

# THE TRANSHUMANT SUBJECT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE REAL

---

## El sujeto trashumante de la filosofía moderna y las transformaciones de lo real

JAVIER CORONA FERNÁNDEZ\*

Universidad de Guanajuato/ México-Guanajuato

[javiercoronafernandez@gmail.com](mailto:javiercoronafernandez@gmail.com)

Orcid Code: <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9544-0417>

---

### Abstract

This article explores the modern paradigm of the subject that as a traveller goes abroad on a time capsule, crosses over different eras and contexts. Over the time, it has been the theme of reflections of all kinds, which also projects it to an open consideration of the future by declaring its death at the present time or by tossing it back to the past to recall its formative stages. Thus, the objective of the article is to provide an overview of the philosophical category of the subject that marked the ways on thinking about the reality in areas as diverse as knowledge, moral life, historical development, social revolutions, political structures and artistic creation, among other theoretical and practical problems. The article considers two different moments. The first section called “The irruption of the subject in Modernity”, focusses on some of the defining phases at conceptual level and the determining junctures that made it the center of gravity for the philosophy. The second one is entitled “The subject and the transformations of the real.” It outlines the outcome of modern philosophy in the context of the first decades of the twentieth century, when the task that corresponds to the philosophy is set as the sense of reality changes, as well as the canon that made the relation between subject and object to be the axis of thought.

---

### Keywords

Modern philosophy, humanism, idealism.

**Suggested citation:** Corona Fernández, Javier (2018). The transhumant subject of modern philosophy and the transformations of the real. *Sophia, colección de Filosofía de la Educación*, 25(2), pp. 59-85.

---

\* PhD in philosophy from Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Professor of modern and contemporary philosophy. Tenured professor in the Department of Philosophy at Universidad de Guanajuato, Mexico, where he has also held different positions as Chancellor of the Guanajuato Campus. Director of the Division of Social Sciences and Humanities. Director of the Faculty of Philosophy.

### Resumen

Este artículo explora el paradigma moderno del sujeto que atraviesa, como el viajero que aborda la cápsula del tiempo, épocas y contextos distintos. En su larga trayectoria, ha sido tema de reflexiones de todo tipo, que de igual modo lo lanzan a una consideración abierta al futuro, que declaran su muerte en el momento presente o lo regresan al pasado a rememorar sus etapas formativas. El objetivo es mostrar una visión panorámica de la categoría filosófica del sujeto que marcó los modos de pensar la realidad en ámbitos tan diversos como el conocimiento, la vida moral, el devenir histórico, las revoluciones sociales, las estructuras políticas y la creación artística, entre otros problemas teóricos y prácticos. La exposición se desarrolla en dos momentos: el primer apartado, “La irrupción del sujeto en la Modernidad”, plantea algunas de las fases definitorias a nivel conceptual y las coyunturas determinantes que lo convirtieron en el centro de gravedad de la filosofía; la segunda parte lleva por título “El sujeto y las transformaciones de lo real”, que esboza el desenlace de la filosofía moderna en el contexto de las primeras décadas del siglo XX, en donde se diseña la tarea que a la filosofía corresponde al transformarse el sentido de realidad y el canon que hizo de la vinculación entre sujeto y objeto el eje central del pensamiento.

### Palabras claves

Filosofía moderna, humanismo, idealismo.

60



## Introduction

The reflections on the gnoseologic process and the various links between the subject and the object have existed for many centuries, and sometimes it seems that the concepts have been refined and have integrated the theories; in other moments it seems the opposites, that the postures have been radicalized and the convictions blurred, until approaching to the contemporary science, with the evanescent principle of uncertainty like an approach or possible elucidation of the reality. In turn, in the link of the subject with the object within the ethical-normative space, it is firmly believed that in this area is built the identity of the subject, but then it is assumed that after an extended path through the ages, and the passage of a long time of acting with caution and fear, the definition of the accidental and contingency of individual existence has created; finally, in the aesthetic articulation between the subject and the object at the end of traversing the ages in history and knowing what the thinkers have exposed about the beauty as harmony of the symbols is herd the idea that the artistic form is at the same time the sign of chaos. By cracking the unscathed rigidity around the form and the beauty, is also approached to the meaning of social transformation, artistic and cultural creation. Castoriadis (2008) says “The artistic form is at the same time form of the chaos and form that flows directly into the chaos. It is step and opening into the abyss. This shaping chaos is what constitutes the *katharsis* of art” (p. 84).

Thus, in the outcome of these three trajectories that has followed the philosophical reason; the contemporary thought gets to a kind of unfathomable complexity in the subject-object theming and in the senses that run about them. In the dilated becoming of humanity, the resources to know and produce spaces of certainty have led to elaborate different conceptions of the world (object) in the desire to maintain and orient the diverse nuances of the existence (subject). With greater or lesser difficulty and with different scopes, the philosophical arguments around the sphere of knowledge, of the inner life of human and of his/her astonishing creative capacities, are today in the midst of a multiplicity of language game that roll on the ground all the beliefs that arise the modern time.

