning. The use of scientific codes and positivist verification-legitimation criteria keep the traditional processes of knowledge production undermined.

This is translated in the praxis of researchers into a scientific and instrumentalist vision that leads to make use of categories of thought and language that keep them anchored in the scientific past, is a limitation to the thought that prevents them from being free, it establishes limits through its disintegrative, simple and instrumentalist epistemological categories.

Because of the latter, the purpose of this dissertation, born from the experience of reality and daily life, is to find in the substantive experiences of thinkers and educational researchers, new keys of reflection that promote a type of discourse and a more experiential and human scientific praxis. In this sense, the concern is the description of new theoretical keys emerging from systematized experiences that stimulate a type of scientific discourse that is integrative, relational, contextual and expe-
The dissertation of the investigation is structured in four fundamental moments, which are:

1. Educational Research and modern rationality: the theoretical aspects of educational research are developed with modern scientific discourse.
2. The methodological path: the method is presented and the fundamental aspects of the systematization of the experiences are described.
3. Reading of systematized experiences: the two theoretical keys that emerged from the theorizing process are presented, and are revealed as fundamental elements to rethink the problem of knowledge in scientific research.
4. Final considerations: a substantive synthesis of the phenomenological nature of the new educational scientific research is offered on the basis of the experiences.

Educational research and modern rationality

Science and knowledge, traditionally, must have a foundation because they depend on an epistemological basis that sustains them. This is clearly explained by Moreno (2005) when affirming that he does not “understand the meaning or sense of a science, of a theory, of a method of investigation if it is not exposed in the light of the epistemological background underpinning it” (p. 39). The episteme, according to Foucault in his work *Words and Things* (1968), is what makes possible or closes all the conditions of scientific endeavor. According to Martínez (1997), “all science, like all theory, method or investigation, only have meaning or sense in the light of the epistemological background, in the light of a solid epistemic foundation” (p. 227). Thus, “outside the episteme all the possibilities of knowing and the roots that lead to the knowledge itself are clouded” (Bermúdez, and García, 2008, p. 92)

The episteme is constituted in the possibility condition of knowledge, in which is found the “foundation of knowledge and covers the cognitive field of a culture” (Morin, 1992, p. 217). This is forged in the field of “normal science” (Kuhn, 1962) in paradigms, in which finds its sense and positivity, as expressions of modern scientific rationality.
The scientific paradigms are conditioned by the episteme, being located “within a cognitivist structure, general philosophical framework or simply, socio-historical” (Martínez, 1997, p. 228). The truth and the meaning of the paradigms of science are not found in themselves, but in the episteme that governs their discourse and praxis.

In this sense, any attempt to understand the praxis of contemporary educational research should begin with the reflection of the paradigms and theoretical rationality that underpin them, the modern episteme; in other words, according to Martínez (1997) “All knowledge, in its genesis, production and product, is informed and governed by that imprint that is the episteme” (p. 229).

In this sense, the educational research, as it is known today, was born in the nineteenth century with the name “Educational Experimental Pedagogy” (Delgado, 2011), an empirical discipline marked by the epistemological codes of the reigning positivism. The research was carried out under the positivist influence to endow the nascent discipline with scientificity. The educational research is born in the historical-social context of modernity where the philosophical positivist thought emphasizes the interest to strengthen the education on empirical and quantitative foundations and to incorporate the experimental method in the human sciences (Delgado, 2011). It emerges permeated by the postulates of modernity. The processes of education and educational research, since its inception, adopted the scientific objectivist methodology as a fundamental instrument to constitute itself in a science (Flores, 2005).

As a consequence, the educational research has been constituted in an empirical discipline that privileges the objectivity of knowledge, the determinism of the phenomena, the sensible experience, the random quantification of the means, the logic and the verification in the field of education. Research and training occur under the myth of the methodological protocols of the scientific method, where what matters is the epistemological order in the research processes.

However, since its birth as educational research in the nineteenth century as “experimental pedagogy”, until today, despite the efforts of epistemological breakdown of university research by “the assumption of qualitative conception” (Delgado, 2011, p. 36) it is still legitimized within the paradigmatic praxis of positivist rationality, summit of modern scientific discourse.

This is because the modern positivist rationality generates a type of science, which works on a mathematical-mechanistic-functionalists (Galileo-Newtonian) supposes, and what the reality reveals is the dis-
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junction quantity (\textit{rex extensa} - Descartes) –and not the quality – conjunction– from a deterministic scientific natural objectivism (hypothetical deductive-Comte) (Gajate, 2002).

This type of scientific discourse has established in praxis a methodological monism of the quantitative method, by employing processes of inquiry and empirical verification, where facts are quantified and reduced to a simple application of techniques and instruments of data collection and statistical analysis. Scientific praxis is a rationalist simplification where the proceeding of those who operate the science of research is mechanical, plagued by norms and methods. They are denatured and dehumanized, distressing and meaningless research processes for the researcher and the real object of scientific reflection. The world is explored from a strong logic-instrumental that ignores the complexity of the social and human realities (Bermúdez, 2015).

Contemporary educational research evokes the modern paradigm, its praxis is reduced to the use of strategies and instruments to collect and verify statistically data in an isolated and decontextualized way forgetting the question of meaning, of what is fundamental: significance (Salcedo, 2011). The concern focuses more on methodologies, on how, neglecting the onto-anthropological nature of reality study problem (Delgado, 2011). What is fundamental is not a matter of reflection or meaning; the efficiency of the medium triumphs due to the prefixed objectives (Bermúdez, 2015).

Educational research has been colonized by modern rationality, being marked by a mechanistic and accurate vision of scientific research. From this paradigm, the logic of the scientific method is privileged as an instrument by means of which the phenomena that can be known and that obey to natural laws, which are constant and necessary, are studied. Hence, its technical and instrumental concern to address the knowledge of the educational world.

The Cartesian, empiricist, mechanistic and positivist approaches have constituted a science, a rationality, an investigation of order and equilibrium, which according to Lyotard (1987), responds to the postulates of the Newtonian mechanistic anthropology, where the epistemological order understands science enclosed in itself, dehumanized and dehumanizing, where man as subject was expelled from it.

The Cartesian-positivist rationality has serious epistemological and methodological consequences for research in the field of human and social sciences, since it was transferred and assumed the scientific method of the empirical and natural sciences to the social sciences, including education. Supported by these approaches, positivist ideas are developed in
educational research in a relevant way from a quantification perspective: mathematics and statistics. Life is a hollow and meaningless concept for science and traditional research.

Thus, an ontological and anthropological emptiness of reality occurs, called by Morin (1999) as the “principle of reduction that tends to limit the knowable to the measurable, quantifiable and formal, according to the Galileo axiom: phenomena should not be described more than with measurable quantities” (p. 92); thus, emptying the reality of the being and the sense, and annihilating in the beings the qualities and their complexities that are not governed by mechanistic or mathematical principles.

The educational research suffers in Lyotard coordinates “the bureaucratic arthrosis” (Lyotard, 1987, p. 17), imposing limits by submitting to the determinism of laws, norms, bureaucratic regulations and methods that prevail “the homology of the experts” (Lyotard, 1987, p. 5), to the detriment of the ontological and anthropological nature of the educational world, which is nothing more than the absence of the epistemological element of understanding and fundamental significance; in other words and according to Garcia (2000):

The different spheres of culture are disconnected from the subject, transformed into a matter of technicians and experts, whose strategies invade the world of subjectivity. The world of personal life is replaced by the “managed” world by experts, whose expertise generates new forms of heteronomy. The one who now imposes the law is bureaucracy, the technique, and the method; the subject’s creativity atrophies as external impositions dominate (p. 34).

The state in which the educational research is located is that of an educational discipline marked by dehumanization, the result of the serious rupture between the humanistic culture and the scientific culture (Morín, 1992); the one that marks the lack of the element onto-epistemic: the anthropological. Descartes “absolute dualism” between mind and matter led to the divorce of the humanity science to the belief that the material world can be objectively described, without reference to the observer subject (León, 2011).

Educational research, from its birth as an experimental pedagogy, is understood within a type of knowledge strongly marked by organization and order because of productivity and efficiency. The question of the meaning and the destiny of human’s life in the world is unthinkable, an absurd to the point that humanity and science are irreconcilable to happen is in clandestinely (Bermúdez, 2015).
This situation has its origin in the approaches and the modern pedagogical praxis that is characterized by the realism, displacing the human sciences by the natural. The realistic pedagogy was unsubordinated against the “humanist formalism” (Gadotti, 1998, p. 71) touting the superiority of the domain of the outside-empirical world on the world of the inside-subject, the supremacy of the things on the human. From humanist, education later became scientific in which knowledge only makes sense when it is prepared for action (instrumental dimension). Hence, the scientific formation of researchers is understood and realized with a scientist purpose. Education prepares for science; both are considered an end in themselves.

As a consequence, the progressive elimination of the human in science has led to the crisis and the epistemic-paradigmatic emergence. The crisis is in the postulates that sustain classical science. Educational research does not escape the crisis. According to Delgado (2011), the “principles on the objective and abstract vision of reality, the application of the methodologies of the natural sciences as the only valid for the study of the human and social, and the technical and instrumental reason of the education” (p. 15). This conception of research collapses the human and the complexity of socio-educational problems.

But, recent studies reveal that this paradoxical situation that undergoes educational research is mainly due to the serious consequences of the epistemological and linguistic code of modernity (Bermúdez, and García, 2016). The educational research suffers from the scientific normalization due to the inadequacy of the epistemological codes. It is undermined by the thought and language of the scientific past. It is a remora that continues to attract it to the scientific past that prevents from delegitimizing it.

The training and scientific experiences suffer from wealth because the reality is not being properly interpreted, but simple repetitions that legitimize the old mentality. Educational research suffers from the need for a new language, a language of experiential character.

Language is a limit to experience. As long as the language of the old paradigm in educational research trials within the qualitative modality continues, knowledge is minimized. Since we are pure language and unaware of its intimate and vital structure, its semiology, all scientific efforts to integrate and approach reality, the life of the concrete man in an experiential and holistic way, that is, to experience and live in fullness all its wealth, is meaningless (Bermúdez and García, 2016, p. 146).
The contemporary epistemological challenge of scientific research is linguistic. The lack of positivist rationality for science lies in its linguistic inadequacy (Higuera, 2016). It lies through a rationalist language that makes people believe that objective reason is the only faculty to understand and dominate the world. It is a rationality that communicates with a language that loses all passion and existential interest in the thinking of the subject itself and in the existence of others. Therefore, it is a complete devaluation of the subject in front of his/her world and a chronic dehumanization process (Marquez-Fernández, 2011).

Methodology

The methodological approach used in this study is qualitative because it is intrinsically linked to the lived experiences of educational thinkers and researchers. It allows systematizing the knowledge in a more human way because it privileges the understanding in depth of the vital experiences of the substantive informants through the subjective universe and the one of the investigators, about the meanings of the experiences born from their way of life and interact with the world.

In this sense, from the methodological point of view, it is considered as a way of theorizing research to the systematization of experiences as proposed by Barrera (2010), as an exercise expression of the reflective thinking and the instrumental proceeding of researcher for generating the theory. The choice of theorization is because it is linked with the nature and the onto-cognitive aspects which are deeply subjective and orients the research, since its closeness with the epistemological advantages of the phenomenology that “is descriptive science of the transcendental pure experiences in phenomenological attitude” (Husserl, 1949, p. 166) and the hermeneutics whose object is to unravel and discover the meaning of things, to interpret as best as possible the words and writings, the gestures, as well as any act, preserving and safeguarding the singularity of the context in which were Gestated (Gadamer, 1977). These currents of contemporary thought favor access to the knowledge of the experiences of educational thinkers and researchers involved, and then describe them and move on to their systematization.

As a method, the systematization of experiences constitutes a path where are found educational thinkers and researchers (substantive informants) in full exercise of subjectivity, original sources and originators of knowledge, propitiating the description of the phenomenon of the life
experience; as it appears and is made present to perception. In those sections where the subjectivity of people (informants and investigators) was present, who also made possible the comprehension keys of the phenomenological essentiality of the described experiences.

In order to carry out the analysis process of the life experiences of the substantive informants, the three core and fundamental moments of the systematization were carried out, which led to the theorization process: (a) description of the experiences (registration and processing); (b) abstraction (identification of the ideas-forces and argumentative structuring of the theoretical corpus); (c) analysis (critique of the theory).

The substantive informants were selected from three important universities of Venezuela, experts in the field of education research training at the postgraduate level, which are: (a) La Universidad Pedagógica Experimental Libertador; (b) La Universidad Nacional Experimental Rómulo Gallegos; and (c) La Universidad Experimental Simón Rodríguez.

Analysis of the systematized experiences

From the theoretical abstraction process of the experiences of thinkers and educational researchers emerged five systematization axes of philosophical character with their corresponding sub-axes, which determine the research process because contains the set of ideas-strengths, the principles that allow appreciating the explanatory sense of the experiences described and serve as a basis for the syntactical construction of the argumentative compendium or emerging theory of the systematization of experiences, these are:

(1) Ontological axis:
(a) return to the bases and conversion of the research to experience.
(b) Education and research for humanization.
(c) Education and research based on human rationality.
(d) Educational research axis of vocational training.
(e) To be a research teacher, to experience and understand the educational praxis.
(f) Philosophy in the life and scientific formation of the researcher.

(2) Anthropo-Gnoseo-epistemological axis:
(a) New Gnoseo-Epistemology of educational research.
(b) New language for thinking, understanding and communicating science.
(c) The subjectivity, theory and method of the new Gnoseo-epistemology.
(d) Daily life, ontological assumption of educational research.

(3) Theological axis:
(a) To live to investigate is to transform.
(b) Interested science.
(4) Axiological axis:
(a) the construction of a trustworthy and human knowledge.
(b) Research axiological halos.
(5) Methodological axis:
(a) Methodological recomprehension.

However, in the framework of the anthropo-gnoseo-epistemological and methodological systematization axes, the experiences of the educational thinkers reveal the knowledge problem as one of the main elements to rethink the new scientific research.

In this sense, the phenomenon of knowledge emerges from experiences as an idea-force questioning that introduces in a new way in the framework of the epistemological reflection of scientific praxis, from new perspectives that project the way to a scientific investigation with conscious, that is, that takes into account the fundamental dimensions of the human condition, that within the objective investigation would have no reason for the scientific validation.

The question of knowledge was developed within an argumentative compendium of theoretical construction, which derives from the axes; this is described in two theoretical keys that are in close transverse relationship, which are presented below:

*Renewed scientific thought*

The systematized experience suggests as a first task eliminating the scientific thought of the old positivist mentality. It is necessary a philosophical exercise that provides educational researchers with new categories of thought to question and think the plot of the generation of knowledge, which project the way to an incarnated scientific research.

A type of thought that disintegrates and reduces its object of thought to the pure materiality does not understand the complex ontological reality of relational being in life. It makes it impossible for scientific experiences to translate into a substantive communication of the human essence that will become vital experiences for those who know them.

Systematized experiences point to a new type of thought for science, with renewed categories. They consider that to achieve this categorical imperative, the following epistemological considerations must be taken into account:
(a) **SCIENCE IS UNITY**

Science is a unit or it will not be science. This involves giving a human sense to science. The human is understood as a complex set of constitutively united dimensions. The recognition of the total being, as a complex being (what is woven together), is the way for the scientific endeavor that involves rethinking the spirit a unity and not divided science.

Reconverting science and research is about recognizing the unity of science, but this will be possible if the total human being recognized first. It cannot be continued with a science that only investigates the objective dimension of the person, forgetting his/her subjective and intersubjective essence, he/she is not only matter. Scientific research must declare person’s unity; this is the first step, the main act of the new scientific education.

The overcoming of the historical divorce between the natural and the human science that have subsumed humanity in a global crisis and that puts at risk the person and his/her world; it is a generational transition that will occur to the extent that it connects to a new kind of thought that believes in the integration between the visions of science and believes that there are no gnoseologic separations when it comes to knowing the structure of reality, and thinks that there is no separation or difference, conceives the unity of reality.

(b) **OVERCOMING THE SUBJECT-OBJECT DUALITY**

The consequences of the practice of old thought have led to a sort of fragmenting knowledge. In order to be able to think the scientific praxis within new coordinates it necessary to go through the historical overcoming of the Cartesian dualism. They consider it a philosophical and pedagogical task at the same time.

It is Philosophical because the educational thinker by penetrating and entering the essence of reality contemplates it as a unit, in a subjective or objective way. Also, thinking in another way, within new epistemological and language categories that gives way to the understanding of unity. As Bolaños says (2015) the first task of thinking is to begin to think that there is no difference between subject and object, not even to make science, there is a meaningful relationship among them.

It is pedagogical because the academic environments must abandon the theoretical dichotomic conception that permeates the science by establishing that the production process of knowledge is the result of a dual relationship that separates in gnoseological categories the subject
and the object. It is only necessary that it be known as historiography of the epistemological systems of the philosophical thought.

There can be no frontiers between the subject and the object for science, they are mistaken, it is impossible to dissociate them, they are no longer understood as two parts, but as an integrated whole. The world for the person is a unit and he/she is a subject of knowledge in unity, and does not accept separating into rationalist categories.

The educational and scientific task should be directed at revealing the scientific thought of the nefarious dualist Cartesian vision to progressively construct a philosophical system provided with epistemological categories of language that speak of unity and interrelation between the person and the world, humanity and worldliness, subjectivity and objectivity. Knowledge must be a process that evokes unity and interrelation, not the opposite, in which reality and the researcher are understood in a complex, dynamic and intercommunicated relationship.

For this reason, the experiences suggest that it would be a great breakthrough to think on new linguistic categories of scientific comprehension to overcome the subject-matter duality of the western scientific tradition, and gradually go towards a new gnoseological relationship, where the investigator is not only (subject-cause) the starting point of the knowledge (object-effect), where this can be only thought and built by him/her, without any possibility of being able to establish a significance relation.

As expressed by Higuera (2016), the linguistic categories of absolute rationalism of science are insufficient. The scientific interpretation of the world through a subject who thinks it as an object, which in turn is part of that world that thinks, beyond the borders of his/her subjectivity of the subject who is thinking, it is impossible to dissociate them from the object, they are affected and melted like paint on a canvas.

For this reason, educational thinkers, from their experience, believe that an education and a scientific practice that denies the subjective and spiritual essence of man in scientific processes are unfeasible. Pedagogical experiences are made necessary to promote new linguistic categories of scientific knowledge that evoke and denote the interrelationship between the person and the world, humanity and worldliness, subjectivity and objectivity, with a sense of total unity, a claimed to the other, without exclusions.

However, based on the contributions of the Husserl phenomenology (1949), the educational thinkers see in the concept of “Life”, Lebenswelt (Vital World), a possibility of a new linguistic code for the scientist to think man and the world in categories of unity and interrelation, always
complex, dynamic and intercommunicated, since the idea of the world depends on a subject that constitutes it and refers to a sense of a whole of its constituent dimensions that mark the way of doing and thinking of the human beings.

The world of life category, as a new linguistic category, provides the possibility of a new way of seeing the knowledge processes. It offers a vision of totality and unity. Life cannot be dissociated nor fragmented; it is a unit of all its dimensions that configures the human essence, being and chores. The notion offers the possibility of understanding the essential unity between the person and the world, between people and the world from their living worlds. The Husserl notion introduces the subjects in relation and in otherness, that is, according to Husserl (1979):

The sense of being objective world is constituted on the background of my primordial world in many degrees. At first instance we must highlight the Constitution degree of the other or the others in general, that is, the egos excluded from my particular self [...]. The strange in oneself first (the first no-me), therefore, is the other me. And this enables the creation of a new infinite realm of the strange, of an objective nature and of an objective world in general, to which all the others belong and I myself. It is implicit in the essence of this Constitution, which rises from the pure others [...], the fact that the others do not remain isolated, but, on the contrary, constitute [...] a community of selves, which includes myself, as a community of selves that exist with one another and for the others, and ultimately a community of the monads, a community that [...] constitutes the an identical world (p. 172).

The notion life allows overcoming absolute rationalism, as it allows passing from the traditional idea of the generation of knowledge to the generation of knowing. The approaches of Cartesian rationalism are narrowed, giving way to understanding from the total person, where he/she no longer sees the world in dualistic categories. This is possible because the linguistic code underlying the world of life concept allows seeing the real person who rejoices and suffers, who works and enjoys, who lives and dreams, a person who is born and dies, approaching in a human way, closer to daily life.

To talk about the world of life is to talk about daily life. The world of life category is a new richer, more complex and experiential source to think about the processes of knowledge. That now cannot be just the generation of knowledge but also the generation of the know-how. Everyday life provides this possibility, to think about knowledge, the everyday being of the man who lives and communicates in the key to knowing.
For this reason, educational thinkers believe in the world of life category as a new gnoseologic scenario of theory generation, where research embarks on a phenomenological understanding process of the constituent dimensions that shape the world of life, which has given rise to knowledge and which are sources of new knowledge.

(c) The epistemological Tetragrammaton

In a rationality that recognizes the human condition emerge the thought categories to think the phenomenon of knowledge in the process of scientific research, as are fundamentally four: subjectivity, intersubjectivity, daily life and knowledge as fundamental elements that make up the new epistemological pattern, all necessary to think and develop the research processes.

Subjectivity, as an essentially human dimension, is a form of knowledge. It is a path of theorizing and a method of scientific observation. It is a source of knowledge that originates in the experiences, is deep and is not tied to any method and is the way to overcome the dehumanizing duality of the subject-object excision that lives in science. For this reason, it is the possibility of a more human science, where it is possible that man is understood as a subject that is part of the world and is recognized also in the other, which is an organic unit of the knowledge.

The systematized experience suggests that the new scientific rationality of a conscious nature is built on the basis of subjectivity; it allows overcoming the obstacles imposed from scientific objectivism. Subjectivity introduces the scientific rationality in the field of the phenomenological, the knowledge of the internal fainoumenon, conscious and experiential of man. Subjectivity is constituted in the origin of a new recreation of scientific activity.

The investigator cannot get rid from subjectivity. It introduces him/her into unexplored worlds so far for science. Allowing to deeply appreciate the human spirit and the spirit of the world so far unrecognizable by objective science. The investigator delves into a conscious science that makes the human, the daily life, the spiritual, the immaterial, the cultural, the social, the experiential and the experiential their most precious contexts of thought.

Subjectivity is constituted in a method of experiential theorizing, as an existential necessity, which is the natural means to trap the essence of the experiences that the human spirit experiences from the incarnation with the person. It is the source of phenomenological communica-
tion, introducing science into the beginnings of a new language and the new categories of scientific discourse. Thus, subjectivity allows passing from knowledge in general to the recognition of the know-how and the worlds of life as new epistemic categories, establishing new and dynamic forms of gnoseo-epistemological relationship.

For this reason, admitting and incorporating subjectivity in the scene of scientific activity leads to take into account the new epistemological references of a science of conscience to think and communicate the essence problem of knowledge. Subjectivity allows showing the phenomenon, the things that considers essential to communicate, as a reflection of an individual endowed with the subjective element in the appreciation of the reality. Subjectivity sees internally, phenomenologically, its own experiences and describes them with its particular experiential language that depends on the daily life and the particular world of living. The discourse of legitimization of subjective science is no longer explained in mathematical code, but is communicated in hermeneutical phenomenological codes.

-Intersubjectivity, from which the researcher is understood as a relational being, of otherness, of complementarity. It constitutes a tool to deepen the reality, in a scientific attitude, in view that the plurality of visions of the researchers is found in the complementarity an opens path so that they can intervene and make meaningful contributions to the processes of knowledge construction, giving rise to a more unity and communicated science through interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary efforts.

Intersubjectivity, grants the possibility of otherness for a enriching dialogue among researchers, whatever their vision of science and their particular disciplinary area of knowledge, therefore, open them to new and diverse ways of seeing their particular processes of research.

-Daily life is a source of scientificity, it had no meaning so far for positivist rationality. The new science, which is unborn, of a conscious nature, recognizes and assumes daily life. The daily life is fundamental to make the new science because it is day and day of people, it is the source of their experiences, it is the being of the people. It configures and expresses the being of the concrete man, where the essentially human is scientific. The daily life is part of the creed of the researcher who appreciates from the subjectivity an experiential scientific investigation. Recognizing the daily life leads to a greater appreciation of the being of the concrete person unfolding in his/her world of living.

Everyday life is the world of living, it allows seeing the real person who rejoices and suffers, who works and enjoys, who lives and dreams, who
is born and dies. Daily life is the being of an experiential scientific research. The everyday is the being of the people, including that of the researcher, and allows going beyond because it makes them enter into the dimension of their life as a starting point of the concerns and investigation processes.

It is in the everyday life where there is a flow of meanings that shape the being of the human condition in its relation with the world. Precisely, the search for the comprehension of its meanings is constituted in a base for the investigation and for the search of a philosophy of the daily life.

Daily life is the key to phenomenological communication, a communication that is expressed in a subjective way, that is, the Da-Sein communication, the being of the concrete person that is expressed through the knowledge. The everyday allows the person to life and communicate through knowledge; they are the epistemological expression of being, always submitted by the same daily life to a dynamic uncertainty. Everyday life becomes a source of research for new scientific knowledge.

-Knowledge is the gnoseological expression of the world of life of the person, of the being that emerges and that cannot be reduced to dualistic or exclusively rationalist categories.

The knowledge gives way the know-how which is the particular-local meaningful expression of all the constituent dimensions that mark the way of making and thinking of the human beings that are configured in their worlds of lives and the interrelation with other worlds of life. Knowledge is the epistemological expression of the being and the making of the concrete person that is the product of the complexity of his/her world of life and the interrelation with others.

(d) The new scientific narrative:

Walking the paths of a new scientific thought means new categories. New science needs a new language. Research and scientific training carry the language of modern science on their shoulders. It is a type of language that constitutes a limit to apprehend reality in its natural state.

The task of the educational thinkers is to delve into the search for a new language, a language to experience and to capture the meaning of experience; a language that makes people able to penetrate the semiology of the life world of the concrete person to experiment and live with him/her, being part with of an experiential process laden with significance.

It is necessary a new language that introduces a new gnoseology, in a new gnoseologic relationship to experience, in a language to trap the being, the essence of the meanings for people in their interrelation with their worlds of life.
Language should not only be considered as the manifestation of the linguistic signs in the daily life of the human being, the signs that experience its act and discover its true being, are the product of an internal being expressed in gestures, the way of dress, in ways of acting, are a series of signs that belong to different codes (Eco, 1986). It is in this daily life where real research arises, which is an immense richness of signs that manifest various phrases that can be read in the various combinations of their categories that are not only grammatical.

They are combinations that arise from various paradigms according to the classification of categories of various codes that are the product of a subjective analysis that is contextualized in their world of life in relation to other worlds of life with which they interact and there is a Conventionality of signs and codes that allow you to interact and understand the reality in which you are immersed.

Language is for science the possibility of a new scientific narrative, there will be no possibility of a new science if it is not introduced into the law dynamics of language. Research should seek in the daily life and subjectivity of the concrete person the rules that shape the linguistics code and other codes, which determine the different functions of the language games, by which it generates its knowledge and the meaning for his/her life.

The problem with language is decisive for the educational researcher. He/she must make use of hermeneutics as a fascinating practice because it introduces him/her into a phenomenological-incarnate communication process, of the deepest significance of the human spirit.

*From the Methodolatry to the scientific methodology*

The positivist method has been a constraint to understand the essential problems of humanity; it does not fully conform to the great spiritual and essential problems that affect humans. The traditional methodology is an obstacle to penetrate and solve the substantial problems that do not configure the elements for the happiness of the person and to restore the lost planetary harmony.

The epistemological paths of the present context have led to many initiatives and experiences that purge for a change and meaning reconstruction of the research processes, which are characteristic of the methodological dimension. Some are betting on destroying it, others bet for the new reconstruction and recreation of the method; others, by the construction of a new method, and others, the most reactionary, bet for a non-method; research is a spontaneous process discovering the world, the things and the paths of research.
These new initiatives purge by a change of meaning and reconstruction of the methodological dimension that are only possible from the new mindset. Without the recognition of the new mentality it will be impossible to overcome the instrumental logic to which scientific research has been subjected, and even to complement them. The methodology will remain being an obligation to develop research and the hegemonic criterion of scientific validity.

The methodological efforts and initiatives of the scientific contemporaneity are the first conversion steps of the research, to return to its bases, to leave behind certain practices and categories imposed that have led to the scientific research by paths that drive it away from reality. Therefore, the experiences suggest abandoning idolatry by the positivist method and all that it has carried with copy and imposition.

In this sense, it is necessary to overcome the methodological monism, the excessive schemes that has damaged by discrediting the scientific reason of the method as an always new, creative and axiomatic path. In this order of ideas, the experience of the educational thinkers considers that it is necessary to react against the rigidity and the methodological imposition. The methodology is not the component, nor the main additive within the research. It cannot remain being the path to meaningful research and solid scientific knowledge, the mere logic of the instrumental methodology is insufficient.

From this perspective, in these cyclical moments of change within scientific thought, which is favored by the staging of the new currents of thought of a qualitative nature, in the transit of one mentality to the other, urges to abandon the logic and the instrumental methodology to give more importance to the originality and creativity of the researchers that allows them to experience and integrate with the reality of the research and then build the method.

For this reason, the new mindset gives scientific research not only a new form of thought, but also multiple and diverse paths to develop it. New rationality delves into the new science not only by unexplored trails, but also in a new way of thinking, seeing and feeling the research. It recreates a state of new awareness of methodological processes, so that the methodological dimension will undergo changes, providing new and amazing science ways of approaching realities, allowing them to understand them better; that is, more experiential and original new ways to understand experiencing, to integrate to the reality in an exploratory way, previous and preliminary to any methodological construction.
From this perspective, educational thinkers consider that the methodological processes of scientific research are always previously more a praxis where scientific creation is essential; that is, they are a philosophical-experiential exercise of epistemological and ontological appropriation of the realities of scientific reflection. For this reason, the method is understood as an exercise of scientific creation, never of copying or imposing that adjusts to the nature of the reality object of the experiences and thoughts of the scientific researcher.

The method, as a scientific creation, is a profound epistemological and ontological reflection. It is a necessary incarnation between the researcher and the reality of scientific reflection whose result is a particularly non-definitive to fit research processes and meaningful knowledge. Thus, the method is important, as it is a scientific construction, because it links the characteristics, conditions, context, and all the particular elements of the reality and intentions of the actors involved in the particular process of the study carried out.

The scientific processes within the research are fundamental, and must be taken into account, but they cannot emerge from a “cooking recipe”, nor be an artificially constructed formula. In a research, methodological processes have to be consistent, fit and linked to the reality that the scientific actors involved are experiencing in the preliminary stage. These, after having felt and experienced with all the senses, decide how they will unravel, to reveal and to make known.

Therefore, the methodological dimension is a dependent dimension and linked to the triad of onto-antrum-epistemological dimensions, that is, the experiences, the experience and the discernment that the scientific researchers make of the reality. There is a concomitant linkage between the philosophical dimensions of research in thinking about how research; that is, the experiences of researchers and the method are always united, where the first are the reason for this; the methodological dimension of research is linked to the ontological dimension.

In this sense, the methodology can no longer be seen as a constraint, as an obstacle laden with procedures of scientific legitimation, which mention the limits, and violating them would constitute a veto. On the contrary, the methodology is a genuine scientific creation that contributes to broadening what were the preliminary processes of the experiences and understanding of the reality of scientific study. It must serve to imbue itself even more within it, where one is immersed to penetrate on it; to live it, to experience it, to feel it, to enjoy it. Then, the method becomes meaningful as a scientific creation, as a consubstantiality practice with the reality of study.
This would be a breakthrough, since creativity, as an axiomatic exercise, and not an invention of the imagination or manipulation of reality, has been taken out from scientific research. Scientific creativity has been a deficiency. Therefore, scientific creativity in its genuine sense must be present to rescue what is obvious in the old mindset and must be obtained from the new, which is nothing other than methodological complementarity. The excesses of the instrumental logic, in the name of the scientific objectivity, cracked the reality and the person, to the point of separating them to study them, which led to a separation and rupture of the science. In this order of ideas, recovering creativity can be a reason to build a path between human sciences and the objective sciences, based on praxis of methodological complementarity.

From this perspective, the educational thinkers consider that the scientific creativity comes to be formed like an exercise and a necessary virtue of the new scientific logic, opening it to an infinite range of epistemological and Methodological paths. Creativity cannot be ignored, is a basic component of the methodological processes of research, as it constitutes a philosophical rationalization exercise of research as it allows to transcend the excessive objectivist, looking in all possible ways more reflective research processes that make of these an experience marked by the methodological weighting and not by the simple artificial imposition. In addition, creativity as a scientific virtue provides the researcher the possibility of breaking the scission discourse, which has caused so many problems by introducing scientific experiences within the dynamics of a new integrationist language of the visions of science.

Scientific creativity establishes the balance between rigorousness and methodological flexibility, adding to the methodological research dimension a new meaning to its scientific sense, thus avoiding any risk of methodological debauchery.

Final considerations

Systematized experiences see in the new thought metaphor that a philosophical and educational shift is brewing from the comprehension and application of the scientific educational research processes. The science of the future must be closer, more incarnated to emerge new and diverse ways of reading and pronouncing the universe, that is, to experience it, to understand it and to communicate it.
The research finds an epistemological rethinking of its praxis in the ontology and the anthropology, the work and the scientific concern delves into the discovery of the sources that produce the investigation. It is from the life experiences that the person experiences his/her relationship with the world and the meaning that gives to these constitutes the new horizon of the science work. Now, the relationship of the researcher with the researched, the researcher with the world and the world with the researcher, is an indissoluble unit. Science is founded on the vital truth of man, which emerges from the world of life and is irreducible to scientific rationality.

Scientific concern is neither the subject nor the world-object, but the world lived by the subject. Science becomes phenomenology, which recovers with subjectivity the onto-epistemological research value, returns it to its sources and to its original spirit. Methodolatry is no longer the way out for research with significant knowledge (Feyerabend, 1970).

Scientific research becomes phenomenological praxis and radical subjectivity (Marías, 1999), in a twist that repositions science in its original position. It is decentered of the a priori of the modern science, posing a philosophical and scientific shift to find its sense and its new work in transcendental subjectivity, as a metaphysical capacity of the knowledge of the factual being, of its worldliness (Heidegger, 1972). Thus, subjectivity is a way of knowing a methodological path, of doing science, which reintegrates it to its loss perspective, the Human (Gajate, 2003).

From subjectivity, scientific problems are addressed within its global sense and complexity. Subjectivity is constituted in a radical questioning of the classical ontology, attacking its fundamental line: the structuring of the reality around the subject-object excision. Thus, the problem of knowledge is ontological and linguistic, not just gnoseologic.

The scientific processes become more incarnated, focused on the world of life as they are lived, decentralizing the investigation of the objectivist vision that dissociates the researcher from the reality that is object of thought. The scientific question focuses its attention on the problem of human existence, in the onto-anthropological character, that is, the Dasein, the being-there and not the Weseinser-out of itself (Salcedo, 2011), the person is a dynamic being that is able to manifest and understand the self.

It gives way to the language of phenomenological communication, with linguistic and renewed thought categories. The new science is the objectivation of the subjectivity language, of vital and everyday knowledge. The scientific research finds the way of the content description that structure the meaning of the existence, of the objectification of life, of the incarnated spirit.
Research becomes a hermeneutical phenomenology, that is, a hermeneutic of the language comprehension of human life in its worldliness and facticity (Heidegger, 1972). It is the basis of meaningful, existential, everyday knowledge and wisdom, as objectivity of being (Salcedo, 2011).

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Abstract

This research will analyze “the end of history,” which originated in Kojève’s interpretation of the philosophy of history proposed by Hegel and was finally completed and reformulated by Fukuyama. The paper analyses the main contributions of these three thinkers in the construction of this category, with their respective repercussions in the real world, and establishes a relationship between the approaches of Fukuyama and the protophilosophy of Augustinian history. After elaborating the framework about the end of history, the paper presents the criticisms made by Butler and Cadahia about their roles as mechanisms of domination over all anthropological machinery and posthistory. Finally, it presents some reflexions about framework of the sujexion in order to apply this on education. For this reason, I will establish a dialogue between two authors, Foucault and Freire, and I will use opposing arguments about currently education. The genealogical methodology enables an understanding of the beginning of school as we know it today, taking into account its conditions of possibility within a specific power structure. In this sense, sujexion will be fundamental in the current educational subject that will find himself overwhelmed, and this crisis will force them to choose between hope or sujexion.

Keywords

History, philosophy, school, education, hope.

Subjection in the educational landscape after the “end of history”
La sujeción en el panorama educativo después del “fin de la historia”

Resumen
El presente trabajo parte del análisis sobre el fin de la historia, que tiene su origen en la interpretación que realiza Kojève de la filosofía de la historia de Hegel, que será continuada y reformulada por Fukuyama. Se examinarán los principales aportes de estos tres pensadores en la construcción de esta categoría con su respectiva repercusión en el mundo actual, develando una relación invisibilizada entre los planteamientos de este último y la protofilosofía de la historia agustiniana. Una vez elaborado el marco de referencia del fin de la historia se presentarán las críticas realizadas por Butler y Cadahia sobre el papel que juegan como mecanismos de dominación sobre toda una maquinaria antropológica denominada posthistoria. Posteriormente, se reflexionará en torno al marco de la sujeción anterior, enfatizando en sus implicaciones dentro del campo educativo. Para ello se dialogará con dos autores, en principio, contrapuestos, Foucault y Freire, en disputa por el presente de la educación. La metodología genealógica permitirá visibilizar el comienzo de la escuela tal y como se la conoce en la actualidad atendiendo a sus condiciones de posibilidad concretas dentro de un entramado de poderes determinados. En este sentido, la sujeción jugará un papel fundamental en la conformación de un sujeto educativo contemporáneo que se verá desbordado y será precisamente en esta crisis donde existirá una posibilidad de elección: esperanza o sujeción.

Palabras clave
História, filosofía, escuela, educación, esperanza.

