

SUBJECTION IN THE EDUCATIONAL LANDSCAPE AFTER THE “END OF HISTORY”

La sujeción en el panorama educativo después del “fin de la historia”

LUIS R. LÓPEZ M.*

Ministry of Education / Quito-Ecuador

luis2_1_21@hotmail.com

Orcid Code: <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1598-4236>

Abstract

This research will analyze “the end of history,” which originated in Kojève’s interpretation of the philosophy of history proposed by Hegel and was finally completed and reformulated by Fukuyama. The paper analyses the main contributions of these three thinkers in the construction of this category, with their respective repercussions in the real world, and establishes a relationship between the approaches of Fukuyama and the protophilosophy of Augustinian history. After elaborating the framework about the end of history, the paper presents the criticisms made by Butler and Cadahia about their roles as mechanisms of domination over all anthropological machinery and posthistory. Finally, it presents some reflexions about framework of the subjection in order to apply this on education. For this reason, I will establish a dialogue between two authors, Foucault and Freire, and I will use opposing arguments about currently education. The genealogical methodology enables an understanding of the beginning of school as we know it today, taking into account its conditions of possibility within a specific power structure. In this sense, subjection will be fundamental in the current educational subject that will find himself overwhelmed, and this crisis will force them to choose between hope or subjection.

Keywords

History, philosophy, school, education, hope.

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* Master (c) of Research Philosophy and Thought. Bachelor in Philosophy and Pedagogy. Teacher of Specialization in Education with Young People and Adults of CREFAL Paraguay. Curriculum Analyst in Ministry of Education Ecuador.

Resumen

El presente trabajo parte del análisis sobre el fin de la historia, que tiene su origen en la interpretación que realiza Kojève de la filosofía de la historia de Hegel, que será continuada y reformulada por Fukuyama. Se examinarán los principales aportes de estos tres pensadores en la construcción de esta categoría con su respectiva repercusión en el mundo actual, develando una relación invisibilizada entre los planteamientos de este último y la protofilosofía de la historia agustiniana. Una vez elaborado el marco de referencia del fin de la historia se presentarán las críticas realizadas por Butler y Cadahia sobre el papel que juegan como mecanismos de dominación sobre toda una maquinaria antropológica denominada posthistoria. Posteriormente, se reflexionará en torno al marco de la sujeción anterior, enfatizando en sus implicaciones dentro del campo educativo. Para ello se dialogará con dos autores, en principio, contrapuestos, Foucault y Freire, en disputa por el presente de la educación. La metodología genealógica permitirá visibilizar el comienzo de la escuela tal y como se la conoce en la actualidad atendiendo a sus condiciones de posibilidad concretas dentro de un entramado de poderes determinados. En este sentido, la sujeción jugará un papel fundamental en la conformación de un sujeto educativo contemporáneo que se verá desbordado y será precisamente en esta crisis donde existirá una posibilidad de elección: esperanza o sujeción.

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Palabras clave

Historia, filosofía, escuela, educación, esperanza.

Introduction

The present work is divided into two sections. The main goal of the first section is to identify the relationship between Hegel's philosophy of history and the concept of the end of history, initially posited by Kojève (2013) and furthered, disseminated and consolidated more recently by Fukuyama (1992), with its respective impact on the contemporary world in different spheres.

In the first place, it is necessary to briefly characterize the philosophy of history in Hegel. In this sense, and given the extension of this work, only his most significant contributions will be synthesized. These, according to the author, are freedom and the relationship between history and historian translated into subject-object, following the dialectical methodology implemented by Hegel, leading to a brief reflection on its implications in what Kojève (2013) later called the end of history.

Subsequently, Kojève's interpretation (1992) will be analyzed, evidencing the originality of his thoughts in his attempt to interpret Hegel, where two fundamental aspects stand out: the first is the end of history and the second is the role of freedom in this outcome. For him, in the dialectic of the master and the slave, there is a supposed liberation through work. However, with the help of Cadahia (2012) and Butler (2001), it will be demonstrated that what emerges is a form of self-enslavement, a form of servile consciousness backed by an entire anthropological machinery. In addition, the article presents the way in which Kojève's interpretation (2013) was a

clear precedent for the liberal reading that Fukuyama (1992) will later make about the end of history. As a result of this relationship, an attempt will be made to map an unconfessed relationship between the American and the protophilosophy of history proposed by St. Augustine of Hippo.

Next, the paper will analyze the discourse elaborated by Fukuyama (1992), revealing how Kojève (2013) interpretation for the service of liberal democracy, alluding to the authority of Hegel, and making statements about the end of history related to the geopolitics of their time, which have marked contemporary thinking in one way or another. In this sense, their liberal approaches and the reasons for their supposed success will be analyzed, to the point of being considered as the place of arrival of universal history and marking the beginning of what will be known as posthistory.

The article will highlight how the end of history and the consequent construction of post-history were used in the field of biopower for domination, executed through liberal market democracy, where there is a management of political life mediated through mechanisms and strategies of domination evidenced by Cadahia (2012) and Buttler (2001) through a genealogical methodology.

The second part, following the same methodology, will reflect on the current educational work on the basis of the previous statements made about subjection. Two *a priori* confronted authors, Foucault (2003) and Freire (1993), will be discussed. Once closer to the horizon of reflection of both, it is necessary to contextualize education in the contemporary era in order to analyze its role in society.

