Proyecciones didácticas de la teoría argumentativa de la razón
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Resumen
Palabras Clave
Argumentação, racionalidade, crítica, limitada, epistemologia, virtude, evolução argumentation, critical rationality, bounded rationality, virtue epistemology, evolution argumentación, racionalidad crítica, racionalidad limitada, epistemología de la virtud, evolución
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