Introduction
The present work is divided into two sections. The main goal of the first section is to identify the relationship between Hegel’s philosophy of history and the concept of the end of history, initially posited by Kojève (2013) and furthered, disseminated and consolidated more recently by Fukuyama (1992), with its respective impact on the contemporary world in different spheres.

In the first place, it is necessary to briefly characterize the philosophy of history in Hegel. In this sense, and given the extension of this work, only his most significant contributions will be synthesized. These, according to the author, are freedom and the relationship between history and historian translated into subject-object, following the dialectical methodology implemented by Hegel, leading to a brief reflection on its implications in what Kojève (2013) later called the end of history.

Subsequently, Kojève’s interpretation (1992) will be analyzed, evidencing the originality of his thoughts in his attempt to interpret Hegel, where two fundamental aspects stand out: the first is the end of history and the second is the role of freedom in this outcome. For him, in the dialectic of the master and the slave, there is a supposed liberation through work. However, with the help of Cadahia (2012) and Butler (2001), it will be demonstrated that what emerges is a form of self-enslavement, a form of servile consciousness backed by an entire anthropological machinery. In addition, the article presents the way in which Kojève’s interpretation (2013) was a
clear precedent for the liberal reading that Fukuyama (1992) will later make about the end of history. As a result of this relationship, an attempt will be made to map an unconfessed relationship between the American and the protophilosophy of history proposed by St. Augustine of Hippo.

Next, the paper will analyze the discourse elaborated by Fukuyama (1992), revealing how Kojève (2013) interpretation for the service of liberal democracy, alluding to the authority of Hegel, and making statements about the end of history related to the geopolitics of their time, which have marked contemporary thinking in one way or another. In this sense, their liberal approaches and the reasons for their supposed success will be analyzed, to the point of being considered as the place of arrival of universal history and marking the beginning of what will be known as posthistory.

The article will highlight how the end of history and the consequent construction of post-history were used in the field of biopower for domination, executed through liberal market democracy, where there is a management of political life mediated through mechanisms and strategies of domination evidenced by Cadahia (2012) and Buttler (2001) through a genealogical methodology.

The second part, following the same methodology, will reflect on the current educational work on the basis of the previous statements made about subjection. Two a priori confronted authors, Foucault (2003) and Freire (1993), will be discussed. Once closer to the horizon of reflection of both, it is necessary to contextualize education in the contemporary era in order to analyze its role in society.

Both authors present totally opposed visions regarding educational reality. It is worth mentioning that Foucault, despite reflecting and naming the school in several of his books, never carried out a systematic work on it. It is therefore necessary to say that this analysis of education emphasizes above all the methodology used by the author: genealogy. Freire, on the other hand, does reflect on education, it being, in fact, the backbone of his work.

**Hegel’s Philosophy of history**

The author agrees with Salvador Rus (2005) in thinking that history is fundamental in the construction of Hegelian thought, specifically of his philosophical system. In the first place, it is necessary to consider that Hegel conceives of history as the realization of freedom, and his proposal is a thinking philosophy of history, considering that this is not transcen-
dent but immanent. In addition, it is important not to ignore that Hegelian philosophy is a complex system that encompasses many dimensions. The present article covers only some implications about his philosophy of history, without trying to cover the entire complex Hegelian system.

One of the texts that can be fundamental when approaching the philosophy of history in Hegel, according to Rus (2005), is Lessons on the philosophy of history where the author “reflected deeply on the historical reality in which he lived and tried to understand” (p. 28). In this sense, it is fundamental to consider that the author tried to explain history from its origins to the moment he was in, in other words “to understand everything that appeared before his eyes and to integrate it within a philosophical system of his own” (p. 28). It is fundamental to consider the author’s context in order to understand his work, and in Hegel it is particularly important when there is a clear intention to act in his time. In this sense, Napoleon and his historical performance are fundamental within this historical thought.

It is necessary to understand the Hegelian thought to use his method par excellence, dialectics in a speculative sense. Therefore, it is key to clarify that dialectics is understood not as a totalizing system that does not give rise to differences, but rather as Aufhebung, which Reale & Antiseri (1988) define as “the speculative moment, an overcoming in the sense that at the same time it means to suppress and preserve” (p. 113). In other words, the terms A and B are born at the same time, there is something of A in B and something of B in A. A crack appears where there is a cancellation and a conservation, a contamination of both.

As already mentioned, for Hegel the evolution of history is seen as a development of freedom. Thus, universal history, citing Rus (2005), is a “set of phases or historical epochs that are happening temporarily and dialectically in a progressive advance to the establishment of the State, the only way in which individuals live in full freedom” (p. 33). In this way, Hegel develops a type of historical route that goes from East to his Germanic world, going through classic Greece and the Roman world. In the last stage, nations “have come to the awareness that man is free as a man and that everyone is born to be free” (p. 35). It is important to mention that at this point we do not talk about the end of history, but many subsequent readings have seen the logical need to place this notion here. As Reale & Antiseri (1988) put it:

Is history destined to stop in the Christian-Germanic phase? Does the historical dialectic stop its advance at a given moment? This is what should be deduced from Hegel’s words, contrary to what the principles of the dialectic itself would necessarily demand. It is a serious aporia that will also have an impact on Marx’s conception of history (p. 150).
The Hegelian philosophy of history starts from historical facts which are a fundamental part, its raw material, but it goes beyond them. His vision is rational, because reason will be what will allow us to see how the world has evolved. This can be better understood. As Rus (2005) states, knowing the “three different types of writing and making history” (p. 38), the author will present a retrospective view of how history has been made before him and he will want to overcome all these positions using a dialectical methodology. For Hegel, there are three possible types of history that are original, reflective and thinking. All of them can be understood from the relationship between subject-object that will also mark the role of freedom in each of them.

The first, the original history, is characterized by being the most primitive. It has a necessary starting point, but it is insufficient. In this type of history, historians are mere witnesses of what happens, describe in first person what they have lived and experienced, with clear similarities with the Spanish chroniclers. In this sense, they are not able to take distance from what they have lived, go beyond it. They are part of what happens. Their role is insufficient, since there is no work mediated by reason in history, “the spirit in which the historian writes the original story is the same with which he confronts the actions” (p. 39). Here there is a subordination of facts to thought. Freedom is not possible because there is no mediation of reason, subject and object are identified. The historian is one with history, therefore, the development of freedom cannot occur.

Reflective history begins to work from understanding. Therefore, it is possible to go beyond what is present in the historian himself whenever there is a kind of reflection. However, here the subject looks at the object as already given. In other words, a kind of dualism appears between object and subject, they are independent of each other. In this sense, the historian takes on the role of spectator, “it is a history of history” (p. 40). Within this type of history Hegel builds a series of subcategories, in which a pedagogical and moral sense of history can begin to be visualized, because this would be a place of learning that serves to avoid committing the same errors of the past in the present and future. It is important to consider that this is not necessarily so, because knowing the mistakes of the past does not guarantee that they are not committed again. Contemporary history shows this.

Relating this to the issue of freedom, it can be said that it is found in the self, in the subject in full freedom. This is still insufficient because freedom does not develop fully because the subject does not intervene in history due to the existing subject-object duality. Therefore, the move-
ment of thought that creates the absolute and leads to freedom does not arise. The historian sees history as something given in which he cannot intervene or transform, therefore, freedom cannot develop either.

Finally, there is the thinking history. Here, the historian takes the role of philosopher and therefore performs a process of dialectical synthesis between immediacy and distance, to “show how the spirit evolves in time and materializes in space” (p. 42). An Aufhebung is produced. There is an awareness of the immediacy of the thing, but as it is insufficient, a work of distancing is necessary, that is, there is a reflexive distance with the object. The Aufhebung gives rise to this thinking consideration of history, where history and reason must be linked, because reason itself is born in history. This link allows us to think about the development of freedom, because it is not a given principle in the self but is made in history.

Freedom is understood as synthesis. History can be understood by understanding the game of distancing and immediacy and the mutual participation of the subject and the object, because history can be transformed, and freedom can be developed in it. In this sense subject and object are contaminated, historian and history contaminate one another, and freedom can be cultivated. There is no longer an identification or a dualism, but a dialectical game where the absolute appears and therefore the possibility of freedom to transform history.

In this sense, after briefly appreciating some important points of the philosophy of history within Hegelian thought, it can be seen that the German philosopher, as already mentioned, does not seem to allude to an end of history. In fact, as Anderson (1992) puts it, “it is difficult to find a similar phrase in his texts,” but then we must add that “the logic of Hegel’s system as a whole requires it practically as a conclusion, as there is no doubt about the existence of sufficient evidence to think that he assumes it in various contributions of his work” (p. 17).

Therefore, it can be said that Hegel never proposed the end of history in those terms, but it did inspire these readings or deductions in authors such as Kojève who properly raises the purpose of l’histoire as an original contribution as will be seen below.

The end of history in Kojève’s interpretation

The most repeated idea by Kojève (2013) in his book Introduction to Reading of Hegel is that “Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit is history understood as having come to its end.” In this sense, this book represents
the completion of the human essence on two sides. The first is the “active development of this essence”, and the second, as Jiménez (2013) explains, “the contemplative development of its own self-understanding” (p. 9).

It is interesting to observe here that Kojève, when trying to explain Hegelian thought, comes to something new. In this sense his interpretation is unsuccessful. However, he contributes completely original and lucid ideas. As Cadahia (2012) points out, “through the mask of Hegel he exposed his own thought” (p. 164). And his contributions are extremely important, for example, his ideas regarding the dialectic of the master and the slave.

For Jimenez (2013), in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Kojève sees the self-understanding of history at the moment it closes, where man is understood as a man, this is like a historical being that is consummated and ends. This historically finished man is the free and recognized human being, a synthesis of the universal and the particular.

*The Phenomenology of Spirit* is, for Kojève (2013), a phenomenological description of human existence, that is to say, it is described as it appears or manifests to the person who lives it. The part that concerns the present analysis can be seen clearly when Kojève presents subdivision C of Chapter VI, which discusses the post-revolutionary State, that is the Napoleonic Empire, where it clearly states that “we are at the end of history” (p. 190).

For Kojève (2013), Hegel thinks of the Napoleonic empire as a total or definitive reality. In fact, it is a universal and homogeneous State that unites the whole of humanity and suppresses differences within itself, which is why it is impossible for wars or revolutions to exist, because “the State will no longer be modified, it will remain eternally identical with itself” (p. 191). This will also imply that man will not change either and nature will always be finished, “therefore, the science that correctly and completely describes the Napoleonic World will continue to be totally valid forever” (p. 191).

Napoleon cannot be absent from Hegel’s reflection. He is the citizen of the universal and homogenous State, that is, the full and satisfied man. The French, as a man within the framework of Hegelian thought, is satisfied with the State that he has created, he is the citizen who “offers his work, knows what he does and does nothing but what he knows; therefore, there is an absolute coincidence between Will and Knowledge” (p. 193). In this way, Napoleon rises above the *Sein* and is truly present in the World. Making an analogy with Christianity, Kojève (2013) says that, if Napoleon is the revealed God, Hegel is the one who reveals it.
According to Cadahia (2012) Kojève takes a clear position in his reading. This, more than a literal interpretation, is a rereading from his context “from the thirties and forties of the last century” (p. 164). Later on, the implications of these new contributions in the contemporary world and in the conformation of posthistory will be seen in more detail. Before this, it is necessary to make visible how this vision in favor of liberal democracy is used in the statements made by Fukuyama (1992) starting from, although not limited to, a transcendental historical fact: the end of the Cold War.

Fukuyama’s end of history

Fukuyama’s *The End of History* of (1992) is probably one of the most influential works in the field of politics due to all the implications it has had and continues to have. This author raises a controversial thesis that would assume that liberalism and its corresponding democratic application are nothing less than the best way to embody a system of government, and this is demonstrated by its ability, according to the author, to overcome rival ideologies such as communism, as the main opponent, in addition to fascism and hereditary monarchies. The American goes even further and states that “liberal democracy could be the final point of the ideological evolution of humanity and the final form of government, and as such would mark the end of history” (p.11).

To talk about the end of history, Fukuyama (1992) relies on Hegel, repeatedly appealing to his authority. However, as seen above, it was Kojève (2013) who raised this idea, because Hegel never speaks of the end of history, but rather of a goal as proposed by Anderson (1992):

Hegel almost never speaks of Ende (end) or Schluii (conclusion), but refers to Ziel (goal), Zweck (finality) or Resultat (result). The reason is very simple: in German there is no word that combines the two senses of the word “end” in English (or in Spanish): on the one hand the final part, on the other a purpose. Hegel was especially interested in the second of these meanings (p. 19).

Liberalism as a system of government, for Fukuyama (1992), is free of internal contradictions and this is what has made it, among other reasons, a great success, in contrast to the other political ideologies that have been characterized by serious defects and irrationalities, which can be seen when observing their collapse in practice. However, the author is aware that liberalism has produced flaws in basic principles such as
justice, which, from his perspective, are products of an incomplete application of the principles of equality and freedom. Note that for Fukuyama (1992) there is, therefore, no incoherence in liberal democracy per se, but in its application.

The controversial ideas previously raised by Fukuyama (1992) had an immediate reaction that the author himself could verify. Critics are oriented around the fact that, in the first place, history has no purpose because history itself is not “directional, oriented and coherent” (p. 13). The American states, for his part, that this is because today’s society is extremely pessimistic, and this is due, in large part, to the two devastating world wars that took place in the first half of the 20th century.

What was found is that science was used for war and desolation, people witnessed the rise of atrocious totalitarian regimes, the destruction of the environment, in other words, man against man. For Fukuyama (1992) this, evidently, was not the fault of liberalism, but of the fact that human beings have developed a supposed pessimism that does not let us see the good things that history brings us, like liberal democracy. One cannot help but see traces of the vision of history as determined and guided by providence as stated by Saint Augustine.

One of the premises of economic liberalism is found in the free market, which Fukuyama (1992) sees with optimism as being responsible for “producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity” (p. 14). However, in the face of these assertions Cadahia (2012) asks “if the liberal democratic state has triumphed over the other ideologies, why do the conflicts persist?” (p. 173) This is where the end-of-history construct and its corresponding posthistory come in, as there would be some countries that reached the light, understood as the liberal market democracy, and other countries that are still in the dark trying to reach this goal: “The world would be divided between a part that would still be historical and a part that would already be post-historical” (p. 173).

It can be clearly seen that Fukuyama (1992) puts Hegel’s thought, and unknowingly that of Kojève (2013), at the service of liberalism and with it the new world order, “makes the rise of liberal capitalism the place where all the contradictions of history come to be resolved” (Cadahia, 2012, p. 173). Many contemporary discourses rely heavily on Fukuyama’s approach, which permeates the social imaginary.

The discourse of Fukuyama (1992), to his regret, does not follow the Hegelian approaches, because in many aspects they are totally distorted. For example, Cadahia (2012) states, it reverses “the role attributed by Hegel to civil society and the State” (p. 173). Within the framework of
liberal thinking, the individual prevails over the social, and this is not in accordance with Hegelian thought, because in it, the State aims to “regulate the gap between misery and wealth” (p. 174).

The end of the Cold War seemed to agree with Fukuyama and allowed the fiction of an irrefutable triumph of democratic liberalism to consolidate. However, now the landscape has changed, as manifested by Cadahia (2012) and “the emergence of new economic superpowers seems to endanger the existing order” (pp. 174-175). In this sense, there is a return to history, as Kagan (2008) argues when stating that “history has returned, and democracies must unite to give shape to it, otherwise others will do for them” (p. 3). For assuming a thinking vision of the philosophy of history, human beings can and should intervene in history, as it it’s not predetermined as the Augustinian heritage has led us to believe.

Saint Augustine and the end of history

As already mentioned, Fukuyama (1992) relies on the authority of Hegel to propose the end of history with its great geopolitical burden. However, this thesis is linked much more with Kojève (2013) and, in the author’s opinion, there is an unconfessed relationship with Saint Augustine. The historical vision of Christianity raises a theology based on a purpose, which for this religion would be salvation. This implies several things, including a directionality and linearity of history.

We must begin by making visible that the work The City of God Against the Pagans by Saint Augustine is not a mere theological treatise. In fact, its subtitle already demonstrates that this work has a clear political character. Contextualizing this work, it must be said that it was written in response to the crisis of Christianity that resulted from the invasion of the Roman Empire, as Ramos (2008) puts it: “St. Augustine’s reflection on the events that he has to live” (p. 4). The apparently invincible Rome was conquered and plundered, as Montes (1994) reminds us “the Eternal City had to confess to being mortal” (p. 2).

Saint Augustine is in a dispute with the pagans regarding the significance of the Roman Empire. God gave the power to Rome to become an empire, God decided so, the cause of the power of the Roman Empire is given by the Christian religion. Therefore, the task of his work is to justify and dispel the questions raised against the Christian religion resulting from the fall of Rome: “his thought is doubly eschatological” (p. 5).
One of the fundamental implications of this work is the linear vision of history that is imprinted, in contrast to the circular vision of the Greeks. For Saint Augustine (1994) it is Divine Providence, understood as the will of God, which guides and “establishes the human kingdoms” (p. 2). The main point of interest in his work is the distinction of two types of cities: the city of men, the earthly, as opposed to the city of God, the heavenly. In this sense, a duplication of the notion of history is generated. There is a profane history and on the other hand a sacred history, “He is the one who gives happiness, proper to the kingdom of heaven, only to religious men. On the other hand, the kingdom of Earth is distributed to the religious and the wicked, as it pleases Him” (p. 34). The celestial city can be seen in the mundane city at certain times.

For all the above, it will be Saint Augustine (1994) who lays the foundation for an idea of progress in earthly history. And the approaches of Fukuyama (1992) seem to focus on the inheritance of this theological teleological tradition rather than on the contributions of Hegel as he states in his work. This meta-narrative will be constituted as a mechanism of domination in the contemporary world.

**Domination and the end of history**

The end of history has marked the matrix of contemporary thought. This includes the discursive matrices of domination. It is therefore necessary, according to Cadahia (2012), to “think about the contemporary biopolitical experience in a post-historical key” (p. 163). For this it is fundamental to consider the discourses laid out earlier regarding the end of history by Kojève (2013) and Fukuyama (1992), who laid some of the bases for this to occur.

For Cadahia (2012), Kojève’s end of history is marked by the post-revolutionary State, which is characterized by being homogeneous and universal, where man himself “disappears, being progressively replaced by the animal of the Homo sapiens species” (p. 165). Cadahia (2012), following Bataille, does not agree with this statement, and comments that “although we have entered posthistory, there still survives a sacred remain, understood as a negativity not presently employed in the forms of art, eroticism and laughter” (p. 168). Kojève’s position will cause him problems and he will end up approaching Bataille’s position as Cadahia (2012) points out: “his trip to Japan will help him get away from this belief” (p. 169).
Agamben (2002) will also reflect on the end of history, specifically on man, whom he considers as “a field of dialectical tensions already cut by caesuras that always separate in him—at least virtually—the anthropopharous animality and the humanity that he incarnates in it” (p. 28). This, says Cadahia (2012), leads to the problem of “the body of the servant as an object of biopower” (p. 175). As a logical consequence of the end of history, post-history will appear, and humanity will enter it taking control of the management of this animality posed by Agamben, through three different figures, which are “the genome, the global economy and humanitarian management” (p. 175).

The aforementioned figures allow controlling or enabling the management of the animal. In this sense, the proposal made by Agamben and rescued by Cadahia (2012) is to rethink the anthropological machinery that makes this possible, “the relationship of differentiation and articulation between the human and animal, the result of an anthropological machinery that permeates all Western culture” (p. 176). However, the attempt to dissolve the anthropological machinery is not successful because, as Cadahia warns, “it only manages to stop the anthropological machinery that it criticizes through the configuration of another anthropological machinery” (2012, p. 177). It is interesting to appreciate the path that Agamben (2002) makes with the identification of the myths on which the possibility of animality management is built, especially the one that allows to differentiate the animal from the human, which is what the author ends up denying.

The end of history, according to Cadahia (2012), in principle seems to have two possible outcomes for the human being. On the one hand, to choose the satisfied slave form and thereby alienate himself under capitalism, or to be unsatisfied slaves “eclipsed by the speech of the master and his tale of the end of history” (p. 179). Cadahia (2012), like Butler (2001), regarding Foucauldian thought, warn that Kojève’s interpretation of the possible liberation of man through work is not enough because it is no longer a case of external enslavement, but rather self-enslavement: “Foucault has pointed out that the object of modern politics is not to free the subject, but rather to inquire into the regulatory mechanisms through which subjects are produced and maintained” (p. 44). In this sense, what exists, as Cadahia (2012) sees it, is “a movement of false liberation that cannot escape the limits of a supposed working essence or subjectivity, self-imposed to a certain extent by the master for whom the slave transforms the object” (p. 180).
From the above it follows that there is some optimism in the interpretation of Kojève (2013) to think that man only needs work to be free, because there are at least two moments for this to happen, as Cadahia (2012) recalls, “one linked with the subject and another linked with subjectivation” (p. 180). The same author identifies the irony of history in which these two moments have coincided in the servile consciousness, which Butler (2001) also studies in her reading on Hegel from a different perspective.

**Subject formed in subjection**

Generally, when power is understood as a form of domination, it is customary to think, as Butler (2001) recalls, of “power as something that exerts pressure on the subject from the outside, something that subordinates, places below and relegates to a lower order” (p. 12). Thanks to Foucauldian contributions (2003) it is known that power or, specifically, domination is not only external to the subject, but is something that forms or constitutes the very subject. For example, chapter three called *Discipline* shows how the “methods that allow the meticulous control of the body’s operations, which guarantee the constant subjection of its forces and impose a docility-utility relationship” (p. 141). However, it was Butler (2001) who masterfully complemented this theory with her interpretation of the hapless consciousness of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*. From it, she clarifies how the subject is formed in subordination, that is, the problem of subjection.

To contextualize Butler’s contributions (2001) it is essential to briefly recall the transition of the sections *Master and Servant* and *The freedom of self-consciousness* from Hegel’s aforementioned book. In these chapters the figures of the slave and the master are already visible, where the former appears as “an instrumental body whose work provides the master with the material conditions of his existence and whose material products reflect both his subordination” (p. 47) and the corresponding domination of the master. In the traditional interpretations it is through work that the slave would obtain a supposed liberation or autonomy from which Butler distances herself.

The division between master and slave is given at first by the life or death confrontation by which the slave agrees to become the master’s body due to the absolute fear of dying, because “the strategy of domination was to replace the fight to life or death” (p. 53). At the end of the section the slave, realizing his formative capacity, becomes master of him-
self, however, at a great cost of the emergence of the so-called unhappy consciousness.

Unhappy consciousness continues to be a form of servitude, no longer imposed from the outside by the master, but from within the very subject, meaning “the subject is subordinated to the norms and these are subjectivating, that is, they confer ethical form to the reflexivity of the emerging subject” (p. 54). In other words, the master is no longer outside of us, he is now within us.

Both Butler (2001) and Cadahia (2012), from different perspectives, see a possible path of exploration through which it would be possible to overcome this servile consciousness, this self-enslavement, because “the foucaultian ethical-political subject, converted into object/subject of the devices of power and resistance, remains firmly placed in the terrain of history and in the possibility of its transformation” (p. 181). In this same sense, speaking of the psychic mechanisms of power, “suppression not only leads to its opposite [...] but in more contemporary formulations leads to define the subject as an institution that overflows the dialectical framework that generates it” (p. 68).

The previous reflections in this sense are not pessimistic, but they do show a complex web of power relations to which Foucault himself did not give a clear and convincing exit. As Zizek (2001) reminds us, by recognizing the continuity of the resistance and power, he also tacitly accepts that “it is not enough as a basis for an effective resistance, a resistance that is not ‘part of the game’ but allows the subject to assume a position outside the disciplinary/confessional” (p. 267). Zizek accuses Foucault of forgetting a key concept to think about the subject, that of antagonism: “from the production of a surplus of resistance, the intrinsic antagonism of a system can very well set in motion a process that leads to its final collapse” (p. 273).

Cadahia and Butler, from different perspectives, argue that a thinking philosophy of history, united with the consideration that there is a dialectical relationship between power and freedom, allow us to be aware that it is possible to transform history and resist domination strategies and even subvert them. Now, from the educational field, what is the relationship between it and the subject?

**Education and subjection**

Education as knowledge constitutes certain institutions that in turn legitimate a type of discursive framework from which a type of subject
emerges, in this case, the student that must be educated. As is generally known, the microphysics of power show how normalized and docile subjects are produced through various institutions.

According to Ball (1990), Foucault, “never devoted to education a systematic and finished work, but he refers to pedagogies, educational systems, examination devices” (p. 14). One of the fundamental theses that can be deduced through his contributions is that “schools, like prisons and asylums, are fundamentally concerned with moral and social regulation” (p. 18). Formal education is constituted as an enormous machinery that is able to objectify the subjects through different classification and division processes, using diverse techniques, among which the examination stands out. In this way, identities and subjectivities are built that are “central to the organizational processes of education in our society” (p. 8). In addition, it is important to mention that the teacher is the one who has all the authority and is able to dominate the student from diverse practices such as punishments, rewards or reinforcements. These practices mold students into a kind of necessary submissive subject that, in the sixteenth century, was a factory worker.

School, like prison, is built on the basis of different discourses that constitute what can be said and thought, creating relations of power and subjectivities. One of the fundamental elements is the knowledge of the so-called Educational Sciences, “dividing practices are critically interconnected with the formation and the increasingly complex elaboration of the sciences of education: educational psychology, pedagogy, sociology of education, cognitive and evolutionary psychology” (p. 8). At present, these disciplines have consolidated while simultaneously trying to maintain their epistemological status, they have even been nourished by a set of emerging knowledge from different areas. From the authority of these disciplines the school is naturalized as an institution that reproduces inequalities.

In addition to the exams, prizes, punishments, reinforcements and knowledge that legitimize education, it is possible to inquire about such important characters as the teacher and his role in education. This figure is awarded the category of bioteacher, moving away from “a gross and mechanical discipline” (p. 76) due to the criticisms received. However, new strategies were sought based on “the new truths of medicine and psychology” (p. 77). In this way, the teacher gradually becomes a kind of professional similar to the doctor as a standardization agent, since he is able to almost “diagnose” and “cure” the students.

The school would have its origin in the sixteenth century machinery, where the foundations of the institution that is known today
are based. It is extremely important to point out the aspects that have been consolidated for the existence of formal education of children and adolescents proposed by Varela and Álvarez (1991): the definition of a childhood statute; the emergence of a specific space for the education of children; the emergence of a body of childhood specialists endowed with specific technologies and “elaborate” theoretical codes; the destruction of other modes of education and finally the actual institutionalization of the school: the imposition of compulsory school decreed by public authorities and sanctioned by law.

It can be clearly seen that all the previous elements have had to conform so that the idea of school appears and with it its naturalization, “archaeological search with the purpose of exposing the sociopolitical foundations on which the genesis of the school is based. compulsory primary education” (p. 175). The success of the above can be seen today because in the social imaginary there is a notion of a Kantian child and adolescent (2004) who has to look for the “exit of the minority” (p. 92) with all that it implies.

The school, as it is known, emerged as a space of civilization for the child worker. In addition, the process of normalization suffered by the school is strongly questioned and, according to Varela and Álvarez (1991), “is seen more and more as a natural process” (p. 175). It can be said that the school is constituted as a fundamental element of all societies and, despite numerous criticisms, a necessary element for the assurance of the future. It is important to analyze one of the forms of knowledge that legitimizes it, pedagogy, born from the contributions of Kant, within a current that can be called German idealism.

The emergence of pedagogy

It is necessary to turn back to the end of the 18th century and the 19th century, specifically to the tradition of German philosophy that plays a fundamental role in shaping what is called pedagogy today. From its roots, two different visions appear, as Vázquez (2012) recalls: on the one hand, there is the inheritance of Herbart with its scientific-mechanistic vision and, on the other hand, the one cultivated by the historicist philosophy of Dilthey. From these two philosophies, two paths for pedagogy can be distinguished: “normative pedagogy represented by neo-Kantian authors, such as Natorp and others of Christian inspiration, such as Henz and F. März, and that of empirical pedagogy” (p. 8).
For normative pedagogy this discipline is undoubtedly a science because it would be supported or closely linked to ethics and psychology, both concerned by what Kant would call practical reason understood as “autonomous in the Kantian way, whether illuminated by Christian revelation” (p. 8). From this point, the historical vision of education as a good act, or a must be, where ethics plays a fundamental role is revealed. Psychology in turn is responsible for legitimizing the students’ behaviors in some way.

On the other hand, the historicist line will take shape with the educational contributions of Scheleimarcher for whom ethics is not universal but responds to “social-historical conditions” (p. 8). Here the approaches are oriented to a formation of young people by the elderly, as education is a historical process of formation of successive generations.

The two previous cases show a factor common to both lines, where Kantian reason plays a fundamental role because “philosophy and pedagogy are at the root of reason and its scope, as proposed by Kant” (p. 9). It is not surprising that until now the search for knowledge on a purely rational basis is still valid. Numerous authors have criticized that in the curricular meshes, for example, it is strange to find disciplines such as art, music or physical education. If they do appear, they are less important than other areas, where creativity has traditionally not played a significant role.

The nomination of pedagogy corresponds to the now classic division between Natural Sciences and Sciences of the Spirit. For Dilthey, obviously pedagogy will be in this last group because “education is not properly a technical task, nor is it a matter of enabling growth, but rather of introducing the learner into the world of meaning, of values, of having to be” (p. 10). In addition, he adds to the hermeneutic approach by stating that what is proper to education is understanding and not explaining, which would be typical of natural sciences. This tendency would dominate pedagogy until the sixties and seventies coinciding with the criticism of German philosophy and its instrumental reason. It is important to mention that the name of Educational Sciences has a different genealogy, which in itself deserves a more detailed analysis linked to a scientific vision, as stated by Higuera (2013), leading to: “A large number of people in the West recognize as truth only that which is based on scientific facts” (p. 24).

The Frankfurt School, following Vázquez (2012), was the one to include a dimension aside from pedagogy. In this way, “they propose a concept of education, as a work of emancipation and for pedagogy [...] critical hermeneutics focused on the reflection on the social conditions in which education develops” (p. 10). In this way the educational process does not occur in a decontextualized space, but rather responds to a time...
and a space. Even today, the central idea of emancipation as a fundamental object of education is still very much in force. In a way, educating for being can lead to a certain type of indoctrination, and it is precisely the risk that these thinkers were able to identify.

In Latin America there were also questions about a type of education that Brazilian Paulo Freire (1984) called banking education. Instead he proposes a pedagogy of the oppressed that seeks a liberation and that has hope as a fundamental category:

While in the domesticating practice the educator is always the educator of the student, in the liberating practice, on the other hand, the educator must “die” as the exclusive educator of the student, in order to “be reborn” as the student of his student. Simultaneously he must propose to the student that he “dies” as the exclusive student of the educator, in order to “be reborn” as an educator of his educator (p. 77).

The fundamental criticism made to the pedagogy of the theorists of the Sciences of the Spirit, says Vázquez (2012), is that they belong “to an ideology that masks with abstractions—freedom, personal development—failure and discrimination in schools” (p. 12). In this sense, education is no longer seen as a place where the lumen ratio should be able to illuminate social practices, but rather it is a frontal criticism of these praxis in its incoherent and contradictory manifestations.

**Education: hope or subjection?**

Paulo Freire (1993) is one of the main thinkers in what the liberation education movement refers to as a critical view of the school. His work *Pedagogy of Hope* thinks of itself as a reunion with his most famous work, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* and, precisely in it, responds to the numerous criticisms that the author received in this work, “accusing dreams and utopias not only of being useless, but also inopportune” (p. 23).

It is important to consider that Freire was not an uncritical apologist of the school, because like many other thinkers he strongly criticized the real role of education in society. Specifically, it can be said that he raised a strong question about the traditional education of his time, and with it also the student-teacher relationship. Freire, despite the hard questioning, radically departs from the approaches made by Foucault where a rather pessimistic vision of the world clearly predominates, and where the school would not have, in principle, possible salvation. According to Zizek (2001) the error of the French author is, paradoxical as it may seem,
the subject, because for the Slovenian it is clear that the subject by its own definition is a “surplus over its cause” (p. 273). In this way there is no possible way out despite the resistance posed by Michel Foucault (2003), and following these postulates, there is no possibility for the school either as a reproductive entity of power and therefore of the frameworks of power and social inequities.

The meshes of power that seem to surround the school and its strategies of domination seem to show a dead end from which it is not possible to leave. Freire (1993) on the contrary raises an ontological category that is necessary to maintain in such discouraging contexts: “Hope is an ontological necessity: hopelessness is hope that, losing its direction, becomes a distortion of ontological necessity” (p. 24).

Education in itself can be totally discarded or even worse, be seen as a machine that cannot possibly be changed and therefore enters a feeling of hopelessness that, far from allowing us to change reality, “makes us succumb to fatalism in which it is not possible to gather indispensable forces for the re-launching of the world” (p. 24). This thesis by Freire is fundamental for the analysis of the school as a possible element of resistance and liberation. There are therefore two possibilities for acting, ironically posed by Gonfi- antini (2007): “Sit down to mourn, feeling ourselves imprisoned in power structures, or propose a different location considering that institutions are also places of mediation, opposition and new possibilities” (p. 94).

Throughout the text, many of the nodal issues raised in his work par excellence, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, are answered or clarified, such as the accusation of a kind of teleology of history where liberation would be considered as a kind of end. In this regard, Freire (1984) states that it is not a finality, but rather a creative utopia that needs to be visualized in order to build.

The proposed education does not respond by teaching a large amount of content to the students, but by raising awareness in them of the apparently neutral and objective contents. It is exactly at this point where the fundamental importance of education as an act of knowledge resides, not only of content but of the rationale of economic, social, political, ideological, historical events that explain the greater or lesser degree of interdiction of the conscious body to which we are subject (p. 129).

The proposal by Freire therefore seeks to emphasize learning and teaching on the pillar of what he calls critical understanding. In this sense, the traditional model of passive transmission of knowledge of teachers to students and their corresponding alienation is questioned. Awareness
comes as a concept similar to what the school should be, because without it there is no possible change. Regarding his conception of the subject, it can be said that he agrees with Aguilar (2009) that “From the Latin American perspective, *being a subject* must be understood as the self-affirming act through which the subject is positioned and appropriates its context to value it and execute its leading actions” (p. 67).

Many of Freire’s ideas have a clearly Marxist inspiration, because when he speaks of oppressors and oppressed, in principle, a clear analogy can be seen between bourgeois and proletarians. The criticism made to capitalism is taken up by Freire in the field of education itself. It is necessary to remember that for Marx (2011) there must be an empowerment of this oppressed social class, “the proletariat, the lowest layer of today’s society, cannot rise, nor can it straighten up, without blowing up the entire superstructure formed by the layers of official society” (p. 126). Saving differences, Freire’s proposal has points in common, since a certain dichotomy that could be classified as dialectic is also visible.

Paulo Freire is a point of reference in terms of education, and its Latin American context makes it especially interesting for the Ecuadorian reality. In his famous work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* he proposed an education for people who have been invisible throughout history. In this sense he was oriented to a type of education that allowed people to free themselves from the chains that bind them through political praxis. He questioned the conception of literacy of his time as the mere fact of learning to read and write in a reduced sense. On the contrary, he envisioned a literacy in which the person could become an active entity of society and participate politically, in order to exercise and defend their rights. In this sense, following Moreno (1980), “the primary objective of education is this awareness with a critical sense, which commits to action” (p. 523).

## Conclusion

Throughout the present work, the first part briefly presented the main lines of the philosophy of history present in Hegel which are, according to the author, marked by the development of freedom and the role of history and historian and its subject-object relationship. It has been shown that the end of history as such is not a theoretical construct made by Hegel, but by its commentators and readers such as Kojève (2013). It is important to state that many of the readers mention that, although Hegel did not state the end of history, his proposals may lead to that deduction.
On the other hand, Kojève (2013) carried out an attempt to interpret Hegel’s texts where his own original approaches are visible, among which the end of history stands out, given by the construction of a homogenous and universal State. This reading would set a precedent that Fukuyama (1992) would take up in a liberal reading where its democratic application would be the end of history as a goal, towards which all nations must arrive, entering what will be called post-history. An anthropological machinery of domination will be consolidated on the basis of these events.

The arguments made by Fukuyama (1992) are based on historical conceptions that are not Hegelian, but rather show deterministic nuances where there is a Providence that guides history towards the best—in this case, liberal democracy. However, it can be seen that this world order is in crisis because of its internal flaws, where there is no justice or equity, but competition and accumulation.

With the help of Cadahia (2012) and Butler (2001) it has been shown how the end of history and its corresponding post-history created a series of domination mechanisms that are no longer outside the subjects but within them, under a form of servile consciousness that generates self-enslavement through different mechanisms.

There is a road to be explored, under the conception of a thinking history, in which the human being can act on history and therefore transform it, because domination strategies are overwhelmed by themselves, there is a dialectical relationship between power and freedom that leaves room for praxis and hope for remaking history.

In the second part, a dialogue has been attempted between two radically different authors, Foucault (2003) and Freire (1993). According to the author, it is important to use the genealogical methodology to analyze the beginning of the school, as well as to visualize its perverse role that cannot be ignored in order to avoid the naivety of thinking about a neutral, objective and transforming school when historically it has been the complete opposite. However, it is essential not to remain solely in Foucault’s pessimism, and it is here that Freire provides a light of possible future for the school: hope.

If formal education aims to maintain itself, it is necessary to make a series of structural changes in many aspects: the teacher-student relationship, the legitimacy of knowledge, horizontality, non-indoctrination, awareness, political praxis and especially the transformation of social and individual liberation. These changes necessarily involve the participation of different social sectors. In this sense at least the State and civil society
should be included. If both actors do not collaborate, the change cannot be made from a single front.

In conclusion, the author has the conviction that the school can be saved and go beyond what it is, but to accomplish this it must be transformed structurally from its foundations, and this mutation must occur from the numerous places in which it is inserted, being part of a much larger and more complex unjust system that needs to be transformed, always maintaining hope as a reference and a fundamental ontological category.