Both authors present totally opposed visions regarding educational reality. It is worth mentioning that Foucault, despite reflecting and naming the school in several of his books, never carried out a systematic work on it. It is therefore necessary to say that this analysis of education emphasizes above all the methodology used by the author: genealogy. Freire, on the other hand, does reflect on education, it being, in fact, the backbone of his work.

Hegel's Philosophy of history

The author agrees with Salvador Rus (2005) in thinking that history is fundamental in the construction of Hegelian thought, specifically of his philosophical system. In the first place, it is necessary to consider that Hegel conceives of history as the realization of freedom, and his proposal is a thinking philosophy of history, considering that this is not transcen-



dent but immanent. In addition, it is important not to ignore that Hegelian philosophy is a complex system that encompasses many dimensions. The present article covers only some implications about his philosophy of history, without trying to cover the entire complex Hegelian system.

One of the texts that can be fundamental when approaching the philosophy of history in Hegel, according to Rus (2005), is *Lessons on the philosophy of history* where the author “reflected deeply on the historical reality in which he lived and tried to understand” (p. 28). In this sense, it is fundamental to consider that the author tried to explain history from its origins to the moment he was in, in other words “to understand everything that appeared before his eyes and to integrate it within a philosophical system of his own” (p. 28). It is fundamental to consider the author’s context in order to understand his work, and in Hegel it is particularly important when there is a clear intention to act in his time. In this sense, Napoleon and his historical performance are fundamental within this historical thought.

It is necessary to understand the Hegelian thought to use his method par excellence, dialectics in a speculative sense. Therefore, it is key to clarify that dialectics is understood not as a totalizing system that does not give rise to differences, but rather as *Aufhebung*, which Reale & Antiseri (1988) define as “the speculative moment, an overcoming in the sense that at the same time it means to suppress and preserve” (p. 113). In other words, the terms A and B are born at the same time, there is something of A in B and something of B in A. A crack appears where there is a cancellation and a conservation, a contamination of both.

As already mentioned, for Hegel the evolution of history is seen as a development of freedom. Thus, universal history, citing Rus (2005), is a “set of phases or historical epochs that are happening temporarily and dialectically in a progressive advance to the establishment of the State, the only way in which individuals live in full freedom” (p. 33). In this way, Hegel develops a type of historical route that goes from East to his Germanic world, going through classic Greece and the Roman world. In the last stage, nations “have come to the awareness that man is free as a man and that everyone is born to be free” (p. 35). It is important to mention that at this point we do not talk about the end of history, but many subsequent readings have seen the logical need to place this notion here. As Reale & Antiseri (1988) put it:

Is history destined to stop in the Christian-Germanic phase? Does the historical dialectic stop its advance at a given moment? This is what should be deduced from Hegel’s words, contrary to what the principles of the dialectic itself would necessarily demand. It is a serious aporia that will also have an impact on Marx’s conception of history (p. 150).

The Hegelian philosophy of history starts from historical facts which are a fundamental part, its raw material, but it goes beyond them. His vision is rational, because reason will be what will allow us to see how the world has evolved. This can be better understood. As Rus (2005) states, knowing the “three different types of writing and making history” (p. 38), the author will present a retrospective view of how history has been made before him and he will want to overcome all these positions using a dialectical methodology. For Hegel, there are three possible types of history that are original, reflective and thinking. All of them can be understood from the relationship between subject-object that will also mark the role of freedom in each of them.

The first, the original history, is characterized by being the most primitive. It has a necessary starting point, but it is insufficient. In this type of history, historians are mere witnesses of what happens, describe in first person what they have lived and experienced, with clear similarities with the Spanish chroniclers. In this sense, they are not able to take distance from what they have lived, go beyond it. They are part of what happens. Their role is insufficient, since there is no work mediated by reason in history, “the spirit in which the historian writes the original story is the same with which he confronts the actions” (p. 39). Here there is a subordination of facts to thought. Freedom is not possible because there is no mediation of reason, subject and object are identified. The historian is one with history, therefore, the development of freedom cannot occur.

Reflective history begins to work from understanding. Therefore, it is possible to go beyond what is present in the historian himself whenever there is a kind of reflection. However, here the subject looks at the object as already given. In other words, a kind of dualism appears between object and subject, they are independent of each other. In this sense, the historian takes on the role of spectator, “it is a history of history” (p. 40). Within this type of history Hegel builds a series of subcategories, in which a pedagogical and moral sense of history can begin to be visualized, because this would be a place of learning that serves to avoid committing the same errors of the past in the present and future. It is important to consider that this is not necessarily so, because knowing the mistakes of the past does not guarantee that they are not committed again. Contemporary history shows this.

Relating this to the issue of freedom, it can be said that it is found in the self, in the subject in full freedom. This is still insufficient because freedom does not develop fully because the subject does not intervene in history due to the existing subject-object duality. Therefore, the move-



ment of thought that creates the absolute and leads to freedom does not arise. The historian sees history as something given in which he cannot intervene or transform, therefore, freedom cannot develop either.

