

CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE YOUNG
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE FOR THE FORMATION
OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY¹

Aportes de la filosofía del joven Friedrich
Nietzsche para la formación del individuo
en la sociedad contemporánea

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Abstract

This article tries to trace one of the central vertebrae of Nietzschean thought that has been treated in a tangential way, namely, his interpretations of human formation. In this order of ideas, he addresses a reading of some of the criticisms and proposals on education found in the *Schopenhauer educator* and *The future of our educational institutions*, conferences presented by Nietzsche between January and March 1872, from a psychological perspective that is expressed in the Nietzschean doctrine of impulses. The first part of the article delves into a careful interpretation of the formative proposal of a psychological nature of the individual as a unit of style that Nietzsche presents in the second section of the *Schopenhauer educator*. The second part highlights the critical and proactive value of the Janus-headed thesis with which Nietzsche articulates his interpretation of the cultural task of education in the future of our educational institutions. This project that Nietzsche presents to education turns out to open up the field to this day and still turns out to be a valuable and critical perspective to interpret the high cultural tasks of our education, as well as it would allow to establish a plausible basis of interpretation to trace the role of education. in Nietzsche's doctrine

Keywords

Formation, philosophy, impulses, genius, culture, erudite.

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Resumen

Este artículo intenta rastrear una de las vértebras centrales del pensamiento Nietzscheano que ha sido tratada de modo tangencial, a saber, sus interpretaciones sobre la formación humana. En ese orden de ideas aborda una lectura de algunas de las críticas y propuestas sobre la educación que se encuentran en *Schopenhauer como educador* y *El futuro de nuestras instituciones educativas*, conferencias presentadas por Nietzsche entre enero y marzo de 1872, desde una perspectiva psicológica que se expresa en la doctrina de los impulsos nietzscheana. La primera parte del artículo se adentra a una interpretación detenida de la propuesta formativa de carácter psicológico del individuo como unidad de estilo que Nietzsche presenta en la segunda sección del *Schopenhauer educador*. La segunda parte pone de relieve el valor crítico y propositivo que tiene la tesis con cabeza de Jano, con la cual Nietzsche articula su interpretación de la tarea cultural de la educación en *Sobre el futuro de nuestras instituciones educativas*. Este proyecto que Nietzsche presenta a la educación resulta abrirse campo hasta nuestros días y resulta ser aún una perspectiva valiosa y crítica para interpretar las altas tareas culturales de nuestra educación, así como también permitiría fundamentar una base plausible de interpretación para rastrear el papel de la educación en la doctrina de Nietzsche.

Palabras clave

Formación, filosofía, impulsos, genio, cultura, docto.

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Introduction

Nietzsche's concern with education and training is observed in all his thinking. In his works of maturity, this concern is intimately related with other central themes of his thought such as the free spirit, the transvaluation of values or the philosopher of the future. However, in many cases, it has been treated as a tangential or complementary concern to the central doctrines of his thought, despite the importance that training has in the development of Nietzsche's work. Contrary to the foregoing, this article shows the importance of the notion of human formation in Nietzsche's thought, reason for which the subject of this article is the interpretation that Nietzsche offers about human formation -from the perspective of psychology- in his work of youth. Views that Nietzsche understands as a pulsion dynamic, which is understood as a pulsion doctrine of human psychology. Doctrine from which will be interpreted - both the formation of the individual and the cultural role of training institutions - according to the critical criterion that Nietzsche offers in two works of his youth: *On the future of our educational institutions* (FEI) -lectures presented by Nietzsche between January and March 1872- and *Schopenhauer as educator* (SE) -third of the untimely considerations- published in 1873.

The problem that this article seeks to address arises from the place that human formation has in Nietzsche thought, as well as the way in which such formation is related to culture -formation [Bildung], education [Erziehung]?; culture and philosophy seem to keep intimate con-

nections in Nietzsche's thought. Such a relationship can be seen, e.g., in the task that the free spirit acquires in *Beyond Good and Evil* (BGE) by seeking to create the conditions in which a high type of human being called a *philosopher of the future* can be raised (teach) (cf. Nietzsche, 2016b, p. 326)³. These conditions have been propitiated by means of the critical exercise carried out by the free spirit on the cardinal values of the 'modern culture' -peoples who renounce their own culture- This exercise, which can be explicitly traced back to its origin -*Human, too human I* (HtH-I)- because it is in this book where appears the notion of free spirit for the first time. It is precisely in this work where for the first time the free spirit will subject the high values of modern cultural expressions to criticism. Such a critical exercise of the free spirit ends up revealing -in the history of metaphysics- religion, art and Western morality, a hierarchy of impulses contrary to life; for this reason, it ventures to a *transvaluation of all values* that instate a new pulsion hierarchy in which there are conditions to form the philosopher of the future. In this same way: the philosopher of the future is a new type of trainer who will know how to use the cultural forces of people - art, religion, morality and philosophy - to achieve his ends: the reproduction of his own *type*. This, in turn, will lead to the formation of a new type of higher community with free spirits (cf. Nietzsche, 2016b, p. 337-38).

This elaborate and conscious idea of the relationship between his philosophy and the formation that Nietzsche presents to us in his maturity is already quite developed in his youth under the idea of the formation of the genius of culture. The problem is that many of these keen intuitions were overshadowed by his worship - almost blind to Wagner - Nietzsche himself becomes aware of the way in which his devotion to Wagner ended up overshadowing his youth work, becoming confused with Wagner's. Such a critique makes it explicit to the *Birth of Tragedy*, a work which states "to be fair with the *Birth of Tragedy* (1872) will be necessary to forget some things. He has been *influenced* and even fascinated by what was wrong with him, by his application to *Wagnerianism*" (Nietzsche, 2016b, p. 817). This statement can be extended to all the work of youth. Despite this, the preoccupation for training is present in the works of youth, which escapes Wagnerian obtundation. Following this interpretative path, the problem that seeks to address in the following pages is the extraction of criticisms and proposals that the work of the young Nietzsche presents, as a horizon for a cultural reform and transformation, which will seek to put in dialogue with the formative and cultural problems that have been present in our contemporaneity. In this order

of ideas, the aim of the paper is to draw from the darkness some of the more lucid intuitions about education that Nietzsche maintained during his youth and to show the relationship that he has with his critique of culture. Subsequently, to demonstrate the value of the connection between formation and culture in Nietzschean thought to address current problems of education and its task for culture.

The thesis that seeks to support this article is that both the formative proposal of the individual exposed in the SE, as the critique and renewal of educational institutions in FEI are approached by Nietzsche from a psychological perspective, from which he says that human formation aims to the fulfillment of certain cultural tasks. Thus, what sustains Nietzsche's conception of formation is a certain doctrine of impulses, which will allow him to postulate a pulsion dynamic that he considers as the appropriate way to shape both the individual and educational institutions. This doctrine has an emphatic psychological character that leads to a humanistic form proposal that, in a Greek sense of the term, would be read as the formation of a high type of human being. This interpretation leads him to propose a certain reversal of the pulsion order in the formation of the individual and the way educational institutions were conceived in the nineteenth century Germany. Criticism and formative proposal that will be sought to evidence within this article against the conception of education -from modern Germany of Nietzsche to our current way of conceiving it- Among the findings, it is found that criticism of Nietzsche's education are still valid for our current educational situation; and therefore, the subject is intimately related with our educational and cultural problems. Thus, a reading of the Nietzschean perspective of education provides a good horizon of interpretation of the sickening pretensions of contemporary Latin American education. In order to demonstrate this *a priori*, the methodology used in this research has been a hermeneutic exegesis of the two works of his youth referred to, turning to certain interpreters of Nietzsche's work, to finally relate them with current criticisms of culture and training.

The text is structured in two sections. In the first one, a detailed reading of the formation and style unity of the individual in the SE is made, having the psychological metaphor of the 'solar system endowed with living movements' as interpretive reference, presented by Nietzsche in the second section of this work (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 763). In the second section, Nietzsche's critique and pulsion proposal of education are analyzed. From this reading, the connection between the two works is highlighted from a psychological perspective, in which Nietzsche in-



terprets and criticizes education. It is a connection that shows an ideal of education in Nietzsche: a training proposal that dialogues from the individual level of the training act to the institutional and social level.

Formation and style unity of the individual at the Schopenhauer as an educator

In the light of the reinterpretations and revaluations that Nietzsche undertakes on his own work, between 1884 and 1886, of which there are traces both in his correspondence (cf. Nietzsche, 2010b) and in his preparatory writings (cfr. e.g., Nietzsche, 2006) and that are concretized in the five prefaces that he writes for his works before the *Za*; i.e., *the Birth of the Tragedy, Human, too human I and II, Aurora and Jovial Science*, since in them it is possible to highlight an idea that already inhabits in Nietzsche's thinking from his youth. In *The Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (FTG) of 1873 (text that writes in his years as a teacher of Basel to judge Wagner but that was never released) Nietzsche proposes to interpret philosophy as the expression of a *personality* and what must endure in history is the *great man* (cfr. Nietzsche, 2016a)⁴. This interpretation of philosophy, as the author's self-confession -which makes it the interpreter's task to bring to light those inadvertent confessions of the author (the morality or amorality they profess)- is a fundamental feature of Nietzsche's reading of 'every great philosophy' throughout the development of his thought. These readings are extremely important to find a psychological position in Nietzschean philosophy. In order to trace this line of interpretation of philosophy as the author's self-confession -in the young Nietzsche- it is possible to refer, e.g., to the first introduction of Philosophy in the *Tragic Age of the Greeks*,

I tell the story of these philosophers in a simplified way: I just want to highlight those elements of each system that are part of a *personality* [...] the task is to reveal what we should *always love* and *venerate* and what cannot be removed by any future knowledge: the great man (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 573).