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SUBJECTIVITY AND AUTHORITARIANISM
IN THEODOR W. ADORNO’S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
Subjetividad y autoritarismo en la filosofía de la educación de Theodor W. Adorno

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Abstract

This paper aims to discuss the relevance and current significance of Theodor W. Adorno’s reflections on education. In this context, the paper demonstrates that the central point of Adorno’s philosophy of education is his concern for ways of authoritarian subjectivation and its antidemocratic potential in light of the recent German past. The paper points out that the so-called “turn to the subject,” Adorno’s leitmotiv for a critical pedagogy, must be understood in relation to his empirical works on authoritarianism carried out from the 50’s onward, and to certain issues of his philosophy, such as the idea of crisis of experience, his critique of the autonomous subject and his anti-conformist criticism. The article is based on the critical and interpretative reading of Adorno texts on education, especially his lectures and writings published in the volume Education for Emancipation, as well as other important texts of his work. The general objective of the article is to think about the role of education in the formation of appropriate ways of subjectivation for a democratic life, capable of resisting manifestations of social authoritarianism. The conclusions show that the core of the problem is the rigidity and the non-critical identity of forms of individualities, which a political education for democracy should call into question.

Keywords
Critique, education, identity, democracy, authoritarianism.


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Introduction

Within the multiplicity of meanings and references posed by what nowadays we might refer to as “critical thinking,” it is certain that Adorno’s work occupies a central place. His diagnosis of modernity, his renewal of dialectics, his concern for the autonomy of art, his critique of the modern concept of subjectivity, and his reflections on the culture of capitalism—among many facets of his work—are all elements that go through the modes that we have today to think about our societies. But there is a reason that is often overlooked, which is the importance of Adorno’s public intervention in post-war Germany, especially from his efforts to combat the remnants of Nazism that still persisted in the universities and in German culture. This intervention implied, at the same time, a rescue of the best of that culture that had engendered barbarism, but that had also provided the intellectual tools to combat it. That is to say, Adorno’s intervention in post-war Germany consisted of passing the whole German cultural tradition through a critical filter after the occurrence of Auschwitz as a form of present elaboration of the past. No one expresses it better than one of his most well-known disciples, Albrecht Wellmer (1996), when he says that “with Adorno, it became possible once again to be present intellectually, morally and aesthetically in Germany without having to hate Kant, Hegel, Bach, Beethoven, Goethe or Hölderlin” (p. 242).

This activity not only had to do with what we could call German high culture, but also with the very practice of that culture, and this is
something that we can see clearly in his interventions on the pedagogical practice analyzed in this work. Adorno’s commitment to education was not only limited to his work as a professor at the University of Frankfurt, but also as a proponent of the anti-authoritarian pedagogical reforms that were carried out especially during the 1960s. This facet of his work, somewhat forgotten or reduced to solemn expressions—“education for emancipation” or “education after Auschwitz,” etc.—will be the object of the present article. In these lines I intend to resume the conferences of Adorno on education compiled by Geld Kadelbach in 1970 under the name *Education for emancipation (Erziehung zur Mündigkeit)*, and which brings together a good part of his pedagogical reflections from 1959 to the year of his death in 1969.

Although they are texts that, unlike much of Adorno’s work, can be read with relative fluidity, they contain a philosophical density that often escapes the reader if they are not considered within the framework of other central concerns in his work. This is exactly what I propose to restore in this work. I believe, and this will be my reading hypothesis, that these Adorno texts all revolve around a critique of the authoritarian forms of subjectivation—the so-called “turn to the subject”—and its antidemocratic potential as a central task of educational practice. Taking charge of the subjective conditions of latent authoritarianism within the democratic culture must be the object of what Adorno calls an “education for emancipation” and whose critical and anti-conformist component I will try to highlight here (Cf. Mina Paz, 2012).

The article is divided into three sections. In the first one, “Auschwitz and the turn to the subject,” I will discuss the importance of the recent National Socialist past as a motif of the Adornian philosophy and its repercussion in their reflections on education from the motive of a “turn to the subject.” In the second section called “On authoritarian subjectivity,” I will present the main ideas of research on the authoritarian personality and on forms of social authoritarianism in light of its consequences for educational practice. In the final section, “Education, Mündigkeit and Democracy,” I will address these reflections by focusing on the problem of the formation of rigid and aggressive subjectivities as a central problem of democracy, and on the role of education as a tool to achieve a model of pluralistic and non-identitary autonomy. Finally, in “Final Considerations,” I will offer a summary and an evaluation of the conclusions arrived at in the present work.
Auschwitz and the “turn to the subject”

In 1966 the conference “Education after Auschwitz” took place in the framework of a series of lectures called “Committed questions of the present” (Bindungsfrage der Gegenwart) on the state-owned Hessen Radio, a cycle to which Adorno was frequently invited. This conference was quickly disseminated throughout the Federal Republic of Germany, although it was only published a few weeks after his unexpected death in 1969 as a chapter of the book Catchwords, and since then it is undoubtedly a classic text in the history of the contemporary German philosophy of education and culture. The singularity of that text is not only its theme, but the many categories and central impulses of Adorno’s philosophy that are set in motion around two concerns that go through the set of reflections in different ways: the question about the National Socialist past, and the need for an anti-authoritarian political education. But before dwelling on its content, it is worth mentioning the context in which Adorno formulated this famous conference.

In Federal Germany, the beginning of a climate of political and cultural radicalization would lead to the student revolt towards the end of the 60s. This revolt had Frankfurt as one of its epicenters in Germany, and the figure of Adorno, already at that time a great representative of the Critical Theory of the prestigious Frankfurt School, as an inescapable inspiration. But, at the same time and like its counterpart, certain debates about the German past had emerged in the public opinion from the trial against the criminals responsible for Auschwitz in the same city of Frankfurt in the summer of 1965. Alongside, there had been the surprise admission to the parliament of Hessen and Bavaria in 1966 of representatives of the far-right party, NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany), in the midst of an incipient economic recession. The NPD raised for the first time since the end of the Second World War an institutional legitimation of opinions that were not only authoritarian, but openly vindicated the völkisch ideology of the Nazi regime along with a Holocaust denial. But the NPD also implied some ideological renewal of the right, which would later be known as the New Right, based on motives no longer openly biological, but rather focused on a critique of multicultural societies and immigration, a strong nationalist claim and a clear recognition of the need for ideological intervention from the instances that made democracy possible—publications, electoral campaigns, entry into regional parliaments (Cf. Pfhal-Thraugber, 1999). The NPD it was a clear example of antodemocratic tendencies within a fragile democracy.
While the issue of the recent past and its resilience was at the center of the debates in the Federal Republic at that time, this issue was not recent in Adorno’s work, but had strongly impregnated his writings from at least the middle of the 40 years when almost no European intellectual had yet to reflect on Auschwitz as a theme (Cf. Traverso, 1997). What was a little more surprising is that he articulated these concerns in the context of a debate in the pedagogical field. This concern for education becomes more and more concrete in Adorno’s work, more in direct controversy with the conjuncture and internalized in the educational debates contemporary to him. This process can be seen in the interest of his early reflections on education, more focused on a philosophical analysis of culture in the terms of a Kulturkritik and on a dialectical analysis of the humanistic concept of Bildung. In these texts, his concern was focused on breaking the nexus of meaning between subjective experience and objects of cultural consumption from the introduction of commercial fetishism in the sphere of culture. Adorno (2004c) used the term “pseudoculture” (Halbbildung) to refer to a certain reified relationship with the culture and with the educational contents that prevented an appropriation of its content of truth and a transformation of subjectivity. This diagnosis was closely related to his famous analysis on the “cultural industry” as a way of constructing subjectivities during late capitalism and will appear again in his reflections on education.

As Paffrath (1994) points out, it was only from his participation in the Commission of Sociology of Culture and Education (Bildung und Erziehung) of the German Society of Sociology after 1958, of which he would later be president, that Adorno’s interest in education becomes more empirical. His reflection turns to the social and cultural conditions of education, to the place of the school and the extracurricular educational institutions in the formation of individuals. This did not imply an abandonment of its criticism of culture, but its articulation in a more concrete dialogue. The aforementioned conference, “Education after Auschwitz,” represents a singular piece in this sense, since in it his recent pedagogical concerns are successfully interwoven with the body of his philosophy, the philosophical materializes as a reflection on the present and as an inspirer of concrete pedagogical tasks, for which this text constitutes an unbeatable introduction to discuss what we could call the “philosophy of Adornian education.”

The conference in question begins by addressing the problem without preamble. In the first sentence, Adorno (1998) states that “the requirement that Auschwitz not be repeated comes first of all in educa-
tion.” This presence of the idea of Auschwitz as a theoretical concept is something that must be clarified if one wants to understand exactly the relevance that Adorno assigned to education. In his 1966 Negative dialectic, the same year of the conference in question, Adorno (1992) had stated that “Hitler imposed on men in their state of non-freedom a new categorical imperative: to orient their thinking and action in such a way so that Auschwitz is not repeated” (p. 365). This moral imperative after Auschwitz would not be expressed either in a fact of reason as is the case with Kant, nor would it be the consequence of a logical deduction, but would be based on an “impulse” of rejection expressed in sentences like “you will not do this,” “you will not torture,” “you will not suffer,” phrases that “are true as an impulse if they come with the realization that there has been torture somewhere” (p. 282). The task then was to think of Auschwitz not within the framework of a cosmogony in which this event was singled out as a sort of metaphysical event, but fundamentally to clarify the cultural conditions of possibility of what had happened. It was about bringing to light the cultural ethos that had made Auschwitz possible.

Of course, the set of such conditions of possibility was multiple: political, economic, sociological, emergency cultural conditions that overlapped and made the texture of the understanding of Auschwitz immeasurable. In this infinity of variables, Adorno understood that it was up to education to think about the modes of subjectivation, the constructions of identity, the individual dispositions that made normal people naturalize barbarism. This is the heart of Adorno’s proposal (1998, 2013) to think about the role of education that is discussed in the present work: political education after Auschwitz must consist of a “turn to the subject” (Wendung aufs Subjekt) in order to “recognize the mechanisms that make men capable of such atrocities” (p. 80, p. 78). Such conditions had to do with what Adorno called a “widespread symptom of universal coldness” (Ibid., p. 91) through which it was possible to kill without feeling hatred, and which lead to millions of lives being exterminated without any moral consideration. “Coldness” which, as stated in Negative Dialectics (1992), constitutes the “fundamental principle of bourgeois subjectivity without which Auschwitz would not have been possible” (p. 363). In this context, education would be fundamentally a mode of critical self-reflection on those generalized forms of insensitivity that Adorno saw were still present in post-war Germany.

These manifestations of anger and violence against the weakest, of submission and obedience to the strongest, of enchantment with power, of inability to distance oneself from one’s own positions, of the dissolu-
tion of individuality in the mass, the virility forged in hardness in the face of humiliation, masochism that turns into sadism, manipulative character, lack of emotion, exaggerated realism, the cult of efficiency and blind activity, gang spirit, all these are symptoms of that “coldness” that Adorno tries to unveil as the cultural ethos of Auschwitz. Those forms of conservative, adaptive and destructive sensibility were what he considered important to deactivate, first through research work and then through emotional education. But the people whom Adorno (1998) thought of as protagonists of education were not the executioners, for whom justice was only to be found in the courts, but those men and women who were indifferent, silent, tolerant of violence, without whom no Nazi barbarism would have been possible. This extended coldness “was, as far as indifference to the fate of others, the determining factor explaining why so few moved” (p. 89), and it is there to which pedagogical efforts should point (Cf. Reyes Solís, 2010).

The idea of “Auschwitz” throughout Adorno’s thought (2008) acts as an obligation of self-consciousness for any cultural practice, and especially for educational practice, self-awareness that means reflection on its assumptions and on its social commitments. This is the idea contained in these often-misunderstood phrases, according to which “poetry cannot be written after Auschwitz” (p. 30). An education after Auschwitz would mean an education that could carry out a self-criticism of the ideals that guided it and especially, as I will show, the ideal of an autonomous and self-sufficient subject. But beyond these pretensions, Adorno (1998; 2013) ends the essay in question quite modestly: “I am afraid that no matter how many measures are taken in the field of education, it will hardly be possible to prevent the emergence of office assassins (Sch-reibtischmörder)” (p. 92; p. 103).

The limits of education against barbarism are obvious, but its strength lies not in the impossible task of suppressing violence, but in the most humble but fundamental task of preventing that violence from being naturalized, in preventing these executioners from having accomplices or their crimes from being committed in a climate of indifference, since as long as “there are human beings who in inferior positions, reduced to slaves, execute what perpetuates them in their slavery and deprives them of their own dignity... this is something against which something could be done through education and enlightenment” (Auschwitz, 2008).

In the conference “What does it mean to overcome the past?,” which is also the conference marking the beginning, in 1959, of his participations as a guest on Hessen Radio, Adorno (1998; 2013) had already
pronounced the idea of a “turn to the subject” in saying that “the overcoming of the past as enlightenment is essentially this turn to the subject (Wendung aufs Subjekt), the reinforcement of his self-consciousness and, consequently, of his self” (p. 28; p. 26). In that same text, against the culture of forgetfulness, insincerity and overacting of the so-called “guilt complex,” he affirms that “National Socialism survives, and to this day we do not know if only as a mere ghost of what was so monstrous, or because it did not die, or if the disposition to the indescribable continues beating both in men and in the circumstances that surround them” (Adorno, 1998, p. 18). As a phantasm, as reality or as latency, the past is still present and imposes the task on education and the whole culture to think about the ways and conditions of that survival. However, the “turn to the subject” that Adorno requests from “education after Auschwitz” and the attempt to “overcome the past” must be done with awareness of the limits of the pedagogic practice and the possibilities of enlightenment, but also with an awareness of its urgency and the importance of this limited task. To better understand this “turn to the subject” that Adorno proposes, it is necessary to refer now to his studies on authoritarian subjectivity based on different empirical studies carried out within the framework of the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt.

On authoritarian subjectivity

In 1950 the classic collective study “The Authoritarian Personality” directed by Adorno (2009) at the University of Berkeley appeared, which proposed to investigate the conditions and dispositions that made certain individuals particularly vulnerable to anti-democratic propaganda (p. 153). It was not an attempt to X-ray confessed Nazis, but of finding trends, ways of thinking, opinions that could converge with a fascist movement. The authors used the concept of “personality,” in vogue in the psychology of the time, to allude to a tensioned psychic structure between two levels: that of needs and that of ideologies, that of trends and that of opinions. That is, both the level of “opinions, attitudes and values” that are expressed “more or less openly by words,” as the level of “deeper trends” not necessarily articulated as ideas or points of view (Adorno, 2009, p 156). In the general “Introduction” to the aforementioned study Horkheimer (2006) defines the “authoritarian personality” as a new figure of individuality that “seems to combine ideas and skills typical of a highly industrial society with irrational or anti-rational beliefs.” The ideal
type of an authoritarian personality was, then, “at the same time enlightened and superstitious [...] proud of his individualism and constantly afraid of resembling others, jealous of his independence and inclined to submit blindly to power and authority” (p. 165). It was not a specific individual, but a set of characteristics, attitudes, dispositions, and behaviors that made people more or less receptive to authoritarian propaganda.

It is worth commenting on some details of the study since it gives an account of what was at stake in the idea of authoritarian personality. The study was based on interviews and questionnaires made to almost 3000 people who scored according to four scales: antisemitism, fascism, conservatism and ethnocentrism—uncritical identification with the endogroup. These scales (of which the scale F—fascism—became famous and was replicated in innumerable studies to this day), when applied to the material, grouped nine items around which the general characteristics of the authoritarian personality were defined: 1) conventionalism and rigid adherence to socially accepted values, 2) submission to authority, 3) opposition to forms of introspection, reflection and subjective considerations, 4) authoritarian aggression as a tendency to condemn and punish those who violate conventional values, 5) superstition and stereotyping, for example, the belief in the fate of human nature and the tendency to think in fixed categories, 6) the valuation of personal relationships according to categories such as weak-strong, power-submission and identification with the strong, 7) the approval of violence against those who violate the rules without moral or empathic considerations, 8) the tendency to outwardly project unconscious impulses that lead to perceive the world as a place of excess and dangers, and 9) an exaggerated concern about sexual matters. Both the scale and the theoretical bases of the study were criticized, reformulated, defended, recovered and re-criticized in the long history of empirical studies on authoritarianism that this investigation inaugurated, but they will not be further discussed here (Cf. Catanzaro, 2016).

A peculiarity of these studies was the almost complete absence of reference to a specific minority, something that could be considered a defect but that in reality constituted a theoretical assumption of the work: when investigating prejudices against certain minorities without focusing on the determinations proper to those minorities, it was assumed that prejudices were automated structures without precise references. For Adorno, it was about forms and dispositions of subjectivity whose main characteristic consisted in being unable to see the particularities of the object of hatred. The problem of the authoritarian personality was not
the inability to see the equality of the individuals to whom the aggression was directed, but the inability to see the difference between the stereotype and the specificity of that group. This denoted the strong influence that, in Adorno, still possessed a motif inherited from Walter Benjamin and that ran through all of his work: that of the loss of capacity to entertain experiences in contemporary societies (Cf. Jay, 2009). With the authoritarian personality, these were ultimately individuals incapable of engaging in vital experiences with their inner world and of establishing inter-subjective and differentiated intersubjective relationships.

To see the philosophical significance and the implications in terms of social diagnosis of this idea, we must refer to its “Elements of anti-Semitism” in the *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* of 1944 (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2006). In this text, the terms in which Adorno thought about intersubjective experience referred to the model of the theory of modern knowledge, which considered two moments in all experiences, a passive moment and an active moment: the passive moment was based on the opening of subjective structures to an alien determination, which prevented the danger of solipsism and, at the same time, allowed an enrichment of subjectivity through its contact with an externality rich in its own determinations; at the same time, the experience implied the possibility of structuring that already mediated material in a narrative, of filling that empty space that remains between the pure perception of the phenomenon and our representation of it. To experience, then, meant to enter into a negotiation between the mediations themselves and the mediations of the object. As stated before, this also seems to be the framework in which Adorno conceives the intersubjective experience, whose double condition—passivity and activity—the anti-Semitic subject is not capable of fulfilling. Thus, in the authoritarian personality, the active aspects of experience are identified in a reified quietude, which is resolved in an externalization of destructive impulses, so that the active aspect becomes a “pathological projection” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2006, p. 235) while the passive becomes a reproduction of stereotypes (p. 130). Anti-Semitism, and with it all authoritarian subjectivity, would then be the product of a hermetic, self-centered and fixed form of subjectivity, incapable of questioning its structures in an intersubjective encounter.

However, in “Elements of anti-Semitism” Adorno was not thinking about pathological cases, and the individuals interviewed in *The Authoritarian Personality* were not fanatics or asocials of some kind, but rather they were socially well integrated individuals, whose behavioral patterns corresponded to the commonly accepted norm and for that reason were
so much more dangerous. This was also the case in his social psychology texts where Adorno (2004a) analyzed this “irrational adaptation” by means of the concept of wounded narcissism complementary to the concept of authoritarian character: if the authoritarian character consisted of a regressive formation that combined the tendencies to obedience and submission with a kind of “conformist rebellion,” wounded narcissism was the product of the impotence and social insignificance experienced by a self that only finds satisfaction in an identification with a collective (pp. 45-52; Cf. Reich, 2004). Both concepts tried to account for social forms of internalization of norms that, at the same time, impeded an adequate reflection on objective social conditions. Both concepts were attempts to describe forms of subjectivation that were adaptive, conformist and prone to violence.

This was what two texts that served as a theoretical basis for the empirical analysis carried out in The Authoritarian Personality showed, specifically “Antisemitism and fascist propaganda,” a paper presented in 1944, and “Freudian theory and fascist propaganda schemes” published in 1951. Both texts contain some differences on which I will not stop, since I only want to briefly reconstruct the argument to make clearer the relationship between authoritarian character and wounded narcissism. It was through trying to explain the psychological structure of these well-integrated individuals that Adorno recognized a correspondence between aggression and submission, between authoritarian character and wounded narcissism. Based on the psychology of the masses of Freud, Adorno (2004b) states that the social bond is based on a relationship of libidinal character and not on a community of ideas, since what is at stake is the individual’s narcissistic gratification and not its conviction. Narcissistic impulses are not channeled because the weak ego is unable to contain or sublimate them. In this sense, the wounded narcissistic individual satisfies these libido pre I impulses by establishing an erotic bond with the primitive father personified in the figure of the leader. In the love of the leader and in that identification with his power, there would also be an idealization of the I, a projection of an improved I on that primitive father. Through that love, the individual can overcome the tension he experiences between the narcissistic pretensions of his ego and his social impotence.

In short, both with his studies on the authoritarian personality and in his studies on narcissism, the goal is to show that the authoritarian forms of subjectivity are also forms of social impotence, of diminishing the effective capacities to experiment and transform the social world. It is this correspondence between authoritarianism and impotence that must
be deactivated in the “turn to the subject” that should be at the center of education. In both cases, Adorno tried to show that the rigid affirmation of subjectivity carries a load of material violence, an antidemocratic potential that must be studied and combated. As I said, these studies are not based on convinced Nazis or executioners in concentration camps, but rather on well-integrated and socially functional individuals, so that what we were trying to think here was not exceptionality, but authoritarian forms of subjectivation latent in democratic societies. The goal was not to locate an enemy outside, but to locate authoritarian and violent remnants that operated within the subjectivities responsible for building and giving body to the forms of democratic coexistence.

The task of education after Auschwitz is to deactivate the violence contained in the authoritarian character and in the wounded narcissism to make possible new forms of subjectification. However, Adorno was skeptical about the role of education as the basis of a democratizing process, to the extent that he noted in The Authoritarian Personality that the excessive emphasis on the role of education was a constant that was repeated among the respondents who scored high on the diagrammed scales. In the section “Education instead of change” (2009) Adorno denounced “the exaggerated emphasis that is given to education in some interviews,” emphasis that acted “as rationalization of social privileges” disguised as progressivism (p. 405). In “Theory of pseudo-culture” Adorno (2004c) stated that one should not assume that “education alone guarantees a rational society. She clings from the beginning to the deceitful hope that she can provide by herself what men are denied by reality” (p. 87). Any criticism of education and all critical education should also be critical of society if it does not want to fall into the ideology of inequality. For Adorno, fetishizing education not only would hide the importance of social inequality, the need to democratize spaces such as justice or the media, but would also be a new form of ideology, such as that discussed by Marx and Engels (2005) when they criticized the neo-Hegelians who took the spirit for reality and pretended that from the transformation of consciousness the transformation of history would take place directly (pp. 26-28). As a good materialist, for Adorno education does not transform history, but it does influence the ethos that makes it possible.

Of course, the historical conditions and the intellectual context in which these analyses were written are no longer the same. These studies are marked by the surprise before an emerging mass society and the very recent experience of fascism. Surely this is what caused a strong suspicion of the collective, the fact that institutions or people from which virtual
senses could emerge rose as manipulating leaders or as forms of social deception, and that the antidote to antidemocratic tendencies emphasizes the sphere of a reflective individuality. In our days, with the neoliberal revolution, this emphasis on the individual seems suspicious, since the ideologies of flexibilization and of taking responsibility for oneself exploit that figure to unload on it the weight of the public and the collective (Cf. Sennett, 2005). However, beyond these limitations, I believe that the relevance of these studies is that they focus on the subjective conditions of antidemocratic ideologies, thus showing that between democracy and authoritarianism there is a latent continuum present in the plane of subjectivations. In this relationship between subjectivity, authoritarianism and present democracy, not only in the field of opinions and ideologies available in the public space, but in latencies and often unconscious tendencies, is where I think the most interesting aspect of these studies lies, as well as their importance to understand the pedagogical writings of Adorno as I will try to demonstrate below.

Education, Mündigkeit and democracy

Studies on authoritarian subjectivity not only demonstrated the empirical vocation of critical theory, but also made the relationship between democracy and subjectivity more complex. Adorno tried to explain the phenomena of subjectivation as a symptom that could not be reduced to its economic location, nor could it be explained by an analysis of the relations of political forces, but had to be investigated both in its manifest reactions and in its latencies. In this way, and as proposed by Ezequiel Ipar (2011), these reflections on authoritarian ideologies can pose an interesting critical counterpoint to certain theories of liberal democracy that, both in post-war Germany and in an Argentina of post-democratic dictatorial transition, tried to found an order of peaceful coexistence to overcome the burden of authoritarianism on the basis of a model of deliberative democracy. These theories, based fundamentally on Jürgen Habermas, started from a recognition of the performative power of discourse in a public sphere, so that democracy appeared as the institutional framework in which different individual interests could be expressed in non-violent terms (Cf. Habermas, 1998; Nino, 1989). The problem is that they did not consider the dangers that could come from within that deliberative order and this is exactly what Adorno (1998) wishes to reflect on: “The survival of National Socialism” in democracy is potentially much
more threatening than the survival of fascist tendencies against democracy.” (p. 15, italics in the original). It is a matter of thinking not about the institutional frameworks but about the sensitivity of the actors that give content to those frameworks.

This “aporia of democracy,” as defined by Ipar (2011), is based on the fact that the nexus between democracy and totalitarianism is not external, and that it is not enough to simply secure a public sphere in which sovereign individuals can express their authentic opinions and interests, since the problem is precisely what lies behind that sovereign and self-regulating individual who expresses his true interests. The problem is precisely his subjectivation as a sovereign individual. The authoritarian subject was characterized by Adorno as an identity not questioned, hermetic but respectful of sanctioned, violent and submissive rule, which, in obeying the law, could turn to the law against his spirit. This authentic and imperturbable subject is that dark point that the theory of deliberative democracy had to assume at the time of the decision to think about the consensus but, at the same time, which put in danger all that deliberative order, insofar as it accepted the procedural rules of democratic institutions to convey antidemocratic attitudes with them. The authoritarian personality was for Adorno, in short, an uncritical form of affirmation of the self that could perfectly camouflage itself in the deliberative spaces, which is why it is so much more dangerous. This is why the criticism should be directed not only to the improvement of the institutional mechanisms of consensus generation, but also to the dismantling of that self-regulated subject, of that self-affirming individuality that the institutional procedures presuppose.

Adorno was quite skeptical about the valuation of democracy in Federal Germany at that time, a democratic culture that spread through Germany only through defeat, and that was introduced as something external by the victors. This precariousness and this novelty, not of democracy but of democratic culture, is what worries Adorno (1998, 2013), who sees in it a conjunctural and pragmatic acceptance of democracy linked almost exclusively to economic prosperity: “[Democracy] has not taken root to the point that people experience it as their own thing, knowing themselves as subjects of political processes” (p. 19; p. 14); on the contrary, “it is perceived as a system among others [...] but not as identical with the people themselves, as an expression of their emancipation (Mündigkeit)” (p. 19; p. 14). How to achieve a democracy that is felt as a value, that is to say that subjects can experience a pluralist culture as their own, as identical with their own interests and as linked to their political
sensitivity is a question that education should help to answer. Now, the concept with which Adorno thinks about the new democratic tasks of a political education, that is to say the anti-authoritarian movement contained in the “turn to the subject,” is the concept of Mündigkeit, a term that means “coming of age,” but that it can also be translated as “emancipation” or even as “autonomy” and on which I am now going to stop.

In one of the famous radio conversations with the pedagogue Helmut Becker titled “Education for Emancipation” (Erziehung zur Mündigkeit) Adorno (1998; 2013) makes explicit reference to Kant’s famous 1784 article “What is the Enlightenment?” when he affirms that “the enlightenment is the exit of man from his underage self-guilt (selbsverschuldeten Unmündigkeit)” (p. 115; p. 133). For Kant, as well as for Adorno, the Enlightenment is the “Sapeter aude!” as an argument to “have the courage to use your own understanding,” the possibility of criticism of and distancing from all foreign tutelage. This Kantian incitement is politically fundamental as a necessary condition of any democratic program since “democracy rests on the formation of the will of each individual,” even synthesized in the form of a representative election, and for such a thing “the value and the capacity of each to use their understanding must be a given” (Adorno, 1998, p. 118). A democracy is only possible if citizens are able to deal with public affairs by following their own will, and this means that they can engage in critical judgments about their political reality and shared social meanings. But there is in this concept of Enlightenment as emancipation and autonomy between Adorno and Kant a profound and decisive difference that must be considered.

In his readings of Kantian moral philosophy, Adorno denounces a certain correspondence between freedom and obedience, between reason and submission. This can even be clearly seen in the recently commented text “What is the Enlightenment?,” where Kant (2004) differentiates a “public use” of reason that should be promoted from a “private use” that should be limited. Only in the area of “public use of reason” could an individual “speak in his own name,” but as a member of a certain community or institution to which he belonged he could only “speak on behalf of another,” that is, he should obey the norms and the mandates that prevail in the society in which he lives and in the institutions of which he is part (p. 36). Against revolution and anarchy, Kant seems to recommend the necessity of a cautious use of the Enlightenment to avoid it jeopardizing the authority of the kings or the effective powers (Cf. Beade, 2014). This is why the concept of Mündigkeit that Adorno proposes ceases to be Kantian at the moment when it is fundamentally understood as an antiauthoritarian
political slogan that should serve as an assumption of every democratic community. I am going to stop a little more at this point since I consider it fundamental to understand the idea of an “education for emancipation.”

This correspondence between authoritarianism and freedom that Adorno read in Kantian philosophy was not only characteristic of the concept of the Enlightenment but was also present in the central concepts of autonomy and freedom. In Kant’s practical philosophy the ideas of moral freedom and autonomy were equivalent insofar as they could refer to the possibility of obeying only the law of one’s own reason, of being one’s own subject and legislator of one’s own law. This concept of freedom as self-legislation (Selbsgesetzgebung) had a progressive meaning in history as freedom of conscience and, as Honneth (2014) states, also as a possibility of “emancipatory efforts of resistance to those unjustified social relations” (p. 133). However, what Adorno tried to show is that the rationalist approach to the concept of freedom and autonomy already contained these repressive elements. This became clear to Adorno if he took the ideal of the ethical subject that Kant assumed as a model. According to Adorno (1996), in Kant there is a subject capable of following the law of his own reason—to ensure that the maxim of his action is valid as a general law—only from the repression of all inclination, of all feeling, of all affectation of affectivity, thus producing “a fetish of renunciation. This means that this doctrine is born from the independent renunciation of its gratification and makes it something that exists per se and that is good by itself” (p. 139).

On the basis of Kantian ethics, Adorno sees the renunciation and hardening of the subject, something that can be seen in the words of Kant (2007) for whom the morally capable subject was “a man who, being, moreover, honored, be cold tempered and indifferent to the pains of others” (p. 12). If the Mündigkeit as autonomy or emancipation of the subject supposed a self-affirmation of the self in front of external forces, Adorno tried to show that behind this self-assertion was not only the ability to criticize, but also the repression of impulses and emotions, that said autonomy in the rationalist terms in which Kant had proposed it demanded as a model an individual with a cold and rigorous character.

However, this complexity of the concept of Mündigkeit raises two questions: on the one hand, the concept of emancipation that should be the end of all pedagogical practice is full of aporias and, secondly, that emancipation should not be resolved as self-affirmation, but as critical rejection even of the assertion itself. In more clear terms: for Adorno, to live as a free individual, to be a moral subject that follows the law of
his own reason, is not something that is free of objective contradictions. Being an autonomous person generates a series of aporias to the extent that the subjective affirmation is made on the basis of self-repression, insofar as the identity of the self merges into a violent rationalization of our non-rational dimensions. While it is true that all identity is the result of a repressive synthesis (of our longings, our perversions, our instincts, even our affections), it is also true that without that identity—according to Adorno (1992) “both non-identical and of diffuse nature” (p. 296)—it would be impossible for us to submit those relations that cause us discomfort to criticism. It would also be impossible for us to have transformative judgement and action according to an idea of the common good. In other words, without that identity that must be subjected to criticism, it would be impossible to criticize that identity.

The concept of autonomy, of Mundigkeit, that Adorno (1998; 2013) has in mind then is not exactly Kantian. It is not autonomy as self-affirmation but, as he states in his lecture “Education for emancipation,” “the only true force against the principle of Auschwitz would be autonomy, if I may use the Kantian expression: the power to reflect, to self-determine, not to enter into the game (Nicht-Mitmachen)” (p. 83; p. 92). The Humboldtian harmony between the person who functions socially and the fully formed person has disintegrated. That is why, for Adorno, “the individual only survives today as a center of strength of resistance” (Adorno, 1998, p. 104). In education, we must work on the need for an identity as a resistance to blind obedience and that is capable, at the same time, of engaging in its own questioning. Emancipation is a civic virtue, but after Auschwitz it no longer means the self-affirmation of an autonomous self or the consummation of a collective conscience, but the strengthening of the capacity for resistance, non-participation, suspicion in the face of collective, non-reflective identifications.

It is true that the process by which one becomes an emancipated person presupposes authority (Adorno, 1998, p. 104), not only family and school authority, but the authority of social norms in whose confrontation the Ego is forged. Our Self is only possible after a process of identification and conflict with the authority—parent, superego, social, even pedagogical—, therefore, education should not consist of a rejection of all authority, but of fostering a reflective relationship with it. Only through the mediation of authority, not through its complete denial, can we become autonomous. Education should help build a mature relationship with that authority, to dissolve the identifying mechanisms so that subjects are able to see the norms as contingent social relations suscep-
tible of legitimation and not as pure facts to obey. It is necessary to show the relational and contingent character of the “authority, the connection (Bindung), or whatever these atrocities are called” (Adorno, 1998, p. 117; Adorno, 2013, p. 135).

These theses can seem surprising and anachronistic in a context in which many pedagogues speak of a lack of discipline and structure as the main problem of youth (Cf. Rorth, 2012). However, what Adorno (1992) has in mind is not only the Nazi past and its emphasis on an irrational community, but also the ideological power of mass media and its appeal often times to an unreflective identification, its emphasis on blind integration through distraction, in our reified relationship with technology or in the collective frenzy that often emerges in contexts such as sports events. For such a thing, it is necessary to strengthen the Self, but to strengthen it by means of a work of dismantling its rigidity, freeing it “from the coercive nature of identity” (p. 296). Self-employed and emancipated individuals would be those who, capable of acting critically, do not consider their own identity as absolute, nor their community belonging as definitive and explosive.

In this sense, work with emotions and all those dimensions that are not purely rational, even those potentially violent such as shame, disgust, repulsion or hatred, acquire special relevance for educational practice. These impulses should not be repressed or hidden, but rather sublimated and directed as intolerance towards violence against the weakest. The object of education should not be a carefree new age subjectivity that inserts itself into the rhythm of life from a conformist interiority, but one capable of sublimating its destructive impulses in community terms and in solidarity with the suffering of others. This implies a return to that idea of restoring the ability to have experiences that permeates Adorno’s philosophy as an intention, a certain demand for openness to the “non-identical,” that is only possible with the participation of the emotional dimensions. A democracy’s model is not that of the rational and well adapted subject, nor the spirit of the moderate who can face barbarism. Without a quota of indignation in the face of oppression and in the face of the suffering of another, without an emphatic rejection of violence over the weak, such an “emancipated” subjectivity would be impossible, since, as stated by the Strindber phrase cited by Adorno (1998): “How could I love the good if I did not hate the bad” (p. 107). Those who do not feel a moment of repulsion or shame in the face of unjustified violence, in the face of the suffering of the weak, have not overcome this context of coldness. We are more predisposed to respect the other and to face situa-
tions of injustice or cruelty with empathy, love or outrage than with some kind of ethical conviction. Work on this sentimental education, on that affective disposition against cruelty and discrimination, is the essential task of education for democracy.

But if, as we saw, in the same idea of Mündikeit there was some ambiguity—as an affirmation of subjectivity and as a critique of the violent consequences of that affirmation—there is also a certain ambiguity in the concept of education concerning its relationship with democracy. On the one hand, education is training for the fulfillment of functions that the world requires: integration into the labor market, the formation of a responsible citizen, capable of rising up to what is expected of them (Cf. Sibaña, Jaramillo & Vinueza, 2017). On the other hand, and as Adorno emphasizes, it is also education that must provide the tools so that we can question that very social world and what is expected of us (Sibaña, Jaramillo & Vinueza, 2017, p.96). Education gives knowledge of the world and prepares us for the execution of roles, but it can also grant the ability to criticize the way in which those roles are assigned, the possibility of choosing our relationship with that world. In Adorno, the task of education becomes a defense against the integrating tendencies of the world, against what in several places of his work he calls the “managed world,” a homogenous and homogenizing world, where the individual is a cog in a machine and whose creativity is only valid insofar as it can be translated in terms of economic return.

In short, the idea of “education for emancipation” after Auschwitz must be, for Adorno (1998), a form of “education for contradiction and resistance” (p. 125). Not a blind resistance to all norms, but to fetishized identifications, to hardened subjectivities, to forms of social order not passed through the filter of criticism. Kant’s Sapere Aude! should also be understood as a dare to think against oneself, against one’s own subjective affirmation, to question the common sense on which one’s beliefs and representations are based. It is in this sense that the “turn to the subject” does not imply the acclimatization of tame subjectivities, but the questioning of fixed and authoritarian subjectivities, of the violence contained in the narcissistic wound, of the latent aggression in the authoritarian character, of the identification and idealization of the power relations that constitute us. This criticism of subjective affirmation is also a question of the ideal of adaptation, such as in the case of those who can adapt to any task in a flexible and efficient way and, at the same time, be aggressive and violent in other contexts (Adorno, 1998, p. 84). Emancipation, autonomy, Mündigkeit, or whatever it is called, does not consist
in the fixity of the authoritarian character, nor in the flexibility of the adaptive character that is required today as a condition of entry into a highly flexible labor market, but in the constant exercise of criticism of any imposed identity. Emancipation is not a state, but a project, a task with provisional syntheses, a process of construction of one’s own subjectivity that supposes an incessant critical self-reflection without which democracy becomes a mere formality. In the incentive of that project lies the task of education after Auschwitz.