Finally, there is the thinking history. Here, the historian takes the role of philosopher and therefore performs a process of dialectical synthesis between immediacy and distance, to “show how the spirit evolves in time and materializes in space” (p. 42). An *Aufhebung* is produced. There is an awareness of the immediacy of the thing, but as it is insufficient, a work of distancing is necessary, that is, there is a reflexive distance with the object. The *Aufhebung* gives rise to this thinking consideration of history, where history and reason must be linked, because reason itself is born in history. This link allows us to think about the development of freedom, because it is not a given principle in the self but is made in history.

Freedom is understood as synthesis. History can be understood by understanding the game of distancing and immediacy and the mutual participation of the subject and the object, because history can be transformed, and freedom can be developed in it. In this sense subject and object are contaminated, historian and history contaminate one another, and freedom can be cultivated. There is no longer an identification or a dualism, but a dialectical game where the absolute appears and therefore the possibility of freedom to transform history.

In this sense, after briefly appreciating some important points of the philosophy of history within Hegelian thought, it can be seen that the German philosopher, as already mentioned, does not seem to allude to an end of history. In fact, as Anderson (1992) puts it, “it is difficult to find a similar phrase in his texts,” but then we must add that “the logic of Hegel’s system as a whole requires it practically as a conclusion, as there is no doubt about the existence of sufficient evidence to think that he assumes it in various contributions of his work” (p. 17).

Therefore, it can be said that Hegel never proposed the end of history in those terms, but it did inspire these readings or deductions in authors such as Kojève who properly raises the *purpose of l’histoire* as an original contribution as will be seen below.

The end of history in Kojève’s interpretation

The most repeated idea by Kojève (2013) in his book *Introduction to Reading of Hegel* is that “Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit is history understood as having come to its end.” In this sense, this book represents

the completion of the human essence on two sides. The first is the “active development of this essence”, and the second, as Jiménez (2013) explains, “the contemplative development of its own self-understanding” (p. 9).

It is interesting to observe here that Kojève, when trying to explain Hegelian thought, comes to something new. In this sense his interpretation is unsuccessful. However, he contributes completely original and lucid ideas. As Cadahia (2012) points out, “through the mask of Hegel he exposed his own thought” (p. 164). And his contributions are extremely important, for example, his ideas regarding the dialectic of the master and the slave.

For Jimenez (2013), in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Kojève sees the self-understanding of history at the moment it closes, where man is understood as a man, this is like a historical being that is consummated and ends. This historically finished man is the free and recognized human being, a synthesis of the universal and the particular.

The Phenomenology of Spirit is, for Kojève (2013), a phenomenological description of human existence, that is to say, it is described as it appears or manifests to the person who lives it. The part that concerns the present analysis can be seen clearly when Kojève presents subdivision C of Chapter VI, which discusses the post-revolutionary State, that is the Napoleonic Empire, where it clearly states that “we are at the end of history” (p. 190).

For Kojève (2013), Hegel thinks of the Napoleonic empire as a total or definitive reality. In fact, it is a universal and homogeneous State that unites the whole of humanity and suppresses differences within itself, which is why it is impossible for wars or revolutions to exist, because “the State will no longer be modified, it will remain eternally identical with itself” (p. 191). This will also imply that man will not change either and nature will always be finished, “therefore, the science that correctly and completely describes the Napoleonic World will continue to be totally valid forever” (p. 191).

Napoleon cannot be absent from Hegel’s reflection. He is the citizen of the universal and homogenous State, that is, the full and satisfied man. The French, as a man within the framework of Hegelian thought, is satisfied with the State that he has created, he is the citizen who “offers his work, knows what he does and does nothing but what he knows; therefore, there is an absolute coincidence between Will and Knowledge” (p. 193). In this way, Napoleon rises above the *Sein* and is truly present in the World. Making an analogy with Christianity, Kojève (2013) says that, if Napoleon is the revealed God, Hegel is the one who reveals it.



According to Cadahia (2012) Kojève takes a clear position in his reading. This, more than a literal interpretation, is a rereading from his context “from the thirties and forties of the last century” (p. 164). Later on, the implications of these new contributions in the contemporary world and in the conformation of posthistory will be seen in more detail. Before this, it is necessary to make visible how this vision in favor of liberal democracy is used in the statements made by Fukuyama (1992) starting from, although not limited to, a transcendental historical fact: the end of the Cold War.

Fukuyama’s end of history

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Fukuyama’s *The End of History* of (1992) is probably one of the most influential works in the field of politics due to all the implications it has had and continues to have. This author raises a controversial thesis that would assume that liberalism and its corresponding democratic application are nothing less than the best way to embody a system of government, and this is demonstrated by its ability, according to the author, to overcome rival ideologies such as communism, as the main opponent, in addition to fascism and hereditary monarchies. The American goes even further and states that “liberal democracy could be the final point of the ideological evolution of humanity and the final form of government, and as such would mark the end of history” (p.11).

To talk about the end of history, Fukuyama (1992) relies on Hegel, repeatedly appealing to his authority. However, as seen above, it was Kojève (2013) who raised this idea, because Hegel never speaks of the end of history, but rather of a goal as proposed by Anderson (1992):

Hegel almost never speaks of Ende (end) or Schluii (conclusion), but refers to Ziel (goal), Zweck (finality) or Resultat (result). The reason is very simple: in German there is no word that combines the two senses of the word “end” in English (or in Spanish): on the one hand the final part, on the other a purpose. Hegel was especially interested in the second of these meanings (p. 19).