This position can be found in Nietzsche's writings of maturity, e.g., in the first aphorisms of *Beyond Good and Evil*, especially in the sixth aphorism: "Little by little I have been manifesting what has been until now every great philosophy: namely, the self-confession of its author and a kind of unloved and unnoticed memories" (Nietzsche, 2016b, p. 300).



Meléndez (2001) in his work *Man and Style, (his) greatness and unity* in Nietzsche, and García-Pedraza (2021) in his work *Disease, Health and Philosophy can also be used. Perspectives on the disease* in Nietzsche's *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*.

That thought, which had already come from his youth, allows Nietzsche to think that the whole life of the spirit (i.e., all the spiritual expressions of the human being: art, religion, morality, philosophy, etc.) arises from the most individual, from his body, even though certain philosophers and moralists try to deceive themselves and pretend that their doctrines were born of a cold and objective dialectic (cf. Nietzsche, 2016b). Philosophy is “the self-confession of its author and a kind of unloved and unnoticed memories” (Nietzsche, 2016b, p. 300). Such a statement can be applied to both philosophy and the rest of the expressions of the human spirit, as shown by the treatment of morality and religion in BGE and *The Genealogy of Morality* (GM).

If considering this reflection of Nietzsche on the relationship between spiritual expressions in his personal corporal origin leads us to question how to understand the notions of the personal and the corporal of the individual, in other words, to ask ourselves for the interpretation of the *notion of personality* in Nietzsche. In this psychological field, in turn, the question arises for the formation of that individual, because precisely from it arises the expressions on which it is concretized and give shape to itself and to the culture.

The first of these questions leads us to the field of Nietzsche's psychological interpretation, because, if cultural expressions and the doctrine of an individual are only the expression of the most personal of himself, then we must ask ourselves for that 'self' (Selbst) that means two things parallelly: personality and body. The two things are intimately connected by the interpretation of Nietzsche's doctrine of impulses or instincts (Triebe), since, precisely, Nietzschean psychology is a certain doctrine of instincts. This way of interpreting Nietzsche's psychology as a doctrine of impulses is also explored and exposed by Assoun (1984) in his text *Freud and Nietzsche*. In fact, his comparative reading between these two philosophers evidences his psychological perspective of the Nietzschean doctrine -in a more concrete way- and dedicates the first two sections of the first book of his work to analyze the notions of instinct and drive, thereby pursuing to sustain that the psychoanalytic object of Nietzsche is precisely instinct or impulse (Trieb) (cf. Assoun, 1984). In that order of ideas: the 'self' - therefore, the personality or the body of the individual - is a set or game of impulses in open conflict and struggle



with each other to dominate or rule over others, which implies taking the direction and voice of the whole, i.e., putting oneself (as impulse) as the ultimate end of existence. For that reason, Nietzsche shows us in BGE that every impulse has been philosophized, since

whoever examines the fundamental instincts of men in order to know to what extent they may have acted here as geniuses (or demons) inspirators will find that they have all been philosophical one time, - and that each of them would very much like to present as the ultimate end of existence and as the rightful lord of all other instincts (Nietzsche, 2016b, p. 300).

From this psychology of impulses, the question of education in Nietzsche becomes understandable and takes a clear image before our eyes. Regarding interpretation of the education of the individual for Nietzsche, it refers to the psychology of his impulses. It is a psychological and formative path that is explicitly shown to us by SE, in the light of a high formative *task* of humanity, because, for Nietzsche, “humanity must work continuously to form [erzeugen] (procreate) great unique human beings and this - and this only - is its task [Aufgabe]” (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 790).

It is possible to assert that the question -for the formation of the individual- is the base for the considerations that Nietzsche makes about his time in this third *untimely*. These considerations are expressed in the SE from the proposal of an “educator philosopher” (cfr. Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 763.768, 776-7, 785). Nietzsche presents this educator from a critique of the two maxims or educational tendencies that modern education proposes. These maxims or tendencies are nothing but the government of certain impulses over others -if interpreted from a psychological perspective- as it does explicitly in FEI (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a). By way of diagnosis, Nietzsche presents, at the beginning of the second section of the SE, an X-ray of the educational maxims that give way to the educational practice of his time. This diagnosis presents two trends that synthesize the ways of directing the life models of modern human beings. A maxim focuses on the central impulse of life giving all the leading force to this impulse, in detriment of all other impulses, which ends up leading to a tyranny of the dominant impulse, and with it, an educational deformation. On the contrary, the other maxim seeks to enrich all impulses to the same extent by offering a *general education of the individual*. However, this general education, lacking of harmony, does not establish any unitary relationship between impulses, leading, finally, to weaken all impulses of the individual (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a). For Nietzsche, any of these two educational maxims is doomed to failure, since it does not respond



to the formative search of an individual who can assume historical-cultural goals and tasks; therefore, they do not tend to the formation of great single human beings -what Nietzsche conceives as part of the authentic direction of education- so, Nietzsche's proposal to form this type of 'geniuses of culture' does not take any of these extremes -on the contrary- seems to find an intermediate path from which it is possible to generate a unitary relationship between the set of impulses, which constitute *the self* what we call individual. Here is Nietzsche's proposal:

[...] what if both maxims were not antithetical at all? Does one merely say that human beings must have a center, and the other must also have a periphery? That educating philosopher with whom I dreamed would not only be able to discover the central force [...] his educational task would rather, in my opinion, consist in transforming the whole human being into a solar system and a planetary system endowed with living movements, and in knowing the law of his superior mechanics (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 763).

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This passage shows the way in which formation must work to shape the individual, starting from a psychological understanding of the dynamics of their impulses or instincts. What Nietzsche (2016a) declares as "a planetary system endowed with living movements" (p. 763) would be the objective of formation, i.e., the form of the individual, or more exactly the dynamics to which education must attend to form those great single human beings. This form of the individual reveals to us the Nietzschean concept of the individual to be formed and the very purpose of education.

However, the quote begins with two questions that Nietzsche (2016a) refers to the horizon that the maxims of education in his time have been proposed; and therefore, the maxims that have governed and instrumentalized the education that now he criticizes. The above statement as: to pay attention to the central impulse, ignoring the other impulses, or a general education that does not determine a unity of the movements. Faced with the failure of these educational perspectives, Nietzsche proposes an educating philosopher: this educating philosopher must direct the people to the high ideals of culture - in other words - to that foundational *task* of humanity. Such task is raised, in a way of discovering, in the SE under the figure of the '*genius of culture*', as an objective. Nietzsche evidences this relationship between genius as the goal and task of culture as follows:

[...] Just as from the feeling of his sinfulness his longing for the saint springs forth, so he experiences in himself, as an intellectual being, a

deep demand for genius. Here is the root of all true culture; and if by this I understand the age-race of human beings to be reborn as saints and as genius [...] the procreation of genius - which is the goal of all culture (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 773).

These lines show that to achieve these cultural ideals, it is necessary to form a type of individual that can conduct them. A type of individual that Nietzsche describes as the “great single human beings” (2016a, p. 773), but that the educational maxims that govern in their time -and we could say that in ours- do not provide. But how can we understand this individual who fulfills the ideal of culture? Nietzsche speaks in the individual fragment as a game of forces. Game that is established as a tension of movements between a “central force” and “other forces” (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 763), which could be understood as peripheral. In order to understand this dynamic of the forces discussed here, it is necessary to ask an essential question: what to understand in this passage by the word force? Here Nietzschean psychology reemerges as a perspective of interpretation, since the word ‘force’ can be understood as the vital manifestations of the human being, i.e., his impulses or instincts. In such a way that it is lawful for us to interpret the central force and the other forces as a directional impulse; and the other impulses of the individual that come in relation to the central impulse. A relationship that can be either a conflict or a subordinate relationship. What is at stake in the formation of the individual: its mood life, its pulse dynamics, its psychology. The forces at play in the formation of the individual are his impulses; thus, to educate the individual must shape and relate the mechanics of the impulses that direct his life. These mechanics will give rise to all the spiritual manifestations that this individual can express in his culture.

The educator philosopher dreamed by Nietzsche (2016a) is the one who allows the pulsion formation of the individual, since he comprehends the way that authentically must be his soul. In this way, Nietzsche declares it as: “a planetary system endowed with living movements” (p. 763), of which this philosopher knows “the law of his superior mechanics” (p. 763). This metaphorical image is the conception that Nietzsche has of the individual and his formation. When confronted with an interpretation of this statement, we can think of the ‘planets’ of that ‘planetary system’ that is the individual as a form of manifestation of different forces, and with it a metaphorical way of talking about the impulses of the individual. Each impulse - like a gravitational force - has its movement, but it is not a random movement because it is coordinated in a cosmic dance and endowed with “living movements.” Now, as a dance, rhythm



is needed that unifies these movements. Precisely, that rhythm is given by its 'law of superior mechanics'. Nietzsche understands the educator as an individual with a psychological acuity that allows him to understand the harmonious way in which impulses can move to -cultivate, feed and allow the best life of the individual- as he understands the conflict of impulses and their hierarchy. Thus, regarding this conflictive dynamic, the educator does not eliminate the conflict, but tends to harmonize it to allow the rhythmic and hierarchical dance of impulses. The educating philosopher is an excellent orchestra master lens, which vibrates impulses in a rhythmic symphony, in which the individual dances.