Final considerations

In the previous lines I tried to demonstrate that what we could consider as Adorno’s philosophy of education has an anti-authoritarian character that is articulated as an attempt to mitigate violent and repressive forms of subjectivation. To show the relationship between the concepts of subjectivity and authoritarianism in Adorno’s reflections on education, I began by analyzing the philosophical importance of Auschwitz as a new categorical imperative of all cultural production. What that imperative revealed was the need to inquire into the conditions of possibility of what happened in the concentration camps, fundamentally in that cultural ethos that allowed naturalization and disinterest in what happened in the camps. Among the elements of such an ethos Adorno emphasizes a certain “universal coldness” that made men and women indifferent to the suffering of others. In this way, the task of education in the context of overcoming the past and consolidating democracy is to deal with the subjective conditions of barbarism, the “turn to the subject” has as its purpose the dismantling of that coldness.

For the analysis of these conditions, I stopped in a reading of his empirical works on the authoritarian personality and his most psychoanalytic texts about the concept of wounded narcissism with the aim of highlighting the importance of education in the constitution of a democratic society. The need to think authoritarian nuclei within our democracies, a care for the affective dimensions, the need for a process of self-criticism with our identity claims, the strengthening of our capacity for criticism rather than integration, are the vital elements of the Adornian proposal in education. But, as Zamora (2009) says, Adorno’s reflections “are read in the wrong way when direct indications for educational praxis are expected of them” (p. 25), in any case they should be considered as reflection proposals for a pedagogy that is committed to overcoming the
past and democratic and self-critical subjectivities, but at the same time aware of its limitations in that task.

Notes

1 I will use the Spanish edition of this book in the very good translation of Jacobo Muñoz (Adorno 1998). In case of clarifications or expressions of relevance I am going to refer to the German edition (Adorno, 2013). In these cases, I will indicate the page numbers in the Spanish edition first and then in the German edition.

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THINKING THE ENIGMA OF SUBJECTIVITY THROUGH DIVERSITY

Pensando el enigma de la subjetividad
a través de la diversidad

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Abstract

This article presents a bibliographical exploration with the objective of analyzing how the enigma of subjectivity can be thought of and reflected on from a frame of attention to diversity, with the aim of safeguarding the recognition of the other as a singular being in order to reduce exclusion and discrimination processes. What do educational practices show when efforts are pointed at paying attention to diversity and recognizing students’ individuality? As diversity is a multifaceted construct, it must turn its attention to the intersubjective plane of nature, and its essence deserves to be tackled from an interdisciplinary scaffolding whose basis is represented by philosophy, psychoanalysis and social science. Thus, a stage is set to interrogate the history and subjective construction of teaching staff and student body in general, underlining the social function that school has not as an agent of knowledge, but a producer of subjectivity. In this time of globalization and consumerism, the resignification of the teacher/student experience must become a central subject that invites reflections about the strengthening link between the educational task and the psychoanalytic act, in such a way that results. In this sense, it is indispensable to evaluate the dynamics of transference and to privilege the desire of both subjects.

Keywords

Discrimination, individuality, history, globalization, philosophy, psychoanalysis.

Thinking the enigma of subjectivity through diversity
Pensando el enigma de la subjetividad a través de la diversidad

Resumen

En el presente artículo se desarrolla una exploración bibliográfica que tiene como objetivo, analizar cómo el enigma de la subjetividad puede pensarse y reflexionarse desde un marco de atención a la diversidad, en donde lo que se pretende salvaguardar, en aras de reducir procesos de exclusión y discriminación, es el reconocimiento por el otro como ser singular. ¿Qué es lo que se trasluce, en la praxis educativa cuando los esfuerzos se dirigen a brindar una atención diversificada y a reconocer la individualidad de los estudiantes? Al ser la diversidad un constructo multifacético, ésta debe dirigir su mirada al plano intersubjetivo de la naturaleza humana y su esencia merece ser abordada desde un andamiaje interdisciplinario, cuyo basamento sea representado por la filosofía, el psicoanálisis y las ciencias sociales. Se abre así, un escenario que interpela por la historia y constitución subjetiva del corpus docente y del estudiantado en general, destacando la función social que tiene la escuela, no como gestora de conocimientos sino como productora de subjetividades. Resignificar la experiencia docente/alumno en estos tiempos de globalización y consumismo, habrá de convertirse en un tema capital que invita a reflexionar sobre el vínculo que se ha ido soldando entre el quehacer educativo y acto psicoanalítico, de tal manera que resulta imprescindible dentro del campo investigativo, preponderar la dinámica de la transferencia y privilegiar el deseo de ambos sujetos.

Palabras clave

Discriminación, individualidad, historia, globalización, filosofía, psicoanálisis.

And so it is repeated from school to school, the spectacle of the struggle between the law and the spirit, and we see again how State and school are abstracted in the task of killing and uprooting the deepest and most valuable spirits that spring up every year.

(Hesse, 2015, p.76)

Introduction

The avatars before which a subject/student can be constituted as being unique, autonomous and socially ethical are diverse. According to Bleichmar (2008), the new forms of interaction that exist between people today, as well as the mechanisms that convey the recognition of the other as being different, will have to be represented as challenges and obstacles in the path towards a subjective constitution.

Today, school corridors show not only students with disabilities or difficulties in their learning process. It is also common to encounter a set of divergences that seems to have transited from the latent to the manifest, inluding, for instance, the so-called emotional, behavioral and ethnic group problems.

The rhetoric of attention to diversity, following Restrepo (2014), is a cornerstone that invites us to reflect on an enigma that becomes relevant in the act and educational discourse, namely the question of subjectivity. Within the daily routine of the school, countless experiences are developed that reflect the feeling, thinking and being of each one of the students with respect to themselves and to others, those events which
may or may not be recognized in the educational plot, constituting the basis on which the cosmos of diversity can turn.

In order to face these challenges, Booth and Ainscow (2015) reveal that the school as a training institution, far from focusing only on the transmission of knowledge, must turn its gaze to the intersubjective plane of human nature, that is, to the construction of attention to diversity, where it is taken into account to ensure the differences of the students in order to reduce processes of exclusion and discrimination.

Based on the elucidations of González, Mitjáns and Bezerra (2016), to focus attention on the processes of subjectivation that unfold in schools, leads to take into account that to think the foundations of an educational response that addresses the course of diversity, it is inexorable to analyze and signify not only the psychic processes that make up the building of the student but also the socio-cultural conditions that represent it.

As a result of the above, and taking Socolovski (2014) into account on the fact that the school becomes a breeding ground for the proliferation of new social bonds, new ways of weaving the threads that represent the duality of recognition/difference and especially, the laying on scene or circulation of students’ desires, the purpose of this article arises: when exploring and analyzing, what is reflected in the educational praxis when efforts are directed to provide diversified attention and to recognize the singularities of students? The guidelines for weaving the warp of this question are reflected from an interdisciplinary standpoint, which means that in order to breathe the airs of diversity, it is necessary to scrutinize them from different perspectives. In this case, reference is made to the social sciences, to philosophy and psychoanalysis. Likewise, the role played by diagnosis as an instrument of subjectivation with respect to the various problems faced by students in the school environment is examined.

The structure of this document is broken down into the following sections: imaginary of subjectivity for attention to diversity and significance of the teaching/student experience.

The analysis of the information that has been revealed in this article was made possible through a literature review of primary sources (books, journals) on the scaffolding of attention to diversity, and what this entails for educational praxis. The criteria for the selection of journals that were taken into account for such an inquiry are limited to the following: 1) international recognition and indexation; 2) year of publication (no more than ten years from the date of consultation) and; 3) whether it enriches or contributes to the topic of analysis.
Thinking the enigma of subjectivity through diversity

Imaginaries of subjectivity for attention to diversity

Thinking about the enigma of subjectivity in current times is a cross-roads that becomes propped up in the framework of attention to diversity, understanding that this is the process by which a subject can value and respect the differences of others. On this line Booth and Ainscow (2015) state that:

Inclusive respect implies valuing others, treating them well, recognizing their contributions to a community thanks to their individuality, as well as through their positive actions. It has nothing to do with giving in to people or bowing to them because of their position or authority. “Diversity” includes the visible and non-visible differences and similarities between people: diversity deals with the difference within a common humanity. Diversity encompasses all, not only those observed from an illusory normality (p. 27).

The above rests on the speech delivered by the The Salamanca Statement and Framework for Action on Special Needs Education, directed by UNESCO (1994), where it is stated that educational spaces may be able to reorganize administratively and methodologically to satisfy the right of the students to receive a complete education, that is to say, in which each one of the characteristics of individuality of any student are taken into account. With this vision, it was exhorted that not only students who presented special educational needs were integrated into regular educational contexts, but also those who at some point in their school journey could find themselves in a situation of vulnerability.

According to the UNESCO guidelines (2015) an inclusive education can be considered as one based on criteria of equity and respect for diversity, as well as recognition for the marginalization that exists in educational systems, able to respond to the needs, characteristics and capabilities of students through comprehensive education.

For Parrilla (2002), this type of inclusive education implies a reorganization and transformation of schools, which becomes configured from the educational policies and practices to face the challenges represented by school inequality and exclusion. He also points out that in order to address this problem, different areas of knowledge must converge on a starting point.

What are the implications of this new conception of addressing the different, what causes uncertainty, what is not situated within the so-called “norm,” because as long as it is not fully understood, it is not considered as assimilated? Faced with this dilemma Aguerrondo (2008) postulates that:
The new rationality is not based on the causal relationship and an explanation of reality that assumes that it is immutable and with laws that can be known. The age of knowledge is based on other knowledge, one that does not understand change as a disruption of order but as a promising innovation. One in which science is not only a description of the “natural laws” and explanation of phenomena, but also involves the creation, the modification of nature, and therefore gives a new place to human protagonism. One in which the production of knowledge is not one thing and ethics another (p. 72).

According to certain studies in favor of the inclusive school and the attention to diversity movement, it is revealed as pointed out by Escarbajal et al. (2012) that the change should start with educational policies, because although it is true that the attention directed by schools to the uniqueness of each student should be addressed from an inclusive perspective, everyday practices demonstrate the opposite. On one hand, there are actions that are still handled in terms of educational integration, or even in processes of classificatory order. On the other hand, statutes are perceived as aiming to offer a generalized and not particular attention. In response, the authors point out that:

This is an inescapable premise of any policy that prides itself on defending democratic values. Only on the double basis of legal equality and inclusive education is it possible to realize a social recognition that accepts diversity without fear in all its social and personal manifestations (p. 142).

To put the above in context, it is necessary to elucidate a situation of contrast that is profoundly paradoxical, since it indicates that the dynamics of inclusion have not yet been established and strengthened; while on the one hand, article 41 of the General Education Law (1993) in Mexico states that special education should focus its efforts on prioritizing access and participation of those students who are in a vulnerable situation; research such as the one developed by Velázquez (2010) refers to insufficiencies in integration processes, possibly due to the fact that this may be the result of a legal or contextual imposition. Likewise, one of the limitations to advance the field of inclusive education is administrative activity, lack of resources and lacking training, where teacher training is conditioned by external and internal factors.

Nowadays it seems that to access this step of school inclusion it is necessary, in the first place, to reflect on the educational practices that are lived in the daily life of schools. Failure to recognize the differences and uniqueness of each student represents a complex situation in which, on
the one hand, attention is not given to their real needs and on the other, what they think or what they want is overlooked.

In this regard, Juarez, Comboni and Garnique (2010) consider that educational inclusion can be equated with social inclusion. The latter seeks for people to live in a socially potable environment. The school as a social system should be reinforcement process through which indicators that reveal a culture of acceptance and respect for differences may be reflected a posteriori. These authors reveal that inclusive education implies a change in the way in which special education operates, because as credit is still granted to special educational needs, its homogenizing character will continue to be maintained.

The line of thought that is juxtaposed to this framework is outlined in the works of Echeita and Sandoval (2002). They start from the idea that, for many years, special education has only been conferred, or rather, has been associated to people with special educational needs related to disabilities. This vision, rather than minimizing the effects of exclusion, has intensified them in the sense that the school environment has maintained a discourse that victimizes students. It is therefore necessary to focus on a perspective where the adjustment occurs not on the student’s education system but the other way around, that is, the school must decipher what is considered “normal” for its students, without neglecting the subjectivity of each of them.

It is necessary to mention that an inclusive education not only encompasses students who have a disability or difficulties in their learning, but the student population in general. As diversity is multifaceted, Barrio (2009) mentions that:

Taking all these differences into account, the school cannot perform a homogenizing function and it will be necessary to reflect on who the “diverse” are: students with special educational needs, the disadvantaged, immigrants or those who cause problems of coexistence and do not study. In each of these groups inequality is found, but not as a concept that nurtures the idea of diversity, but as a concept opposed to that of equality (pp. 15-16).

Beyond their similarities with respect to the fact that schools must ensure that every student, regardless of their physical, social or psychic characteristics, can access learning and participation, it is worth noting that in thinking the terms of an inclusive education, the first challenge is an ideological one. For this, it is essential to reflect on the perceptions through which the differences in the other are identified, which can gen-
erate the deployment of attitudes or thoughts of rejection or exclusion. In this perspective, Rosano (2008) points out that:

The diversity that characterizes society and, therefore, the educational system refers to the range of different people who respond to several factors: language, culture, ideology, religion, gender, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, geographical frame, physical, psychic, or sensorial capacity, learning style, affective situation, health [...] (p. 8).

With this preamble, it is clear that the ideal to which all schools aspire will focus on providing pyramidal and non-linear attention, whose common denominator is the difference and respect of each of the students. However, the prelude to all these dynamics is based on recognition by the other and, in this regard, Joaqui and Ortiz (2017) point out that “education plays a transcendental role in this process, having the door open to offer recognition to their identity and the opportunity to exercise it in relation to others” (p. 212).

When exploring the perceptions that teachers have regarding the development of educational practices from diversity, Garnique and Gutiérrez (2012) reveal that in the case of support teachers or collaborating teachers, there are limitations in their practice due to the lack of information and training, in addition to feelings of rejection and resistance manifested among special education support staff and the regular environment.

On this line, an investigation developed by Suriá (2012) in Spain is based on an expost-facto design, since the representative sample of the participating subjects was selected according to gender, age and school grades in which each teacher teaches his classes. Through a questionnaire it was possible to know the answers of 116 teachers about the question of whether the students with disabilities in their classrooms generated some discomfort, to which they expressed an affirmative answer.

In another research developed by Mellado, Chaucono, Hueche and Aravena (2017) in Chile called “Perceptions about inclusive education of teachers with a school integration program,” it can be seen that within teaching practices, there are tendencies to segregate the students with special educational needs, that teaching strategies are not heterogeneous and therefore do not respond to diversity, that there is an exclusive promotion of basic thinking skills and a climate of distrust in the interactions with SEN students.

While it is true that these designs open a landscape that, according to Gil (2009), involves recognizing and assessing, beyond the similarities that may exist between people, the question of the difference between
them, which is why it constitutes a fundamental pillar in the subjective construction of man.

Subjectivity is a construct that, far from being reduced to the field of a discipline or area of knowledge, nowadays is extended towards an interdisciplinary network where the common objective starts from considering the subject as a social-historical being. Regarding this, Peralta (2009) points out:

All subjectivity is the place of affections, of memories, of deliberative thinking, or all subjectivity is, in principle, the trace of irreverence, of what resists and expresses itself, and of what it accepts as a cultural ideal, family agreement or normative for social coexistence, and in the warning that in everyday life the significant and the real coexist, and that it corresponds to language to say which is our place of utterance, and which is our place of enunciation to then give rise to education with joy, with smiles and laughter, master adjectives to be better people, citizens and professionals; the idea of professional depends, certainly, because we have to leave the criterion that education is the ladder to achieve the title granted by the cardboard industry, and because we know that education is for life (p. 43).

In González (2008), it can be seen that subjectivity will be developed/produced in relation to others, such as parents or teachers, and under the auspices of socio-cultural conditions. The author emphasizes that this will be protected under nuances of experiences, emotions and immediate relationships that a person can form with their peers.

Meanwhile, a psychoanalytic cut will allow us to see how this construct of subjectivity put on stage is unveiled for the educational act, in which in many cases the subject has forgotten and even has succumbed to hegemonic school demands, namely its historicity and desires.

The fact of listening to the discourse and revealed desire not only by the students as Elgarte (2009) points out, but also by the teachers as transmitters of a knowledge or a truth, represents a crucial situation, because while it is encouraged to develop an active listening in front of the students, they also need to build processes of subjectivation, of teachers who are given a space to reveal their unconscious motivations and desires. From this position it is legitimate to mention what Terrones (2017) states from a philosophical point of view:

There is a relationship between subjective identity and intersubjectivity. This is better understood if one observes that in order to be aware of oneself, one must do so in reference to something, and that something is the others, that is, intersubjectivity. The act of identity construction
is a hermeneutical act because it is based on a reflection that involves understanding oneself and understanding others. Individuality cannot be conceived as isolated since it is immersed in a context that is also made up of intersubjectivities. The intent is to show that the individual is inexorably linked to the collective. An ethical praxis, typical of the postulates of discursive ethics, can be an effective tool in the educational field [...] (p. 9).

On the importance of listening to children and adolescents, Zaldúa and Lenta (2011) report that:

[...] the powers of these spaces and efforts are highlighted as enablers of possibilities of thinking about other places, other links, which propitiate journeys away from the immediacy of substitutive and deadly satisfactions, and openness to think, desire, fantasize about futures other than the announced death, disappointment and fury. Difficult, but not impossible, commitment to subjective, intersubjective and social recognition beyond the logic of domination (p. 319).

In correlation with these ideas, Ramírez (2007) talks about an ethics of listening in order to prioritize the subjectivity of students with special educational needs. However, in these times of volatility, its essence could also embark on the path of diversity represented by a school center. For this, a core point to consider is that within teacher training the competence or ability to develop a free listening is taken into account.

This commitment to the rescue of subjectivity in schools has been gaining relevance based on studies and research conducted on students who manifest a disability or who have difficulties in their learning process. For example, Cúpich and Campos (2008) perceive that the students that present some disability see their subjective constitution run down, because models of attention and response do not correspond to their real needs, highlighting in this respect that:

In the educational field, the concern for difference translates more into a concern for the “different,” for the “strangers,” or in the field of disability for the “abnormal.” The translation of some of the differences into “different subjects” once again positions those marks as opposing and negative regarding the idea of the “norm,” of the “normal” and, then, of the “correct,” the “positive,” the “better,” etc. It establishes, thus, a process of “differentialism” that consists of separating, of distinguishing from difference some traits that we could call “different” and always doing it with a pejorative and subaltern connotation. And it is this differentialism, this differentialist discourse (p. 897).
According to these ideas, Rojas (2008) notes that children who have some disorder in their childhood manifest indicators that destabilize the family system of which they are a part. This mismatch is considered one of the main conditions that motivates parents to request a psychotherapy treatment, since in the background of a scenario like this, ghosts of the family plot are hidden, in such a way that the moment of diagnosis becomes a delicate situation, because far from establishing an adequate framework of work, a classification system can be fostered and, thus, run the risk of enclosing the child in a symptomatological picture when it is barely in the process of being constituted.

Regarding the role that clinical and psychiatric diagnosis plays in schools, Paiva and Oliva (2014) consider that it should not only focus on the opinion and classification of behaviors through the exclusive use of manuals such as the DSM-IV. On the contrary, they reveal that, as tools that amalgamate to the subjective constitution of any student, they should take into account the context where a phenomenon is observed.

In this sense, Ramírez (2007) believes that to mitigate this situation it is necessary to develop an ethic of listening by those in charge of teaching, a psychoanalytic intervention whose purpose is to focus on the desires of the subject through free listening. An intervention focused solely on issuing diagnoses on the basis of predetermined manuals and a corresponding type of treatment is considered a relevant proposal, and in addition thereto, it runs the risk of setting aside the individual’s own desire as it does not involve listening to real needs.

The disjunctive that comes into play here is the desire of the child against the medical and school discourse. Mannoni considers this situation to be a dynamic of segregation, since as the child is being represented as a “sick” person, their desires will be subordinated to those of the specialist or professor. In this sense, it is worth reflecting on the medicalization trends that exist with respect to the work of a student who is not within the parameters of “normality,” for which Mannoni’s writing is taken as a frame of reference (2005):

Education has given way to instruction; this has become an impossible business and has given way to medicine. The parallel school built on the notion of a phantom of medical equipment constitutes for the child a place of life even more pathogenic than that of the school (pp. 61-62).

In this situation where the diagnosis plays a fundamental role in the treatment of children, Lora (2007) in her article referring to the practice with infants from a psychoanalytic approach, states that from this
In the research carried out by Parisí and Manzi (2012) in which the topic of subjectivity is addressed from teacher training and its impact in relation to students, based on a process of accompaniment and interventions that was carried out over three years by a psychoanalytically oriented psy-
chologist during professional internships, it was possible to glimpse how the teaching figure, shaper of subjectivities, is still anchored to a mere transmission of knowledge, in addition to how authority as a figure of trust and identification has lost the place and meaning that it previously had. The relevant events that converge to trigger these situations are circumscribed in two edges. On the one hand, teacher training does not provide them with the necessary tools to fully develop their work; on the other, the feeling of helplessness is so subtle that there is no anchoring between the students and the teacher, which annihilates any attempt to internalize norms and respect as a strategic means.

Based on the study by Rincón (2011), which aimed to analyze the representations of teachers about the symbolic construction of childhood, we can see how the classroom factor in this sense plays a role of transformation because it is perceived that the children’s imaginary is re-elaborated. That is to say, when the children enter the school they are considered as restless, abrupt, loud, cruel among each other, mostly living hours of solitude, in situations of vulnerability and, in turn, tender, divergent and fun, lacking in affection and with families that are very diverse in their composition, sometimes distant, timid or fearful in some cases, eager not only to explore and know, but also of affection and containment. This research shows that the child’s imagination is changing in terms of the intersubjective plane and various contexts in which its history is drawn. It also coincides with the idea that the teacher-student interaction is fundamental in terms of affectivity, as the historicity of the teaching body itself can offer a clear understanding of all which represents early childhood and its influence.

It is worth mentioning that this process of affectivity existing between teacher/student has its implications in the subject of school failure according to Ruiz (2011). Through an analysis of the channels that make up school failure in students, it is noted that this, in Mexico, is associated with various factors, including a program of studies with contents unrelated to daily life, an undervaluing of areas other than mathematics and Spanish, performance evaluated generally through written tests and distorted, to some extent, by the affective bonds and subjectivity of the teacher.

The way to approach this topic seems a central point in every teaching process, because today there are different connotations regarding why a student fails in school. The reflection that is made on whether students fails in school, or if the school itself fails as an educational device, seems to be a terrain in which various aspects that go beyond teaching are interwoven, since those State projects will have to be resumed and
re-elaborated, concomitant to the constitution and formation of teachers as both psychic and social beings.

Different factors are involved in the call to this subject, but one of them is closely related: the knowledge placed on the figure of the adult as revealed by Palma and Tapia (2006):

To build learning, an understanding of the other is necessary in order to transform them with knowledge and personal experiences. The knowledge that the learner has and with which he transforms the knowledge of the other, is in their questions and the possibility of answers [...] The truth is not ill, what is ill is the false knowledge insofar as there is no desire to know as a way to avoid suffering. The secret produces violence on the one who suffers it and on the one who executes it, coercing the authorship of thought. While the repressed can be elaborated, the absent, from the secret, is outside the scope of elaboration (p. 104).

When analyzing the implications of the teaching figure with respect to educational practices, Dominguez (2011) rescues several factors that go beyond this exercise. On the one hand, there is a barrier to the saturation of the curricular program where mechanicism or repetition is the basis. Likewise, there is no autonomy to elaborate or re-elaborate the instruments through which the learning achieved by students can be identified. Finally, extra-curricular work is a constant that is part of the subjectivity of the faculty. All these situations generate an ambivalence of feelings in the teachers that results in emotional wear. The perception of the classroom for them is like that of a refuge, because in that scenario they can exercise their own work with free will. The cultural factor in this research process demands a meticulous analysis, since the advent of the teaching being as a psychic and social entity comes to be installed in interaction with other teachers, with other stories, in such a way that their reality will be a function of the subjection that has do with the culture in which it develops.

In this tuning it can be considered that the human being is consigned to a historical swing that, by nature, will grant quality and certain acts of morality that seek their welfare. However, the cost to be avoided to safeguard the uniqueness of each person can be high if their needs or demands are not taken into account. On this line, it is necessary to review the thought of Freud (1930):

It does not seem possible to encourage human beings, through some kind of influence, to transmute their nature into that of a termite: they will always defend their demand for individual freedom against the will
of the masses. Much of the struggle of humanity revolves around a task: find a balance according to ends, that is, dispenser of happiness, between individual demands and the cultural demands of the masses; and one of the problems concerning human destiny is to know if that balance can be reached through a certain cultural configuration or if the conflict is insurmountable [...] the extent to which the culture is built on the renunciation of the instinct, the degree to which it is based, precisely, on non-satisfaction (through suffocation, repression, or what else?) of powerful impulses. This “cultural denial” governs the vast scope of social ties among men. We already know that this is the cause of the hostility against which all cultures are forced to fight (pp. 94-96).

Rescuing the subjectivity of the teacher is thus a fundamental aspect in the field of attention to diversity. According to Cadavid (2016) it is important to safeguard and prioritize its historicity, since in that way filters can be established that make educational practice and the relationships they sustain with others viable. The author mentions that:

[...] there is a need to rescue the teacher subject in the complexity of his generational experiences and from the construction of meaning from the representative events of the community, which leads to the collective production of knowledge and the configuration of new forms of thinking and creating education that help to constitute their identity in both corporal, mental, affective, collective and cultural domains, read in certain situations, which converge in their subjectivity and constitute vital traces as perennial vestiges that affect, found and give meaning to their own existence, from the basis of representative events (p. 342).

Taking these elucidations into account, it is worth considering the discipline of psychoanalysis, as it can unfold as an auxiliary means to privilege the subjective constitution of the teaching being and their praxis with students.

The first reference made by Freud (1913) to pedagogy is that the teacher, as an adult with unconscious desires and motivations and with a particular history, is not alienated from his own childhood life and experiences that shaped his quality as a subject:

The great interest of pedagogy for psychoanalysis rests on a thesis that has become evident. An educator can only be one who is able to empathize with the child’s soul, and we adults do not understand children because we have stopped understanding our own childhood (p. 191).

The thought that Freud (1932) would establish about the link between pedagogy and psychoanalysis, lies in the following: the fact that
both constructs analyze the system of relationships that a subject can sustain with their immediate context and the way in which it can affect their academic experience and/or affective processes, can result in a core issue, since while one focuses its efforts on providing comprehensive care to students, the other, being a clinical reference that advocates mental stability of a person, can be offered as a set of theoretical-practical orientations.

In the prologue that Freud makes about the work of Aichhorn (2006), *Helpless Youth*, it can be observed that although it is true that psychoanalysis cannot replace pedagogy, it can be offered as a tool to address different disagreements that make up the subject. On this subject it is shown how the dynamics of transfer thought in terms of a social re-education can be a dividing line in the student’s subjective construction:

> When we talk about the transfer in relation to social reeducation, we mean to signify the emotional response of the student to the educator, the counselor or the therapist, as the case may be, without meaning to say that it takes place in exactly the same way as in psychoanalysis [...] The need to create good relationships with the child towards their mentor is of paramount importance. The re-educator cannot leave this to chance; he must deliberately accomplish this and face the fact that, without it, any effective work is impossible (pp. 111-114).

The transferential plot that has been blurring in this issue aims to reconsider, from public regulations, the objective of the pedagogical function; for just as there are different ways of understanding and recognizing the subject, so there are means to attack their subjectivity. Given this, Alejandro Reyes (2009) in his study on teens reveals that:

> From high schools that enable adolescent, intercultural and intergenerational encounters, where adolescents are built and rebuilt, they seem to demand new curricular and institutional devices and a new pedagogical relationship; based on their recognition as social actors, in their capacity for dialogue and in their sociocultural and identity diversity, that consider the different meanings that school and education acquire, and identify through them educational potentials and needs (p. 171).

This dynamic of the transference implies, beyond having a degree of empathy for the daily life of the students, to develop a moral commitment that privileges responsibility towards the student, for example, when developing a plan that is subject to plans and curricular programs, and which also prioritizes that the student knows, develops and executes certain knowledge. It is necessary to reflect on whether what is predeter-
mined as learning is really what students want to learn. In this sense Báez (2013) states that:

The happy world in education, when going through the reflection of the transfer in its field, does not stand on very firm ground. It is not about creating the method for all learners to learn and learn without effort and, even less, learn what they want in their intention of premature satisfaction. A desire, anchored to the transfer, assumes a responsibility with the other; this implies that a subject with desire does not sever the desire of the other. On the contrary, the dynamics of transference connote the need of awareness of the existence of the other in order to arrive at the goal of satisfaction; only then could we think of an education for the subject and for a possible autonomous and self-determining society (p. 189).

While it is true that what prevails in these lines is the preservation of desire, it is because its genesis transcends towards the dams of a truth of difficult discernment. In this regard Fazio (2013) states that:

The desire for the subject is an enigmatic variable, uncontrolled, and does not respond to any standard measurement method. It is crossed by multiple conditioning factors. There is no pure desire. It is necessary, from a psychoanalytic perspective, to distinguish between school or educational knowledge, of which educators, teachers and other knowledge are concerned, the knowledge of the unconscious that is dealt with by psychoanalysis, and a knowledge that cannot be taught, knowledge that is not known, that is on the same side as enjoyment. There is, one might say, a connection between this knowledge and unconscious satisfaction, which operates through repetition, insistence: the symptom is a knowledge that repeats itself and forces its decipherment and has a function tied to pleasure (pp. 26-27).

Given the importance of assimilating knowledge such as that offered by psychoanalysis for the understanding of the subject, it can be seen that whoever sets out on this journey should take into account, at least, the existence of a hazy-looking spectrum for consciousness, that is to say of a system that comes to configure part of the history of man. On this, Tres (2012) comments the following:

In order for thought to develop, the child must know “something” of his psychic world. This is how they will relate and explore the compatibilities with their wishes. It is a knowledge that the subject does not know that he has and that is unknown to him by his own constitutive division. It is the knowledge of the unconscious that becomes conscious through
the psychoanalytic cure. This does not mean that without a cure it cannot be known. For the human being has the possibility of connecting with some of that knowledge through creative transactions or, in the worst cases, through symptomatic formations that show ignorance due to not wanting to know (pp. 74-75).

The task or entanglement that has been proposed here within the educational framework represents an embarrassing situation for systems and educators, because although it is true that there is a willingness to weave the tangle that every day is presented in diversity, this leads us to re-think the educational act. That is, it forces a revision of governmental structures and every corner of the classroom, and the cycle of actions that each Nation unfolds to determine which subject it wishes to produce and see in the future. Taking into account that this reflective exercise must be established from educational policies and practices, Veto (2013) points out that:

Education should not aim, however, only to the suffocation of the drives, to the dominion over their externalizations, but should create human beings capable of culture and socially useful, that is, provide means for the sublimation of the instinctual energies in goals and socially valued objects [...] (p. 33).

Among the thinkers who responded to the call linking education and psychoanalysis is Anna Freud (2007), who in her attempt to lay the foundations of mental hygiene in the first years of life, will encourage a special training of teachers with respect to the infant psychic apparatus, in such a way that they could be able to face a subject with their own desire. In her work the author highlights three contributions:

[...] we believe that today psychoanalysis offers three aspects to pedagogy. In the first place, it contributes to the criticism of existing pedagogical norms. Then, as a doctrine of the instincts, the unconscious and libido theory, it broadens the pedagogue’s knowledge of man, and sharpens his understanding of the complex relationships between the child and the adults who educate him. Finally, as a therapeutic method, that is, as an analysis of the child, it tries to remedy all the damage that may have been suffered in the course of his education (p. 91).

Alvarado (2005) states that the relationship between education and psychoanalysis as a point of dialogue and reflection, aims to establish a framework that can enable, as much as possible, a better educational experience. Both disciplines reveal in their praxis a common goal, namely the conjuncture symbolized in the transmission of a knowledge or a
truth, because the design pursued by each of these disciplines permeates or restructures the components that sustain the subjectivity of man. In this way one can allude to what Winnicott (1936) refers to:

There are many ways of conceiving human nature, and according to one of them we see that people are involved in an interior life and an exterior life. The exterior is quite obvious, although most of its motivations are dark and unconscious, even deeply buried. The inner life is primarily a matter of the unconscious. There is an interaction between this inner and outer life in healthy people, so that the external world is enriched by our own inner world, which we can easily place in the people and things with which we come into contact. In addition, our internal world is modified by contact with the externally real, so as time goes on we become surer of ourselves, in the sense of having a clearer distinction between the two realities (p. 935).

So far, we have seen and realized the relationship between education and psychoanalysis. Their antecedents are not limited in terms of temporality, nor are they restricted in terms of their content. The primacy which both enjoy is that of a supposed “knowledge.” A simile that in this case seems to rediscover itself refers to a game of chess; the movements and causes that are drawn day by day on a battlefield, where the real and the phantasmatic enter the scene, and where desire and suffocation have a place. The only thing to be safeguarded is the existence of the king (desire of the other) against the arbitrariness with which it is treated and the simplicity with which it is spoken, in such a way that the dams for its apprehension will be no easy prey for those who have the subtle intention of watching over the truth.

With this it is necessary to refer to the statement made by Sierra (2016):

[...] an aspect of great relevance within the contributions that psychoanalysis can offer to the field of education comes into play, which is to consider the concept of subjectivity... What is sought from this psychological perspective is the possibility of providing the academic community with a listening space, analytical listening, with which there is commitment to opening spaces within the educational institutions for the word to arise in group and individual processes to understand those dimensions or psychological aspects that are mobilized in the different problems of school and its actors, to find what they did not know or had not thought about in the psychic processes of such actors, and to lead to new pedagogical methodologies that provide real Freedom to the Educational Subject (pp. 86-87).
Conclusions

The insights that have been made possible through this bibliographical analysis show that what is radiated in the school every day in the matter of attention to diversity, is an invitation as pointed out by Peralta (2009) so that schools can re-think the enigma of Subjectivity, that is, teachers can reflect on those mechanisms through which their students can represent themselves and others as unique beings.

In addition to the above, another link that demands to be attended and heard is related to the subjective constitution of the teaching being; taking into account its historicity amalgamated by psychic processes and socio-cultural factors, is a situation that requires consideration.

It was found in studies such as Susinos and Rodríguez (2011) and Saldarriaga (2016) that the schools’ commitment to the development of processes of subjectivation and participation of students, where their voices and desires are taken into account, represents an unavoidable opportunity that can be inscribed as a spearhead to offer an integrated educational response.

On the other hand, the fact of not considering individual and social aspects in the path of the psycho-social construction of the learner, represents how Pacheco (2015) visualizes a picture of risks that point to exclusion or discrimination mediated by indicators of violence.

One of the great challenges schools face when dealing with the processes of exclusion and discrimination that are the order of the day, goes beyond a methodological adjustment in the educational task. The understanding unveiled by Gómez (2010) indicates that it is necessary to re-think the student as a subject, that is, a person who is not only in school to acquire knowledge and develop skills, but who is also in it to think and be constituted as a being with its own identity, capable of differentiating and recognizing itself through intersubjective relationships with others.

This ideal to which any inclusive school points cannot be carried out without an essential ingredient, namely the subjective constitution of the teaching being. Just as it is important to rescue the subjectivity of the student to attend to diversity, so is prioritizing the historicity of the teacher so that, based on an understanding and analysis of their own, he or she can re-direct their work and praxis with respect to their students and peers. In this aspect, this work is in agreement with what was revealed by Cadavid (2016), namely, the subjectivity of the teacher becomes very important when the intent is to make changes and fundamental transformations in educational practices.
The task proposed here is not easy to grasp. Educational policies and practices will have to reflect on the subjects that are in the process of being built. Beyond providing them with the tools to adjust and become part of a consumer and competitive society, it is necessary to re-establish the foundations that sustain the recognition and respect for the other.

Another aspect to be questioned according to Paiva and Oliva (2014), is the excessive use of diagnostic manuals such as the DSM-IV to catalog not only the behavior of a student, but also to judge their attitudes and psychological characteristics. The considerations put forth by the authors show that the clinical and psychiatric diagnosis have a subjective power in the process of students, and may risk pigeonholing and labeling them throughout their lives if their context and historicity, that is, their own subjectivity, is not taken into account.

The aspects that transcend educational praxis to address diversity and recognize the uniqueness of each student can be seen in two fronts. While on the one hand it is considered necessary to reflect on the enigma of teacher/student subjectivity, on the other, it is important to recognize and triangulate the epistemological dynamic that in this case education has with disciplines such as social sciences and psychoanalysis.

For Aulagnier (2007) the school plays an essential role in the life of its actors, because it is considered as a space where not only the student but also the teacher is thought and configured, that is to say, as an instituting scenario for certain subjectivities. It is because, from it, new forms or means can be welded that allow a better educational experience.

Speaking in terms of educational practices, leaving aside the uniqueness of each teacher can be a risk. It is important to recognize, from the main organizational structures, the articulation that can be made of their personal and professional life. To reincorporate a path of personal understanding to proposals of teacher training would appear, in this sense, as a holistic construct that would have a significant impact on educational quality.

Given the elucidations that preponderate in this article, it is understood that the issue of the subjectivity of the teaching body is a subject that will have to be re-taken a posteriori, in the matter of educational research and regarding attention to diversity. While it is true that there have been some bases that officiate the behavior of schools to address the course of diversity, privileging the recognition/difference dualism, it is necessary to mention that this opens a completely complex overview that demands to be addressed. That is to say, it is necessary to resignify the historicity of the teaching body, but this in turn requires thinking about the terms in which this goal can be reached. It is not enough only to estab-
lish training and information processes to know how to develop inclusive practices. It is necessary to go further and establish spaces for teachers to have the opportunity to undertake this journey of introspection, which allows them to reflect on their unconscious desires and motivations.