Liberalism as a system of government, for Fukuyama (1992), is free of internal contradictions and this is what has made it, among other reasons, a great success, in contrast to the other political ideologies that have been characterized by serious defects and irrationalities, which can be seen when observing their collapse in practice. However, the author is aware that liberalism has produced flaws in basic principles such as

justice, which, from his perspective, are products of an incomplete application of the principles of equality and freedom. Note that for Fukuyama (1992) there is, therefore, no incoherence in liberal democracy *per se*, but in its application.

The controversial ideas previously raised by Fukuyama (1992) had an immediate reaction that the author himself could verify. Critics are oriented around the fact that, in the first place, history has no purpose because history itself is not “directional, oriented and coherent” (p. 13). The American states, for his part, that this is because today’s society is extremely pessimistic, and this is due, in large part, to the two devastating world wars that took place in the first half of the 20th century.

What was found is that science was used for war and desolation, people witnessed the rise of atrocious totalitarian regimes, the destruction of the environment, in other words, man against man. For Fukuyama (1992) this, evidently, was not the fault of liberalism, but of the fact that human beings have developed a supposed pessimism that does not let us see the good things that history brings us, like liberal democracy. One cannot help but see traces of the vision of history as determined and guided by providence as stated by Saint Augustine.

One of the premises of economic liberalism is found in the free market, which Fukuyama (1992) sees with optimism as being responsible for “producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity” (p. 14). However, in the face of these assertions Cadahia (2012) asks “if the liberal democratic state has triumphed over the other ideologies, why do the conflicts persist?” (p. 173) This is where the end-of-history construct and its corresponding posthistory come in, as there would be some countries that reached the light, understood as the liberal market democracy, and other countries that are still in the dark trying to reach this goal: “The world would be divided between a part that would still be historical and a part that would already be post-historical” (p. 173).

It can be clearly seen that Fukuyama (1992) puts Hegel’s thought, and unknowingly that of Kojève (2013), at the service of liberalism and with it the new world order, “makes the rise of liberal capitalism the place where all the contradictions of history come to be resolved” (Cadahia, 2012, p. 173). Many contemporary discourses rely heavily on Fukuyama’s approach, which permeates the social imaginary.

The discourse of Fukuyama (1992), to his regret, does not follow the Hegelian approaches, because in many aspects they are totally distorted. For example, Cadahia (2012) states, it reverses “the role attributed by Hegel to civil society and the State” (p. 173). Within the framework of



liberal thinking, the individual prevails over the social, and this is not in accordance with Hegelian thought, because in it, the State aims to “regulate the gap between misery and wealth” (p. 174).

The end of the Cold War seemed to agree with Fukuyama and allowed the fiction of an irrefutable triumph of democratic liberalism to consolidate. However, now the landscape has changed, as manifested by Cadahia (2012) and “the emergence of new economic superpowers seems to endanger the existing order” (pp. 174-175). In this sense, there is a return to history, as Kagan (2008) argues when stating that “history has returned, and democracies must unite to give shape to it, otherwise others will do for them” (p. 3). For assuming a thinking vision of the philosophy of history, human beings can and should intervene in history, as it’s not predetermined as the Augustinian heritage has led us to believe.

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Saint Augustine and the end of history

As already mentioned, Fukuyama (1992) relies on the authority of Hegel to propose the end of history with its great geopolitical burden. However, this thesis is linked much more with Kojève (2013) and, in the author’s opinion, there is an unconfessed relationship with Saint Augustine. The historical vision of Christianity raises a theology based on a purpose, which for this religion would be salvation. This implies several things, including a directionality and linearity of history.

We must begin by making visible that the work *The City of God Against the Pagans* by Saint Augustine is not a mere theological treatise. In fact, its subtitle already demonstrates that this work has a clear political character. Contextualizing this work, it must be said that it was written in response to the crisis of Christianity that resulted from the invasion of the Roman Empire, as Ramos (2008) puts it: “St. Augustine’s reflection on the events that he has to live” (p. 4). The apparently invincible Rome was conquered and plundered, as Montes (1994) reminds us “the Eternal City had to confess to being mortal” (p. 2).

Saint Augustine is in a dispute with the pagans regarding the significance of the Roman Empire. God gave the power to Rome to become an empire, God decided so, the cause of the power of the Roman Empire is given by the Christian religion. Therefore, the task of his work is to justify and dispel the questions raised against the Christian religion resulting from the fall of Rome: “his thought is doubly eschatological” (p. 5).

One of the fundamental implications of this work is the linear vision of history that is imprinted, in contrast to the circular vision of the Greeks. For Saint Augustine (1994) it is Divine Providence, understood as the will of God, which guides and “establishes the human kingdoms” (p. 2). The main point of interest in his work is the distinction of two types of cities: the city of men, the earthly, as opposed to the city of God, the heavenly. In this sense, a duplication of the notion of history is generated. There is a profane history and on the other hand a sacred history, “He is the one who gives happiness, proper to the kingdom of heaven, only to religious men. On the other hand, the kingdom of Earth is distributed to the religious and the wicked, as it pleases Him” (p. 34). The celestial city can be seen in the mundane city at certain times.

For all the above, it will be Saint Augustine (1994) who lays the foundation for an idea of progress in earthly history. And the approaches of Fukuyama (1992) seem to focus on the inheritance of this theological teleological tradition rather than on the contributions of Hegel as he states in his work. This meta-narrative will be constituted as a mechanism of domination in the contemporary world.