But is it still possible to ask: what does that law of superior mechanics mean? One possible interpretation might say that it is the way the central impulse has to govern over the other impulses, by imprinting them an organization, in the same way that the gravitational force of the sun makes the other planets revolve around it. However, although this interpretation is very close to the psychological reading of the individual -as a set of conflicting impulses- where each impulse can act on others (García-Pedraza, 2020), it is possible to make a nuance to enrich this reading. Nietzsche states that what the educating philosopher captures is both the central impulse and the way in which this impulse does not act against other impulses, i.e., this law of superior mechanics can be understood as a way of restraining the central impulse so that it does not become tyrannical. This interpretative nuance is more adjusted, because in the thought of the young Nietzsche -it is quite usual- to reflect around the excess of force of an impulse -understood as tyranny or disease- especially his reflection on the excess of the impulse of knowing or knowledge to which -among other texts- he dedicates a central role in his *Book of the Philosopher*, as it is often called among the interpreters to a set of preparatory writings that Nietzsche intended to publish as a continuation of the *Birth of the Tragedy* (cfr. Nietzsche, 2010a, p. 345-415).

Likewise, García-Pedraza (2021) has a careful, and perhaps naive, interpretation to the problem of the excess of impulse to know, as well as to his sickening manifestation in the culture and the therapy of impulses that Nietzsche proposes in FTG. Seen in this way, the mechanical law is a relationship between the impulses that allows their movements and vitality by restraining and harmonizing them, in other words, a way of unifying the impulses of the individual. Thus, the concept of formation of the individual for Nietzsche would contemplate two intimately related concepts: the individual would be, on the one hand, the impulses or forces that occur in its manifestation and, on the other hand, it would also be the way of restraint



- its law of superior mechanics - which is expressed as a set of links between the impulses that allows the mood life of these in a unitary and harmonic way. The individual would be one and multiple: on the one hand, *multiplicity* of impulses composes his mood life, and on the other hand, *unity* as the law of mechanics that restrains and unifies the multiple impulses.

Thinking about the individual from the image of the solar system -endowed with living movements- that moves according to a higher law, seems to lead us to understand this notion from the idea of the *unity of style*. However, Nietzsche does not seek to understand it as an invariable law to all individuals but is expressed in each individual from his own pulse dynamics. In this way, in this notion of the style unity of the individual seems to synthesize the unitary vision of the impulses that are expressed in a vital way in each individual as a *character*. This unitary character is the *typos* of the individual which manifests himself in his unity of style, since it is in this relationship that the gigantic task of the formation of great single human beings would occur in an appropriate way. Giving light to understand this notion leads us momentarily out of the third storm.

Clarifying the notion of unity of style leads us to understand the subject as *typos*. From the above - the unity of the impulses of the individual reveals a unitary character. This notion of *typos* is observed at the beginning of the second section of FTG, where Nietzsche presents the difference between pre-Platonic philosophers and Plato's philosophers -henceforth in terms of the *typos* they represent- in this way he states that:

Whoever wants to talk unfavorably on these older masters could call them unilateral and their epigones with Plato at the head multifaceted. It would be more just and impartial if we considered the latter as mixed philosophical characters and the former as pure types (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 578).

For Nietzsche this 'pure type' that characterizes pre-Platonic philosophers is because they are men "made and sculpted in one piece. A strict necessity dominates between his thought and his character" (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 577). This 'strict necessity' - between thought and character or way of life - is what makes them individuals sculpted in one piece. The emphasis here is on the word -sculpting- This word can mean the *image of shaping*, e.g., a sculptor who, when sculpting, gives the form to the cold marble of a work of art. This image allows us to affirm that the individual is being shaped since his formation. But what is the material of that training? Just as the sculptor shapes from marble, the educating philosopher shapes from the vital manifestations, i.e., from the impulses.

Now, if we think carefully about the educational metaphor offered by *sculpture*, it shows that it differs from the former sculptor, i.e., they are different entities. However, what gives that *unitary character* to pre-Platonic philosophers is precisely that such distinction does not occur, i.e., they are both sculptors and the sculpted work. Hence, there is a 'strict necessity' between their doctrine and their life, a relationship of necessity that characterizes them, that *makes them who they are*. In that sense, the relationship between the educator philosopher and his young student is not that of master sculptor and raw marble to which the teacher comes from the outside to shape. Nietzsche's proposal is that both the educator philosopher and the young student are working on themselves as sculptors and as works. The image that is created is that of a dialogic work made with four hands. Now, if that is so, then how does the educating philosopher educate his disciple? By example. "For me a philosopher is important to the extent that he is able to set an example. There is no doubt that he can drag whole villages behind him by example" (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 768). The educational relationship is established between two individuals concerned about their *self-training*. Therefore, training is a concern of each individual who dialogues in the midst of education and the vital dialogue established by teacher and disciple. It is self-formation that is the example with which the disciple talks, observing -as one who takes the works of another great teacher to guide himself in his own autonomous formative development- in the creation of his own style. In psychological terms, the teacher seeks to give form and hierarchy to his own impulses: in this formative concern he establishes a dialogue with the *formative search* of his disciple that -in the light of that search of his teacher- encourages his own self-training. So, Nietzsche seems to be showing us that the teacher training establishes the real conditions in which the formation of that other so-called student can be established.

Now, what is affirmed in this formation of the individual is that it is made of a unitary type, a single piece. What does this mean? That this individual follows a higher law that unifies his ways of vital manifestation; in other words, he unifies his impulses through his law of superior mechanics as stated by the SE. This law of superior mechanics would be the most complex element to perceive in the formation of the individual, since it would be presented where impulses manifest as a harmony of hierarchy that, although certain impulses instrumentalize others - they do not prevent their growth and vitality - i.e., they expand to the maximum perspective and multiple condition of the human. When such a pulsion harmony is manifested in an individual, it manifests a unity of



style; therefore, there is a strict necessity in his thought and character: a work made of one piece.

For Nietzsche, the historical example of this formation -which tends to create unique individuals whose impulses manifest themselves in a harmony he calls unity of style- is the tragic Greek people. For Nietzsche, Greece is an area where people are deeply concerned about the formation of high types of human beings, i.e., geniuses of culture. In this way, Nietzsche calls the philosophers of Tales to Socrates as “the typical philosophical minds” (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 577) or “the philosophers of tragic knowledge” (cf. Nietzsche, 2010a, p. 352). These ‘*typical philosophical minds*’ are for Nietzsche the unique great men that Greece formed by taking the human task of educating very seriously. This cultural task is evidenced by the *self-formative* concern of these individuals of culture, who were the tragic philosophers, since they expressed the strength of culture and an understanding of themselves that unified doctrine and character. Hence Nietzsche considers that it is the personality such as this unity that should be perpetuated in the history of these great Greek geniuses (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a). In the pre-Platonic philosophers, Nietzsche sees a precedent of a culture in which educational impulses of real human ends were expressed -where the task of forming great, unique human beings, was fully realized- Thus, in the light of his own training in classical philology, Nietzsche takes up those humanistic objectives of Greek culture and makes a critique to his own culture; critique to which he knots a new educational proposal that starts from a psychological understanding of the impulses of each individual and that tends to the harmonic hierarchy of these. The educating philosopher requires a psychological understanding of the individual to be able to form it.

From the above considerations, it is possible to interpret that the notion that the young Nietzsche has of formation of the individual is very particular. The individual is at the same time his impulses or vital manifestations as the links that are re-established between the impulses in a unitary type that expresses his style unity. The formation of this individual establishes this harmonic dynamic as a tension between the impulses and the law of superior mechanics, which allows the mood life of the impulses, which manifest themselves as strong and tense bonds that do not destroy each other. Thus, the formation for the young Nietzsche is a hierarchical knowledge -without destroying the living mechanics of the impulses of the individual- The origin of all formation is to be able to capture, to have ears and attentive eyes, the mood life of the individuals.

The psychological interpretation of educational institutions

Psychology, as proposed by Nietzsche, is not limited to an analysis of the individual as the modern scientific (natural law) perspective; in a more restricted way: it proposes us to understand it as an analysis of the internal or mental life of the individual. A classic discussion -which has value over the scientific burden of human knowledge- can be found in Hans-Georg Gadamer's *Truth and Method I*, a discussion in which we could include psychology even if Gadamer's reflection focuses on the aesthetic, historical and philosophical experience. Thus, the tracing that he carries out at the beginning of his work on the significance of the humanistic tradition for the sciences of the spirit (Geisteswissenschaften), has a general validity over all the sciences or discourses that seek to understand the human phenomenon (cf. Gadamer, 2012). On the other hand, the Nietzschean perspective seeks to extend the limits of understanding this science, in this way, it pretends that psychology extends its interpretation to the whole human phenomenon (and perhaps to everything existing). For this reason, Nietzsche states in BGE -after criticizing the metaphysical prejudices of philosophers- that: "from now on psychology is again the path that leads to fundamental problems" (Nietzsche, 2016b, p. 313).