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THE NEOLIBERAL EPISTHEME AND EMANCIPATORY STUDENT
REPOLITIZATION IN BRAZIL AND CHILE

La episteme neoliberal y la repolitización estudiantesl emancipatoria en Brasil y Chile

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The present academic work is developed with the objective of a critical analysis linked to the relationship between the ideological foundations generated on the basis of an episteme of neoliberal positioning, the profound consequences of the increasing privatization of formal education that has taken place in the last decades in Latin America, and the multitudinous student emancipatory mobilizations that have recently taken place in countries like Chile and Brazil. From an exhaustive recapitulation of the specialized literature, an argument is built to demonstrate the privatization experienced in the field of education as an growing trend, the cause of the precarization of relational conditions and learning from the perspective of internal functioning of the school, and in turn seeks to depoliticize the student subject, turning it into a player in the neoliberal, disarticulated and individualistic system. However, at the same time that the student experiences situations of depoliticization, the mobilizations seeking emancipation from an inherited system re-politicize the student question, to claim the idea that education is and must be understood with a social look, as a fundamental human right and as an important space for the construction of citizenship in connection with different democratic projects. It concludes by problematizing this process, whose development presents limitations of a socio-political nature related to the difficulty of achieving the articulation of projects that are alternative to neoliberalism.

**Keywords**

Formal education, neoliberalism, student movement, epistemology, citizenship, democracy.

**Introduction**

Today, according to Katz & Mutz (2017) and Elboj (2010), the idea that formal education systems are in crisis has intensified. A crisis that is, according to Nieves and Gerardo (2017), both the horizon of meaning and
political significance of the process of training for social life, as well as the institutional condition for the development of quality of public education and of the knowledge that allows its operation. Formal education is a space for reflection on society in movement, given that it is in the educational system that society reproduces itself as a culture. Hence, we opt for a type of socialization where knowledge, ideologies and their uses presuppose paths for the reproduction of life and its “supposed” improvement.

Philosophy of Education, for Cervantes & Fernández (2011), Izazaga (2011) and Maris (2012), understood as a reflective-comprehensive activity regarding the articulating budgets of the education system, plays a central role in critical debate. It is in the interstice of the spaces of conflict and normalization that criticism fits in as a mobilizing, systematic and provocative activity around educational development. The educational fact is, above all, a social space that condenses diverse and divergent relationships between social and institutional subjects. It is a space in tension that updates a totality, which for Osorio (2012) is a multiple, contradictory and complex unit, which evidences the visions of the world that have been historically constructed and that present continuities and ruptures. This is so because social transformations become conflicts of interest, which put into play forms of economic, social, political, and cultural organization of society, for which knowledge systems that justify such forms of organization are built.

Seen in this way, the discussion around the relation “subject-object of knowledge” in educational systems requires an analysis of the mediations that configure the set of tensions between the conceptions and uses of modern science and ideology; and the structuring of constituted power and constituent power in the development of contemporary capitalist society. The epistemological positioning accounts for the critical examination of existing ideological limits and tensions in the statutory knowledge regimes, which legitimize a certain type of social and institutional order, where the problems and their supposed solutions are constructed, in view of the reproduction and restructuring of such order.

In the perspective of Wallerstein (2001), and Brenner, Peck & Theodore (2010) we live a historical tendency to the galloping commodification of all spheres of life. This tendency, agreeing with Croso & Magalhães (2016), Vergara (2015), Coutinho (2011), is also expressed in education, which has intensified with the neoliberal episteme. Therefore, it is urgent to resituate the epistemological debate to examine the foundations of recent transformations in education. In this sense, the objective of this paper is to problematize the conflictive relationship between the episteme
of the contemporary neoliberal educational system and the epistemes or critical-emancipatory responses of the student movements of Brazil and Chile, from an analysis of the historical-conceptual recapitulation of the specialized literature. The aim is to defend the thesis that strategies to consolidate the neoliberal episteme and its implications for restructuring the role of the State and the educational system have generated processes of depoliticization and fragmentation of political citizenship. At the same time, this conflictive process has created the conditions for the re-politicization of the student question, which is oriented towards the democratization of society and the revaluation of education as a human right, but which has limitations given the difficulty of articulating the construction of alternative socio-political projects to neoliberalism.

For the development of this central argument, first, we place the epistemological problematic within the framework of the development of the modern sciences and the tension that this has with the ideological aspects, to generate a framework of reflection on the politicization of education. It is about characterizing this debate and adopting an epistemic-analytical position. Secondly, a recapitulation of the central premises that have influenced the foundation of a neoliberal episteme of society in general and of the educational system in particular in Latin America, linking the notions of citizenship and the tendency to the commodification of the educational system. In third place, we reflect on the process of precarization of education as a public and political sphere, situating ourselves in the realities thought from critical aspects in Brazil and Chile, alluding to the concept of democracy and the situation of depoliticization of the student subject. Fourth, the new epistemes that emerged from the recent student mobilizations in Brazil and Chile are related and distinguished, which critically resignify the structuring of the educational system based on profit, which leads to the need for re-politicization. Finally, we establish a reflexive synthesis of the analysis, its implications, limitations and potential hypotheses or investigative paths in the field of epistemology and the philosophy of education.

**Epistemology: tensions between science and ideology**

What is known and how? What is it known for? What knowledge systems are assumed to be most credible and useful? What interests and fundamentals define institutionalized knowledge? What should be known for what type of society? And what type of subject is constructed through
the educational process? These are some of the most relevant questions for Maris (2012) and Rodríguez (2009), who have founded a large part of the debates on education, society and subjectivity. Answering these questions cannot be reduced to a specific field of knowledge that fragments the social totality. On the contrary, they are questions that, in line with the thought of Collado (2017) and Nieves and Gerardo (2017), require an effort of integration, abstraction and critical understanding, including a paradigmatic transformation of education in dialogue with ecology of knowledge, and searches for alternative meanings to the dominant epistemology according to Guerrero (2010); since there is a constant dispute over the theoretical appropriation of social reality and a tension, in the key of Gramsci (1995), between the hegemony of reason, scientific knowledge and the ideologies that configure hegemony.1

Today there are two types of mystifications that have been installed from the hegemonic social sciences, and that have impacted the different ways of producing knowledge. On the one hand, the postmodernist relativism that devalues the construction of theories about the totality of the social system, where the explanatory capacity of social reality vanishes; and on the other hand, the almost absolute predominance of what is called a concrete reality promoted by a naive empiricism, by the power of data and so-called “direct” information. According to Osorio (2012), it is about elaborating knowledge that integrates the visible and the hidden, the surface and the structure, that allows to integrate what organizes the diverse and the particular.

Dominant modern science has installed itself in common sense as the knowledge that produces the most truth in society and that is most useful for its development and progress. This process, according to Mignolo (2000), Dussel (1994), and Quijano & Wallerstein (1992), has been an important part of the consolidation of the historical project of westernized European-colonial European society, and, according to Wallerstein (2001), and Arrighi (1999), in the expansion of the global capitalist system. The central premise refers to the fact that the contradictions and problems generated by the capitalist system, raises the need to create areas of “scientific” knowledge to address such problems, and thus ensure not only their reproduction, but also the international transfer of policies, values, norms and behaviors, which assume a global character.

This vision, based on the specific current of thought of positivism at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, according to Löwy (1994), has placed at the center of the debate the need to build an “objective” and universal thought. The ruling that
society is commanded by universal and immutable natural laws, which are independent of the human will, objective, and free of prejudices and ideologies that affect the scientific status of knowledge is well known. The critical response came on the side of historicism first as a conservative response to the enlightenment philosophy and then as a critique of social institutions and ways of thinking as historically relative.

The historicist philosophy of science seems to be the most appropriate for the problem posed, since it is situated in criteria of external rationality, that is to say subjected to social conditioning, which connects with the question of ideology. It is in this line that, in the words of Pérez (1998): “The field of epistemology is a favorable place for the critique of the foundations and logic that animate the world, as well as the forms of knowledge that have the power of scientific reason.” (p. 7)

The task of epistemology consists, according to Castells (1971) in determining the demarcation between theory and ideology, and between different types of ideologies, which are present in all types of research, either explicitly or implicitly. The production of knowledge, that is, theoretical practice, has a relative autonomy with respect to the social structure. There is no purely theoretical object. The theoretical practice is socially determined in its use and in its scientific content with social ideologies. There would be, therefore, an impossibility both of a total independence of the theory with respect to the articulation with society, and of the existence of theoretical objectives equivalent to all social classes. The ideological aspect, for Castells (1978), acts as a system that organizes the relational space from a network of symbols charged with meaning, which will have a social effect of legitimation. When it is communicated, it leads to a process of rationalization of certain interests that are presented as an expression of a general interest and as communication under certain codes that will condition the interpretation processes. These systems permeate social relations and accompany the cycles of capital accumulation.

For Löwy (1994), it is Goldmann who represents the most important attempt, when formulating a Marxist-historicist solution to the problem of social-scientific objectivity, and to construct a differential sociology of knowledge. The central thesis is that the categorial structure of the consciousness of the researcher is a social fact that is related to the aspirations and interests of different social groups. In this sense, the visions of the social world, the ideologies and the utopias of the social classes decisively make up (directly or indirectly, implicitly or explicitly, consciously or unconsciously) the process of knowledge of society. Thought is conditioned not only by its class position, but also by other
non-class and relatively autonomous social belongings with respect to social classes: religion, generations, nationality, culture, sex. The social vision of the world is deviated, in turn, by its connection to certain social categories (student, bureaucracy, intellectuals, etc.), or to certain organizations (parties, churches, sects, circles). There is, therefore, a relative autonomy and not total independence in the knowledge process, to the extent that the role of the visibility horizon is decisive for the constitution of the cognitive field itself.

Now, to assume these premises has important implications for the historical-social and political-intellectual analysis on the relationship between society, subjectivity and education. The tensions between the knowledge of science and ideology, make possible the understanding of the confrontations between worldviews and the functional aspect of the formal educational system to the hegemonic social order that contains and promotes it. In this line, a synthesis is presented below on the fundamentals of the neoliberal episteme and its relationship with citizens, in view of understanding the tendency towards the commodification of education.

The neoliberal episteme and citizenship: commodification

The neoliberal episteme is defined as the assumptions that are at the base of the foundation of the neoliberalization processes of social institutions. They are the main restructuring processes around the relationship between the State, the market and society, which emphasize specific notions of the subject, education and society, and which characterize contemporary changes in Latin America in general and Chile in particular.

Part of the presuppositions of the neoliberal episteme refer to old liberalism. For Skinner (2004), Hobbes is one of the most important ideologues of liberalism: “He maintained that the condition of human nature is one in which we live completely ‘dissociated’ from the rest of men, subsisting as a mere crowd in a state of solitude, in which ‘each man is an enemy of others’” (p. 122).

If there is to be a political pact, it can only take the form of an agreement between each and every one of the individual members of the “crowd,” and not as members of a community.

This current of thought, for Coutinho (2011) and Lázaro (2001), assumes that the common good only exists as the sum of individual benefits, when in a context of generalized increase in wealth everyone gains, without exception, even if unequally: what is called the good or interest
of all. This idea will later be assimilated to the idea of progress between the nineteenth century and the twentieth century, and later to the concept of development in its economic sense.

Liberalism strengthens developmentalist ideas in education, and its positioning regarding the State, in favor of letting individuals do their economic activities, subordinating education to the market, assuming that the individual interest of all is to become a competitive economic agent in a hierarchical labor market. In this way, Ruiz (2010), asserts that: “From 1870 it is the liberal position that will define the global framework of the educational system” (p. 44).

Smith (2015) affirmed that the maximum level of social welfare is generated when each individual, in a selfish way, pursues his individual welfare, and nothing more than that; in this way, selfishness is unintended “altruism,” not based on compassion or another type of feeling towards the other, but as a consequence of the primacy of economic efficiency, of instrumental rationality, which contributes to the generation of riches, In this way, the inequality of wealth between individuals is taken for granted and justified by the different capacities that they would have to increase it.

The doctrinal differences between liberalism and neoliberalism are not very large. Although their fundamental ideas are practically the same, they do not stop having their particularities. Among these, it is worth highlighting the rejection of neoliberalism to the recognition of equality as a natural feature of humanity or a positive value, if this means something different from the commercial or political reciprocity relations characteristic of the conclusion of a contract, which is voluntary and pursues self-interest, but does not necessarily produce equivalent benefits to all parties. Another specificity of neoliberalism is the denial of life as a right that society must guarantee. Beyond the protection against murder by another individual or the State, the latter should not act, but rather leave those who are not able to successfully insert themselves in the labor market to their fate, even if that means not being able to subsist.

Putting the example of Chile as an experiment in neoliberalism, the most influential neoliberal ideologist in the construction of discourse that until now structures public policies in the field of Chilean education, was, and is, Milton Friedman. Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman (1980), are explicit in saying that: “In education, parents and children are consumers, and the school administrator and teachers, producers” (p. 220). For Friedman and his Chilean disciples, the ‘Chicago Boys,’ education is an economic service of valorization of the “human capital” of students, which develops in them both the values of a “free market society”
and the skills that allow them to compete and perform successfully in markets, especially in the labor market, attributing a moral character to the technical criteria of efficacy and economic efficiency.

Thus, education should be determined by: a) the search for the maximum possible economic benefit in the production, sale or purchase of education. Individuals tend by nature and must be able to sell or buy the best goods at the lowest possible price. The principle of instrumental rationality on costs and benefits that extends to the ethical level (ascetic or philanthropic) includes, among its consequences, an increase of the quality of the teaching and the lessons learned; b) competition as a law or principle of interaction that confronts individuals as economic agents interested in appropriating and/or privately accumulating wealth, including a good education. Competition among the holders of the schools to maintain and/or increase their enrollment and financial income; or between the teachers, to avoid punishment or receive salary incentives; or between students, and between families, to access the selective offer of enrollment by more or less exclusive schools, or other benefits or privileges, including new educational opportunities. Competition that is only possible with, c) the segmentation of the educational offer, establishing alternatives attuned to the plurality of preferences and academic and purchasing capacities of each family or individual; alternatives validated in their acquisition or extinct due to lack of demand.

Vergara (2015) points out that both Hayek and Friedman consider that the only obligation of the State is to provide a basic subsidy to cover the cost of basic training in private schools, ensuring an average level for said schools. If parents want their children to have access to a better education, they will have to “pay for the additional expense,” since it is a precious asset that, the more it grows, by attending, for example, higher education, it will produce higher future income for children, since private investment in education has higher levels of return than that made in other forms of capital.

Profit, competition and segmentation are logically subsidized by the State of Chile through policies of official recognition and tax financing, standardized evaluation and accountability to students, teachers, as well as supporters, results of lessons learned, and dis-accountability of the State.

Under these conceptions, liberal in principle and neoliberal later, the question of citizenship becomes a central issue. The development of the discourse of modern citizenship is linked to the emergence of modernity and the State, as a form of political organization. Although, as Sandoval (2008) states:
The discourse of citizenship finds some of its roots in the experience of the Athenian polis or Roman law, the concept of citizen that we share nowadays did not begin to be forged until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, thanks to the stabilization and concentration of political power in a territorially defined unit, called the State (p. 159).

The State, as an invention, is the institution that concentrates power, control and legitimate coercion. Its actions refer to the regulation of social and political life in societies, at the same time that it builds institutions and links between them in order to configure types of social relations and material conditions of existence.

The neoliberal approach, instead, has focused its ideology on the market, the individual and the State, the latter being its scenario of (de)regulation, so that society must be understood from the individual and its relationship with consumerism. The production of social reality is seen, then, from the individual that is either integrated or not to the social order instituted by expert knowledge (Escobar, 2002). The functionalization of the individual to this model includes a limited normativity, which in the end, what it does, is to maintain discourses and regulatory institutional practices of the subjectivities that perpetuate the non-distributive and inequitable structural imbalance.

In contrast, there is a model of socialist republican citizenship, in which all groups and social classes are turned to subalterns by relations of a capitalist, patriarchal, colonialist type or associated with other forms of domination; they build a popular emancipatory national political project. This tends to the dignification of life (human and nature), the construction of communities that enable the broadest deployment of human capabilities to freely and creatively build their world, transforming nature and humanity itself into a process of construction of hegemony where the State identifies itself with, or dissolves in, civil society through the exercise of citizenship (eliminating its coercive nature). The popular national emancipatory political project is one that manages to build an identity, a we, based on the recognition and struggle to overcome relations of domination, which are plural and concrete, impacting the construction of modern identities and communities, and thus, the social whole.

Liberalism and neoliberalism reject the relationship between (public) education and politics, as a particular case of their rejection of any state interventionism beyond the protection of the law, and consequently, deny that education should play a role in training for citizenship, considering it an alternative associated with an ideal of the particular common good before which the State must remain neutral.
It is clear that the relationship between the neoliberal episteme, citizenship and the construction of a “citizen” subject, from the process of formation in the formal educational system, is far from being coherent with each other. On the one hand, the neoliberal episteme reproduces a market subject, that is, a citizen client and consumer, entrepreneur and directly responsible for their own development process. On the other hand, the notion of citizenship implies the involvement in the questions of the political and the public, in the construction of a society that appeals to an ethics-policy that is based on the equitable improvement of the material, relational and spiritual conditions of society.

In this order of ideas, commodification is at the core of the problem. That is to say, if the education system has the objective of training for social life, and the neoliberalization of the educational system leads to the formation of the notion of the individual governed by the market, then we are facing a process of “commodification” of formal education. Commodification refers, according to Jessop (2007), to the process of transformation of those public goods and services that are not full goods, that is to say, that do not derive directly from the work process. Mercantile education means that the education of the population is assumed as a tradable service and operates under the laws of the market, which leads, therefore, to profit.

Gundel (2009) argues that “there is no citizenship if there is no State and there is no politics if there is no citizenship; therefore, citizen action must focus on the strengthening of the State and politics” (p. 39). This idea will have implications for placing an analysis of the quality of the democratic system that is currently promoted in education systems, since it is in the political arena that the versions of society projects come into play, and that is currently dominated by the precepts of the neoliberal episteme. Next, we analyze the relationship between education and democracy, which will be necessary to critically observe the processes of depoliticization in the student system, a direct consequence of the reproduction and deepening of the neoliberal model.

Education and democracy: depoliticization

Undoubtedly one of the most important consequences of the neoliberal system that dominates the actions of the State has to do with the implications in the structure and functioning of formal education and of the Public School in particular. From this perspective, the educational space
is constructed as a reproducer of neoliberalism’s own configurations, and understands as “good citizens” those students who will maintain the model learned and reproduced from school.

The citizen of the School of neoliberalism is constituted from a particular idea of democracy, promoted from the State and normalized socially, where education is limited to mercantilist logics, which tend to privatization to the detriment of public education. De Sousa & Avritzer (2003) identify this situation as a hegemonic conception of democracy, which is liberal democracy. The concept of democracy is reconfigured, understood in terms of García (2009), as the social and political order for the realization of human dignity and freedom, in reference to human rights, as a set of necessary conditions to live a dignified and full life for the neoliberal development paradigm. This means an elitist option that excludes any other subject and mechanism of political participation different from electoral representation. This democratic individualism, for Rancière (2014), explains the naturalization of an idea of democracy accepted by modern society that fulfills the role of establishing an individualist and unfair relational system to restrict equal rights. Indeed, individualism is imposed on the community, highlighting the interpersonal distancing and superficial cooperation of human relations, and ensuring the depoliticization and disarmament of the community in school. In other words, the social, political and emancipatory space that the school itself constitutes is broken internally.

Thus, neoliberal policies, according to Barbosa (2011), reduce the role of the State in the realization of rights by attributing to public institutions a subsidiary role, or the strengthening of public goods only when a response from the private initiative cannot be obtained regarding needs and social demands, including the goods recognized as fundamental rights such as education.

The concrete action results in a planned and systematic dismantling of the public school that, in Latin America, has not been only a task of the dictatorships experienced mainly in the 70s and 80s. On the contrary, once the dictatorships were over, the right to education continues to be violated, in a privatizing, precarious and depoliticizing zeal. According to UNICEF (2006), this has negative repercussions in relation to the provision of effective conditions for participation in the school environment, and for several generations, since children have the right not only to access school, but also to participate within it. The public school is the best place where the right to participation can be developed, given that it is a space of diversity where everyone could have the right to be recog-
nized as protagonists in the construction of the individual in community, without distinction of class, religion, sex or nationality.

Then, from the focus of law in education, following Pizarro (2003), it is possible to understand real democracy in the school as citizen participation and social justice, in the sense indicated by Coutinho (1979), of conquest of different instances that guarantee true participation with freedom and equality; and as Rancière (2014) and Coutinho (2006) point out, where institutions are not at the service of the preservation of capitalism in which there are many who are segregated and excluded, nor the State at the service of private interests, protected by free elections disguised as democracy.

For Atria (2010), in many cases in Latin America private property is above people, who, in turn, are defined by their purchasing power in the market and not by equality in the exercise of their rights. In this sense, and in the face of the privatization of education, as the axis of its precarization, it is more important for the business class and the political elites to develop devices that, according to Bourdieu (2013) allow to care for and increase profits from this property, at the expense of the rights of the people. In many cases, for the National Forum for Quality Education for All (2012), there is a constitution that attributes excessive weight to economic rights.

The school in its state of precarization and depoliticization, therefore, naturalizes undemocratic practices, because it is constituted as a private space, foregoing the meaning of the public school. This is so, following the ideas of Cerda et al. (2004), because curricular reforms, focused on content and methodologies, make it possible to reach a consensus on how the student who attends school should be: a subject capable of inserting himself into globalization and productivity. Hence, because of the actions of dictatorships in association with subsequent government coalitions defending neoliberalism, a strong segmentation of the education system is generated that affects both the quality of learning, especially for students from sectors most affected in their basic rights, as well as the internal practices of educational establishments. When the school ceases to be a public good and becomes a private good, with an internal logic more linked to a company than to education, solutions and interests are individual, and this is how collective identities are lost, and subsequently the sense of participation. This is why internal practices for the school population are constituted as those that do not adhere to concepts of participation and representation, as they do not represent the interests of the private world gestated in societies with a dictatorial constitutionalism.
Beyond the segregating, privatizing and depoliticizing character that this school construction presents, it is interesting to visualize which are the concrete practices that make the school a non-democratic space. These practices are present, for example, in the teacher-student interaction within the classroom and cover both the specific interaction in relation to content, and other sets of dynamics, in reference to certain specific skills for the teacher and the student. This is the case for Cerda et al. (2004) as within the classroom there is a tension between the spaces of participation and the need for productivity, leaving teachers and students trapped in the logic of the shortage of time to generate reflexive processes, with these remaining outside the curriculum. This situation is aggravated by the large number of students that form the courses, especially in the schools that cover the poorest sectors. Participation is not a learning objective and rather becomes an element of disciplinary control. In this way, the reflection is generated in the relation of extracurricular elements in a rather emancipatory sense of control of the classroom.

The schools become closed spaces that forget the communities that contextualize the territoriality of the students. Even more so when the school is located in spaces of poverty, because there is a low expectation about their learning. The “stigma of poverty” generates a homogenization where the student is described as having difficulties, adding to the devaluation of their knowledge and the knowledge of their parents and families, because they are classified as vulnerable. For Batallán & Varas (2002), these attributions are described in behaviors supposedly typical of “a poor man” developed in terms of homogenizing conceptualizations. This treatment, which in turn is disqualifying, deviates from the focus of law and blurs the student as a subject of law.

On the other hand, Batallán (2003) argues that the teacher also finds his work precarized and depoliticized, experiencing the imposition of power from the higher configurations of school organization, with a set of meanings associated with symbolic violence in relation to mastery, discipline and coercion, what seems like an agreement but is done between non-symmetrical parts. Consequently, the school of neoliberalism is precarious and depoliticized in the intention to reproduce the individualism, productivity, authoritarianism and lack of participation that the model requires to survive.

So, in neoliberal societies constituted from neoliberal democracies, it is fundamental, according to Betancourt (2011), to rescue the school as a space of diversity and participatory democracy, with a potential emancipatory element which stresses the established order just by the fact of
existing in the confrontation against the social segregation that tries to be reproduced from the school. It is in this space that we can install the clarity that we are all different, but we have the same rights, which in itself constitutes a democratic society based on pluralism. Emancipation stems from the recognition of diversity and democracy.

It is not that the school is going to change the world, but it is necessary to attempt a rescue from the use given to it by capitalist society, organized as a reproductive agent of capital, with clear economic interests, naturalizing authoritarian practices and built from inequality. This rescue does not mean deconstruction of the school, but rather of the whole society for the construction of a real democracy. However, the school in its massive and obligatory nature has the task of generating democratic cultures that, through their educational action, install in everyday life the real sense of participatory democracy. As Redondo (2005) points out, school cannot do everything, but as the only “obligatory” social space, we can ask no less from it if we are really interested in the right to education, access with equity for all, fighting inequalities and promoting democracy from school systems.

Epistemes in movement: repolitization

The tendency towards privatization and therefore the commodification of education is a reality in Latin America and the Caribbean. This reality directly impacts the realization of education as a fundamental human right. The data shown by the work of Campanha Latino-Americana pelo Direito à Educação (CLADE, 2014), and the investigation of the most relevant bibliography and legislative transformations, developed by Camila Croso and Giovanna Magalhães (2016), allow us to support the thesis that there is a generalized process of fragilization of public education systems. This process is mainly characterized by the negative impacts on the working conditions of teachers, on the democratic management and on the public financing necessary for the strengthening of public education.

The authors show that in all the National Constitutions and the general laws of education analyzed, there are laws that empower the State to transfer competences related to the supply of public education to the private sector. In addition, the incidence of the private sector has also intensified in the debate and in the definition of the public educational agenda, which is not based on a public debate that facilitates a broad participation of the actors directly involved in the educational process. This
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is accompanied by the perception that private management is inherently superior to that of the public sector. With regard to practices, the activists interviewed by Croso and Magalhães (2016) express harsh criticism of result management for teachers and their relationship with their working conditions. They also question the impoverishment of education, the development of individualistic behaviors, as well as corruption and the naturalization of a competitive logic based on reward and punishment.

The deepening of this trend, economically, politically, and socially, has provoked important student and teacher responses, which demonstrate the contradictions that this process of depoliticization of citizens has been consolidating. Given that it is not possible to describe the multiplicity of experiences of occupation, and for reasons of the extension of the text, the most relevant dimensions are synthesized for the analysis of the process of repolitization evidenced by the student movements in Chile first and then Brazil.

The real importance of installing democratic culture in the Chilean school lies in the contemporary history of the country. With the perspective of that failed transition to democracy, it is interesting to look for options so that Chilean society can definitively change and achieve participatory democracy. In the search to build democratic institutions, there is a new generation of young people who found social coexistence and community in the participation and the demand to their basic rights. That is precisely what has happened in Chile in the last ten years, where a significant group of young students of secondary education have become protagonists of social processes, assuming the character of democratic social actors and repoliticizing their passage through School. Thus appears in the public space a practically forgotten citizen, often criminalized only by the fact of being young and discarded from public policy. Faced with the situation of segregation in which the State had placed them, the students organized, went out to the streets to demand the return of participation and social justice, the end of the social, political, legal and constitutional constructions maintained since the dictatorship; from the demands of their generation, including the right to education.

Although the Chilean student movement has a long history, from the early twentieth century to the eighties where the secondary youths were precisely a group of important resistance to the military civic dictatorship headed by Pinochet, this new version of the student movement made its appearance in 2006 with the so-called penguin revolution. It all began in April when secondary students of the Liceo Carlos Cousiño occupied the high school in protest of the water leaks that the authorities
of the establishment had not improved in a long time. From there, other educational establishments quickly began to be occupied by demands that until then were only internal, reaching around 100 occupied schools.

On May 21, during the traditional public accountability speech made by the presidents of Chile, President Michelle Bachelet made no reference to the demands of the secondary students, nor to the more than 100 secondary schools that were occupied at that time. The State of Chile, which refused to consider secondary students as political subjects and social actors aware of the lack of basic rights in the country, underestimated the capacity and political conviction of these actors. This triggered a true student revolution with more than 200 occupied high schools, with massive concentrations in the streets that easily gathered 600,000 students across the country. At the highest point of the movement, according to the Chilean Observatory of Educational Policies OPECH (2010), there were 1,000,000 secondary students actively participating in the process, of a universe of 1,200,000. Here is an interesting fact, because not only did public schools adhere to these mobilizations, which are undoubtedly the most affected by precarization, so did private schools, some for solidarity, others in the global demand generated from these mobilizations.

A movement that started for specific improvements of schools grew nationally and began to demand the end of the Organic Constitutional Law of Education (LOCE), a law imposed by the dictator Pinochet which, as is customary in Chile, continued to be enforced and determined the schooling of all Chilean students. This law was enacted on March 7, 1990, four days before leaving office and maintained without problems by the political pact governing after the dictatorship. The LOCE, for OPECH (2010), seriously violated the right to education, as it established a model of management and financing of education that was based on segregation and inequality, since it took the responsibility of public schools away from the State of Chile and gave it directly to the municipalities, which openly ended the concept of public school. In a country with one of the largest segregated organizations of territoriality such as Chile, this situation only increased segregation and made students from the poorest areas only have access to even more precarious schools than those who attended schools in sectors with greater purchasing power. In this sense, it can be affirmed that the LOCE brought about a strong crisis of inequity for Chilean education and a fierce crisis of social segmentation for schools, in addition to consecrating the possibility of profiting from Education. In summary, this meant that the State gave re-
resources to manage their schools to the private sector, which in turn could profit, in addition to doing so without any regulation.

The proposals of the students are an example for the country, because they manifested the need to rebuild Chilean democracy. Their demands were structural, in relation to the political and legal reality as a legacy of the dictatorship that until then the government coalition called “La Concertación” did not have the will to change, because they came to power through a pact with the dictatorship.4

After the mobilizations of 2006 an important part of the student youth of Chile changed their perspective in relation to their social responsibility, becoming citizen voices that demanded participation in social decisions and within their own schools. Thus, when the mobilizations of 2006 ended, an educational dialog table was created, where again the government coalition created pacts to maintain the privileges of those who profited from education, and gave the students the end of the LOCE as agreed, which meant a great triumph for the movement. However, from the uneasiness of that movement that did not achieve all the proposed changes, the malaise rose again. In 2011, the students went back out on the street. During the popular mobilizations for education of the year 2011,5 secondary students came to occupy up to a thousand educational establishments throughout the country during the months of June to October.

These occupations were accompanied by multiple internal activities and took place in various public spaces, with the elaboration of local demands and proposals for educational reforms. In barricades, street marches and artistic-cultural acts, marathons, performances or occupations of public dependencies and headquarters of the official political parties, or during hunger strikes; the spokespersons for the students declared that their struggle was not for personal benefit, because the changes they demanded in education could no longer be used by them directly, but by the new generations of children and young people who could exercise their right to education. And while gratuity and the end to profit in education were the most striking demands that could materialize as a right, they also claimed the participation of all actors that made up the educational community in the administrative and pedagogical management of each school or lyceum, and of the entire citizenry, in the formulation of educational policies. Thus, they argued, the commodification and reigning authoritarianism in education and in Chilean society could be overcome, which, among other manifestations, was embodied in the disregard of their approaches within the schools and their exclu-
sion from political citizenship, granted to the population over 18 years of age through the right to vote.

All these mobilizations allowed for a national debate that ended up linking the school system with institutional responses to the needs and aspirations of people in other spheres of human life such as health, social welfare and political participation. The critique of the commodification of life expanded and strengthened until several social movements converged in the demand for the realization of a Constituent Assembly that put an end to a neoliberal order protected by the 1980 Constitution, imposed by Pinochet and his followers. In this way, the movement of secondary students was constituted as a relevant political actor.

On August 31, 2016, given the impeachment of the former president Dilma Rousseff by decision of the Federal Senate, Michael Temer, assumed the presidency of Brazil. In the midst of this political crisis and in the context of a global economic crisis, an agenda of neoliberal reforms and privatizations intensified in several strategic sectors, appealing to the need for fiscal adjustment. Two measures caused controversies and were part of the set of determinations that led to the increase of social conflict in general, and of education in particular. First, Provisional Measure number 746/2016, referring to Brazil (2016), which extends the annual workload from 800 to 1400 hours, the withdrawal of compulsory teaching in art and physical education, curricular emphasis in the areas of language, mathematics, nature sciences, human science and technical and professional training, with the possibility to emphasize only two of these areas according to the criteria of the education system; and omission of the study of sociology and philosophy. Second, the Constitutional Amendment Proposal (PEC) number 241/2016, which freezes public expenditures, with figures corrected for inflation, for the next 20 years, and which also has the potential to affect the rules of minimum wage readjustment.

In this context of reforms, in October 2016, the largest occupational movement in the history of Brazil emerged in São Paulo, which later expanded to most of the country’s cities. More than a thousand schools were occupied by the students in 22 states plus the Federal District, which were organized by the Brazilian Union of Secondary Students (UBE), which is the largest student representation body. These mobilizations had as antecedent and inspiration, the occupation of 200 São Paulo schools in November 2015. At that time, Flach & Schlesener (2017) reported that the students mobilized against the process of restructuring the state educational system, which involved the closure of 94 primary and secondary
schools, and the relocation of 311 thousand students and 74 thousand teachers. Alckmin’s government was forced to suspend the measure.6

The experience of 2016 was a generalized uprising of students against the growing process of precarization of public education and in defense of it. The movement had to resist, mainly, the strong repressions of the State and the constant criminalization of mass media. Without a doubt, the movement was not homogeneous. For example, in Goiás, both students and teachers took over schools in response to the proposal to privatize the management of schools by Marconi Perillo. In São Paulo, the flag was raised against the corruption scandal linked to the food service in the Alckim government. In Ceará, the abandonment and precarization of education by Camilo Santana triggered the mobilizations.

Ana Julia, a 16-year-old girl and representative of the student movement of the State of Paraná, in the plenary session of the Parliament in October 2016, stated:7

(...)

Our flag is education, our only flag is education, we are an a-partisan movement, we are a student movement by students, we are a movement that cares about future generations, that cares about society, worries about the future of the country..., what future will Brazil have if we do not worry about a generation of people who will develop a critical sense, (...) We have to be against a functional illiteracy that is a big problem in Brazil today, that is why we occupy our schools. (...) we need a reform that is debated, discussed, a reform that must be made by the professionals of education..., a school without a party8 is a school with no critical sense, a racist, homophobic school, (...) they want to form an army of non-thinkers, an army that listens and lowers its head, and we are not that (...). We are going to continue fighting because we are in search of knowledge. The student movement brought us much greater knowledge about politics and citizenship than the entire time we were sitting in the classrooms. Despite all this ridicule (...) we still manage to have a presence of happiness, because we perceive that we stop being mere adolescents, we become committed citizens.

The proposals for democratization and politicization of the occupations in São Paulo were built from the everyday experience of the student organization. In these spaces of organization, the research of Corsino & Zan (2017) shows the articulation of a strong autonomy of the students and the tendency to build democratic dialog spaces, through open classrooms, workshops, and in the tensions generated around the oppositions to the occupation. In turn, the study by Severo & Correia San Segundo (2017) clearly shows the processes of appropriation of the capacities of
the agency of the students, and a conscious understanding of the school environment as public, which strengthened feelings of responsibility. An element to be highlighted according to the study by Groppo et al. (2017), is the experience of building a political formation based on the horizontality of relations and the strengthening of intergenerational dialogue.

Larchert (2017), who examined the Occupy movement in Brazil in the midst of a process of physical and ideological violence, discovered that the movement was taking political institutional form and content through negotiation and conflict. It contributed in a *sui generis* way to critical training, which gave way to processes of awareness and problematization of social and political reality in terms of Freire (1992). Flach & Schlesener (2017) assert that the experience of the movement was generating changes in the individual, through the reflexivity that led to self-perception, in which the individual feels as an active part of the collective. This was what constituted the educational, social and political learning and training in the process undertaken by the students.

**Final considerations**

In the approach of emancipatory student movements to the neoliberal model in education, three fundamental critical nodes can be identified that contribute to the epistemic debate on society, education and subjectivity: a) the tendency towards the commodification of education in Latin America which, based on the universalist episteme of liberalism, denies political community, enhances individual liberties, and presupposes that education is a good for consumption and profit; b) this trend implies the advance of the dismantling and precarization of education and the public school, promoting an idea of an “obese, inefficient and ineffective” State for the tasks of improving the quality of education, and an idea of a depoliticized subject geared towards universal consumption and entrepreneurship; and c) the student mobilizations in Brazil and Chile, which claim education as a human right, show as a main feature the need to intensify the processes of politicization of education as a space for liberation of “the public” and as a space for the construction of “the political,” democracy and citizenship.

The analysis of recapitulation of the literature has limitations due to the fact that it established more or less arbitrary decisions regarding the hypothesis that was proposed for the debate, and the adoption of a type of epistemological analysis that focused on identifying the ideologi-
cal aspects that underlie the formal education system. The hypothesis of the repolitization that is observed with the student mobilizations must be deepened in at least three aspects. In the first place, it is necessary to deepen the role of teachers and their training in the construction of political subjects. Secondly, it is important to analyze both the legal changes and the institutional restructurings that student movements achieve, as well as the strategies of fracture of the movements by the State. Thirdly, it is essential to develop ethnographic studies that are situated to understand the new forms of politicization that are experienced in these spaces of mobilization and occupation of educational establishments.

The relationship between education, subjectivity and society finds in these spaces of conflict a privileged place to deepen the debate around the transformations that the formal educational system requires for the reconstruction of a new ethics and politics, founded on human rights and participatory democracy. It should be noted that the constituted power of the neoliberal educational system is put in tension by the constituent power of the student mobilizations, above all by the denial on the part of the State of effective spaces of social participation. These mobilizations clearly go beyond the educational issue. It is a response to the tendency towards the commodification of life and the model of neoliberal democracy. The high level of conflict and the opening of negotiating agendas between states and movements is limited by the imposition of capitalist domination structures, which make it difficult to build alternative projects for society. It is the criticism of a vision based on the idea of the alternation in power and management of the neoliberal model. It is about reconstructing the social bases through processes of real democratization, of emancipation, from diversity and for social justice, calling on citizens to become political subjects of transformation. This is the most important flag that students raise from their spaces of creative, plural and autonomous mobilization.