Domination and the end of history

The end of history has marked the matrix of contemporary thought. This includes the discursive matrices of domination. It is therefore necessary, according to Cadahia (2012), to “think about the contemporary biopolitical experience in a post-historical key” (p. 163). For this it is fundamental to consider the discourses laid out earlier regarding the end of history by Kojève (2013) and Fukuyama (1992), who laid some of the bases for this to occur.

For Cadahia (2012), Kojève’s end of history is marked by the post-revolutionary State, which is characterized by being homogeneous and universal, where man himself “disappears, being progressively replaced by the animal of the *Homo sapiens* species” (p. 165). Cadahia (2012), following Bataille, does not agree with this statement, and comments that “although we have entered posthistory, there still survives a sacred remain, understood as a negativity not presently employed in the forms of art, eroticism and laughter” (p. 168). Kojève’s position will cause him problems and he will end up approaching Bataille’s position as Cadahia (2012) points out: “his trip to Japan will help him get away from this belief” (p. 169).

Agamben (2002) will also reflect on the end of history, specifically on man, whom he considers as “a field of dialectical tensions already cut by caesuras that always separate in him—at least virtually—the anthropopharous animality and the humanity that he incarnates in it” (p. 28). This, says Cadahia (2012), leads to the problem of “the body of the servant as an object of biopower” (p. 175). As a logical consequence of the end of history, post-history will appear, and humanity will enter it taking control of the management of this animality posed by Agamben, through three different figures, which are “the genome, the global economy and humanitarian management” (p. 175).

The aforementioned figures allow controlling or enabling the management of the animal. In this sense, the proposal made by Agamben and rescued by Cadahia (2012) is to rethink the anthropological machinery that makes this possible, “the relationship of differentiation and articulation between the human and animal, the result of an anthropological machinery that permeates all Western culture” (p. 176). However, the attempt to dissolve the anthropological machinery is not successful because, as Cadahia warns, “it only manages to stop the anthropological machinery that it criticizes through the configuration of another anthropological machinery” (2012, p. 177). It is interesting to appreciate the path that Agamben (2002) makes with the identification of the myths on which the possibility of animality management is built, especially the one that allows to differentiate the animal from the human, which is what the author ends up denying.

The end of history, according to Cadahia (2012), in principle seems to have two possible outcomes for the human being. On the one hand, to choose the satisfied slave form and thereby alienate himself under capitalism, or to be unsatisfied slaves “eclipsed by the speech of the master and his tale of the end of history” (p. 179). Cadahia (2012), like Butler (2001), regarding Foucauldian thought, warn that Kojève’s interpretation of the possible liberation of man through work is not enough because it is no longer a case of external enslavement, but rather self-enslavement: “Foucault has pointed out that the object of modern politics is not to free the subject, but rather to inquire into the regulatory mechanisms through which subjects are produced and maintained” (p. 44). In this sense, what exists, as Cadahia (2012) sees it, is “a movement of false liberation that cannot escape the limits of a supposed working essence or subjectivity, self-imposed to a certain extent by the master for whom the slave transforms the object” (p. 180).

From the above it follows that there is some optimism in the interpretation of Kojève (2013) to think that man only needs work to be free, because there are at least two moments for this to happen, as Cadahia (2012) recalls, “one linked with the subject and another linked with subjectivation” (p. 180). The same author identifies the irony of history in which these two moments have coincided in the servile consciousness, which Butler (2001) also studies in her reading on Hegel from a different perspective.

Subject formed in subjection

Generally, when power is understood as a form of domination, it is customary to think, as Butler (2001) recalls, of “power as something that exerts pressure on the subject from the outside, something that subordinates, places below and relegates to a lower order” (p. 12). Thanks to Foucauldian contributions (2003) it is known that power or, specifically, domination is not only external to the subject, but is something that forms or constitutes the very subject. For example, chapter three called *Discipline* shows how the “methods that allow the meticulous control of the body’s operations, which guarantee the constant subjection of its forces and impose a docility-utility relationship” (p. 141). However, it was Butler (2001) who masterfully complemented this theory with her interpretation of the hapless consciousness of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*. From it, she clarifies how the subject is formed in subordination, that is, the problem of subjection.

To contextualize Butler’s contributions (2001) it is essential to briefly recall the transition of the sections *Master and Servant* and *The freedom of self-consciousness* from Hegel’s aforementioned book. In these chapters the figures of the slave and the master are already visible, where the former appears as “an instrumental body whose work provides the master with the material conditions of his existence and whose material products reflect both his subordination” (p. 47) and the corresponding domination of the master. In the traditional interpretations it is through work that the slave would obtain a supposed liberation or autonomy from which Butler distances herself.

The division between master and slave is given at first by the life or death confrontation by which the slave agrees to become the master’s body due to the absolute fear of dying, because “the strategy of domination was to replace the fight to life or death” (p. 53). At the end of the section the slave, realizing his formative capacity, becomes master of him-

self, however, at a great cost of the emergence of the so-called unhappy consciousness.

Unhappy consciousness continues to be a form of servitude, no longer imposed from the outside by the master, but from within the very subject, meaning “the subject is subordinated to the norms and these are subjectivating, that is, they confer ethical form to the reflexivity of the emerging subject” (p. 54). In other words, the master is no longer outside of us, he is now within us.