However, although this clarity -about the place of psychology in the interpretation of human phenomena- is explicitly in the work of maturity, it is neither marginal nor of little importance the place that Nietzsche gives to psychology in his reflections of youth. For example, Nietzsche proposes to understand the aesthetic phenomenon of the Greek tragedy in the NT: an understanding that will extend to the phenomenon of human culture -in general- and the resurgence of German culture -in particular- from a psychology of instincts. Nietzsche's revival of Wagnerian music and Wagner as a kind of cultural genius. This interpretation and admiration of Nietzsche by Wagner is expressed explicitly in sections 16 to 25 of the *Birth of the Tragedy*. Jochen Schmidt in *Kommentar zu Nietzsches. Die Geburt der Tragödie*, in *Historier und Krischer Kommentar zu Friedrich Nietzsche Werke* (2012), offers us a general structure that allows to demonstrate the sections and development of arguments that Nietzsche makes in his first opera. So, Schmidt in his *Kommentar zu Nietzsches. Die Geburt der Tragödie* shows that Nietzsche exposes the birth of the Attic tragedy between chapters 1 to 10, later it evidences the decline and death of the tragedy (due to the Socratism of Morality) in-between sections 11 to 15; and, finally Schmidt titles chapters 16 to 25 *Die Wiedergeburt der Tragödie bei*

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Richard Wagner (the Renaissance or regeneration of tragedy in Richard Wagner). Thus, at the beginning of his first opera, Nietzsche argues that “we have gained a lot from aesthetic science” if it is understood that the development of art is due to “two different instincts (*Triebe*) [that however] they go side by side” (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 338). Such impulses are the apollonian impulse and the dionysian impulse. We see here a widespread use of the psychology of impulses to understand the emergence of the Greek tragedy and of aesthetic science, which in turn, will be extended to an analysis of the revival of culture around an artistic work.

This way of psychological analysis of culture is addressed by Nietzsche in the preparatory writing known as the *Book of the Philosopher*—also known as *the Book of the Philosopher* or *The Philosopher* in different Nietzsche scholars such as Paul-Laurent Assoun (cf. Assoun, 1986, p. 82), which have included a set of annotations done by Nietzsche as part of the thematic continuations of NT between late 1872 and early 1873. These *Nachlaß* contain annotations that will later be part of FTG and *About truth and lies in the extramoral sense*. In this preparatory paper, Nietzsche explicitly states these impulses as: “the impulses of these peoples (*Triebe dieses Volkes*)” (Nietzsche, 2010a, p. 355). This idea appears in the analysis of the relationship between philosophy and culture. More accurately the role of philosophy in culture. The role that Nietzsche will play in the breaking (*Bändigung*) of the impulse to know (*Erkenntnißtrieb*).

This brief approach to this preparatory paper allows to think carefully on one of the central concepts that have articulated our psychological reading of the formation of the individual so far: the concept of culture. A notion of which we had only evidenced its formative goal, i.e., the formation of great human beings that Nietzsche called geniuses of culture, but which we had not stopped to think about as a concept. Thus, in this preparatory paper Nietzsche offers a definition of culture understood as “the unitary restraint (*einheitlichen Bändigung*) of the impulses (*Triebe*) of people” (Nietzsche, 2010a, p. 354-5). In this way, culture is evidenced as a normative concept in Nietzsche that would only express or exist in people that can maintain impulses in adequate unitary tension that is given by a restraint that realizes the pressures of the culture of people (philosophy and art as a priority but that could be thought as exerted by morality and religion) on the impulses of people. Understanding that leads Nietzsche to oppose the notion of barbarism to that of culture: people are barbaric insofar as - their impulses are manifested without adequate tension between them (anarchically or tyrannically) – so that they lead to an excess or disproportion in their manifestation that prevent their unity. García-Pedraza



-in *Disease, health and philosophy. Perspectives on the disease in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*- makes a careful interpretation of the posthumous fragment of the *Philosopher's Book* regarding FTG, showing the relationship between the impulses of people and culture, as well as the opposition between culture and barbarism. This interpretation evidences the state of excess and lack of tension of impulses as a barbaric way of expression -opposed to unity as a culture- from the perspective of health and disease of culture. It also explores the concept of tension as a conceptual way to understand the opposition between barbarism and culture. Finally, it presents some arguments on why it is necessary to understand the culture and impulses of people, considering the notion of tension in the young Nietzsche (cfr. García-Pedraza, 2021).

Regarding the above examples of the young Nietzsche, we understand two things -first- that psychology, understood as a doctrine of impulses, as proposed by Nietzsche, is not restricted to an analysis of the inner life of the individual -as I used it throughout my analysis of the SE- but the field of interpretation can be extended to the community life of human beings -second- we have established an appropriate interpretive context to analyze educational institutions, as they are interpreted in FEI, since, Nietzsche's reading about education is conceived within this psychological area and in connection with the culture as an unit of impulses, and the genius as a goal of the culture⁵.

In this interpretative context -which offers a psychological reading of the culture- Jano's thesis (presented by Nietzsche in FIE), emerges with greater depth and acuity. Nietzsche himself, in the introduction to his lectures, considers that what he asserts in them is part of the reflections that a city and some individuals really concerned with education "in the highest sense" (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 484) have already thought. Hence the invitation to the readers to guess and complement what has only been hinted at or omitted. In this way of rethinking what Nietzsche has outlined, let us now go into reflection, following the footprint of psychology.

[...] Two currents, apparently opposite, equally sick (*verderbliche*) in their effects and converging in their results, currently dominate our educational institutions [...] on the one hand, the impulse (*Trieb*) towards *the greatest possible expansion of education*; on the other hand, the impulse (*Trieb*) of *reduction and weakening of it*. [contrary to these emerge], the impulse (*Triebe*) of *narrowing and the concentration* of education as a counterpart to the widest possible expansion, and the impulse (*Triebe*) of *strengthening and self-sufficiency* of education as a counterpart to its reduction. [...] these two tendencies (*Tendenzen*) of



enlargement and restriction are contrary to the purposes of nature, just as it is true that a concentration of education in a few is a necessary law of the same nature, while the other two impulses (*Trieben*) can only function a false (*erlogene*) culture (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 486).

The way of thinking, proposed by Nietzsche in his thesis, offers two different perspectives: the first one to look modern education with objectivity- by virtue of the direction that it proposes, which is due to the impulses that encourage modern educational trends. The second perspective has a future perspective, in which Nietzsche proposes a “renewal, resuscitation and purification” (2016a, p. 484) of education, which will be driven by two purely educational impulses. Two impulses that can realize the task and goal that culture puts on education: the procreation of the child. Because it is in geniuses that “the necessary law [of] nature” is fulfilled, which implies “a concentration of education in a few” (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 486).

But let us look at the psychological analysis that Nietzsche makes from each of the two views he proposes to evaluate educational institutes and modern education in general. In order to delve into this analysis, it is important to give a general outline of the literary resource that Nietzsche uses in these conferences -to present his acute criticisms of modern education- to the *Bildungsanstalten*.

Nietzsche, presents what -at first glance- seems to be an autobiographical memory about a visit to the banks of the Rhine, but that is nothing more than a literary invention with arguments⁶- in the river two boys meet to take care of their own formation, as an educational community that aims to “stimulate [their] cultural impulses (*Bildungstriebe*) and at the same time *keep them at bay (Zaume zu halten)*” (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 489). In this formative objective of the young students, it is evident the psychological reading of the culture by Nietzsche: on the one hand, stimulation of the cultural impulses that is in the individual and that is connected with the impulses of people; at the same time, the way in which these are restrained to maintain the unity, i.e., the culture of people. Hence, these young people seek to *keep their own impulses at bay*. The main notions would then - in the first instance - be the increase of the impulses, which means to make them stronger, i.e., to maintain their dynamic life. Secondly, *taming* these impulses to keep them at bay, which would allow the living and dynamic unity of the individual. This relationship with impulses shows -from the beginning of these conferences- what will be understood later in the SE, as the planetary system endowed with living movements; in this sense these are young people concerned for their own self-formation. The connection of these impulses of the in-



dividual with the culture, by means of the formation, is evident in the fact that the educational objective focuses precisely on the “cultural impulses” of the individual. Thus, the connection between individual and culture is made by formation.

In parallel, the other two central characters of this literary image are the teacher-student and the old philosopher. These two figures are central to the conferences, because these two characters engage through the dialogues. As for the teacher-student, it is important to highlight their double character. On the one hand, a student who -several times during the conversation with his teacher, the old philosopher- is sanctioned or even reminds him of the old lessons learned, despite which, nevertheless, he has a clear respect for him. On the other hand, he also teaches young people, an educational action that commits him to the future of culture. It is precisely in relation to this second mood of his personality, where the most pessimistic side of his discourse is observed, due to his deep discouragement towards education. For this reason, it is possible to demonstrate that from this emotional side - teacher-student- he will direct his sharp criticisms to the current dominant impulses of education. Even when putting his criticism of education in his voice, it is possible to affirm that such emotional side is what characterizes Nietzsche’s own perspective on modern education.