Notes

1 The concept of hegemony is understood as the ability to direct certain groups or social fractions over others. Or those groups that present themselves to others as those that represent and serve the interests and values of an entire society, obtaining voluntary consensus and spontaneous consent, thereby guaranteeing the unity of a social block that remains cohesive and articulated (Gramsci, 1995).

2 Neoliberalization refers to “the diverse tendencies of regulatory change that have spread throughout the global capitalist system since the seventies: it is a tendency that prioritizes responses to regulatory problems from a perspective based, oriented
and imposed by the market; it intensifies the commodification of all areas of social life and mobilizes speculative financial instruments in order to find new niches of capital accumulation” (Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2010, p. 23).

3 In order to consult this process, the documentary “Actores Secundarios” is recommended, as it reconstructs the student movement at the end of the 1980s in Chile. Available at: https://goo.gl/Pu2pCZ

4 The agreement for democracy was a political pact that came to power when the dictatorship reached its end. This political coalition was made up of the Christian Democrats (the party that supported the 1973 coup d’état), the Socialist Party of Chile, the Party for Democracy and the Radical Party. The first president chosen in democratic elections after the end of the dictatorship belonged to that coalition. Patricio Aylwin not only supported the coup, he also summoned the military to take power in the midst of the crisis of 1973 from the Congress of the Republic.

5 This process is shown in the documentary “La primavera de Chile,” available at: https://goo.gl/8B6YL7

6 From the point of view of the legality of the fact, two positions were opposed. On the one hand, the illegality of occupations was argued on the grounds that education, being a public service, could not interrupt its operation, because the right to education guaranteed in the Federal Constitution would be affected. However, in the State of Paraná, the public ministry affirmed the legitimacy of the movement, based on article 205 of the Federal Constitution. This article refers to the fact that one of the functions of education must be training in citizenship, which means that occupations, as a form of protest, would constitute a valid action in a citizen’s practice.

7 The translation of this speech was made by the and the authors. The video can be found at: https://goo.gl/Uh1TBG

8 School without Party was founded in 2004 by Miguel Nagib. It emerged in response to the arrival of the Workers Party (PT) government. The assumption that articulates the meaning of the action of the School without Party, is the idea that the PT would be responsible of the process of spreading leftist ideologies in schools. It is, therefore, to combat this “indoctrination”, for which a first proposal of Law was presented in 2014. For consultation visit the following link: https://goo.gl/JG3mvu

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Abstract

This article presents dialectics as a way of investigating plurinationality and its counterpart, the ancient Ecuadorian monoethnic nation-state. It puts forth the following questions: 1) what is the ontological foundation of plurinationality? and 2) why does plurinationality as a socio-political approach deny the homogeneity of the liberal nation-state and its correlated external-internal colonialism? It is argued that the ontological foundation of plurinationality is found in community society (or social being) and that, in its socio-political praxis, it denies the fetishization of the liberal nation-state, determined as an instrument of the external-internal colonialism of society. The research conceives and applies the dialectical analysis of concrete reality and the law of universal contradiction, as inherent in the social being and the thought that reflects said reality. The study concludes that: 1) dialectics comprises the category of totality and is useful for the analysis and explanation of society as a whole, from the parts to the whole and from the whole to the parts, in mutual universal interrelation; 2) community society is an ontological objectification of plurinationality and manifests itself in the ethnic-cultural diversity of Ecuador, with different historical temporalities, and in opposition to the colonial and republican economic-social formation; and 3) the fetishization of the liberal nation-state as an instrument of external and internal colonialism of Ecuadorian society is still in force and continues to fulfill that same function through the processing of the coloniality of power, the ontological invisibility of the other (alter) and racist colonial differentiation.

Keywords

Dialectics, community, state, nation, colonialism.


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Dialectics of plurinationality as criticism of the liberal state-nation
Dialéctica de la plurinacionalidad como crítica del Estado-nación liberal

Resumen
El artículo estudia la dialéctica como camino de indagación de la plurinacionalidad y su contraparte el vetusto Estado-nación monoétnico ecuatoriano. Indaga: 1) ¿cuál es el fundamento ontológico de la plurinacionalidad? y 2) ¿por qué la plurinacionalidad como planteamiento socio-político niega la homogeneidad del Estado-nación liberal y su correlato el colonialismo externo-interno? Se plantea que el fundamento ontológico de la plurinacionalidad se halla en la sociedad comunitaria (o ser social) y que en su praxis socio-política niega la fetichización del Estado-nación liberal, determinado como instrumento del colonialismo externo-interno de la sociedad. La investigación concibe y aplica el análisis dialéctico de la realidad concreta y la ley de contradicción universal, como inherentes del ser social y del pensamiento que refleja dicha realidad. El estudio concluye que: 1) la dialéctica comprende la categoría de totalidad y es útil para el análisis y explicación de la sociedad en su conjunto, de las partes al todo y del todo a las partes, en mutua interrelación universal; 2) la sociedad comunitaria es una objetivación ontológica de la plurinacionalidad y se manifiesta en la diversidad étnica-cultural del Ecuador, con temporalidades históricas distintas, y en contraposición a la formación económicoo-social colonial y republicana; y 3) la fetichización del Estado-nación liberal como instrumento del colonialismo externo e interno de la sociedad ecuatoriana aún está vigente y continua cumpliendo esa misma función a través del procesamiento de la colonialidad del poder, la invisibilización ontológica del otro (alter) y la diferenciación colonial racista.

Palabras clave
Dialéctica, comunidad, Estado, nación, colonialismo.

Introduction
One of the contemporary problems of scientific disciplines, both positivist and neo-positivist, has to do with the recurrent conception and apprehension of reality in segments and compartments. In this view, the free thinker conceives of reality from his subjectivity and subjectivism, before objects that are interpreted outside of himself, as independent and without any relationality from one another. The same happens with methods. According to the free thinker, the methods of apprehending reality have been segmented into multiple orders called epistemological and methodological pluralism, thus foregoing an understanding of reality as a concrete totality.

The approaches of science from the epistemological or gnoseological perspective are multiple: concordist, disciplinary, multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and in the best of cases, transdisciplinary; according to Falatoonzadeh (2012) they are still divided and disunited as a science and, in the worst cases, disconnected from reality. An example of this is the study of economics, on the one hand, and politics in universities, on the other; many subjectivist scholars separate economic reality from real political life; they even conceive in their thoughts of the public sphere and the private sphere as disconnected in order to account for the world, divorcing politi-
cal society and civil society as if they were two separate realities. In addition to that inherent segmentation, there exists in the curricular programs of the (Ecuadorian) university an academic and functional dualism, as a reality assumption, from which university studies are promoted, as if the natural-social world were structured in this way-content.

In this context, according to the postmodern approaches of Mouffe (1999) and Lyotard (1987), the comprehensions of reality have become particularized or relativized. In this sense, according to Díaz (2015), the historical subject has also been made invisible or hidden under the metaphysical abstraction of the being that forgets the colonial scope of the other as distinct and under increasingly reconstituted colonial conditions.

From the ontological horizon, the nihility or nullity (as negation) of the social being means the objectification, reification or the alienation as loss of identity and negation of the social human essence (or negation of man by man himself). Lessa (2015) denotes that under alienation, the alter, as an individual and a substantial part of the human race, is thought of as an object; in capitalist society as a commodity, detached, distorted and denigrated of its human relations, of its social being. In the perspective of Alcântara (2014), in this set of reified or alienated relations there is no room for the condition of human autonomy and freedom, if what is meant by freedom is the choice of concrete possible alternatives, in the context of the historical-spatial community to which each man and woman belongs. Only there can human life be realized in its specific conditions.

In its concrete form, the social being has correspondence with the social community in conjunction with others, in order to survive and become in the historical space-time, without ceasing to be what it was in its essence and what it is in the present. The community as a social being, in its formation, form and historical content (historicity), is opposed to any essentialism, monism, monadism or historical particularism, because the social community is a community society that, according to Bautista (2014), gives foundation to the singular and universal relations of the present society. And everything that undervalues it, such as the nation-state or global capitalism through the uncontrollability of capital and the plundering of work, is a contradiction that can and must be overcome by the qualitative dialectic of the negation of the negation of the nation-state (substitution of the old for the new) and a different community-based civilizational matrix that, in the language of indigenous and Afro-Latin American societies, corresponds to the plurinationality of societies as a practice of political freedom of processes of self-determination and community self-government, as a product of millennial praxis.
In this general context, the article approaches the study of dialectics as a way of investigating the plurinationality that confronts the ancient modern and Ecuadorian monoethnic nation-state, because the way to approach the reality of the thing itself is through dialectics, as a path of ontological investigation of reality and as a reflection of that reality and not as a field of epistemological or subjective thought that interprets reality. Dialectics is conceived as a movement of concrete reality, in which the world is explained by what is itself (its own nature) and not by something external to it (the metaphysical field). According to Bruno (2011) and Kosik (1976), dialectical thought conceives of reality as a structured totality that develops and creates, that is, as a concrete totality.

In the Marxist conception, dialectics is critical and revolutionary, since it conceptualizes and understands all reality as historical and transitory, and according to Kohan (2014), it does not “fear the antagonism of contradiction” (p. 3); it is understood that there is no dialectic without the contradiction of its own being in its movement, its processual nature and originality. In this sense, plurinationality as an ontological manifestation of the social being of indigenous societies does not escape the historical law of contingency, transience, contradiction and the irreversibility of social processes. In this view, plurinationality as an expression of social being becomes the negation of the homogeneity of the liberal nation-state and of opposition to any process of external-internal colonialism of society.

From what has been stated above, the article aims to delve in two research questions: 1) What is the ontological foundation of plurinationality for the Ecuadorian case? And, 2) why does plurinationality as a socio-political approach deny the homogeneity of the liberal nation-state and its correlate of external-internal colonialism? As a fundamental message, it is established that the ontological foundation of plurinationality is found in the community or community society (as a social being) and that in its socio-political praxis it denies the fetishization of the liberal nation-state as the instrument of external-internal colonialism in civil society.

The article is segmented into three analytical guidelines: 1) the first line of study refers to the understanding of dialectics as an ontological heuristic path; 2) the second guide refers to the understanding of communal society (social being) as an ontological manifestation of plurinationality and its manifestation in the ethnic-cultural diversity of Ecuador, in the context of a variegated social formation, opposed to an economic-social republican formation; and 3) the third line of study has to do with the fetishization of the liberal nation-state as the primary instrument of the external-internal colonialism of society.
Dialectics as an ontological path of study

Although dialectics is present in all civilizations of the world, it was the Greeks who developed it in their philosophical thought and as a mode of explanation of reality. Konder (2008) argues that in ancient Greece, dialectics was the art of dialogue. It was also considered as the peculiarity that provided them with the necessary tools to understand the essence of what they did and the professional activities to which they were dedicated. One of the radical Greek thinkers was Heraclitus of Ephesus, who maintained that everything exists in permanent change and that conflict is the father and king of all things. Heraclitus denied the existence of any stability in being, which disturbed many Greek thinkers, giving way to the thought of another thinker, Parmenides. This author, unlike Heraclitus, taught that the deep essence of being was immutable. And movement, on the other hand, was a superficial phenomenon. The metaphysical thought of Parmenides imposed itself over the thought of Heraclitus. In later societies the metaphysical position prevailed due to class society and its ruling classes. In this way, Heraclitian dialectics was obscured until the appearance of the German philosopher Hegel, who returned to it without extrapolating it from the metaphysics of being. The German philosopher concluded that the principle of contradiction could not be suppressed from the consciousness of the subject and objective reality. Dialectics remained upside down. It was Karl Marx who straightened it out with what is known as historical materialism.

Due to the misrepresentations and misappropriations of the thought of Marx and Engels, dialectics in particular, we can ask ourselves what Marxist dialectics is not. Several answers are possible: it is not a manual of concepts or a catechism of faith (mythification), nor a dogmatic doctrine that must be followed at face value, nor an immutable, archaic and petrified science. It is the opposite. Bruno (2011) states that it is a science of the radical critique of society, of historical and cultural processes, global, micro and macro, and of radical self-criticism of subjects committed to historical praxis and the transformation of class society.

Another problem that should be clarified has to do with the terminological definitions carried out by some intellectuals, especially Ecuadorians, when defining social objects and relations as independent of each other, without any connection. For example, the public and private spheres, theory or practice, or the principle of identity of formal logic that defines a value judgment as A = A (the table is identical to the table), as if reality were like this. On the contrary, Marxist dialectics crosses all the fields of reality, does not neglect some parts for others or the parts
over the whole, because reality is a concrete totality in the sense conferred by Kosik (1976). That is why we must be attentive to the totality of the interrelations and ontological interactions that appear as phenomena and processes and hide the substantiality of being.

In the Marxist vision, dialectics is a fluid and dynamic vision of society and history (read as historicity) of economic and social events. The following quote from Engels and Marx (2006) from the work Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German philosophy (and other writings on Feuerbach) offers a global overview of this perspective:

Men make their history, whatever the course of it, as each one pursues his own ends with will and conscience of what they do; and the result of these numerous wills, projected in different directions, and their multiple influence on the outside world, is precisely history. It matters, then, what the many individuals want. The will is moved by passion or reflection. But the springs that, in turn, move directly to them are very diverse. Sometimes, they are external objects; other times, ideal reasons: ambition, “passion for truth and justice,” personal hatred, and also individual manias of all kinds. But, on the one hand, we already saw that the many individual wills that act in history almost always produce very different results from those intended—sometimes, even contrary—and, therefore, their motives have a purely secondary importance in terms of total result. On the other hand, it is necessary to ask what propulsive forces act, in turn, behind these motives, what historical causes are those that in the heads of men are transformed into these motives (pp. 43-44).

Marx and Engels, unlike Hegel (idealist) put the accent of dialectics on materialist and revolutionary foundations. In this sense, the history of peoples and civilizations advances through contradictory processes that follow one another in non-linear and curvilinear processes of continuity and discontinuity. For this reason, the deployment of reality carries with it the negation of the negation as an overcoming of the previous moment in another, superior moment, one that contains the elements of the previous one. An example of this is written by Erice (2013) referring to the ideas of Herber Marcuse:

In socio-historical terms it means that, in general, crises and collapses are not accidents or external disturbances, but rather manifest the true nature of the thing and, therefore, provide the basis for understanding the essence of the existing social system. It also means that the intrinsic potentialities of man and things can only develop in society through the death of the social order in which they previously originated. Hegel says
that when something becomes its opposite, when it contradicts itself, it expresses its essence.

When, as Marx says, the common idea and practice of justice and equality leads to injustice and inequality, when the free exchange of equivalents produces, on the one hand, exploitation, and on the other, the accumulation of wealth, these contradictions also belong to the essence of existing social relations. Contradiction is the engine of progress (pp. 8-9).

Another dimension of Marxist dialectics has to do with the category\(^1\) of totality, understood as the unity of the whole with the whole and of the whole with the parts, unlike the separatism or the relativity of everything in the whole that is typical of postmodern thought. Lukács (1970), who developed the idea of totality in *History and Class Consciousness*, affirms that even in concrete studies we must not lose sight of the “relationship with society as a whole. Because only in this relation does the conscience that men can have of his existence in each moment appear in its essential determinations” (Lukács, 1970, p. 80). In this way, the category of totality is indispensable to think and explain the plurinationality of society in all its determinations and socio-historical and cultural interactions.

**Community society as an ontological manifestation of plurinationality in the context of a variegated social-spatial formation**

One of the options for explaining the Ecuadorian national question is that of the variegated social-spatial formation with differentiated historical times, different socio-cultural and territorial entanglements, in the contradictory unity of the territory delimited by the State.

In order to explain the category of social and spatial formation, linked at the same time, as it must be understood, to that of economic formation, the Marxist version will be used.

A first explanatory finding is found in the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, either in the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1989) or in *German Ideology* (1974), when they refer to economic-social formation. In relation to the *Contribution to the critique of political economy*, Marx starts from the following assumption: the material conditions of life are the indispensable component from which life and the history of men arises. They think that neither juridical relations, nor the form of the State, nor the general evolution of the human spirit can be understood by themselves, since those relations and form of the State
have their origins in the material conditions of existence or life. In this sense, the form of civil society—in the name that Hegel gives it—must be sought in political economy. In *German Ideology*, Marx and Engels (1974) express the same idea, referring to the conditions of life linked to real individuals and their actions. The following statement correctly expresses the previous idea: “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. The first verifiable factual state is, therefore, the corporeal organization of these individuals and, as a consequence, their behavior towards the rest of nature” (Marx and Engels, 1974, p. 19). The term *naturally* expresses being-alive-existent and human, that is, corresponding to the human species, therefore, individual (the quality of being individual), social and also related to a nature that is both inorganic and organic; in this scaffolding of being, there are different levels of being (inorganic, organic and social) related to each other.

In this way, human history and the existence of living individuals represents the existence and coexistence of human beings among themselves. Marx and Engels (1974) refer to the fact that humans, by differentiating themselves from animals, begin to produce their livelihoods by that very fact: “By producing their livelihood, man indirectly produces his own material life” (p. 19). What is behind the production of livelihoods is work, in a broad sense, as a “basic and fundamental condition of human life” and, at the same time, the fact that “work has created man himself” (p. 371).

Marx and Engels (1974) go on to state that the way in which human beings manufacture their livelihood depends, above all, on the very nature of the means of life with which they find themselves at every step. But this form of production is not only a reproduction of the physical existence of individuals, it is above all a determined form of human activity, a definite modality of expressing one’s life and a delimited way of life of individuals. And individuals are what they are, because of how they express their very life. From this moment, Marx and Engels (1974) trace the general concept of production, whose content is related to what they produce and how they produce men. Marx and Engels conclude that: “What individuals are depends, therefore, on the material conditions of their production” (Marx and Engels, 1974, p. 20). This production logic is what is called productive moment.

There is another element that the authors incorporate in their explanation. They refer to the fact that the vital social production is determined by the degree of development of the material productive forces linked to relations of production that, as a whole, configure the economic
base of society, and it is on this structure that the legal and political superstructure of society stands. Defined modalities of social conscience correspond to this dimension of society. The productive forces and the relations of production are always in conflict or continuous contradiction.

In the field of social formation, in Marx (1989) a new social formation is nonexistent if all the productive forces within it have not yet developed. As such, no new and superior production relations appear if the material conditions for its existence have not matured within the ancient society. Marx exposes in broad strokes the preexistence of several modes of production, e.g. Asian, old, feudal and modern bourgeois, which are comparable to the economic social formation of human society and this closes the prehistory of society. This classification corresponds to the European and other realities studied by Marx, but it does not serve to explain all the historical world realities. Therefore, it is not plausible to accept them as Marx enunciates them for the peoples of America, which entail other different and varied processes in historical spaces-times.

Starting from the socio-economic formation category conceived by Marx, Tapia (2002) in accordance with the ideas of René Zavaleta (2015), formulates a *sui generis* explanation to account for the coexistence of several modes of production at the moment of productive level in the Bolivian multi-society. Other thinkers, says Tapia, have conceived of the category as a structural and superstructural unit which gives unity to that variety “of modes of production at the level of the economic moment” (Tapia, 2002, p. 308). And the sphere of the superstructure would contain components of earlier traditions that are re-functionalized by capitalist society and that would end up being part of “a new political-social quality” (p. 308).

One of the difficulties encountered in the category of socio-economic formation is that of not allowing the understanding of other modes of production or their articulation in heterogeneous societies, such as those determined by indigenous Latin American societies within each country. For this reason, the bet that Tapia (2002) makes with the category of variegated social formation is pertinent to unravel and explain the structure and superstructure of Ecuadorian society as a whole.

Tapia (2002) mentions that a variegated social formation is characterized by the coexistence of diverse temporalities or historical times, an issue that is defined at the level of the productive moment. The notion of historical time is not comparable to the mode of production, due to the existence of other modes of production, particularly in agricultural societies such as the Bolivian, Ecuadorian and others from the contem-
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In such a way that in a variegated social formation, in addition to the coexistence of social and legal relations of production, there are also heterogeneities of historical times that are specificities of profound diversity or differences in political structures and culture. At the same time we must add the diversity of political modalities and social matrices of generation.

Thus, in the Ecuadorian sociopolitical reality—and the Latin American by extension—, exists on the one hand, the political sphere of the national State with formal legal characteristics, and on the other hand, a series of local structures of authority, which are diverse and do not represent the national authority, nor are they designated by the national government; it is more about endogenous local modalities and millenarian and ancestral types that organize the social life of local societies.

In short, the variegated social formation, according to Tapia (2002):

is characterized, then, by containing diverse historical times, of which a more particularized expression is the coexistence of several modes of production; the existence of various political forms of a diverse or heterogeneous matrix, expressed in the existence of a set of local structures of authority that are diverse among themselves, and a more or less modern and national State, but which does not maintain relations of organicity with the previous ones and consequently, it is a more or less apparent State (p. 310).

The appearance of the State is reflected in a set of cultural communities and heterogeneous and inconclusive productions that have not found a foothold in civil society as a whole. The State is apparent because, in those heterogeneous societies, the capitalist system has not yet been developed in its formal composition, nor has the historical process between producer and means of production been definitively divided. In other words, if one follows the Marxist conception (Marx, 1980), the process of original accumulation has not yet been developed prior to capitalist accumulation. However, it can be shown that the original accumulation or what Harvey (2004) calls accumulation by dispossession, today is extended by the State to other processes of social life, such as the commodification and privatization of lands, territories, agribusiness, among other processes that are catastrophic for countries in capitalist dispossession.

In the explanation given by Tapia (2002), the variegated social formation is the composition of extensive margins of segmentation with processes of conjunction of various modes of production and of con-
junction of structures and superstructures related to their own worldviews. In other words, it is about:

A process of incomplete organic totalization, of the dominant mode of production at the level above all of the productive moment, and of an apparent unification of everything that has not been transformed into its social substance but is contained under the domination of a state or superstructural regime that demarcates the horizons of the current system of that diversity which legitimacy claims and legitimates as a national government (Tapia, 2002, p. 310).

In the context of the variegated social-spatial formation, the Military Geographic Institute (2017) attests that the Ecuadorian State, through the 2008 Constitution, has finally recognized fourteen nationalities of millenarian and ancestral origin, with peoples that recognize ancestral languages and inhabit territories in community and/or communal enclaves. In this same sense, the State Policy Letter, CPE (Corporación de Estudios y Publicaciones, 2015) conceives that the nationalities are constituted by indigenous people, and by peoples, such as the Afro-Ecuadorian, Montubio and white-mestizo. However, we must ask ourselves what is beyond this recognition, that is, what is the substance of this social diversity or is it at the very base of indigenous nationalities and peoples, in their social being and the motive of their historical struggle?

Community society on the basis of indigenous nationality

An approximate answer to the previous question is to show that the community or community society, with its respective socio-cultural, economic and political structures, is at the base of the configuration of each nationality. In other words, the foundation of nationality is substantiated in the community society of millenarian and ancestral origin, in the daily practice of relations and networks of kinship and consanguinity that extend beyond the third or even fourth generation. The objective formulation that will be introduced here is that of the Andean ayllu, as the fundamental nucleus of community society, extensive not only to the Ecuadorian case but also to the pan-Andean context. What is or what characterizes a community society?

In the understanding of Kusch (1976), community society implies a way of life, a way of living, a way of “being” (p. 153), a way of existing of the typically pan-Andean life world that is based on the ayllu. The ayllu is a fundamental and life experience of the indigenous community societies.
of Ecuador, and according to Moya (1995) also of the Andean cultures in general; the community society is the basis on which the original social and organizational community structure is built.

According to Bautista (2012) the ayllu is a community society of relatives, with strong ties of kinship and affinity. The ayllu in conjunction with other forms, gives way to a wider community society. This generates a mode of relationship and ad intra and ad extra reciprocity. Bautista maintains that: “The Ayllu indicates not a mere community, but the always extensive congregation of potential relatives; so that the community, in principle, is determined as an open community” (Bautista, 2014, p. 142). Calapucha (2012), referring to the Amazonian ayllu of Arajuno-Ecuador, asserts that the ayllu is the extended family or muntun (from the Spanish montón or heap) and is reference and self-reference for each person. Among the Amazonian kichwas, the community is also the ayllu that is constituted in the ayllukuna (families), in such a way that the ayllu is the foundation of the indigenous society and no social action develops without the participation of the ayllukuna.

Likewise, for Espinoza Soriano (1990) the original community society is a supra-family, extensive structure, in which its members united in simple nuclear families and nuclear-compound families, since pre-classical times, were and continue to be linked today by real or blood kinship. The union of domestic units (nuclear-simple families and nuclear-compound families) in the configuration of broader community societies was fundamental for collective work. The ayllu as an original community society, together with others, always forms a much larger community society or jatun ayllu (big family), in order to organize and resist the ravages of political society and the domination of global capitalism.

In the pre-Hispanic past, the set of original communities composed of farmers shared different ecological levels. According to Mariátegui (2007), this type of community extended beyond the conquest, with the denomination of “agrarian communism of the allyu” (p. 50). In interpreting Peruvian reality, Mariátegui argued that the agrarian communism of the ayllu was the central nucleus of the indigenous community and of the “community under colonialism” (p. 50) that even extended to the republic. However, the colonial legal provisions were what transformed the indigenous community society into “a wheel of administrative and fiscal machinery” (p. 50). The colonial agrarian regime established the replacement of a large part of the indigenous agrarian communities in exchange for privately owned latifundia, cultivated by the Indians subject to a feudal organization. Mariátegui mentions that the ayllu or community continues
to preserve its natural idiosyncrasy, as a subsisting, almost family institution that remains beyond the conquest with its constituent principles.

Castro Pozo, in the framework of “Our indigenous community” (in Marzal, 1998, p. 468), shows that the community is based on common property and consanguineous ties. And the land also belongs to a community that benefits from production.

It has been mentioned above that the indigenous peoples of Ecuador and Latin America base their way of being and living in community society. In the Andes, these communities are ad intra and ad extra, although more endogamous. Ad intra communities, according to Albó and Ramón (1995), form their new homes, share a “territory,” “with their own system of government” (p. 92), a natural environment, a language, a culture, an identity and the same historical root, giving origin to the indigenous nationalities (Ecuador) or nations (Bolivia).

In social praxis, each of the communities is self-contained, related to others with which it competes for resources, and relationships that contain real or potential conflicts. The community society as a social organization chooses the cultural particularities that it adopts as its own identity, be they practices, symbolic representations, parties, dances, jobs and linguistic turns of the language, etc. In the perspective of Groppo and Cenerini (2012), community society is the geopolitical space in which identity is constructed and manifested, linked in fact to the land, territory and territoriality. The territory is considered as an inherent part of this society and its construction, hence it is not only an administrative space, but also a space of “cultural, linguistic or marginal nature” (p. 12) and power relations.

In the Ecuadorian Amazon, in the criterion of the coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin-COICA and assumed by Calapucha (2012), the territory is understood as a natural and social relational totality, where everything is imbued with life. Calapucha (2012) states that:

The mountains, valleys, rivers and lagoons identified with the existence of indigenous peoples and have provided them with their means of livelihood; the inherited wealth of their ancestors and the legacy they are bound to pass on to their descendants; a space in which each small part, each manifestation of life, each expression of nature is sacred in the memory and in the collective experience of that people and that is shared in intimate interrelation with all other living beings, respecting their natural evolution as the only guarantee of mutual development (p. 36).
It should be clarified that what Calapucha (2012) argues cannot be generalized to other places and regions of the Amazon, because the patterns, rationalities and perceptions in Amazonian societies are not natural but cultural and ideological constructions (belief systems). These forms of social being correspond to the superstructure of indigenous societies.

In short, community society is the ontological basis of indigenous nationality identified in the facts, in community territories and with community territorial governments. They exercise authority in specific territories, have political-legal representation, constitute the space for participation and decide on their social, political, economic and cultural aspects. According to the Government Council of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador-CONAIE (2007), community territorial governments have participation mechanisms through community assemblies, extended councils, congresses, among other modalities for collective decision-making, which allows for decision processes, planning and organization of multiple forms of productivity, trade, education, health, etc. From now on, the acronym CONAIE will be used to refer to the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador.

In the Andean context, according to the CONAIE (2012) and Rivadeneira (2014), the territorial governments consider and are governed by several reality principles, as part of their integral philosophy: relationality, complementarity, duality, reciprocity, and community.

Just as the ayllu is to the community society, so the community society is to the indigenous nationality, shaping plurinationality. However, it should be clarified that the terms nationality and indigenous nation are not comparable with that of the modern nation of Bottasso (2010), since the conception of the modern nation evolves within the liberal framework of a nation, even articulated to the modern State.

The following section analyses the historical-spatial problematic of plurinationality.

**Plurinationality as a historical problem**

According to Ramón (1992), until 1975, indigenous claims had not appeared in the political debate in Ecuador, but in 1977, with the invitation made by the Ecuadorian Institute of Anthropology of Otavalo (Ecuador) to Yuri Zubritski, a door to the debate on the plurinational State was opened.

In the testimony of Almeida (2016), the State should consider indigenous people not as peasants or as poor, but as peoples who have
maintained their languages, cultures, territories and historical memory, because indigenous societies were entitled to their own political freedom, to self-govern and not to allow others to assume the role that corresponded to themselves.

Almeida (2016) mentions that Zubritski, referring to the terms of nationality and plurinationality, started from the right of peoples to their identity, belonging and autonomous organizational capacity. Zubritski argued that the concept of peasant employed in the struggle for land did not offer a consciousness of belonging; nor was the concept of Indian suitable for the peoples of America; in a struggle that should be understood for universal reasons of nationality, it was not enough for indigenous people to think of themselves as exploited. For the Russian ethnographer, language, culture, specific history and collective memory could only be constituted in a common collectivity through long historical processes. As such, the categories of community, people, nationality and nation were relevant and articulated the history and politics of indigenous peoples. Zubritski asserted that it is not a question of betting on the secession of the State or of establishing a second State, as Ecuadorian politicians would later interpret.

In this regard, Ortiz Crespo (1992) alludes to a particular circumstance of President Rodrigo Borja (1988-1992 period) who, when defining the meaning of State, nation, agreement or treaty, territory, people and sovereignty, and addressing the leadership of the Confederation of Indigenous nationalities of Ecuador and other representatives of the indigenous movement in 1990, emphasized that the sovereignty of the State cannot be put into discussion by any person or any internal organization; he reaffirmed the right that the State has over the subsoil and over the airspace that belongs to the State and against which no one can argue, reminding them that “you are not a State within another State... because you are subject, like all other Ecuadorians, without any privilege, to the same laws, to the same Constitution and to the same State authorities” (p. 111). Another Ecuadorian politician, Jaime Nebot, of the Social Christian Party, had maintained a similar opinion.

According to Almeida (2016), the best way to collect, agglutinate, bet and assume the political dimension of these notions was through the concept of plurinational State. In historical events, the concept of plurinational State ceased to be a theoretical approach and became a political proposal in the lustrum of the 80s (twentieth century), during the Meeting of Indigenous Peoples held in the city of Puyo, Alfredo Viteri, the Kichwa leader of Sarayacu, played an important role in this event. It is worth
remembering that in the previous decade the Shuar, with the influence of some Salesian priests linked to the Apostolic Vicariate of Méndez, had already raised criticisms against the Ecuadorian State, had considered it alien to indigenous peoples; the Shuar argued that the State had not recognized their historical rights nor respected their identities and differences, nor had it attempted to at least remedy the evils that the transnationals had caused to the environment in the places where they lived.

Between 1983 and 1988, the CONAIE (1986), as the legitimate representative of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement, concomitantly with the discussion of the plurinationality of the country, accentuated the political recognition of multiculturalism and multilingualism in Ecuador. Its fundamental proposal was the recognition of the plurinationality of Ecuador and the institutionalization of the plurinational State. Some events contributed to the establishment of the proposal, such as the Sarayacu Agreement (1989) and, according to Almeida et al. (1993) and Moreno and Figueroa (1992), the indigenous uprising of the Inti Raymi (festival of the Sun) of 1990.

Other intellectuals of the Ecuadorian social sciences, such as Ayala (1992), Ortiz Crespo (1992), Acosta and Martínez (2009), Ávila Santamaría (2011), to name but a few, in due time participated in the debate for the enlightenment of plurinationality. These intellectuals understood that the demand of indigenous societies for their recognition as nationalities was one of the biggest questions regarding the structure of the Ecuadorian society and State. For example, Ayala (1992) affirmed that “we have begun to talk about the recognition of the indigenous nationalities of the country; and their subsequent self-determination. The need for Ecuador to recognize itself as a plurinational, multi-ethnic, multicultural country has been strongly raised” (p. 31). Likewise, Ortiz Crespo (1992) recognized the cultural heterogeneity of the country as a concept from an old phenomenon: “The phenomenon existed since ancient times, but only the development of the Ecuadorian social sciences allowed its discovery and conceptualization in the last decades” (p. 98).

In sum, the aforementioned authors argued that the Ecuadorian reality in principle was heterogeneous and complex, composed of plural and diverse societies.

In this context of complexity of complexes is where the concepts of plurinationality and interculturality that reinvent the Ecuadorian State appear. Therefore, these terms will be analyzed. What is the content of plurinationality and what is the relationship with the intercultural principle?
In the terminology of the CONAIE (2001), plurinationality “is the political principle that guarantees the full exercise of the rights of all nationalities in the country” (p. 37) and the plurinational “is the political organization of the Peoples and Nationalities of the country. The Plurinational State arises when several peoples and nationalities come together under the same government and Constitution” (CONAIE, 2001: p. 35). In this way, the political project of the organization incorporates plurinationality as a political principle and the plurinational State as political and legal organization of the nationalities and peoples of Ecuador. On the other hand, the Development Council of the Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador-CODENPE (2011a), created from the legal and political framework of the Political Constitution of the State of 1998, argues that plurinationality is based on real diversity and irrefutable objectivity of the nationalities and peoples of Ecuador, who built differentiated historical, economic, political and cultural entities; the CODENPE (2011a) asserts that the CONAIE:

Recognizes the right of nationalities to their territory, internal administrative political autonomy, that is, to determine their own process of economic, social, cultural, scientific and technological development to ensure the development of their cultural and political identity and therefore the integral development of the Plurinational State (p. 25).

To what extent is plurinationality related to interculturality?

As conceived by the CONAIE (2012), interculturality is understood as the political and ideological principle of recognition and praxis of individuals, communities, peoples and nations with the intention of building and living in fair, symmetrical, equitable and harmonious relationships with other original societies (Afro-Ecuadorians, Montubios and Mestizos) within the framework of the plurinational State and the intercultural society. For the CODENPE (2011b), interculturality is not only a dialogue of cultures, but also praxis, in the horizon of relationship between cultures in conflict that come together in an organization of power that was modeled as a product of the colony and modernity.

For Walsh (2012), interculturality refers to the principle of respect for the diversity of the nationalities and peoples of Ecuador and the democratic construction of the country that goes through a third critical path, “which considers the structural-colonial-racial problem” (p. 91). In this same perspective, Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel (2007) understand that it is about decolonizing power relations, being and knowing, in the direction of what is currently called the decolonial turn. At present, inter-
culturality is an ideal and not real issue; in other words, it is a story that
forgets the differentiation of concrete classes of society and does not pose
the concrete problem of the class struggle that is the real issue.

The political debate on the plurinational and intercultural State
in the approach of several authors, such as, Alta, Iturralde and López-
Bassols (1998), Almeida, Arrobo and Ojeda (2005) and González, Cal y
Mayor and Ortiz-T. (2010), also articulates other ontological discussions
related to self-determination, indigenous autonomies and, according to
Ospina (2010), the indigenous territorial self-governments, without ex-
cluding Afro-Ecuadorians and Montubios de jure as they are recognized
by the Political Constitution of the State of the year 2008, the Organic
Code of Territorial Organization, Autonomies and Decentralization-
COOTAD and the Law of Lands and Territories of Ecuador.

Currently, the debate and discussion about self-determination,
autonomy and indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian and Montubio self-gov-
ernments is inescapable and unpostponable, given that there lies the
ontological reason for plurinationality and its political liberation. The
existence and coexistence of indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian, Montubio
and Mestizo community societies (popular or of the people), as the ontic
basis of society, cannot be achieved without the link with space, territory
and their own territorialities.

What do the demands for self-determination, autonomy and self-
government mean? Two theoretical perspectives are discussed below.

Regarding the concept of self-determination, the one who best
proposed to raise the national liberation of the peoples was Vladimir Ily-
ich Ulyanov-Lenin (1973). In “The right of nations to self-determinatios”
(p. 46), this author pointed out that although nations are the fruit of
bourgeois revolutions, nevertheless, the masses and peasants play a role
of active struggle for national self-determination. Referring to the na-
tional question, Lenin recognizes the existence of oppressing nations and
oppressed nations; and those who can best contribute to the liberation
from oppression are the revolutionary subjects. The oppressed must fight
for their authentic national liberation.

A different institution that has made relevant statements about
the self-determination of peoples, especially indigenous peoples, is the
United Nations; many states abide by its principles and resolutions. In
the context of indigenous peoples, the principle of self-determination of
peoples is stipulated clearly in several articles of the declaration. For ex-
ample, article 3 of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
states that: “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (United Nations, 2008, p. 5). Additionally, in article 4 the rule states that: “Indigenous peoples, in exercise of their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters related to their internal and local affairs, as well as to have the means to finance their autonomous functions” (United Nations, 2008, p. 5). Consequently, self-determination becomes the exercise of free determination that nationalities and indigenous peoples have, wherever they may be. The declaration favors the right to autonomy and self-government as collective political freedom of the peoples; the concrete problem lies rather in the State reason and its sovereign ontological ascription of governing or of claiming for itself the absolute state sovereignty in favor of capitalist development, because, as mentioned by Córdova Alarcón (2013), capitalism requires the modern State and its ascribed functionality to concentrate the power of decision on the territory and the governability included in itself.

The liberal nation-state as an instrument of external and internal colonialism

It should be noted that they are researchers from the humanities and social sciences who are originating other ways of explaining the conception of the world and have been critically placed on the tangent of global capitalism.