Both Butler (2001) and Cadahia (2012), from different perspectives, see a possible path of exploration through which it would be possible to overcome this servile consciousness, this self-enslavement, because “the foucaultian ethical-political subject, converted into object/subject of the devices of power and resistance, remains firmly placed in the terrain of history and in the possibility of its transformation” (p. 181). In this same sense, speaking of the psychic mechanisms of power, “suppression not only leads to its opposite [...] but in more contemporary formulations leads to define the subject as an institution that overflows the dialectical framework that generates it” (p. 68).

The previous reflections in this sense are not pessimistic, but they do show a complex web of power relations to which Foucault himself did not give a clear and convincing exit. As Žižek (2001) reminds us, by recognizing the continuity of the resistance and power, he also tacitly accepts that “it is not enough as a basis for an effective resistance, a resistance that is not ‘*part of the game*’ but allows the subject to assume a position outside the disciplinary/confessional” (p. 267). Žižek accuses Foucault of forgetting a key concept to think about the subject, that of antagonism: “from the production of a surplus of resistance, the intrinsic antagonism of a system can very well set in motion a process that leads to its final collapse” (p. 273).

Cadahia and Butler, from different perspectives, argue that a thinking philosophy of history, united with the consideration that there is a dialectical relationship between power and freedom, allow us to be aware that it is possible to transform history and resist domination strategies and even subvert them. Now, from the educational field, what is the relationship between it and the subject?

Education and subjection

Education as knowledge constitutes certain institutions that in turn legitimize a type of discursive framework from which a type of subject

emerges, in this case, the student that must be educated. As is generally known, the microphysics of power show how normalized and docile subjects are produced through various institutions.

According to Ball (1990), Foucault, “never devoted to education a systematic and finished work, but he refers to pedagogies, educational systems, examination devices” (p. 14). One of the fundamental theses that can be deduced through his contributions is that “schools, like prisons and asylums, are fundamentally concerned with moral and social regulation” (p. 18). Formal education is constituted as an enormous machinery that is able to objectify the subjects through different classification and division processes, using diverse techniques, among which the examination stands out. In this way, identities and subjectivities are built that are “central to the organizational processes of education in our society” (p. 8). In addition, it is important to mention that the teacher is the one who has all the authority and is able to dominate the student from diverse practices such as punishments, rewards or reinforcements. These practices mold students into a kind of necessary submissive subject that, in the sixteenth century, was a factory worker.

School, like prison, is built on the basis of different discourses that constitute what can be said and thought, creating relations of power and subjectivities. One of the fundamental elements is the knowledge of the so-called Educational Sciences, “dividing practices are critically interconnected with the formation and the increasingly complex elaboration of the sciences of education: educational psychology, pedagogy, sociology of education, cognitive and evolutionary psychology” (p. 8). At present, these disciplines have consolidated while simultaneously trying to maintain their epistemological status, they have even been nourished by a set of emerging knowledge from different areas. From the authority of these disciplines the school is naturalized as an institution that reproduces inequalities.

In addition to the exams, prizes, punishments, reinforcements and knowledge that legitimize education, it is possible to inquire about such important characters as the teacher and his role in education. This figure is awarded the category of *bioteaecher*, moving away from “a gross and mechanical discipline” (p. 76) due to the criticisms received. However, new strategies were sought based on “the new truths of medicine and psychology” (p. 77). In this way, the teacher gradually becomes a kind of professional similar to the doctor as a standardization agent, since he is able to almost “diagnose” and “cure” the students.

The school would have its origin in the sixteenth century machinery, where the foundations of the institution that is known today



are based. It is extremely important to point out the aspects that have been consolidated for the existence of formal education of children and adolescents proposed by Varela and Álvarez (1991): the definition of a childhood statute; the emergence of a specific space for the education of children; the emergence of a body of childhood specialists endowed with specific technologies and “elaborate” theoretical codes; the destruction of other modes of education and finally the actual institutionalization of the school: the imposition of compulsory school decreed by public authorities and sanctioned by law.

It can be clearly seen that all the previous elements have had to conform so that the idea of school appears and with it its naturalization, “archaeological search with the purpose of exposing the sociopolitical foundations on which the genesis of the school is based. compulsory primary education” (p. 175). The success of the above can be seen today because in the social imaginary there is a notion of a Kantian child and adolescent (2004) who has to look for the “exit of the minority” (p.92) with all that it implies.

The school, as it is known, emerged as a space of civilization for the child worker. In addition, the process of normalization suffered by the school is strongly questioned and, according to Varela and Álvarez (1991), “is seen more and more as a natural process” (p. 175). It can be said that the school is constituted as a fundamental element of all societies and, despite numerous criticisms, a necessary element for the assurance of the future. It is important to analyze one of the forms of knowledge that legitimizes it, pedagogy, born from the contributions of Kant, within a current that can be called German idealism.

The emergence of pedagogy

It is necessary to turn back to the end of the 18th century and the 19th century, specifically to the tradition of German philosophy that plays a fundamental role in shaping what is called pedagogy today. From its roots, two different visions appear, as Vázquez (2012) recalls: on the one hand, there is the inheritance of Herbart with its scientific-mechanistic vision and, on the other hand, the one cultivated by the historicist philosophy of Dilthey. From these two philosophies, two paths for pedagogy can be distinguished: “normative pedagogy represented by neo-Kantian authors, such as Natorp and others of Christian inspiration, such as Henz and F. März, and that of empirical pedagogy” (p. 8).