The second central character of these educational dialogues is the philosopher. An old man, strong in character who, even passionate does not stop maintaining the restraint and proper mastery of his passions. It recalls the measured relationship between the more passionate and hot impulses and the impulse of knowledge that functions as a regulator of this dynamic pulsion through the cold intellect, which is gained with the distance of thought in the freedom of the bird in the prolog of HdH-I (cf. Nietzsche, 2014, p. 71). It even echoes the double brain image of free spirit in HdH-I (cf. Nietzsche, 2014, p. 181). Nietzsche in this character presents his image of a reform to education, which would *restore* the culture. This goal is aligned with the one pursued in almost all his works of youth⁷. Now, if considering that this restorative role in the work of youth is played by *the genius of culture*, we see that this philosopher does not seem to understand himself as genius, although he is fully aware of the importance and character of these for culture. Hence, he reminds his pupil - by way of demand - not to “democratize the rights of genius to avoid one’s cultural work (*Bildungsarbeit*) and one’s cultural misery” (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 496). This philosopher seems rather to imply the form of the “philosopher educator” stated in the SE (Nietzsche, 2016a, p.



763). The problem of education develops as a central topic of the conversation of two characters. This conversation recalls the Platonic Dialogues, especially the dialogues of maturity where the Platonic characters present long diatribes that are briefly questioned by their listeners, e.g., the *Timeo* or the *Filebo*.

Nietzsche's critical reading of modern education -from the pessimistic perspective of the student-educator- presents two non-formative impulses that guide and shape modern education. They do not pursue the high goals and tasks that culture expresses in education; on the contrary, they pursue tasks and goals where education simply fulfills an instrumental role and serves the goals of such impulses.

The first of these non-formative impulses is the *expansion* and *dissimination* of education (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 497). Nietzsche shows that this impulse that guides modern education is not a formative impulse - it is really an economic impulse - which is typical of the modern economic-political doctrine. This economic impulse instrumentalizes education to achieve its own 'fundamental end' to nurture its own strength. In this sense, education becomes a way of transforming individuals into *productive* beings, who consider that their life should be guided and directed by productivity -as a central task of their life- so that the formation of these individuals -perceived subjectively as a type of private property- must be aligned with the productive capacity that they have. Seen in this way, the fundamental precept of this type of education - which underlies the economic impulse - would be: "knowledge and education [*Bildung*] in the greatest possible quantity - therefore, production and needs in the greatest possible quantity - therefore happiness in the greatest possible quantity" (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 497). Education, knowledge, productivity and happiness are intimately connected in this doctrine, such that the purpose of education would be the pursuit of that type of happiness stated by the economic doctrine. The happiness that would lie in getting "the greatest possible profit of money" (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 497).

Happiness understood as monetary profit is only possible to obtain through effective and sustained productivity. Hence, the *ultimate goal* of education is utility [*Nutzen*], or more precisely *acquisition or gain* [Erwerb]⁸. The individual is educated to transform his education into production and monetary utility, which allows him to become one of those "beings who earn a lot of money" (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 498), which in turn guarantees the happiness preached by that same dogma. Happiness is the gain extracted from productivity for which education must prepare the individual. Education guided by this impulse is understood

as the ability of an individual to *analyze* the easiest way to understand trade between men and peoples; such that - with that capacity he can extract the greatest possible profit and acquire the greatest amount of money. With this, education individuals will be *updated in time*. A time dominated by economic doctrine. A time in which economics shapes the age, people and, in turn, calls itself 'culture' - even if it is not in Nietzsche's eyes - To that extent the task of education, in this time that critiques are clearly pessimistic between teacher-student, is not to produce 'high types' of human beings that can be called 'geniuses of culture', but, the economic impulse has imposed on education the task of "forming as many men as possible" because "the more numerous of such men the happier the people will be" (Nietzsche, 2010 6a, p. 497).

Nietzsche's criticisms of the education of his time are so contemporary and close that they create a strong discomfort. The instrumentalization of education by the economy - which makes individuals productive beings and education the useful means of achieving that monetary happiness - is something that we live, or more precisely suffer at the same time. Moreover, educating ourselves only to the extent that such education can be transformed into a means to earn money (Nietzsche, 2016a), has as a consequence: to limit all education to utility and productivity; therefore, considering that any education that goes beyond this limit as a moral aberration of the very sense of education makes us feel that Nietzsche was doing a quite accurate - perhaps sickening - radiography of our current educational system. It is like looking in the mirror and seeing ourselves on it. It seems then that the task of our current education is the creation of ordinary beings (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 497) who seek a tool for happiness in education, i.e., for the rapid acquisition of a great deal of money. For which, it is necessary a "fast education" (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 498) that allows us to fully understand the economic flow of the market and thus transform our training in productivity that generates monetary gain. To that extent, education is the tool for creating productive beings. This tool has an economic impulse that underlies and guides. If so the impulse that shapes our education is not really formative: it is an economic impulse that has instrumentalized education and has uprooted it from its original cultural terrain, from its connection with the goal of culture: the production of genius. Moreover, it leads us to ask whether this instrumentalization by a non-formative impulse -which renounces the goals of culture- is at the same time a non-cultural impulse, in the normative sense that Nietzsche understands culture. Therefore, an impulse that has barbarism and not the unity of the impulses of culture. If so,

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we could ask ourselves whether we are a culture today, or rather we are a people without culture -due to its renunciation of the task of culture- we could even ask ourselves how far it has come to influence and with what force this economic impulse is imposed -being *undernourished* or *hyper-nourished* in our time- to the point of becoming subjects of performance, willing to self-alienate and self-violent to maintain the rhythm of hyperproductivity that determines the imaginary of success and monetary happiness, as Byung-Chul Han presents in his work *The society of fatigue*⁹.

Nietzsche's intuition towards the education of his time and its future seems to indicate -in such a latent way to this day- that it is possible to find a very similar view of education, as mentioned by Martha Nussbaum in *Why democracy needs the humanities*, in which, Nussbaum tries to show the problem that comes from the growing trend of multiple nations around the world by seeking the elimination of the humanities from their educational curricula, by considering useless-lacking of utility- to the growing demands of global economic growth. Thus, Nussbaum (2010) states that:

Looking for monetary profits, nation-states and their education systems are inadvertently discarding certain skills that are necessary to keep democracy alive. If this trend continues, nations around the world will soon produce whole generations of utilitarian machines, rather than full-fledged citizens with the ability to think for themselves, have a critical look at traditions, and understand the importance of others' achievements and sufferings [...] what are the drastic changes? In almost every nation of the world, subjects and careers related to the arts and humanities are being eradicated, both at the primary and secondary levels and at the tertiary and university levels. Conceived as useless ornaments by those who define state policies at a time when nations must eliminate everything that has no utility to be competitive in the global market (p. 20).

Nussbaum's critique has a surprising relationship with Nietzsche's critique; in fact, they seem to echo the same voice with multiple tones that extends over time and highlights the origin -not formative- that is the basis of modern and contemporary education. Its dominant tendency and economic drive that vanishes everything that cannot be transformed into profit, utility and can compete in the money and productive market.

The second non-formative impulse that directs and shapes modern education is that of 'reduction and weakening'. This trend that Nietzsche sees as being less loud than the earlier economic boost is, however, just as dangerous for culture's educational purposes, because its origin occurs between individuals dedicated to knowledge. To such an extent, he knows



how to hide - like a chameleon - the disfiguring action he is performing on a culture's own educational tasks. The genesis of this impulse is among scholars who serve science (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a). In that sense, this impulse would be a kind of scientific impulse. Nevertheless, he speaks of 'a kind' of scientific impulse, keeping in mind the fact that free spirit from HdH-I onwards is also understood as an individual of knowledge. This means that the free spirit in HdH-I identifies itself as an individual of science, such that it has its weapon of war against the illusions of culture. Nietzsche is not expected to ignore the critical attacks he has made during his youth period on the 'excessive or untamed' way in which the impulse of knowledge is expressed among these individuals of knowledge he calls scholars when writing his later work. Likewise, one could draw a difference between the scholar and the individual of knowledge as Nietzsche thinks, which, in my opinion, includes the free spirit. Such a difference would be degraded by the way in which the impulse of knowledge of the scholar is unproductive, in the sense of not being able to create, while the individual of knowledge would turn his knowledge into acts of creation.¹⁰ Such a critique about the individual of knowledge that allows to relate the work of youth with the later work of Nietzsche, is presented in FEI -under the sign of the 'specialization'- thus, for the teacher-student education is directed by a scientific impulse that tends to convert all formation into a specialization such that the individual is restricted to a very limited field of his science- causing that he becomes an unproductive scholar. Since, in his area of specialty, he will be an expert but in "the essential questions" he will not be able to answer (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 499).