In the understanding of Dussel (2007) and Wallerstein (2011), colonialism is a long-standing historical and spatial process and, since the 16th century, linked to dominant capitalism. The reality of colonialism, as an analytical category linked to capitalism, also entails a structural problem that is not simply racial or cultural. In this same horizon, for González Casanova (2015), colonialism is dialectically related to the independence of countries (for example, in Latin American), by the monopoly that a dominant country exercises over another country; in this pragmatic sense, colonialism is accentuated as the monopoly intensifies and vice versa; in such a way, a vicious circle with no exit is generated.

While it is true that colonialism initially was external, nevertheless, the processes of coloniality have been internal, promoted by political societies. In Latin America, it is a colonialism that develops within the nation-state linked to the expanding mercantilist, industrial and monopoly-oriented capitalist system. The system was increased with the enormous natural resources or raw materials coming from the colonized countries and the use of cheap labor. In other words, according to González Casanova (2009), metropolitan development has only been possible due to the underdevelopment of peripheral countries.

González Casanova (2015) understands internal colonialism as a set of social relations of domination and exploitation between different cultural groups, each of them with their specific class structures. Domination and exploitation do not occur in pure form, but are traversed by different modes of production, e.g. the hacienda, slavery, salaried work, sharecropping, peonage, the huasipungo, among other modalities.

The internal colonialism of the nation-state as a typical phenomenon of the development of capitalism means not the struggle between ethnic groups or cultural groups, but rather, the dispute of minorities, peoples, indigenous nationalities and nations against the ruling classes, external colonialism and world imperialism. Both foreign and intranational colonialism become phenomena closely linked to the development of dependent and imperial capitalism. As suggested by Robinson (2013), dependent capitalism brings as a consequence not only national, but also transnational class struggle.

In the Ecuadorian case, the debate and praxis before external and internal colonialism come from the historical horizon undertaken by the
indigenous movement and other social movements. Specifically, the concepts of plurinationality and interculturality are on the table for discussion. The three political projects of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, CONAIE, of the years 1994, 2001 and 2012, place the emphasis on colonialism and decoloniality. According to the CONAIE, decoloniality can only be achieved through “the construction of a New State Model and a Plurinational Nation” (1994, p. 1). The same theoretical proposal is outlined in the 2001 political project; the Ecuadorian indigenous movement continues to establish the goal of decoloniality of the country’s social and political system. On the occasion of the National Constituent Assembly held in Montecristi-Manabí in 2007, it proposed the declaration of a plurinational, unitary, sovereign, inclusive, equitable and secular State. One of the proactive axes of the CONAIE (2007) prays precisely for “The construction of a plurinational State, which will forever discard the colonial and monocultural shadows that have accompanied it for almost 200 years” (p. 5). The political proposal was not exempt from conflict between the indigenous organizations themselves.

The proposal of plurinationality and interculturality in the national conjuncture of the National Constituent Assembly developed in Montecristi-Manabí, from 2007-2008, as Simbaña (2008) indicates, was disrupted by the dispute among the three great indigenous organizations of the country, the National Federation of Peasant, Indigenous and Black Organizations, FENOCIN, the Council of Indigenous Peoples and Evangelical Organizations of Ecuador, FEINE and the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, CONAIE. In spite of the oppositions between the organizations, FENOCIN and CONAIE coincide in the abolition of the colonial shadows of the structural monoculturality and power of the colonial State.

Altmann (2013) considers that the indigenous movement understands, describes and criticizes internal and external colonialism as “racism, exclusion and exploitation that go hand in hand with the invisibility of indigenous people, especially in their capacity as nationalities or collective actors who share a culture and a social stance” (p. 133). The criticism of internal colonialism involves interrogating the national question and the State as a whole structural class.

Conclusions

Interest in the study of dialectics as a heuristic modality applied to the sociological and historical question of the indigenous societies of Ecuador,
if one considers the long and present process of collective search to find solutions to the regime of secular domination and oppression exercised with the Indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian and Montubio peoples, originates in the doctoral research project *Plurinationality and State in Ecuador during the government of the Citizen Revolution, 2006-2016 period*. It is a contribution to the collective interest of the indigenous peoples of Ecuador.

The study of dialectics allows us to analyze the problems of plurinationality and the prior-ideation of the plurinational State, in the face of the contradictory reason of the liberal nation-state as a part and instrument of external and internal colonialism. In this horizon, the article set out to investigate two fundamental questions related to the ontology of plurinationality, namely: What is the ontological basis of plurinationality for the Ecuadorian case? And, why does plurinationality as a socio-political relationship deny the homogeneity of the liberal nation-state and its correlate of external-internal colonialism?

In this research, several findings were presented and are detailed below:

1) From the understanding of dialectics as an ontological heuristic path. Dialectics as dialogue and relationship is present in all civilizations and human cultures of the world. However, the Greeks, through their organic philosophers, systematized it as a way of explaining reality. To name just two Greek thinkers, Heraclitus of Ephesus (circa 540-480 BC) and Parmenides (circa 540-470 BC) are two dialectical philosophers, with different conceptions of being, opposed even on the issue of the substance of nature and historical processes. Heraclitus of Ephesus affirmed that everything exists in permanent change and becoming, and that conflict is the father and king of all things. Therefore, there was no stability in being. Parmenides, contemporary of Heraclitus, on the contrary maintained that the deep essence of being was immutable and that movement or change was a surface phenomenon. This directive of metaphysical thought ended up prevailing over the Heraclitian dialectic.

In the aftermath of the next centuries, the metaphysical conception prevailed due to its correspondence with class societies, with the interests of the ruling classes, with the concern to bind both values and concepts, and existing institutions, in order to prevent that men avoid the temptation to seek to change the social regime of their time. Metaphysics became hegemonic and speculative.

In a different century, Hegel (1770-1831) takes up dialectics without extracting it from the metaphysics of being. Hegel thought that the principle of contradiction could not be supplanted by the consciousness
of the subject and of objective reality; even so, dialectics continued to be upside down. It was Karl Marx who straightened it up, putting it on its feet with historical materialism.

Dialectics is a fluid, dynamic and contingent conception of society and historical economic and social facts. It is important to emphasize that, in the history of society, actors are individuals endowed with consciousness that execute actions moved by passion or reflection and in the pursuit of certain desired ends (purposes). However, this explanation is not sufficient to understand the course of human history—as opposed to nature—because history is governed by even more general laws of an internal nature that are also mainstreamed by fortuitous chance and necessity. In another logical conceptual order, necessity, purpose and chance (as circumstances) seem to be the motives of human historicity. However, the question of Marx (Engels and Marx, 2006) remains valid: “What propulsive forces act, in turn, behind these motives, what historical causes are those that in the heads of men serve as motives” (p. 44).

An answer to the previous question is offered by Engels and Marx (2006) in their work *Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German philosophy (and other writings on Feuerbach)*, a source referred to previously which states:

(...) if one wants to investigate the motive forces that—consciously or unconsciously, and often unconsciously—are behind these motives for which men act in history and that constitute the true supreme springs of history, we should not to focus on the motives of isolated men, no matter how relevant they may be, as much as on those that move large masses, entire blocks of people, and, among peoples, entire classes; and not momentarily, in rapid explosions, as fleeting fires, but in continued actions that result in great historical changes. To investigate the determining causes of their leaders—the so-called great men—as conscious motives, in a clear or confused way, directly or under an ideological and even deified wrapping: here is the only way that can lead us to discover the laws by which history is governed as a whole, as well as different periods and countries. Everything that moves men must necessarily pass through their heads; but the form it takes within them depends very much on their circumstances (p. 45).

Engels and Marx (2006) put the emphasis of dialectics on materialist and revolutionary foundations. The history of societies advances through a web of contradictory processes that would become revolutionary processes. For this, then, it is necessary to consider the law of contradiction as the engine of human-social progress.
Another important element of dialectics is the understanding and application of the category of totality for the explanation of society as a whole. The category of totality includes levels of analytical relation of society that can go from micro levels to macro levels and vice versa, with detours of the thing itself. In this sense, dialectics is a method of decomposition of the unitary whole, without whose action no knowledge can be generated, since dialectics does not consider the products and relations as something fixed. From a scientific perspective, following the approaches of Kosik (1976), it is thought that dialectics leads to the destruction of pseudo-creation (phenomenal appearance) through: a) the revolutionary criticism of the praxis of humanity that agrees with the evolution of the human being, whose key circumstances are social revolutions; b) the dialectical thought that dilutes the fetishized world of appearance to arrive at the thing itself and reality; and c) the realization of truth and the construction of human reality in an ontogenetic process.

In short, dialectics as a way of study allows us to understand reality in its entirety; it is a science of the radical critique of society, of historical processes and serves as a self-criticism for the agents committed to the transformation of capitalist society. It does not matter what place or society is analyzed.

In the context of this article, dialectics becomes essential for the analysis of plurinational societies and for delving into the complexity of the social being of socio-cultural and identity diversities, as is the case of the Ecuadorian national question.

2) In the study of the Ecuadorian national question we have opted for the categorical formulation of variegated social-spatial formation that includes historical times differentiated from each other, with diverse socio-cultural and territorial intertwined in an apparent State.

The variegated social-spatial formation is characterized by the coexistence of diverse historical temporalities—which is not the same as modes of production—, in the diversity of spaces-territories occupied and inhabited by millenary and ancestral societies. The historical times are defined at the level of the productive moment that is not the same for all the indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian and Montubio nationalities. Historical temporalities are also a substantial part of the territorial spatiality of peoples. The categories of temporality and specific spatiality are two elements that are present in the cosmovisions of indigenous societies and other peoples, where life itself is constructed in its totality. Life itself or full life in the Ecuadorian Kichwa language means sumak kawsay.
Sumak kawsay or fullness of life in indigenous societies is manifested in the molecular practice of community societies. Three concrete cases illustrate this way of community life.

A first exemplary case corresponds to the indigenous societies of the inter-Andean alley, life itself is woven and woven around what this article refers to as community societies that have the ayllu at their core. The ayllu is a community society of relatives with strong ties of kinship and consanguinity that extends beyond the third or fourth generation. The Andean territory is a good laboratory to study kinship, consanguinity and affinity relations in the context of the ayllu (simple nuclear families and composite nuclear families).

A second case related to the Shuar-Achuar nationality, of the Ecuadorian-Peruvian Amazonian region, corresponds to the local or domestic community, studied by Mader (1999); among the Shuar-Achuar, each person is part of a local or domestic community, whose membership is determined by offspring and marriage alliances; the domestic community is structured as an extended family comprising one to five monogamous and polygynous family units.

A third specific case corresponds to the Montubio people, people from the Ecuadorian coast, often denigrated as “cholos,” who have been studied by Álvarez (2016). The authentic Montubio people, in order to identify themselves as a collective self, have been structured in a communal and community system; in their narratives and myths they see themselves as people different from whites and with rights to their ancestral collective territories occupied uninterruptedly for centuries. The Montubio people claim their territories as part of their collective property where they develop community life.

The aforementioned examples, which do not exhaust the reality of deep Ecuador, show that the indigenous nationalities and other peoples (Afro-Ecuadorian, Montubio, even mestizo) are built from the notion of community society, understood as a real community of relatives linked by consanguinity and affinity relationships.

Just as the ayllu is to the community society, so the community society is to the indigenous nationality. This means that the set of indigenous communities make up a nationality. Nationality is understood as the quality of nation, whose material and immaterial substance represents the whole of one or several peoples linked by an equal historical origin, share the same cultural characteristics, territory, original language and a real sociopolitical organization. In the conception of the CONAIE (2012), the nations and native peoples are governed by their own laws,
customs and beliefs, native languages and forms of social, economic and political organization in their authentic territories of ancient and ancestral roots. The existence and definition of nationality predates the creation of the Ecuadorian State. The Ecuadorian indigenous nationality does not coincide with the Ecuadorian nationality of white-mestizo order. The indigenous nationality has to do with the legal-political relationship of the individuals with the plurinational State and their respective original nations.

The historical recognition of the plurinationality and the plurinational State allows the credible critique of the liberal nation-state and its connection with external and internal colonialism.

3) The structure of the current State shows the faithful fetishization of the liberal nation-state as the primary instrument of the external-internal colonialism of society and the reification of it for the achievement of particular interests and the conservatism of private order.

What is meant by fetishization in this particular case? Fetishization is the action and effect of fetishizing, that is, turning something into a fetish (idol). In the religious field, in its first, lower phase, of religious development, the fetish as an idol was the object of adoration of the faithful. This is still so. Fetishes also exist in capitalism: merchandise, money and capital. As material objects, they have become fetishes or objects of worship. Fetishes are considered as natural or are naturalized in everyday life and are seemingly normal. For capitalist intellectuals, merchandise, money and capital are not understood as expressions of capitalist relations of production but as something natural. In capitalism, the relationship between peoples becomes a cosmic or objectual relationship that merges into merchandise and mercantile relations. Nor does the State escape the principle of fetishization and commercial commodification. Everything becomes merchandise.

If the modern State, from its origins, is the appropriate instrument of the modern world-system, it is also the ideal device for the expansion of external colonialism, reproduced internally in the colonized and currently neo-colonized countries. In the modern world-system, colonialism, coloniality and the nation-state were fetishized as objects of deification and replication unparalleled in the history of humanity.

From a historical perspective, colonialism is part of a historical process through which overseas territories were unevenly integrated into the world economy of European countries. Strictly speaking, colonialism was the formal control of a given territory by a more powerful or imperial country. Colonialism led to the colonization of the territories, as a process
of occupation of the conquered territories. Colonization admitted the violent irruption of the European countries in the invaded continents. As a result of colonization, a colonial stage characterized by political and legal domination over subjugated peoples was established, economic and political relations of dependence were established for the ends (or interests) and needs of the imperial economy, and new institutions regulating social composition were formalized, differentiated by racial and cultural inequality. The situation went much further, inaugurating a process of coloniality that lasts until today.

This process of coloniality is what González Casanova’s (2015) research identifies as the internal colonialism that has been promoted by political societies. The author studies the Mexican case, which is very valuable for other countries of the continent of Abya Yala (land in full maturity). González Casanova (2015) understands internal colonialism as a totality of social relations of domination and exploitation between various cultural and class groups. It should be emphasized that the domination and exploitation of subaltern classes is not pure, but is mediated by different modes of production, with varied forms of forced labor including the mita, encomienda, reductions, yanaconas (hereditary servitude), hacienda, slavery, wage labor, sharecropping, peonage, wasipungo (feudal mode and exploitation of precarious work) and other forms not mentioned here. It is also important to note that nowadays there are other forms of slavery in the Abya Yala continent that require new research from the social sciences.

Finally, the liberal nation-state fulfilled and continues to play a relevant role in the reproduction of colonialism, neocolonialism and coloniality. According to Dávalos (2013), the modern nation-state “processed the coloniality of power, the ontological disappearance of the Other and the colonial difference of racism” from the beginning (2013, s/p). In this perspective, the other as another (otherness) must disappear or be included in the world-system as servile labor and its natural assets as raw materials or commodities.

Notes

1 Marx states that: “Categories are forms of being, determinations of existence.” (quoted in Lukács, 2007, p. 65). In this article, the term category will be understood and used in this sense.
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Dialectics of plurinationality as criticism of the liberal state-nation

Dialéctica de la plurinacionalidad como crítica del Estado-nación liberal

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Editorial guidelines / Normas editoriales
1. General Information

«Sophia» is a scientific publication of the Salesian Polytechnic University of Ecuador, published since January 2006 in an uninterrupted manner, with a fixed biannual periodicity, specialized in Philosophy of Education and its interdisciplinary lines such as Epistemology, Deontology, Aesthetics, Critical Studies, Hermeneutics, Axiology, Ontology, Philosophical Anthropology, Sociology, Philosophical Analytics, among others, all linked to the field of Education.

It is a scientific journal, which uses the peer-review system, under double-blind review methodology, according to the publication standards of the American Psychological Association (APA). Compliance with this system allows authors to guarantee an objective, impartial and transparent review process, which facilitates the publication of their inclusion in reference databases, repositories and international indexing.

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Original contributions in Philosophy of Education, as well as related areas: Epistemology, Deontology, Aesthetics, Critical Studies, Hermeneutics, Axiology, Ontology, Philosophical Anthropology, Sociology, Philosophical
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For those works that are empirical investigations, the manuscripts will follow the IMRDC structure, being optional the Notes and Supports. Those papers that, on the contrary, deal with reports, studies, proposals and reviews may be more flexible in their epigraphs, particularly in material and methods, analysis, results, discussion and conclusions. In all typologies of works, references are mandatory.

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2) **Full name and surnames:** Of each of the authors, organized by priority. A maximum of 3 authors will be accepted per original, although there may be exceptions justified by the topic, its complexity and extent. Next to the names there will have to be included, the name of the institution at which it is employed as well as the city, the country, the e-mail and number of ORCID.

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Literature reviews are based on the analysis of major publications on a given topic. Its objective is to define the current state of the problem and to evaluate the investigations carried out. Its structure responds to the phases of the theme/problem, contributions of researchers or teams, changes in theory or main theoretical currents; unsolved problems; current and future trends (Giordanino, 2011). According to UNESCO, this type of work is also known as “recapitulative studies.”

1) **Title (Spanish) / Title (English):** Concise but informative, in Spanish on the first line and in English on the second. A maximum of 85 characters with spaces are accepted. The title is not only the responsibility of the authors, changes being able to be proposed by the Editorial Board.

2) **Full name and surnames:** Of each of the authors, organized by priority. A maximum of 3 authors will be accepted per original, although there may be exceptions justified by the topic, its complexity and extent. Next to the names there will have to be included, the name of the institution at which it is employed as well as the city, the country, the e-mail and number of ORCID.

3) **Abstract (Spanish) / Abstract (English):** It will have a minimum extension of 220 words and a maximum extension of 250 words, first in Spanish and then in English. The abstract will describe concisely and in this order: 1) Justification of the topic; 2) Objectives; 3) Methodology; 4) Main results; 5) Main conclusions. It must be impersonally written “This paper analyzes ...” In the case of the abstract, the use of automatic translators will not be accepted due to their poor quality.

4) **Keywords (Spanish) / Keywords (English):** A maximum of 6 keywords must be presented for each language version directly related to the subject of the work. The use of the key words set out in UNESCO’s Thesaurus will be positively valued.

5) **Introduction:** It should include a brief presentation of the topic, the formulation of the purpose or objective of the study, the context of the problem and the formulation of the problem that is proposed, the presentation of the idea to be defended, the justification explaining the importance, the relevance of the study; the methodological framework used, and finally, a brief description of the structure of the document. In the justification it is necessary to use bibliographical citations as well as the most significant and current literature on the subject at national and international level.

6) **Body or development of the document:** It implies putting into practice throughout the text, a critical attitude that should tend towards the interpellation, in order to attract the attention of the topic and the problem treated.
The writer must generate in the reader the capacity to identify the dialogical intention of the proposal and to promote an open discussion.

7) **Conclusions:** Objectively state the results and findings. Offer a vision of the implications of the work, the limitations, the tentative response to the problem, the relations with the objective of the research and the possible lines of continuity (to fulfill this objective it is suggested not to include all the results obtained in the research). The conclusions should be duly justified according to the research carried out. The conclusions may be associated with the recommendations, evaluations, applications, suggestions, new relations and accepted or rejected hypotheses.

8) **Bibliography:** It is the set of works used in the structuring of the scientific text. It should include only the reference of the works used in the research. Bibliographical references should be ordered alphabetically and conform to the international APA standards, in their sixth edition.

### 3.2. Guidelines for references

**PERIODIC PUBLICATIONS**


**BOOKS AND BOOK CHAPTERS**


**DIGITAL MEDIA**


It is prescriptive that all quotations that have DOI (Digital Object Identifier System) are reflected in the References (can be obtained at http://goo.gl/gfruh1). All journals and books that do not have DOI should appear with their link (in their online version, if they have it, shortened by Google Shortened: http://goo.gl) and date of consultation in the indicated format.

Journal articles should be presented in English, except for those in Spanish and English, in which case it will be displayed in both languages using brackets. All web addresses submitted must be shortened in the manuscript, except for the DOI that must be in the indicated format (https://doi.org/XXX).

3.3. Epigraphs, Figures and Charts

The epigraphs of the body of the article will be numbered in Arabic. They should go without a full box of capital letters, neither underlined nor bold. The numbering must be a maximum of three levels: 1. / 1.1. / 1.1.1. A carriage return will be established at the end of each numbered epigraph.

The charts must be included in the text in Word format according to order of appearance, numbered in Arabic and subtitled with the description of the content.

The graphics or figures will be adjusted to the minimum number required and will be presented incorporated in the text, according to their order of appearance, numbered in Arabic and subtitled with the abbreviated description. Their quality should not be less than 300 dpi, and it may be necessary to have the graph in TIFF, PNG or JPEG format.

4. Submission Process

The receipt of articles is permanent, however, considering that the publication of the Sophia Journal is bi-annual, the manuscripts must be sent at least one period before the date stipulated in the corresponding Call.

The manuscripts must be sent through the OJS (Open Journal System) system of the journal, for which it is necessary that the author previously registers in the respective space (enter in the following link: http://sophia.ups.edu.
The two documents that must be sent are:

1) **Presentation and cover (Use official model)**, which will appear:

**Title.** In Spanish in the first line, in letter Arial 14, with bold and centered, with a maximum of 85 characters with space. In English in the second line, in letter Arial 14, in italics and bold.

**Full names and surnames of the authors.** Organized in order of priority, a maximum of 3 authors are accepted per original, although there may be exceptions justified by the topic, its complexity and extent. Each name must include the name of the institution in which he/she works as well as the city, country, email and ORCID number.

**Abstract (Spanish)** Minimum 220 and maximum 250 words. It must include 1) Justification of the topic; 2) Objectives; 3) Methodology; 4) Main results; 5) Main conclusions. It must be impersonally written “The present paper analyzes ...”

**Abstract.** Summary with all its components, translated into English and in cursive. Do not use automatic translation systems.

**Keywords (Spanish):** 6 standardized terms preferably of a single word and of the UNESCO Thesaurus separated by commas (,).

**Keywords.** The 6 terms above translated into English and separated by comma (,). Do not use automatic translation systems.

In addition, a statement must be included (using a template called: Presentation) in which it is explained that the submitted manuscript is an original contribution, not sent or being evaluated in another journal, confirmation of the signatory authors, acceptance (if applicable) of formal changes in the manuscript according to the norms and partial transfer of rights to the publisher. This document must be signed and recorded through the OJS system, in the section: “Complementary files”.

2) **Manuscript** totally anonymized, according to the guidelines referred in precedence.

All authors must register with their credits on the OJS platform, although only one of them will be responsible for correspondence. No author can submit or have in review two manuscripts simultaneously, estimating an absence of four consecutive numbers (2 years).
1. Información general


Es una revista científica arbitrada, que utiliza el sistema de evaluación externa por expertos (peer-review), bajo metodología de pares ciegos (doble-blind review), conforme a las normas de publicación de la American Psychological Association (APA). El cumplimiento de este sistema permite garantizar a los autores un proceso de revisión objetivo, imparcial y transparente, lo que facilita a la publicación su inclusión en bases de datos, repositorios e indexaciones internacionales de referencia.

«Sophia» se encuentra indexada en el directorio y catálogo selectivo del Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex), en el Sistema de Información Científica REDALYC, en el Directorio de Revistas de Acceso Abierto DOAJ y en repositorios, bibliotecas y catálogos especializados de Iberoamérica.

La revista se edita en doble versión: impresa (ISSN: 1390-3861) y electrónica (e-ISSN: 1390-8626), en idioma español, siendo identificado además cada trabajo con un DOI (Digital Object Identifier System).

2. Alcance y política

2.1. Temática

 Contribuciones originales en materia de Filosofía de la Educación, así como áreas afines: Epistemología, Deontología, Estética, Estudios Críticos, Hermenéutica, Axiología, Ontología, Antropología Filosófica, Sociología, Ana-
lítica Filosófica,… y todas aquellas disciplinas conexas interdisciplinarmente con una reflexión filosófica sobre la educación.

2.2. Aportaciones

«Sophia» edita estudios críticos, informes, propuestas, así como selectas revisiones de la literatura (state-of-the-art) en relación con la Filosofía de la Educación, aceptando asimismo trabajos de investigación empírica, redactados en español y/o inglés.

Las aportaciones en la revista pueden ser:

- **Revisiones**: 10.000 a 11.000 palabras de texto, incluidas tablas y referencias. Se valorará especialmente las referencias justificadas, actuales y selectivas de alrededor de unas 70 obras.
- **Investigaciones**: 8.000 a 9.500 palabras de texto, incluyendo título, resúmenes, descriptores, tablas y referencias.
- **Informes, estudios y propuestas**: 8.000 a 9.500 palabras de texto, incluyendo título, resúmenes, tablas y referencias.

2.3. Características del contenido

Todos los trabajos presentados para la publicación en «Sophia» deberán cumplir con las características propias de una investigación científica:

- Ser originales, inéditos y relevantes
- Abordar temáticas que respondan a problemáticas y necesidades actuales
- Aportar para el desarrollo del conocimiento científico en el campo de la Filosofía de la Educación y sus áreas afines
- Utilizar un lenguaje adecuado, claro, preciso y comprensible
- No haber sido publicados en ningún medio ni estar en proceso de arbitraje o publicación.

Dependiendo de la relevancia y pertinencia del artículo, se considerarán como contribuciones especiales y ocasionalmente se publicarán:

- Trabajos que superen la extensión manifestada
- Trabajos que no se correspondan con el tema objeto de la reflexión prevista para el número respectivo

2.4 Periodicidad

«Sophia» tiene periodicidad semestral (20 artículos por año), publicada en los meses de enero y julio y cuenta por número con dos secciones de cinco artículos cada una, la primera referida a un tema Monográfico preparado con antelación y con editores temáticos y la segunda, una sección de Misceláneas, compuesta por aportaciones variadas dentro de la temática de la publicación.
3. Presentación, estructura y envío de los manuscritos

Los trabajos se presentarán en tipo de letra Arial 12, interlineado simple, justificado completo y sin tabuladores ni espacios en blanco entre párrafos. Solo se separarán con un espacio en blanco los grandes bloques (título, autores, resúmenes, descriptores, créditos y epígrafes). La página debe tener 2 centímetros en todos sus márgenes.

Los trabajos deben presentarse en documento de Microsoft Word (.doc o .docx), siendo necesario que el archivo esté anonimizado en Propiedades de Archivo, de forma que no aparezca la identificación de autor/es.

Los manuscritos deben ser enviados única y exclusivamente a través del OJS (Open Journal System), en el cual todos los autores deben darse de alta previamente. No se aceptan originales enviados a través de correo electrónico u otra interfaz.

3.1. Estructura del manuscrito

Para aquellos trabajos que se traten de investigaciones de carácter empírico, los manuscritos seguirán la estructura IMRDC, siendo opcionales los epígrafes de Notas y Apoyos. Aquellos trabajos que por el contrario se traten de informes, estudios, propuestas y revisiones podrán ser más flexibles en sus epígrafes, especialmente en Material y métodos, Análisis y resultados y Discusión y conclusiones. En todas las tipologías de trabajos son obligatorias las Referencias.

A. Investigaciones empíricas

Su objetivo es contribuir al progreso del conocimiento mediante información original, sigue la estructura IMRDC: Introducción (objetivos, literatura previa), Materiales y métodos, Análisis y Resultados, Discusión, integración y conclusiones. Siguiendo los criterios planteados por la Unesco, es este tipo de textos científicos se llaman también como: “memorias originales”

La estructura recomendada, especialmente en trabajos que incluyen investigaciones empíricas, es la siguiente:

1) Título (español) / Title (inglés): Conciso pero informativo, en castellano en primera línea y en inglés en segunda. Se aceptan como máximo 85 caracteres con espacio. El título no solo es responsabilidad de los autores, pudiéndose proponer cambios por parte del Consejo Editorial.

2) Datos de Identificación: Nombres y apellidos completos de cada uno de los autores, organizados por orden de prelación. Se aceptarán como máximo 3 autores por original, aunque pudieren existir excepciones justificadas por el tema, su complejidad y extensión. Junto a los nombres deberá incluirse, el nombre de la institución en la que trabaja así como la ciudad, el país, el correo electrónico y número de ORCID de cada autor.

3) Resumen (español) / Abstract (inglés): Tendrá como extensión mínima 220 y máxima 250 palabras, primero en español y después en inglés. El
resumen describirá de forma concisa y en este orden: 1) Justificación del tema; 2) Objetivos; 3) Metodología y muestra; 4) Principales resultados; 5) Principales conclusiones. Ha de estar escrito de manera impersonal “El presente trabajo analiza...”. En el caso del abstract no se admitirá el empleo de traductores automáticos por su pésima calidad.

4) Descriptores (español) / Keywords (inglés): Se deben exponer máximo 6 términos por cada versión idiomática relacionados directamente con el tema del trabajo. Será valorado positivamente el uso de las palabras claves expuestas en el Thesaurus de la UNESCO.

5) Introducción y estado de la cuestión: Debe incluir el planteamiento del problema, el contexto de la problemática, la justificación, fundamentos y propósito del estudio, utilizando citas bibliográficas, así como la literatura más significativa y actual del tema a escala nacional e internacional.

6) Material y métodos: Debe ser redactado de forma que el lector pueda comprender con facilidad el desarrollo de la investigación. En su caso, describirá la metodología, la muestra y la forma de muestreo, así como se hará referencia al tipo de análisis estadístico empleado. Si se trata de una metodología original, es necesario exponer las razones que han conducido a su empleo y describir sus posibles limitaciones.

7) Análisis y resultados: Se procurará resaltar las observaciones más importantes, describiéndose, sin hacer juicios de valor, el material y métodos empleados. Aparecerán en una secuencia lógica en el texto y las tablas y figuras imprescindibles evitando la duplicidad de datos.

8) Discusión y conclusiones: Resumirá los hallazgos más importantes, relacionando las propias observaciones con estudios de interés, señalando aportaciones y limitaciones, sin redundar datos ya comentados en otros apartados. Asimismo, el apartado de discusión y conclusiones debe incluir las deducciones y líneas para futuras investigaciones.

9) Apoyos y agradecimientos (optionales): El Council Science Editors recomienda a los autor/es especificar la fuente de financiación de la investigación. Se considerarán prioritarios los trabajos con aval de proyectos competitivos nacionales e internacionales. En todo caso, para la valoración científica del manuscrito, este debe ir anonimizado con XXXX solo para su evaluación inicial, a fin de no identificar autores y equipos de investigación, que deben ser explicitados en la Carta de Presentación y posteriormente en el manuscrito final.

10) Las notas (optionales) irán, solo en caso necesario, al final del artículo (antes de las referencias). Deben anotarse manualmente, ya que el sistema de notas al pie o al final de Word no es reconocido por los sistemas de maquetación. Los números de notas se colocan en superíndice, tanto en el texto como en la nota final. No se permiten notas que recojan citas bibliográficas simples (sin comentarios), pues éstas deben ir en las referencias.

11) Referencias: Las citas bibliográficas deben reseñarse en forma de referencias al texto. Bajo ningún caso deben incluirse referencias no citadas en el texto. Su número debe ser suficiente para contextualizar el marco teórico con
criterios de actualidad e importancia. Se presentarán alfabéticamente por el primer apellido del autor.

**B. REVISIONES**

Las revisiones de literatura se basan en el análisis de las principales publicaciones sobre un tema determinado; su objetivo es definir el estado actual del problema y evaluar las investigaciones realizadas. Su estructura responde a las fases del tema/problema, aportes de investigadores o equipos, cambios en la teoría o las corrientes teóricas principales; problemas sin resolver; tendencias actuales y futuras (Giordanino, 2011). De acuerdo a la UNESCO, este tipo de trabajos se conocen también como: “estudios recapitulativos”

1) **Título (español) / Title (inglés):** El título del artículo deberá ser breve, interesante, claro, preciso y atractivo para despertar el interés del lector. Conciso pero informativo, en castellano en la primera línea y en inglés en la segunda línea. Se aceptan como máximo 85 caracteres con espacio. El título no solo es responsabilidad de los autores, también los Miembros del Consejo Editorial puede proponer cambios al título del documento.

2) **Datos de Identificación:** Nombres y apellidos completos de cada uno de los autores, organizados por orden de prelación. Se aceptarán como máximo 3 autores por original, aunque pudieren existir excepciones justificadas por el tema, su complejidad y extensión. Junto a los nombres deberá incluirse, el nombre de la institución en la que trabaja así como la ciudad, el país, el correo electrónico y número de ORCID de cada autor.

3) **Resumen (español) / Abstract (inglés):** Tendrá como extensión mínima 220 y máxima 250 palabras, primero en español y después en inglés. El resumen describirá de forma concisa y en este orden: 1) Justificación del tema; 2) Objetivos; 3) Metodología; 4) Principales resultados; 5) Principales conclusiones. Ha de estar escrito de manera impersonal “El presente trabajo analiza…”. En el caso del abstract no se admitirá el empleo de traductores automáticos por su pésima calidad. 

4) **Descriptores (español) / Keywords (inglés):** Se deben exponer máximo 6 términos por cada versión idiomática relacionados directamente con el tema del trabajo. Será valorado positivamente el uso de las palabras claves expuestas en el Thesaurus de la UNESCO.

5) **Introducción:** Deberá incluir una presentación breve del tema, la formulación del propósito u objetivo del estudio, el contexto de la problemática y la formulación del problema que se propone enfrentar, la presentación de la idea a defender, la justificación que explica la importancia, la actualidad y la pertinencia del estudio; el marco metodológico utilizado, y finalmente, una breve descripción de la estructura del documento. En la justificación es necesario utilizar citas bibliográficas así como la literatura más significativa y actual del tema a escala nacional e internacional.

6) **Cuerpo o desarrollo del documento:** Implica poner en práctica a lo largo de toda la exposición, una actitud crítica que deberá tender hacia la in-
terpelación, a efectos de concitar la atención del tema y el problema tratados. El escritor deberá generar en el lector la capacidad de identificar la intención dialógica de la propuesta y propiciar en él una discusión abierta.

7) **Conclusiones:** Exponen de manera objetiva los resultados y hallazgos; ofrece una visión de las implicaciones del trabajo, las limitaciones, la respuesta tentativa al problema, las relaciones con el objetivo de la investigación y las posibles líneas de continuidad (para cumplir con este objetivo se sugiere no incluir todos los resultados obtenidos en la investigación). Las conclusiones deberán ser debidamente justificadas de acuerdo a la investigación realizada. Las conclusiones podrán estar asociadas con las recomendaciones, evaluaciones, aplicaciones, sugerencias, nuevas relaciones e hipótesis aceptadas o rechazadas.

8) **Bibliografía:** Es el conjunto de obras utilizadas en la estructuración del texto científico. Deberá incluir únicamente la referencia de los trabajos utilizados en la investigación. Las referencias bibliográficas deberán ordenarse alfabéticamente y ajustarse a las normas internacionales APA, en su sexta edición.

3.2. **Normas para las referencias**

**PUBLICACIONES PERIÓDICAS**


**LIBROS Y CAPÍTULOS DE LIBRO**


**Medios electrónicos**


Es prescriptivo que todas las citas que cuenten con DOI (Digital Object Identifier System) estén reflejadas en las Referencias (pueden obtenerse en http://goo.gl/gfruh1). Todas las revistas y libros que no tengan DOI deben aparecer con su link (en su versión on-line, en caso de que la tengan, acortada, mediante Google Shortener: http://goo.gl) y fecha de consulta en el formato indicado.

Los artículos de revistas deben ser expuestos en idioma inglés, a excepción de aquellos que se encuentren en español e inglés, caso en el que se expondrá en ambos idiomas utilizando corchetes. Todas las direcciones web que se presenten tienen que ser acortadas en el manuscrito, a excepción de los DOI que deben ir en el formato indicado (https://doi.org/XXX).

**3.3. Epígrafes, tablas y gráficos**

Los epígrafes del cuerpo del artículo se numerarán en arábigo. Irán sin caja completa de mayúsculas, ni subrayados, ni negritas. La numeración ha de ser como máximo de tres niveles: 1. / 1.1. / 1.1.1. Al final de cada epígrafe numerado se establecerá un retorno de carro.

Las tablas deben presentarse incluidas en el texto en formato Word según orden de aparición, numeradas en arábigo y subtituladas con la descripción del contenido.

Los gráficos o figuras se ajustarán al número mínimo necesario y se presentarán incorporadas al texto, según su orden de aparición, numeradas en arábigo y subtituladas con la descripción abreviada. Su calidad no debe ser inferior a 300 ppp, pudiendo ser necesario contar con el gráfico en formato TIFF, PNG o JPEG.

**4. Proceso de envío**

La recepción de artículos es permanente, sin embargo, considerando que la publicación de la Revista Sophia es semestral, el envío de los manuscritos deberá efectuarse al menos un periodo antes de la fecha estipulada en la Convocatoria correspondiente.

Los manuscritos deberán remitirse a través del sistema OJS (Open Journal System) de la revista, para lo cual es necesario que el autor se registre pre-
viamente en el espacio respectivo (ingrese en el siguiente link: http://sophia.ups.edu.ec/index.php/sophia/user/register, complemente el formulario y siga cada uno de los pasos que se sugieren).

Los dos documentos que deben ser enviados son:

1) **Carta de presentación o Cover letter** (usar modelo oficial), en la que aparecerán:

   **Titulito.** En castellano en la primera línea, en letra Arial 14, con negrita y centrado, con un máximo de 85 caracteres con espacio. En inglés en la segunda línea, en letra Arial 14, en cursiva y con negrita.

   **Nombres y apellidos completos de los autores.** Organizados por orden de prelación, se aceptan como máximo 3 autores por original, aunque pudieren existir excepciones justificadas por el tema, su complejidad y extensión. Junto a cada uno de los nombres deberá incluirse, el nombre de la institución en la que trabaja así como la ciudad, el país, el correo electrónico y número de ORCID.

   **Resumen.** Tendrá como extensión mínima 220 y máxima 250 palabras. El resumen describirá de forma concisa y en este orden: 1) Justificación del tema; 2) Objetivos; 3) Metodología; 4) Principales resultados; 5) Principales conclusiones. Ha de estar escrito de manera impersonal “El presente trabajo analiza...”.