For normative pedagogy this discipline is undoubtedly a science because it would be supported or closely linked to ethics and psychology, both concerned by what Kant would call practical reason understood as “autonomous in the Kantian way, whether illuminated by Christian revelation” (p. 8). From this point, the historical vision of education as a good act, or a must be, where ethics plays a fundamental role is revealed. Psychology in turn is responsible for legitimizing the students’ behaviors in some way.

On the other hand, the historicist line will take shape with the educational contributions of Scheleimarcher for whom ethics is not universal but responds to “social-historical conditions” (p. 8). Here the approaches are oriented to a formation of young people by the elderly, as education is a historical process of formation of successive generations.

The two previous cases show a factor common to both lines, where Kantian reason plays a fundamental role because “philosophy and pedagogy are at the root of reason and its scope, as proposed by Kant” (p. 9). It is not surprising that until now the search for knowledge on a purely rational basis is still valid. Numerous authors have criticized that in the curricular meshes, for example, it is strange to find disciplines such as art, music or physical education. If they do appear, they are less important than other areas, where creativity has traditionally not played a significant role.

The nomination of pedagogy corresponds to the now classic division between Natural Sciences and Sciences of the Spirit. For Dilthey, obviously pedagogy will be in this last group because “education is not properly a technical task, nor is it a matter of enabling growth, but rather of introducing the learner into the world of meaning, of values, of having to be” (p. 10). In addition, he adds to the hermeneutic approach by stating that what is proper to education is understanding and not explaining, which would be typical of natural sciences. This tendency would dominate pedagogy until the sixties and seventies coinciding with the criticism of German philosophy and its instrumental reason. It is important to mention that the name of Educational Sciences has a different genealogy, which in itself deserves a more detailed analysis linked to a scientific vision, as stated by Higuera (2013), leading to: “A large number of people in the West recognize as truth only that which is based on scientific facts” (p. 24).

The Frankfurt School, following Vázquez (2012), was the one to include a dimension aside from pedagogy. In this way, “they propose a concept of education, as a work of emancipation and for pedagogy [...] critical hermeneutics focused on the reflection on the social conditions in which education develops” (p. 10). In this way the educational process does not occur in a decontextualized space, but rather responds to a time



and a space. Even today, the central idea of emancipation as a fundamental object of education is still very much in force. In a way, educating for being can lead to a certain type of indoctrination, and it is precisely the risk that these thinkers were able to identify.

In Latin America there were also questions about a type of education that Brazilian Paulo Freire (1984) called banking education. Instead he proposes a pedagogy of the oppressed that seeks a liberation and that has hope as a fundamental category:

While in the domesticating practice the educator is always the educator of the student, in the liberating practice, on the other hand, the educator must “die” as the exclusive educator of the student, in order to “be reborn” as the student of his student. Simultaneously he must propose to the student that he “dies” as the exclusive student of the educator, in order to “be reborn” as an educator of his educator (p. 77).

The fundamental criticism made to the pedagogy of the theorists of the Sciences of the Spirit, says Vázquez (2012), is that they belong “to an ideology that masks with abstractions—freedom, personal development—failure and discrimination in schools” (p. 12). In this sense, education is no longer seen as a place where the *lumen ratio* should be able to illuminate social practices, but rather it is a frontal criticism of these praxis in its incoherent and contradictory manifestations.

Education: hope or subjection?

Paulo Freire (1993) is one of the main thinkers in what the liberation education movement refers to as a critical view of the school. His work *Pedagogy of Hope* thinks of itself as a reunion with his most famous work, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* and, precisely in it, responds to the numerous criticisms that the author received in this work, “accusing dreams and utopias not only of being useless, but also inopportune” (p. 23).

It is important to consider that Freire was not an uncritical apologist of the school, because like many other thinkers he strongly criticized the real role of education in society. Specifically, it can be said that he raised a strong question about the traditional education of his time, and with it also the student-teacher relationship. Freire, despite the hard questioning, radically departs from the approaches made by Foucault where a rather pessimistic vision of the world clearly predominates, and where the school would not have, in principle, possible salvation. According to Žizek (2001) the error of the French author is, paradoxical as it may seem,

the subject, because for the Slovenian it is clear that the subject by its own definition is a “surplus over its cause” (p. 273). In this way there is no possible way out despite the resistance posed by Michel Foucault (2003), and following these postulates, there is no possibility for the school either as a reproductive entity of power and therefore of the frameworks of power and social inequities.

The meshes of power that seem to surround the school and its strategies of domination seem to show a dead end from which it is not possible to leave. Freire (1993) on the contrary raises an ontological category that is necessary to maintain in such discouraging contexts: “Hope is an ontological necessity: hopelessness is hope that, losing its direction, becomes a distortion of ontological necessity” (p. 24).

Education in itself can be totally discarded or even worse, be seen as a machine that cannot possibly be changed and therefore enters a feeling of hopelessness that, far from allowing us to change reality, “makes us succumb to fatalism in which it is not possible to gather indispensable forces for the re-launching of the world” (p. 24). This thesis by Freire is fundamental for the analysis of the school as a possible element of resistance and liberation. There are therefore two possibilities for acting, ironically posed by Gonfiantini (2007): “Sit down to mourn, feeling ourselves imprisoned in power structures, or propose a different location considering that institutions are also places of mediation, opposition and new possibilities” (p. 94).