The essential questions are the field where the - genius as an individual - of culture has its greatest role, because by relating to the essential issues of his people he transforms himself into *one* who sets the high goals of *his* culture. For Nietzsche "the life of peoples reflects in a confusing way, the image offered by its greatest geniuses" (Nietzsche, 2010a, p. 345), in this way the genius is intimately linked with the life of the impulses of his people, since, in it, the hierarchy and unity of impulses of peoples with which he shapes his culture are expressed in a purest and clearest way. Genius would then be the clear and higher-grade reproduction of the image of his people, in other words, would be the image of the culture. Creating such individuals is precisely the task of education for Nietzsche, which is evidenced in the thesis of these conferences, called *the necessary law of nature*. According to this law there is an absolute need for "a concentration of education in a few" (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 486). This concentration of education in a few does not mean that education should

be something that only a few can access - as an elite - on the contrary, the philosopher throughout the lectures shows us the need to strengthen the culture and formation of genius (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 515). Such concentration advocates the non-democratization of the rights of genius; it is precisely the latter that the philosopher demands from his student-teacher. It is necessary to understand that many in educating ourselves do not do it for us, as if all the cultural forces of a time were turned for the private property of 'our' education, so that we immediately consider ourselves 'children of culture' - on the contrary - our education makes a cultural expression that seeks the creation of such individuals. Geniuses that may be inadvertently realized in one or more of us, or perhaps we are just another expression of an entire people seeking that image of genius that will give concreteness and identity to itself. In that last case, we simply contributed to the creation of genius.

When education is driven by a non-formative impulse - like the erudite impulse of science - individuals are educated to become specialists of a specific field of science - disconnecting themselves from the other expressions and impulses of their people - they would not be, nor would they seek to understand the full image of their era or culture, much less to concretize in themselves such an image. The specialist is a scholar who is limited to his own field and sees in that limited specialization, who does not seek to worry about the image of his entire era, a laudable ethical phenomenon (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 499). Nietzsche identifies this phenomenon of scholarly specialization with the condition of worker. The scholar would be a knowledge worker in a knowledge production machine. Knowledge that would only reproduce its own type, i.e. the scholarly knowledge. To that extent, the modern educational system would be nothing more than a "division of labor in sciences" (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 499). Division where each specialist or, what is the same, each scholar would restrict himself to the knowledge of his limited knowledge, striving with all his strength and with an untamed impulse to know the object of his knowledge to a greater extent. This excessive drive for specialization makes the knowledge of these individuals become a work that is increasingly detached from the concerns and movements of the impulses that shape their people, their time. The scholar is an individual immersed in his small, limited world, who does not know at the end how to connect his knowledge with the pulsion movement that surrounds him, i.e., with the tension or conflict of pulsion that shape his people. So, in the face of such movements, he can only be quiet. Nietzsche evidences in the SE that there is a direct war at all times between scholars and geniuses. This is



observed by the question of the “significance that the scholar [*Gelehrten*] has for culture”. To which he responds:

[...] Everyone who knows how to observe, warns that the scholar, in essence, is sterile [*unfruchtbar*] [...] and that he has a certain natural hatred of the human being who is fertile [*fruchtbar*][...] because the latter want to kill, dissect and understand nature, and the former, want to increase it with new living nature [...] Entirely happy times did not need the scholar and did not know him, entirely sick and sad times valued him as the highest and most dignified human being, and granted him the first rank (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 101. 799).

That modern education is directed and given a scholarly impulse of science makes it become sterile and sickly, thus, the alumni of our modern academies of knowledge are sick subjects unable to turn their knowledge into creative pieces. So that we feed for years the impulse of knowledge of these individuals eager to know in each of our modern and even hyper-technologized contemporary classrooms, if we put in direct dialogue Nietzsche’s criticism with our time - without even questioning ourselves for the nutritional content of that food - may such food be sterile. It is the transformation of knowledge into a tool of specialization and technique. Moreover, the scholar has a natural hatred of the fertile individual, of the genius, to such an extent that by educating scholars we may be educating individuals who create a hatred of all that is fertile, of all that is productive, of all that is directed towards genius. We may teach our students to hate and bury in themselves everything that is directed towards genius, everything in them that has the drive to create. A similar critical direction on the place of academia and its educational task is that presented by Joan B. Llinares in his article *Seeking Spaces for Truth: Nietzsche and Philosophy at the University* (2008), in the book compiled by Faustino Oncina entitled *Philosophy for the University, Philosophy against the University* (From Kant to Nietzsche). In this article, Llinares stops at a careful analysis of these lectures made by Nietzsche at the University of Basel; however, Llinares interpretation seeks to make a critique from the problem of truth and the way in which it determines the educational factor and the productive character of knowledge. On the other hand, a critique regarding education and its relationship with technique and specialization can be found in the text of Marta Nussbaum *Not for profit. Why Democracy Needs Humanities* (2010). Although Nussbaum’s concern in the text implies humanities in general and plays special attention to the problem of the relationship between these and democracy. Understan-



ding that can be put in dialog with the critical analysis of Robert Bolaños in his text *Freedom: ideal possible or instrument of domination?* (2010), in which he reflects on current narratives that appeal to the idea of freedom and the need for education to be the one that can differentiate and clarify this confusion of narratives that can be used to dominate the individual.

The modern academy is for Nietzsche a place where sterile individuals educate and reproduce their own kind over other individuals, who attend their classrooms; in the midst of that process the individual reproduces the hatred towards genius in the midst of the spaces that should produce it. If looking carefully at the close connections that our current academy has with that Humboldt university that Nietzsche criticizes, then the critique fits in the educational practice that shelters us. Genius is the one who connects with the totality and shapes the concerns and goals of a culture, whereas, the scholar is the one who derives from that close relationship with his culture by limiting his knowledge to research that only have importance in his field and do not dialogue: a scholarly specialization that creates its own goals rooted from the goals of a culture - where academic knowledge directs its gaze to a direction totally different from the direction in which they look at the most essential concerns of their culture - concerns against which this scholar can only silence. It is precisely in this disparity between academia and culture that Professor Carlos Gutiérrez focuses his reflections when questioning the relationship between Colombian academia and the concerns of our society from the perspective of a “lack of critical activity”, in which, for him, lies a potential that could link academia with the concerns of our society:

The lack of critical activity in Colombia is, in my opinion, a main factor so that knowledge and science are not at the center of the process of our development and do not contribute to the analysis of the conflicts of our society and its institutional channeling (Gutiérrez, 2019, p. 436).

Gutierrez, like Nietzsche, sees a disparity or distance between the academy and his culture; only for the former: the problem lies in the lack of critical activity; while for the latter: it lies in the limited and unproductive relationship of his knowledge with the essential problems, i.e., with his tendency to specialization guided by his impulse for scholarship. However, in both cases it is possible to show that distance that has made the academy and the individual of knowledge -not a subject who understands the soul life of his people as long as he lives it- but seems restricted and isolated from that impulsive life that shapes his culture; I even consider that Gutierrez’s intuition starts from Nietzsche’s: the specialization of science; only that, its

analysis does not have that psychological character of Nietzsche's perspective. Nevertheless, it does not prevent both authors from enjoying the same acute intuition about the role that academia has to culture.

From this perspective, the panorama that the teacher-student presents, turns out to be extremely discouraging, since we are facing either an education that is an instrument of an economic drive that seeks to manufacture productive individuals or an education that only wants specialties that are detached from the concerns of society. From this perspective, Nietzsche seems to portray our own time because perhaps we are a productive education and an academy that stops to be enclosed in itself and not connect with the essential problems of its people and time. The pessimistic coloring of this character is perhaps justified. However, just as the philosopher seeks to offer a couple of words for the comfort of this hopeless teacher-pupil, it may be necessary to analyze, at least in a general way, his words offer us a little comfort and hope.

Thus, it is important to ask ourselves what is the philosophical proposal that would allow a purification and renewal in education so that it can assume truly formative goals; proposal that is aligned with the thesis: Nietzsche calls two truly formative impulses: *narrowing* and *concentration* - on the one hand - and *strengthening* and *self-sufficiency* of education - on the other - these two impulses would be concretized in the proposal of forming an individual who can reproduce the history and image of his culture. Such an individual would tend to be by himself: a genius of culture, or at least: to be part of the productive history of genius within his culture. This type of individual is nothing more than what Nietzsche called in the SE as the goal of culture- Thus, this type of individual is interpreted in the SE as a planetary system, endowed with living movement according to a law of superior mechanics. This pulsion harmony of the individual that allows giving a unity and hierarchy to his impulses would tend to transform this individual - in a one piece being - with absolute necessity between his thought and his life as mentioned in the previous section.

What is observed then is that both FEI and SE seek form geniuses of culture, or at least -individuals who tend to be genius- individuals whose drive dynamics reflect in a purest and clearer way the mechanics of their people; hence they can give the goals and horizons to their culture. That individual would shape and guide his culture by shaping itself, echoing the cultural tasks that are carried out in themselves. In the light of the old philosopher's formative ideas, it is possible to connect the educational goal and task of forming an individual -whose life is unitary- and at the same time, the living manifestation of his impulses in an organic



dynamic -as stated by SE- with the task of education to create geniuses of culture that -by forming themselves- become the concretion of the image [*Bild*] of his culture, as proposed by FEI.