   **Abstract.** Resumen con todos sus componentes, traducido al inglés y en letra cursiva. No utilizar sistemas de traducción automáticos.

   **Descripores.** Máximo 6 términos estandarizados preferiblemente de una sola palabra y del Thesaurus de la UNESCO, separados por coma (,).

   **Keywords.** Los 6 términos antes referidos traducidos al inglés y separados por coma (,). No utilizar sistemas de traducción automáticos.

Además, se deberá incluir una: **Declaración** (usar modelo denominado: Presentación) en la que se explica que el manuscrito enviado es una aportación original, no enviado ni en proceso de evaluación en otra revista, confirmación de las autorías firmantes, aceptación (si procede) de cambios formales en el manuscrito conforme a las normas y cesión parcial de derechos a la editorial. Este documento deberá ser firmado y consignado a través del sistema OJS, en la sección: “**Ficheros complementarios**”.

2) **Manuscrito** totalmente anonimizado, conforme a las normas referidas en precedencia.

   Todos los autores han de darse de alta, con sus créditos, en la plataforma OJS, si bien uno solo de ellos será el responsable de correspondencia. Ningún autor podrá enviar o tener en revisión dos manuscritos de forma simultánea, estimándose una carencia de cuatro números consecutivos (2 años).
Indications for External Reviewers of «Sophia»

The Board of External Reviewers of «Sophia» is an independent collegiate body whose purpose is to guarantee the excellence of this scientific publication, because the blind evaluation - based exclusively on the quality of the contents of the manuscripts and carried out by experts of recognized International prestige in the field - is, without a doubt, the best guarantee for the advancement of science and to preserve in this header an original and valuable scientific production.

To this end, the Board of External Reviewers is made up of several scholars and international scientists specialized in Education, essential to select the articles of the greatest impact and interest for the international scientific community. This in turn allows that all the articles selected to publish in «Sophia» have an academic endorsement and objectifiable reports on the originals.

Of course, all reviews in «Sophia» use the internationally standardized system of double-blind peer evaluation that guarantees the anonymity of manuscripts and reviewers. As a measure of transparency, the complete lists of reviewers are published on the official website of the journal http://Sophia.ups.edu.ec/)

1. Criteria for acceptance/rejection of manuscript evaluation

The editorial team of «Sophia» selects those that are considered more qualified in the subject of the manuscript from the list of reviewers of the Board of Reviewers. While the publication requires the maximum collaboration of reviewers to expedite the evaluations and reports on each original, acceptance of the review must be linked to:

a. **Expertise.** Acceptance necessarily entails the possession of competences in the specific theme of the article to be evaluated.

b. **Availability.** Reviewing an original takes time and involves careful reflection on many aspects.

c. **Conflict of interests.** In case of identification of the authorship of the manuscript (despite their anonymity), excessive academic or family closeness to their authors, membership in the same University, Department, Research Group, Thematic Network, Research Projects, joint publications with authors ... or any other type of connection or conflict / professional proximity; The reviewer must reject the publisher’s invitation for review.

d. **Commitment of confidentiality.** Reception of a manuscript for evaluation requires the Reviewer to express a commitment of confidentiality, so that it cannot be divulged to a third party throughout the process.
In the event that the reviewer cannot carry out the activity for some of these reasons or other justifiable reasons, he/she must notify the publisher by the same route that he/she has received the invitation, specifying the reasons for rejection.

2. General criteria for the evaluation of manuscripts

a) Topic

In addition to being valuable and relevant to the scientific community, the topic that is presented in the original must be limited and specialized in time and space, without excessive localism.

b) Redaction

The critical assessment in the review report must be objectively written, providing content, quotes or references of interest to support its judgment.

c) Originality

As a fundamental criterion of quality, an article must be original, unpublished and suitable. In this sense, reviewers should answer these three questions in the evaluation:

- Is the article sufficiently novel and interesting to justify publication?
- Does it contribute anything to the knowledge canon?
- Is the research question relevant?

A quick literature search using repositories such as Web of Knowledge, Scopus and Google Scholar to see if the research has been previously covered, may be helpful.

d) Structure

Manuscripts that refer to «Sophia» must follow the IMRDC structure, except those that are literature reviews or specific studies. In this sense, the originals must contain summary, introduction, methodology, results, discussion and conclusion.

- The title, abstract, and keywords should accurately describe the content of the article.
- The review of the literature should summarize the state of the question of the most recent and adequate research for the presented work. It will be especially evaluated with criteria of suitability and that the references are to works of high impact - especially in
WoS, Scopus, Scielo, etc. It should also include the general explanation of the study, its central objective and the followed methodological design.

- In case of research, in the **materials and methods**, the author must specify how the data, the process and the instruments used to respond to the hypothesis, the validation system, and all the information necessary to replicate the study are collected.

- **Results** must be clearly specified in logical sequence. It is important to check if the figures or charts presented are necessary or, if not, redundant with the content of the text.

- In the **discussion**, the data obtained should be interpreted in the light of the literature review. Authors should include here if their article supports or contradicts previous theories. The conclusions will summarize the advances that the research presents in the area of scientific knowledge, the future lines of research and the main difficulties or limitations for carrying out the research.

- **Language**: It will be positively assessed if the language used facilitates reading and is in favor of the clarity, simplicity, precision and transparency of the scientific language. The Reviewer should not proceed to correction, either in Spanish or English, but will inform the Editors of these grammatical or orthographical and typographical errors.

- Finally, a thorough **review of the references** is required in case any relevant work has been omitted. The references must be precise, citing within the logic of the subject at study, its main works as well as the documents that most resemble the work itself, as well as the latest research in the area.

### 3. Relevant valuation dimensions

For the case of empirical research articles, «**Sophia**» uses an evaluation matrix of each original that responds to the editorial criteria and to compliance with the publication guidelines. In this sense, the reviewers must attend to the qualitative-quantitative assessment of each of the aspects proposed in this matrix with criteria of objectivity, reasoning, logic and expertise.
If the original is a review of the literature (status of the matter) or other type of study (reports, proposals, experiences, among others), the Editorial Board will send to the reviewers a different matrix, including the characteristics of Structure of this type of originals:

**REPORTS, STUDIES, PROPOSALS, EXPERIENCES**

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<thead>
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<tr>
<td>03. Review of the literature</td>
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<td>04. Structure and organization of the article</td>
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<tr>
<td>05. Argumentative capabilities and coherence</td>
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<tr>
<td>06. Scientific redaction</td>
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<td>07. Original contributions</td>
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<td>08. Conclusions</td>
<td></td>
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<td>09. Quotations</td>
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**RESEARCHES**

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<td>14. Quotations (variety and richness)</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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</table>
4. Ethical issues

a. **Plagiarism**: Although the journal uses plagiarism detection systems, if the reviewer suspects that an original is a substantial copy of another work, he must immediately inform the Editors citing the previous work in as much detail as possible.

b. **Fraud**: If there is real or remote suspicion that the results in an article are false or fraudulent, it is necessary to inform them to the Editors.

5. Evaluation of the originals

After the quantitative-qualitative evaluation of the manuscript under review, the reviewer may make recommendations to improve the quality of the manuscript. However, the manuscript will be graded in three ways:

a. **Rejection** due to detected deficiencies justified and reasoned with quantitative and qualitative assessment. The report should be longer if a score of less than 40 of the 50 possible points is obtained.

b. **Acceptance without review**

c. **Conditional acceptance** and therefore review (greater or lesser). In the latter case, it is necessary to clearly identify which review is necessary, listing the comments and even specifying paragraphs and pages suggesting modifications.
Indicaciones para revisores externos de «Sophia»

El Consejo de Revisores Externos de «Sophia» es un órgano colegiado independiente cuyo fin es garantizar la excelencia de esta publicación científica, debido a que la evaluación ciega –basada exclusivamente en la calidad de los contenidos de los manuscritos y realizada por expertos de reconocido prestigio internacional en la materia– es la mejor garantía y, sin duda, el mejor aval para el avance de la ciencia y para preservar en esta cabecera una producción científica original y valiosa.

Para ello, el Consejo de Revisores Externos está conformado por diversos académicos y científicos internacionales especialistas en Filosofía de la Educación, esenciales para seleccionar los artículos de mayor impacto e interés para la comunidad científica internacional. Esto permite a su vez que todos los artículos seleccionados para publicar en «Sophia» cuenten con un aval académico e informes objetivables sobre los originales.

Por supuesto, todas las revisiones en «Sophia» emplean el sistema estandarizado internacionalmente de evaluación por pares con «doble ciego» (doble-blind) que garantiza el anonimato de los manuscritos y de los revisores de los mismos. Como medida de transparencia, anualmente se hacen públicos en la web oficial de la revista (www. http://Sophia.ups.edu.ec/) los listados completos de los revisores.

1. Criterios de aceptación/rechazo de evaluación manuscritos

El equipo editorial de «Sophia» selecciona del listado de evaluadores del Consejo de Revisores a aquellos que se estiman más cualificado en la temática del manuscrito. Sí bien por parte de la publicación se pide la máxima colaboración de los revisores para agilizar las evaluaciones y los informes sobre cada original, la aceptación de la revisión ha de estar vinculada a:

   a. **Experticia.** La aceptación conlleva necesariamente la posesión de competencias en la temática concreta del artículo a evaluar.

   b. **Disponibilidad.** Revisar un original exige tiempo y conlleva reflexión concienzuda de muchos aspectos.

   c. **Conflicto de intereses.** En caso de identificación de la autoría del manuscrito (a pesar de su anonimato), excesiva cercanía académica o familiar a sus autores, pertenencia a la misma Universidad, Departamento, Grupo de Investigación, Red Temática, Proyectos de Investigación, publicaciones conjuntas con los autores… o cualquier otro tipo de conexión o conflicto/cercanía profesional; el revisor debe rechazar la invitación del editor para su revisión.

   d. **Compromiso de confidencialidad.** La recepción de un manuscrito para su evaluación exige del Revisor un compromiso expreso de
confidencialidad, de manera que éste no puede, durante todo el proceso, ser divulgado a un tercero.

En caso que el revisor no pueda llevar a cabo la actividad por algunos de estos motivos u otros justificables, debe notificarlo al editor por la misma vía que ha recibido la invitación, especificando los motivos de rechazo.

2. Criterios generales de evaluación de manuscritos

a) Tema

La temática que se plantea en el original, además de ser valiosa y relevante para la comunidad científica, ha de ser limitada y especializada en tiempo y espacio, sin llegar al excesivo localismo.

b) Redacción

La valoración crítica en el informe de revisión ha de estar redactada de forma objetiva, aportando contenido, citas o referencias de interés para argumentar su juicio.

c) Originalidad

Como criterio de calidad fundamental, un artículo debe ser original, inédito e idóneo. En este sentido, los revisores deben responder a estas tres preguntas en la evaluación:

- ¿Es el artículo suficientemente novedoso e interesante para justificar su publicación?
- ¿Aporta algo al canon del conocimiento?
- ¿Es relevante la pregunta de investigación?

Una búsqueda rápida de literatura utilizando repositorios tales como Web of Knowledge, Scopus y Google Scholar para ver si la investigación ha sido cubierta previamente puede ser de utilidad.

d) Estructura

Los manuscritos que se remiten a «Sophia» deben seguir la estructura señalada en las normas de publicación tanto para las investigaciones empíricas como para revisiones de la literatura o estudios específicos. En este sentido, los originales han de contener resumen, introducción, metodología, resultados, discusión y conclusión.

- El título, el resumen y las palabras clave han de describir exactamente el contenido del artículo.
La revisión de la literatura debe resumir el estado de la cuestión de las investigaciones más recientes y adecuadas para el trabajo presentado. Se valorará especialmente con criterios de idoneidad y que las referencias sean a trabajos de alto impacto –especialmente en WoS, Scopus, Scielo, etc. Debe incluir además la explicación general del estudio, su objetivo central y el diseño metodológico seguido.

En caso de investigaciones, en los materiales y métodos, el autor debe precisar cómo se recopilan los datos, el proceso y los instrumentos usados para responder a las hipótesis, el sistema de validación, y toda la información necesaria para replicar el estudio.

En los resultados se deben especificar claramente los hallazgos en secuencia lógica. Es importante revisar si las tablas o cuadros presentados son necesarios o, caso contrario, redundantes con el contenido del texto.

En la discusión se deben interpretar los datos obtenidos a la luz de la revisión de la literatura. Los autores deberán incluir aquí si su artículo apoya o contradice las teorías previas. Las conclusiones resumirán los avances que la investigación plantea en el área del conocimiento científico, las futuras líneas de investigación y las principales dificultades o limitaciones para la realización de la investigación.

Idioma: Se valorará positivamente si el idioma utilizado facilita la lectura y va en favor de la claridad, sencillez, precisión y transparencia del lenguaje científico. El Revisor no debe proceder a corrección, ya sea en español o inglés, sino que informará a los Editores de estos errores gramaticales u ortotipográficos.

Finalmente, se requiere una profunda revisión de las referencias por si se hubiera omitido alguna obra relevante. Las referencias han de ser precisas, citando en la lógica de la temática a estudiar, sus principales obras así como los documentos que más se asemejen al propio trabajo, así como las últimas investigaciones en el área.

3. Dimensiones relevantes de valoración

Para el caso de artículos de investigaciones empíricas, «Sophia» utiliza una matriz de evaluación de cada original que responde a los criterios editoriales y al cumplimiento de la normativa de la publicación. En este sentido los revisores deberán atender a la valoración cuali-cuantitativa de cada uno de los aspectos propuestos en esta matriz con criterios de objetividad, razonamiento, lógica y experticia.
Para el caso de artículos reflexivos, estudios, revisiones de literatura (estado de la cuestión) u otro tipo de estudio (informes, propuestas, experiencias, entre otras), el Consejo Editorial remitirá a los revisores una matriz distinta, comprendiendo las características propias de estructura de este tipo de originales:

### ESTUDIOS, INFORMES, PROPUESTAS, EXPERIENCIAS

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### INVESTIGACIONES

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4. Cuestiones éticas

a. Plagio: Aunque la revista utiliza sistemas de detección de plagio, si el revisor sospechare que un original es una copia sustancial de otra obra, ha de informar de inmediato a los Editores citando la obra anterior con tanto detalle cómo le sea posible.

b. Fraude: Si hay sospecha real o remota de que los resultados en un artículo son falsos o fraudulentos, es necesario informar de ellos a los Editores.

5. Evaluación de los originales

Una vez realizada la evaluación cuanti-cualitativa del manuscrito en revisión, el revisor podrá realizar recomendaciones para mejorar la calidad del original. Sin embargo, se atenderá a la calificación del manuscrito de tres maneras:

a. Rechazo debido a las deficiencias detectadas, justificadas y razonadas con valoración cualitativa y cuantitativa. El informe ha de ser más extenso si obtiene menos de los 30 de los 50 puntos posibles.

b. Aceptación sin revisión.

c. Aceptación condicionada y por ende con revisión (mayor o menor). En este último caso, se ha de identificar claramente qué revisión es necesaria, enumerando los comentarios e incluso especificando párrafos y páginas en las que sugieren modificaciones.
### Protocol of Manuscript Evaluation for External Reviewers

**Article Details**

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<th>Date of return of evaluation:</th>
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Title of the article to be evaluated:

**SECTION: REPORTS, STUDIES, PROPOSALS AND REVIEWS**

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Print ISSN: 1390-3861 / Electronic ISSN: 1390-8626, pp. 341-344.
Protocolo de evaluación de manuscritos para revisores externos

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**SECCIÓN: ESTUDIOS, PROPUESTAS, INFORMES Y REVISIONES**

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Estructura y organización artículo
Capacidad argumental y coherencia
Redacción científica

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Aportaciones originales
Conclusiones

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<td>(Más detallada si el trabajo no obtiene 40 puntos, para informar al autor/es).</td>
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## Checklist prior to sending the manuscript

### 1. CHECK OF THE MANUSCRIPT, PRIOR TO SENDING

To facilitate the process of evaluation of the manuscript and to accelerate the report of its possible publication, a final self-review of the manuscript is advised, checking the following questions.

#### COVER LETTER

| Title of the manuscript in spanish (maximum 85 characters). |
| Title of the manuscript in english (maximum 85 characters). |
| The two versions of the title of the manuscript are concise, informative and collect as many identifiable terms as possible. |
| The abstract in spanish is included, in a single paragraph and without epi-graphs (minimum / maximum: 220/250 words). |
| The abstract in english is included, in a single paragraph and without epi-graphs (minimum / maximum: 220/250 words). |
| Abstracts in spanish and english respond in order to the following issues: justification of the subject, objectives, study methodology, results and conclusions. |
| It includes 6 descriptors (in english and spanish) (only simple words, not phrases or combinations of words), with the most significant terms, and if possible standardized. |
| The texts in english (title, abstract and descriptors) have been written or verified by an official translator or expert in this language (The use of automatic translators is prohibited). |
| All the identification data of the authors are included in the order stipulated in the norms: identification and correspondence data, professional filiations, last academic degree ... |
| The first and last name of the authors has been normalized. |
| Each author is identified with their ORCID code. |
| The maximum number of authors is three, with the exception of those works that justify a higher but limited number of authors |
| The author(s) have duly signed the letter of presentation of the article, which includes the partial transfer of rights and the declaration of conflict of interest. |

#### MANUSCRIPT

| It includes title of the manuscript, abstract, and keywords. All in spanish and english. |
An introduction is included that in order contains: brief presentation of the subject; problem formulation; Idea to defend or hypothesis to prove; objective; Importance of the theme; relevance; methodology; structure of the document.

The text is within the minimum and maximum extension:
In the Review sections: 10,000/11,000 words of text (including references).
In the research section: 8,000/9,500 words of text (including references).
Reports, Studies: 8,000/9,500 words of text (including references).

In case of research, the manuscript responds to the structure required in the guidelines (IMRDC).
In the case of a report, study or review, the manuscript respects the minimum structure required by the guidelines.

The review work includes three citations from three previous issues of Sophia Journal.

The manuscript explicitly cites and cites the used sources and materials.

The methodology described for the research work is clear and concise, allowing its replication, if necessary, by other experts.

The conclusions follow on objective and problem raised are supported by the results obtained and presented in the form of a synthesis.

If statistical analyzes have been used, they have been reviewed/contrasted by an expert.

The citations in the text are strictly in accordance with the APA 6 regulations, reflected in the instructions.

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The final references have been rigorously reviewed and only those that have been cited in the text are included.

The final references conform in style and format to the international standards used in Sophia.

The number of references is according to the theoretical basis of the study carried out

DOIs have been included in all References that carry it in the following format: doi: https://doi.org/XXXXXX

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If figures and charts are included, they should provide additional and not repeated information in the text. Their graphic quality has been verified.

The number of charts and / or figures does not exceed 6

If the case, financial support is declared.
### ASPECTOS FORMALES

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<td>The epigraphs have been properly and hierarchically numbered in Arabic.</td>
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<td>Double spaces have been deleted.</td>
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<td>The typographic quotes « » (with <code>alt + 174</code> and <code>alt + 175</code> for opening and closing) have been used.</td>
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<td>The text has been supervised by external staff to ensure grammar and style.</td>
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### PRESENTATION

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### ANNEXED DOCUMENTS

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<tr>
<th>Attached are the two attached documents: the cover letter and the manuscript.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The accompanying documents and annexes have been published with Figshare.</td>
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# Chequeo previo al envío del manuscrito

## 1. CHEQUEO DEL MANUSCRITO, PREVIO AL ENVÍO

Para facilitar el proceso de evaluación del manuscrito y acelerar el informe de su posible publicación, se aconseja una autorevisión final del manuscrito, comprobando las siguientes cuestiones.

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- Se incluye título del manuscrito en español (máximo 85 caracteres).
- Se incluye título del manuscrito en inglés (máximo 85 caracteres).
- Las dos versiones del título del manuscrito son concisas, informativas y recogen el mayor número de términos identificativos posibles.
- Se incluye resumen en español, en un solo párrafo y sin epígrafes (mínimo/máximo: 220/250 palabras).
- Se incluye abstract en inglés, en un solo párrafo y sin epígrafes (mínimo/máximo 220/250 palabras).
- Los resúmenes en español e inglés responden ordenadamente a las siguientes cuestiones: justificación del tema, objetivos, metodología del estudio, resultados y conclusiones.
- Se incluyen 6 descriptores (en español e inglés) (sólo palabras simples, no sintagmas o combinaciones de palabras), con los términos más significativos, y a ser posibles estandarizados.
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En su caso, se declaran los apoyos y/o soportes financieros.

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<th>DOCUMENTOS ANEXOS</th>
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<td>Se adjuntan los dos documentos anexos: la carta de presentación y el manuscrito.</td>
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Cover Letter

Section (Mark)
Monographic Dossier ___
Miscellaneous ___

Title in Spanish: Arial 14 bold and centered.
Maximum 85 characters with spaces
Title in English: Arial 14 cursive. Maximum 805 characters with spaces

Name author 1 (standardized)
Professional category, Institution, Country
Institutional email
ORCID

Name author 2 (standardized)
Professional category, Institution, Country
Institutional email
ORCID

Name author 3 (standardized)
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Institutional email
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Abstract (Spanish)
Minimum 220 and maximum 250 words. It must include 1) Justification of the topic; 2) Objectives; 3) Methodology; 4) Main results; 5) Main conclusions. It must be impersonally written “The present paper analyzes ...”

Abstract (English)
Minimum 220 and maximum 250 words. It must include 1) Justification of the topic; 2) Objectives; 3) Methodology; 4) Main results; 5) Main conclusions. It must be impersonally written “The present paper analyzes ...” Do not use automatic translation systems.

Keywords (Spanish)
6 standardized terms preferably of a single word and of the UNESCO Thesaurus separated by commas (,).
Editorial guidelines
Normas editoriales

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Miscelánea ___

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Abstract


Descriptores

6 términos estandarizados preferiblemente de una sola palabra y del Thesaurus de la UNESCO separados por coma (,).
Keywords

Los 6 términos referidos en inglés separados por coma (,). No utilizar sistemas de traducción automáticos.

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Proyecto subvencionado:
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The authors (s) certify that this work has not been published, nor is it under consideration for publication in any other journal or editorial work.

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Sophia 26
Biology and education: neuro-education

Descriptors: Philosophical foundations of biology; The interdisciplinarity of biology; Approaches and perspectives of biology of education; Value and limits of sociobiology; Bioethics; Biological determinism, freedom and education; Social evolutionism today: educational consequences; Evolutionary epistemology; Teaching-learning strategies of biology; Philosophical foundations of neuroscience; Contributions and strategies of the neuro-education; Problems or limits of neuroeducation; Biological mechanisms of learning; Mind and brain in contemporary neuroscience.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts: July 15, 2018
Publication date of this issue: January 15, 2019

Sophia 27
Ontology of language in education

Descriptors: Ontological foundation of the educational language; The challenges of transformational learning in education; Intelligences, transformational learning and disruptive innovation; Philosophical foundations of language; The sense and meaning of the ontology of language; Implications of language ontology for education.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts: December 15, 2018
Publication date of this issue: July 15, 2019
Sophia 28
Philosophy, technology and innovation in education

Descriptors: Philosophy of technology; Philosophical foundations of technology; Philosophy of educational innovation; Philosophy and educational theories for the network society; Innovation and educational technology; Computational thinking; Pedagogical theories of computational thinking; Of connectivity to critical thinking; New technologies and creativity in education; Video games and education; Successful pedagogical experiences with communicative technology; Educational innovation with emerging communicative devices (Smartphones and Tablets).

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts: July 15, 2019
Publication date of this issue: January 15, 2020

Sophia 29
Complex thinking and the sciences of complexity in education

Descriptors: Paradigms of complexity and transdisciplinarity; Philosophy of knowledge and learning from complexity; Complex thinking and learning; Problem of method in complex thinking; Contributions of the complex thought for education; Education and complex thinking; Criticisms of the complexity paradigm; Complex thinking, critical thinking and education; Complex thinking and creativity in education; The being and the existence in the paradigm of the complexity.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts: December 15, 2019
Publication date of this issue: July 15, 2020

Sophia 30
Philosophy of the cognitive sciences and education

Descriptors: Philosophy and cognitive science; Philosophical debate on the cognitive sciences; Philosophical foundation of cybernetics; Epistemological foundations of cognitive theory; Philosophical foundations of connectionist theory; Current trends in cognitive science; Theory of mind and cognitive sciences; Evolutionary psychology and education; Relations between cognitive sciences and education sciences; Contributions of the cognitive sciences for education.
Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

**Deadline for receipt of manuscripts:** July 15, 2020
**Publication date of this issue:** January 15, 2021

Sophia 31

The problem of truth in the sciences and in the pedagogical practice

**Descriptors:** Conceptions of truth in the history of philosophy and its implications in educational processes; Philosophical, psychological and pedagogical foundations of truth; Truth, fact and science; Truth in the social sciences; Truth in the natural sciences; Truth in the exact sciences; Truth in the human sciences; Truth in the sciences of information and communication; New trends, approaches and perspectives on truth; The truth in education.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

**Deadline for receipt of manuscripts:** December 15, 2020
**Publication date of this issue:** July 15, 2021

Sophia 32

Philosophical reflection on the quality on education

**Descriptors:** Analysis of the concept of “quality” in education; Philosophical, psychological and pedagogical fundamentals of quality in education; Quality and comprehensive and inclusive educational models; Philosophical basis of complex competences in education; Quality and skills in education; Approach of the capacities and educational quality.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

**Deadline for receipt of manuscripts:** July 15, 2021
**Publication date of this issue:** January 15, 2022

Sophia 33

Philosophy of the mind and education

**Descriptors:** Effects and causes of mental states; The nature of mental states and their importance in education; Monistic responses to the mind-body problem; Theories about the philosophy of mind; The philosophy of mind at the present; Philosophy of mind and its relationship with other sciences; Found-
ation of mental activity and behavior; Relationship of the philosophy of mind with psychology; Philosophy of mind and education; The power of the mind in education; Pedagogical strategies for the development of the mind; Concept of disability or mental dysfunction: implications and proposals in education.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

**Deadline for receipt of manuscripts:** December 15, 2021  
**Publication date of this issue:** July 15, 2022

Sophia 34  
Philosophy, anthropology and education

**Descriptors:** Philosophical foundations of ethnography; Philosophical basis of cultural theories; Contributions of cultural and social anthropology to education; Philosophical foundation of dialogue between cultures; Interculturality, multiculturalism and education; The task of philosophy in intercultural dialogue; The thought of diversity and its educational importance; Global citizenship, cosmopolitanism and education; Ecosophy, culture and transdisciplinarity.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

**Deadline for receipt of manuscripts:** July 15, 2022  
**Publication date of this issue:** January 15, 2023

Sophia 35  
Philosophical currents and their impact on pedagogical orientations

**Descriptors:** Philosophy as the fundamental basis of pedagogical orientations. Idealism as the basis for the generation of pedagogical orientations; Rationalism as the foundation of pedagogical orientations; Empiricism as the basis of educational realism; Illustration as support of educational enlightenment; Other philosophical currents as the basis of theories or pedagogical orientations throughout history; Philosophical foundations of the new pedagogies; Philosophy of technology in the educational field; Philosophical basis of constructivism and other pedagogical theories; Ethical thinking and pedagogy; Philosophical critique of current educational models; Philosophy of dialogue and education; Hermeneutics and their contributions to the current pedagogy.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

**Deadline for receipt of manuscripts:** December 15, 2022  
**Publication date of this issue:** July 15, 2023
Sophia 36
Philosophical approach to learning as a cognitive process

Descriptors: Philosophical basis of learning; Learning as a cognitive process; Learning as a product and as a process of knowledge; Philosophical foundation of learning theories; Psychological and pedagogical foundations of learning; Philosophical foundations of multiple intelligences and education; Emotional intelligence and its impact on educational processes; Science and philosophy of human emotions: educational repercussions; Sense and meaning of cognitive processes; Memory, thought and language as the main cognitive processes of the human being; Cognitive processes and meaningful learning.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts: July 15, 2023
Publication date of this issue: January 15, 2024

Sophia 37
Physics, metaphysics and education

Descriptors: Philosophical reflections on the interpretation of physics; Metaphysics in the twenty-first century; History of physics and its educational approach; Relations between conceptions of physics in the history of philosophy; Problem of sense and truth in the philosophy of physics; Nature and implications of thermodynamics; Epistemology and guiding principles of current physical theories; Philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics; Philosophical implications of quantum theory; Philosophical implications of Newtonian physics; Philosophical implications of the theory of relativity; Pedagogical strategies in the teaching-learning of physics; Educational proposals to boost the understanding of physics; Philosophical implications of current theoretical physics.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts: December 15, 2023
Publication date of this issue: July 15, 2024

Sophia 38
The inductive method in the humanities and pedagogy

Descriptors: Scientific activity and reflection on the method of knowledge; The inductive method in the social sciences; Induction, experience and action as the foundation of pedagogy; The methods of knowledge and
learning in the humanities; Value and limits of the experimental method in the human sciences; Value and limits of pedagogical positivism; Reflections on the scientific method and implications in the learning processes; Applications of the inductive method in education; Usefulness of the inductive method for psychology; Pedagogical proposals of an inductive character in the human sciences.

Generation of articles from representatives of philosophy prominent in the central theme and its implications in psychology, pedagogy or other disciplines.

**Deadline for receipt of manuscripts:** July 15, 2024
**Publication date of this issue:** January 15, 2025
**Convocatorias 2018 - 2025**

**Sophia 26**

**Biología y educación: la neuroeducación**

**Descriptores:** Fundamentos filosóficos de la biología; la interdisciplinariedad de la biología; enfoques y perspectivas de la biología de la educación; valor y límites de la sociobiología; bioética; determinismo biológico, libertad y educación; evolucionismo social hoy: consecuencias educativas; epistemología evolucionista; estrategias de enseñanza-aprendizaje de la biología; fundamentos filosóficos de la neurociencia; aportes y estrategias de la neuroeducación; problemas o límites de la neuroeducación; mecanismos biológicos del aprendizaje; mente y cerebro en la neurociencia contemporánea.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

**Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos:** 15 de julio de 2018

**Fecha de publicación de esta edición:** 15 de enero de 2019

**Sophia 27**

**Ontología del lenguaje en la educación**

**Descriptores:** Fundamentación ontológica del lenguaje educativo; los retos del aprendizaje transformacional en la educación; inteligencias, aprendizaje transformacional e innovación disruptiva; fundamentos filosóficos del lenguaje; el sentido y el significado de la ontología del lenguaje; implicaciones de la ontología del lenguaje para la educación.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

**Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos:** 15 de diciembre de 2018

**Fecha de publicación de esta edición:** 15 de julio de 2019
Sophia 28
Filosofía, tecnología e innovación en la educación

Descriptores: Filosofía de la tecnología; fundamentos filosóficos de la tecnología; filosofía de la innovación educativa; filosofía y teorías educativas para la sociedad red; innovación y tecnología educativa; pensamiento computacional; teorías pedagógicas del pensamiento computacional; de la conectividad al pensamiento crítico; nuevas tecnologías y creatividad en la educación; videojuegos y educación; experiencias pedagógicas exitosas con tecnología comunicativa; innovación educativa con dispositivos comunicativos emergentes (Smartphones y Tablets).

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de julio de 2019
Fecha de publicación de esta edición: 15 de enero 2020

Sophia 29
El pensamiento complejo y las ciencias de la complejidad en la educación

Descriptores: Paradigmas de la complejidad y la transdisciplinariedad; filosofía del conocimiento y el aprendizaje desde la complejidad; pensamiento complejo y aprendizaje; problema del método en el pensamiento complejo; aportes del pensamiento complejo para la educación; educación y pensamiento complejo; críticas al paradigma de la complejidad; pensamientos complejo, pensamiento crítico y educación; pensamiento complejo y creatividad en la educación; el ser y la existencia en el paradigma de la complejidad.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de diciembre de 2019
Fecha de publicación de esta edición: 15 de julio de 2020

Sophia 30
Filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas y educación

Descriptores: Filosofía y ciencia cognitiva; debate filosófico sobre las ciencias cognitivas; fundamentación filosófica de la cibernética; fundamentos epistemológicos de la teoría cognitivista; fundamentos filosóficos de la teoría conexiónista; tendencias actuales de la ciencia cognitiva; teoría de la mente y ciencias cognitivas; psicología evolutiva y educación; relaciones entre ciencias cognitivas y ciencias de la educación; aportes de las ciencias cognitivas para la educación.
Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

**Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos:** 15 de julio de 2020  
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### Sophia 31

**El problema de la verdad en las ciencias y en la práctica pedagógica**

Descripciones: Concepciones de verdad en la historia de la filosofía y sus implicaciones en los procesos educativos; fundamentos filosóficos, psicológicos y pedagógicos de la verdad; verdad, hecho y ciencia; la verdad en las ciencias sociales; la verdad en las ciencias naturales; la verdad en las ciencias exactas; la verdad en las ciencias humanas; la verdad en las ciencias de la información y de la comunicación; nuevas tendencias, enfoques y perspectivas sobre la verdad; la verdad en la educación.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

**Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos:** 15 de diciembre de 2020  
**Fecha de publicación de esta edición:** 15 de julio de 2021

### Sophia 32

**Reflexión filosófica sobre la calidad en la educación**

Descripciones: Análisis del concepto de “calidad” en la educación; fundamentos filosóficos, psicológicos y pedagógicos de la calidad en educación; calidad y modelos educativos integrales e inclusivos; bases filosóficas de las competencias complejas en la educación; la calidad y las competencias en la educación; enfoque de las capacidades y calidad educativa.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

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### Sophia 33

**Filosofía de la mente y educación**

Descripciones: Efectos y causas de los estados mentales; la naturaleza de los estados mentales y su importancia en educación; respuestas monistas al problema mente-cuerpo; teorías sobre la filosofía de la mente; la filosofía de la mente en la actualidad; filosofía de la mente y la relación con otras ciencias; fundamento
de la actividad mental y de la conducta; relación filosofía de la mente con la psicología; filosofía de la mente y educación; el poder de la mente en la educación; estrategias pedagógicas para el desarrollo de la mente; concepto de discapacidad o disfunción mental: implicaciones y propuestas en educación.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de diciembre de 2021
Fecha de publicación de esta edición: 15 de julio de 2022

Sophia 34
Filosofía, antropología y educación

Descriptores: Fundamentos filosóficos de la etnografía; bases filosóficas de las teorías culturales; aportaciones de la antropología cultural y social a la educación; fundamentación filosófica del diálogo entre culturas; interculturalidad, multiculturalidad y educación; el quehacer de la filosofía en el diálogo intercultural; el pensamiento de la diversidad y su importancia educativa; ciudadanía global, cosmovisión y educación; ecosofía, cultura y transdisciplinariedad.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de julio de 2022
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Sophia 35
Corrientes filosóficas y su incidencia en las orientaciones pedagógicas

Descriptores: La filosofía como base fundamental de las orientaciones pedagógicas. El idealismo como base para la generación de orientaciones pedagógicas; el racionalismo como fundamento de orientaciones pedagógicas; el empirismo como sustento del realismo educativo; la ilustración como apoyo del iluminismo educativo; otras corrientes filosóficas como base de teorías u orientaciones pedagógicas a través de la historia; fundamentos filosóficos de las nuevas pedagogías; filosofía de la tecnología en el ámbito educativo; bases filosóficas del constructivismo y de otras teorías pedagógicas; pensamiento ético y pedagogía; crítica filosófica a los modelos educativos actuales; filosofía del diálogo y educación; la hermenéutica y sus aportaciones a la pedagogía actual.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos: 15 de diciembre de 2022
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**Sophia 36**

**Enfoque filosófico del aprendizaje como proceso cognitivo**

Descripciones: Bases filosóficas del aprendizaje; el aprendizaje como proceso cognitivo; el aprendizaje como producto y como proceso del conocimiento; fundamento filosófico de las teorías del aprendizaje; fundamentos psicológicos y pedagógicos del aprendizaje; fundamentos filosóficos de las inteligencias múltiples y educación; la inteligencia emocional y su incidencia en los procesos educativos; ciencia y filosofía de las emociones humanas: repercusiones educativas; sentido y significado de los procesos cognitivos; memoria, pensamiento y lenguaje como principales procesos cognitivos del ser humano; procesos cognitivos y aprendizajes significativos.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

- **Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos:** 15 de julio de 2023
- **Fecha de publicación de esta edición:** 15 de enero de 2024

**Sophia 37**

**Física, metafísica y educación**

Descripciones: Reflexiones filosóficas acerca de la interpretación de la física; la metafísica en el siglo XXI; historia de la física y su planteamiento educativo; relaciones entre concepciones de la física en la historia de la filosofía; problema del sentido y de la verdad en la filosofía de la física; naturaleza e implicaciones de la termodinámica; epistemología y principios rectores de las teorías físicas actuales; fundamentos filosóficos de la mecánica cuántica; implicaciones filosóficas de la teoría cuántica; implicaciones filosóficas de la física newtoniana; implicaciones filosóficas de la teoría de la relatividad; estrategias pedagógicas en la enseñanza-aprendizaje de la física; propuestas educativas para dinamizar la comprensión de la física; implicaciones filosóficas de la física teórica actual.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

- **Fecha límite para la recepción de manuscritos:** 15 de diciembre de 2023
- **Fecha de publicación de esta edición:** 15 de julio de 2024
Sophia 38
El método inductivo en las humanidades y en la pedagogía

Descriptores: La actividad científica y reflexión sobre el método de conocimiento; el método inductivo en las ciencias sociales; inducción, experiencia y acción como fundamento de la pedagogía; los métodos de conocimiento y aprendizaje en las humanidades; valor y límites del método experimental en las ciencias humanas; valor y límites del positivismo pedagógico; reflexiones sobre el método científico e implicaciones en los procesos de aprendizaje; aplicaciones del método inductivo en la educación; utilidad del método inductivo para la psicología; propuestas pedagógicas de carácter inductivo en las ciencias humanas.

Generación de artículos desde representantes de la filosofía destacados en el tema central y sus implicaciones en la psicología, en la pedagogía o en otras disciplinas.

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