Throughout the text, many of the nodal issues raised in his work par excellence, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, are answered or clarified, such as the accusation of a kind of teleology of history where liberation would be considered as a kind of end. In this regard, Freire (1984) states that it is not a finality, but rather a creative utopia that needs to be visualized in order to build.

The proposed education does not respond by teaching a large amount of content to the students, but by raising awareness in them of the apparently neutral and objective contents. It is exactly at this point where the fundamental importance of education as an act of knowledge resides, not only of content but of the rationale of economic, social, political, ideological, historical events that explain the greater or lesser degree of interdiction of the conscious body to which we are subject (p. 129).

The proposal by Freire therefore seeks to emphasize learning and teaching on the pillar of what he calls critical understanding. In this sense, the traditional model of passive transmission of knowledge of teachers to students and their corresponding alienation is questioned. Awareness



comes as a concept similar to what the school should be, because without it there is no possible change. Regarding his conception of the subject, it can be said that he agrees with Aguilar (2009) that “From the Latin American perspective, *being a subject* must be understood as the self-affirming act through which the subject is positioned and appropriates its context to value it and execute its leading actions” (p. 67).

Many of Freire’s ideas have a clearly Marxist inspiration, because when he speaks of oppressors and oppressed, in principle, a clear analogy can be seen between bourgeois and proletarians. The criticism made to capitalism is taken up by Freire in the field of education itself. It is necessary to remember that for Marx (2011) there must be an empowerment of this oppressed social class, “the proletariat, the lowest layer of today’s society, cannot rise, nor can it straighten up, without blowing up the entire superstructure formed by the layers of official society” (p. 126). Saving differences, Freire’s proposal has points in common, since a certain dichotomy that could be classified as dialectic is also visible.

Paulo Freire is a point of reference in terms of education, and its Latin American context makes it especially interesting for the Ecuadorian reality. In his famous work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* he proposed an education for people who have been invisible throughout history. In this sense he was oriented to a type of education that allowed people to free themselves from the chains that bind them through political praxis. He questioned the conception of literacy of his time as the mere fact of learning to read and write in a reduced sense. On the contrary, he envisioned a literacy in which the person could become an active entity of society and participate politically, in order to exercise and defend their rights. In this sense, following Moreno (1980), “the primary objective of education is this awareness with a critical sense, which commits to action” (p. 523).

Conclusion

Throughout the present work, the first part briefly presented the main lines of the philosophy of history present in Hegel which are, according to the author, marked by the development of freedom and the role of history and historian and its subject-object relationship. It has been shown that the end of history as such is not a theoretical construct made by Hegel, but by its commentators and readers such as Kojève (2013). It is important to state that many of the readers mention that, although Hegel did not state the end of history, his proposals may lead to that deduction.

On the other hand, Kojève (2013) carried out an attempt to interpret Hegel's texts where his own original approaches are visible, among which the end of history stands out, given by the construction of a homogenous and universal State. This reading would set a precedent that Fukuyama (1992) would take up in a liberal reading where its democratic application would be the end of history as a goal, towards which all nations must arrive, entering what will be called post-history. An anthropological machinery of domination will be consolidated on the basis of these events.

The arguments made by Fukuyama (1992) are based on historical conceptions that are not Hegelian, but rather show deterministic nuances where there is a Providence that guides history towards the best—in this case, liberal democracy. However, it can be seen that this world order is in crisis because of its internal flaws, where there is no justice or equity, but competition and accumulation.

With the help of Cadahia (2012) and Butler (2001) it has been shown how the end of history and its corresponding posthistory created a series of domination mechanisms that are no longer outside the subjects but within them, under a form of servile consciousness that generates self-enslavement through different mechanisms.

There is a road to be explored, under the conception of a thinking history, in which the human being can act on history and therefore transform it, because domination strategies are overwhelmed by themselves, there is a dialectical relationship between power and freedom that leaves room for praxis and hope for remaking history.

In the second part, a dialogue has been attempted between two radically different authors, Foucault (2003) and Freire (1993). According to the author, it is important to use the genealogical methodology to analyze the beginning of the school, as well as to visualize its perverse role that cannot be ignored in order to avoid the naivety of thinking about a neutral, objective and transforming school when historically it has been the complete opposite. However, it is essential not to remain solely in Foucault's pessimism, and it is here that Freire provides a light of possible future for the school: hope.

If formal education aims to maintain itself, it is necessary to make a series of structural changes in many aspects: the teacher-student relationship, the legitimacy of knowledge, horizontality, non-indoctrination, awareness, political praxis and especially the transformation of social and individual liberation. These changes necessarily involve the participation of different social sectors. In this sense at least the State and civil society

should be included. If both actors do not collaborate, the change cannot be made from a single front.

In conclusion, the author has the conviction that the school can be saved and go beyond what it is, but to accomplish this it must be transformed structurally from its foundations, and this mutation must occur from the numerous places in which it is inserted, being part of a much larger and more complex unjust system that needs to be transformed, always maintaining hope as a reference and a fundamental ontological category.

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