To achieve the creation of these types of individuals Nietzsche proposes in FEI the need to align the educational task to the training centers from the baccalaureate [*Gymnasium*] to the university [*Universität*]. In this way, the task that would articulate all schools as an expression of the goal of culture -the formation of this type of individual that reproduces the history of their culture itself- in other words -a formation that tends to genius- if achieved, could renew modern education and its deviant pseudo-cultural goals. For Nietzsche, it is essential that such renewal originates from the baccalaureate, since “all other institutions must be measured against the criterion of the educational goal [*Bildungsziele*] to which the baccalaureate aspires” (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 501). With this in mind, I would like to outline the proposal that Nietzsche offers us from the voice of the old philosopher. It seeks to highlight two central elements of his discourse: on the one hand to think the relationship between language and genius, and, on the other hand, what Nietzsche calls the “aristocracy of the spirit” (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 514). Proposals from which the renewal of education is considered.

The old philosopher proposes, as a first exercise to renew education, the purification and renewal of the language teaching in high school (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 502), specifically of the German language, which we can understand together with the teaching of the mother tongue. In the light of Nietzsche’s analysis of the teaching of German among his own people, it is possible to understand the way in which he considered language and its connection with the subject and culture. In this sense, Nietzsche understands language as something that is inhabited - language is a world of meaning that gives meaning to both the individual and the culture - that allows them to be what they are, therefore, language is first and foremost the “expression of the soul of the people [*Volksseele*]” (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 305). Therefore, it cannot be treated, and less taught, either with the sterility of the grammarian, or with the futility of the journalist (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 502-3). In that sense, if the idea is to reconnect the individual with the pulsion dynamics of his people, which is what defines life, in other words - the soul of the people - then it is necessary that the individual has a vital relationship with his language. Hence, the high school must teach the mother tongue as something alive and in which it is inhabited, something that shapes both the soul of the people and the soul of the individual. It should not be re-pointed with



the sterile gaze of the learned grammar or philologist. For Nietzsche, the scholar and all his learned culture would only spoil the appropriation of the being of culture and the ability to develop in the individual a sense and sensitivity that allow him to inhabit his own culture by experiencing his language as a living phenomenon, as a habitat of himself and his culture (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 510).

Nietzsche immediately connects this living appropriation of language with genius (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 504-8). This living appropriation of language and its senses - which unite the individual with his culture - would pave the way for the formation of genius. However, for Nietzsche this path is restrained among modern Germans, which require a return to the “hometown of culture” (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 509), return to Greece. But what is the reason for this return to Greece to understand the necessary formation of genius and its connection with culture? because it is among the Greeks that one can clearly observe the great goals of a humanist education. For Nietzsche it was Greece, specifically tragic Greece, that really took the human task of education - which seeks to form high types of human beings, i.e., geniuses of culture - which would be the human task of education to which all human beings and all peoples are invited. This high educational task has not only been observed by Nietzsche, but also by Jaeger Werner in his *Paideia*, a work that seeks to highlight the Greek formative ideals, highlights that same formative purpose of the Greeks:

[...] It is not possible to describe in brief words the revolutionary and leading position of Greece in the history of human education [...] But this lived history would have disappeared long ago if Greek man had not created it in its permanent form. He created it as an expression of a supreme will through which he sculpted his destiny [...] and the end was increasingly inscribed in his consciousness, always present: the formation of a high type of man [human being]. For him the idea of education represented the meaning of every human endeavor (Werner, 1957, p. 6).

We see that, for both Nietzsche and Werner, Greek education aims to the formation of -a high type of human being- goal and task that are intimately connected with the very existence of all the Greek people, of their culture. Therefore, all the people’s efforts were directed towards the formation of this type of human; this is precisely what the two authors understand by a truly human-mind education. It is precisely this cultural effort that Nietzsche sees in Greeks people must teach the modern world. It is the knowledge of the Greek world that can enable the renewal of



culture and education - precisely by putting the human being back at the center of its concerns - by displacing the economic and erudite concerns that dominate today. Nietzsche therefore advocates humanistic education in the Greek sense. And it is precisely in that sense that the proposal presented by Nietzsche, in the voice of the old philosopher, is essential today because -as presented to us by FEI conferences - we are in a time where the economic impulse has not only instrumentalized education but has become the aim of the human existence- to the point that the human being has forgotten himself and it seems that we live a dehumanization process increasingly acute. So that -trying again to put the human being as a main concern of education- is essential so education can take up the cultural task that it has with a time. Genius as Nietzsche thinks it would allow reconnecting the impulses of an era by giving a figure to this one, a delimitation and a sense. Advocate for education of human beings who can understand their relationship to their culture and try to connect in an honest way with their 'essential concerns'. The vital sense of these individuals does not finish on themselves and their properties, but - it expands to the other, to culture as a unit seeking to reunite people fragmented and sick. Precisely for achieving that reconnection with the essential concerns of their people is that the education of the mother tongue in high school must be a living phenomenon, a dwelling ground of sense that gave a place and horizon of sense to the individual from its birth.

A renewal of the language teaching would allow to resume the place and role of genius in culture by educating individuals in an area that is inhabited linguistically (as Gutiérrez would say). These individuals reconnected with their culture would pave the way for the emergence of genius in an era in which - for Nietzsche - European peoples have renounced the goals of culture, have renounced the formation of genius, and by extension, modern and contemporary peoples. Hence, education has progressively given up on truly formative goals and its objectives are aligned with the economic objectives of the market with time.

Perhaps Nietzsche's proposal sounds a little romantic in the background, but at least the formative intuition of putting the human being back at the center and advocating for an education to the greatest possible degree that turns the human being into an individual who seeks to be the image of his culture and in that sense inhabit the essential senses of his people, which is born from a habit and live his own language, turns out to be an intuition that, at least, is worth trying.

The old philosopher's second proposal aggressively tramples on our current democratic sensibility, because it proposes an "aristocracy of



the spirit” where education would be for “the few”. This is precisely what the philosopher calls the seductive deception of culture, so that:

The real secret of culture is hidden here: in the fact that a lot of people aspire to culture [*Bildung*] and work-down with a view to culture [*βildung*], apparently in their own interest, but, in reality, only to make possible the existence of a few people (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 496).

This principle dazes our democratic view and brings to our mind the image of an educational elitism. But what Nietzsche proposes can really be simplified into an educational elitism? If so, we might ask why he says that innumerable people who aspire to culture are necessary, i.e., that they are formed, to make possible the existence of those “few people” called the geniuses of culture. There seems to be an intimate relationship for Nietzsche between the *education of the people* and the *formation of genius*. This relationship escapes the simple interpretation of an educational elitism. When Nietzsche talks about education being for “the less,” he does not mean that it is a *private good* of the few, but it is also not a democratic good in the modern sense of the notion. These last two interpretative nuances are precisely due to the critical perspective with which Nietzsche viewed modern democratic tendencies - he saw in them a search for the equalization of human beings that renounced the hierarchy and the human pretensions of greatness - (criticism that he will develop more deeply in BGE). Because as he observed in the humanistic tendency of the Greek formation, human beings - in order to be human they must form themselves - and such formation must tend to the maximum amplitude and pulsion dynamics, in other words - to become those unique beings whose pulsion life was endowed with living movements - pretending with it to become an image of the pulsion life of their own people and with it to show the highest goals of their culture, what Nietzsche calls the formation of geniuses of culture. However, modern democratic impulses tried to equalize all human beings, and worst, that their equalization was by the low, which is why modern pseudo-culture renounced genius - leaving aside the concern for the human being and displacing its humanity from the center of culture - turning it into a useful tool of scholars or economic ends; thus, the aristocracy of the spirit for Nietzsche is: a bet to bring back the concern for the human being and put it at the center of culture, and with this concern to renovate the understanding of education; such that the formation of individuals is moved by human tendencies that train them in the highest sense of their humanity.

For Nietzsche, such a formation of the few is intimately linked to the formation of the people:



But for him to make his appearance [the genius of culture], that he emerges in the midst of people, that represents its reflective image, the essence of all the forces of this people, that shows the supreme determination of people in the symbolic being of an individual and in an eternal work, thus linking his people to the eternal and freeing them from the changing sphere of the momentary, the genius can do all this only if he has been raised and matured in the maternal bosom of the education of people (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 515).

Genius is an individual or individuals - in the case that a culture produces several geniuses - that requires to be raised, matured and formed “in the maternal bosom of the education of people”. Nietzsche proposes an intimate interdependence between people and genius, so that -for genius to occur- it is necessary to have titanic cultural forces that concentrate on the education of people; the education of people is the niche from which the genius emerges to determine the culture of such people. Thus, education - for a few is not an elitism that reserves education as a private privilege for a few; on the contrary, Nietzsche seems to be detached from an economic interpretation of education where - education is a private property of each individual - such that he can claim that it is ‘his education’. Contrary to this, Nietzsche considers education - and all the individuals involved in this living and dynamic process - as part of the forces that peoples apply to shape themselves, i.e., to create culture.

Education is just an expression of culture, and even if I think that my education belongs to me, I am actually part of a cultural work that seeks to create a few individuals called geniuses. Education concentrates and has its hope in these geniuses “the few”. Everyone else, including the one holding the pen at the moment, is just a cultural worker who, through his educational exercise, helps peoples to be to self-determine. This does not take away the fact that education and training is a self-concern and a high ‘self-motivated’ intention that in each individual must tend to the highest expression of his culture.

Conclusions

In the previous pages, we can observe -contrary to certain predominant readings in interpreters of the Nietzschean doctrine- as is the case of Volker Gerhart (2011; 2019), that the Nietzschean philosophy holds high humanistic ideas. The form of order sought by Nietzsche is expressed and supported by Nietzsche’s proposal. Thus, one of the main results of this article is to open an interpretative path in which Nietzschean humanism

is clearly revealed to us, when we highlight the marked psychological character with which Nietzsche interprets the formative phenomenon, so that both the individual and the people are susceptible to be interpreted as a pulsion dynamic. In this sense, the first contribution of Nietzsche's philosophy is that both the formation of the individual and the educational institutions within a culture must be connected with a high cultural goal, which is understood as the formation of cultural geniuses. This high educational goal puts at the center of the training problem the human being who is thought and developed to a very high degree, i.e., whose horizon is the formation of that type of great human beings. Precisely this claim is the second fundamental contribution of Nietzschean thought to contemporary education. These two contributions are intimately connected in the thought of the young Nietzsche and constitute what could be understood as the humanist invitation of Nietzsche's educational proposal.

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In a sense very close to my interpretation, Helmut Heit (2020) in his article *Human, too human, ultra-human. Nietzsche's challenge to humanism*, the author analyzes the image of superman in the *Za* as an invitation to humanism. For Heit, "The word superman refers not to a moral ideal, but to an attractive possibility. It is an invitation to the self-improvement of the human species" (Heit, 2020, p. 106). Precisely this invitation to the formation and improvement of the human being is already present in the intuitions of the young Nietzsche on the education, both in SE and in FEI, as demonstrated. Such a claim is the backbone of Nietzsche's humanistic contribution to his youth philosophy. This is evidenced, on the one hand, in the image of the solar system endowed with vivid movements that is governed by a law of superior mechanics that is presented in the SE, with which one can observe the Nietzschean proposal of the formation of the individual. On the other hand, the thesis with which Nietzsche criticizes the impulses that shape the education of his time- but which seems to speak to us directly to our time, proposes a new task for education, which can also be said to be our task as philosophers and educators, considering the cultural, social and epochal limitations, typical of the Latin American formative context. In that order of ideas, I consider that the invitation to humanism observed by Heit in the doctrine of Nietzsche can also be applied to the invitation that the young teacher of Basel makes to education, namely, "the challenge of Nietzsche to humanism is an invitation to be better human beings" (Heit, 2020, p. 100); a challenge that I believe is still present, whispering a horizon of action to contemporary education.

In the same way, following the psychological path proposed in this article, a third contribution of the philosophy of the young Nietzsche to education is evident, namely that the image of the formed individual expressed in the metaphor of the solar system endowed with living movements is also in connection with an educational proposal in which it is possible to demonstrate that there is a strict need in the formed individual between thought and life; therefore, the formation points to a certain unity of style. This analysis evidences a fourth contribution of Nietzsche to the current education, the understanding of the genius of the culture that the young Nietzsche offers in his first writings, from which it is possible to understand that the purpose that the institutes of education must be guided and directed by real formative impulses. Thus, from an acute critique and understanding of the non-formative impulses that governed and directed education in his time, he proposes a renewal of education with a marked humanistic tendency that seeks the formation of high types of human beings, in other words, the overcoming of the human being, his openness and his formation as geniuses of culture.

The previous contributions of the philosophy of the young Nietzsche faces us to the portrait of our own time and its educational ideas. This panorama still seems to have in its foundations the same non-formative tendencies that Nietzsche denounced, although more accelerated and with different masks. For this reason, Nietzsche's response invites us to demonstrate the marked need nowadays to rethink humanistic education that sets as a goal the formation of high types of human beings. Such an invitation is, at the very least, necessary for current education in Colombia, in Latin America and perhaps in a world that only imposes the individual to be up to the market and to the academy, to be enclosed in his concerns learned and which are perhaps dogmatic.

Notes

- 1 The present article arises from two experiences in *my modus vivendi*, which I want to thank. On the one hand, it is part of the reflections that have emerged during years of dialogue and creation of academic and philosophical community with the members of the Research Group *Thought of Friedrich Nietzsche: Aurora*. I thank all of them for their dialogue and corrections. I especially want to thank Dr. Harol Villamil and Dr. Raul Melendez for reading, correcting and commenting on previous versions of this article, because their comments and critical observations have contributed immensely to the perspectives developed in this article. I would also like to thank Dr. Germán Meléndez who has contributed greatly to my intellectual development during the last years of my life. I also wish to thank Master Juan

Herrera for the dialogues we have had in the midst of our friendship, as these have fueled many of my philosophical concerns. On the other hand, they arise from the different conversations, and concerns that my students of the subject of Psychology and education of the Department of Foreign Languages of the National University of Colombia, have expressed to me during the last years that I have taught the subject. Every one of the conversations, expressions and doubts have gone deep into my being and my intellect. This article is also the result of what they have offered every semester. However, the ideas, reflections and interpretations presented here stem from my concerns, and I am solely responsible for their virtues and defects.

- 2 I will follow a difference of meaning proposed by Luis E. de Santiago Guervós between *Bildung* and *Erziehung* in his translation in the Complete Works of Nietzsche of the Tecnos publishing house (cf. Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 483. Note 1). This difference leads us to understand the notion of *Erziehung* internally related to the educational processes in which a person develops, in this sense connected with the way we understand education as a process that is concretized in educational institutions. For his part, *Bildung* refers to the formation processes of the individual in relation to himself, a movement that also implies an awareness of the processes in which he is involved within a culture that realizes its educational models and ideals in educational institutions. This intimate relationship between these two terms is part of my most intimate intuitions that drive my interpretations in this article.
- 3 At the time of quoting I will follow alternately the translations of Andrés Sánchez Pascual of the publishing house Alianza and the translation of the publishing house Tecnos directed by Diego Sánchez Meca. The criterion that I will follow when choosing between one or the other translation will be the clarity with which, from my perspective, I consider that German is poured into Spanish, thereby allowing a better understanding in reading and a line of interpretation that I will try to highlight in the relevant cases. I have also consulted for translation problems the canonical citation of the *la Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe* de Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, by their canonical acronym KSA.
- 4 Because the *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe* by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari does not include the minor texts of Nietzsche's youth, which are included in the first volume of the *complete Works* of the Tecnos publishing house, under the name of "Posthumous Writings of the Basel Period" (in which FTG and FEI are found), I have turned to the *Friedrich Nietzsche Gesammelte Werke of the Musarion Ausgabe* for conceptual and translational problems.
- 5 Many of the reflections Nietzsche presents at the conferences in 1872 are intimately connected with a text by Schopenhauer entitled *On the Philosophy of the University*, which is part of the first volume of *Parerga and Paralipomena*. In this work Schopenhauer asks about the character and the actual philosophical act of the philosopher of university, i.e., the philosopher who becomes a university professor and is limited by an institutionality. However, the difference between Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's reflections lies in the role that psychology has in its critique and unity with the goals of culture. (cfr. Schopenhauer, 2009, p. 149-210).
- 6 In a letter to Malwida von Meysenbug from 1872 Nietzsche highlights the inventive character of this whole scene on the banks of the Rhine "The whole stage on the Rhine, as well as everything that seems biographical, has been absolutely invented. I want to entertain - and not entertain - the people of Basel with the truths of my life" (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 370-71).



- 7 Leaving aside that this need for a *restoration of the culture* is present in multiple works from different perspectives and reappropriation by Nietzsche. In HdH-I, this role as a restorer of culture is acquired by the free spirit, which, through a critique of the fundamentals of the expressions of culture (metaphysics, morals, religion and art), highlights the illusions or errors of reason, thus paving the way for the emergence of a new culture that Nietzsche calls superior culture. Thus, the free spirit is a transit from a lower culture to a higher one.
- 8 Luis E. de Santiago Guervós uses the German words *Nutzen* and *Erwerb* for utility and profit, respectively, which I consider to be adequate. Nevertheless, I wish to highlight an ambiguity or synonym with which Nietzsche seems to be playing here, since *Nutzen* can alternatively mean utility, profit, profit or even profit, and in turn *Erwerb* can mean profit, acquisition and profit. In that order of ideas, the supposed precision [*noch genauer*] does not turn out to be a precision of its own, it is a reverberation or emphasis on the goal of this economic impulse (Nietzsche, 2016a, p. 497).
- 9 The pathological consequences of this current hyper productivity in the psychology of individuals can also be observed in Han's thought in his work *The Palliative Society*.
- 10 This difference between the creative and non-creative or the productive and unproductive of knowledge is a subject that Nietzsche addresses from his youth, e.g., in the first and second issue of the unproductive scholar, vis-à-vis either the figure of Strauss or the antiquarian historian is central in his criticism of the most appreciated forms of scholarly culture of modernity.
- 11 In his SE translation for Gredos Joan B. Llinares publishers, he decides to use the noun *der Gelehrte* for “docto”, while Luis E. de Santiago Guervós in his FEI translation for the same publisher uses the same word for “erudite”. In order to maintain the same rhetoric, and for keeping in mind the importance that scholarly practice and scholarship have for Nietzsche's later thinking, I allow myself to modify Llinares' translation slightly and to maintain the notion of erudite rather than docto.



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