Indeed, the modern individual started elaborating his/her own narrative by appropriating the prudential knowledge, which according to Aristotelian ethics, explains the meaning of life towards a purpose, which is happiness. However, the apparent caution of the ancient world changed in modernity by an open discernment towards the challenges that the future poses, a variant that constitutes perhaps the most radical transformation undertaken hitherto in the horizon of ethics. Additionally, the perception of the human being with regard to its own nature also suffers a mutation; it is no longer the substantial unit of matter and form that exists in a world ruled by necessity, cosmos in which each sensitive or intelligible substance occupies a certain place; on the contrary, from the Renaissance the ontological condition of the individual is required according to the awareness of his/her accidentality in a world composed of moving matter. In classical Greece, although there is no concept of subject, there is the construction of an identity that is generated in the ethical-normative space. However, beyond this signal, it can be affirmed that the germination moment of the subject is located in the modern era, and agrees with the splendor of philosophy as a cultural form and with the beginning in the economy of a flourishing period that figures its expectations in the attainment of abundance, the organization of society according to the principle of freedom and the personal yearning for happiness.

Modernity will become a hegemonic pattern in the European model to follow, with its optimistic vision that contrasts with the torn world of these days, in which the number of starving people —counted in millions— continues to increase. The system ravages of organization and productivity that have privileged scientific knowledge about the formation of personality, which has promoted the replacement of finalism, the replacement of a creator and almighty God by impersonal systems and processes is presented to humans as the price to be paid in exchange



for a rational explanation that banishes fear and uncertainty. Under this continuous mutation that breaks old schemes, facticity accounts for the positivity and performance demanded in a research. It is a fact that, in the contemporary culture —characterized by the search for efficiency and profitability— philosophy has lost its hegemonic role because is reproached for *its unproductive nature* in the era of innovation and competitiveness; consequently, it has become marginal, and has been even displaced by science. Meanwhile, within the sphere of the willingness that marks the existence humans live a narcissistic individualism, but also have longing for the subject as a self-conscious and creative actor who faces the construction of personal history and bears in parallel several lives and environments.

For its part, the market allows everything but does not fix anything; the metropolis of the 21st century — its best creation — are paradoxically explained by the social vacuum, the power without center, the fluid economy. Among the contradictions of abundance, economists regret that humans live today in a society of exchange and services rather than production. On the political level, coexistence is defined by almost zero participation, despite the fact that sociological discourse insists on talking about social actors. However, if thought of the conceptual elucidation in the contrast of theoretical sites that take place in the midst of the relations between modern philosophy and contemporary reflection, it is seen that the theoretical perspective of complex thought has arisen to understand the new subject-object relationships, surpassing the reductionism of the simplicity principle in the subject and projecting the implication, diversity and constellation in the object. For these reasons, this text aims to show that philosophy cannot make a *tabula rasa* of the past, on the contrary, bringing to the discussion those layers of growing complexity of history must expose the centrality of their training moments and the relationships of the subject with his/her world in a lattice that can only be understood from an intersubjective dimension that remains until today; hence the concept of subject has been analyzed and re-examined, despite its apparent expiration.

Thus, this article recovers certain reflective lines in the relation approach of the subject with an externality that is presented nuanced by the concepts of the cognitive reason, by the expectations of an autonomous willingness or by the plasticity of the symbolic language. It constitutes a historical journey through the discussions that animated the philosophical reflection during the classical modernity, from Descartes and his conception of subject as a substance, to the post-kant notions of

late modernity where subject and object are totalized in the concept of subjectivity. To this end, the essay has been structured in two moments with the intention of approaching the development of the philosophical category of the subject in a panoramic way, and his/her path in a world he/she owns in multiple ways. The first section, “The emergence of the subject in modernity” exposes some of his/her determining phases of training and junctures, in which undertakes his/her own definition in view of the reductionism of the laws by which nature is objective, here are addresses some concepts, ideas and authors that laid the foundations of the modern world; the second entitled “The subject and the transformations of the real” raises the problematic constituted around these terms in the context of the first decades of the twentieth century, all from theoretical constellations that have been paradigmatic in this topic, which outlines the outcome of modern philosophy; it is designed the task that philosophy corresponds to the transformation of the sense of reality and the canon that made the link between subject and object as the central axis of thought. Finally, in the conclusions are proposed some elements that define the contemporary thought, mentioning the critiques of the scientific reason, the fracture of the knowledge theory and the derivation of the society by converting the technology reason in a political basis.



## The emergence of the subject in modernity

*Too far had I entered, flying, in the future:  
A shiver of fright seized me.  
When I looked around, my only contemporary was time.  
then I went backwards, towards the hearth, and today I  
am again with you, men of the present,  
and in the country of civilization (Nietzsche, 1983, p. 160).*

The philosophical category of the subject is mainly formed in the modern era. However, despite its long journey through the centuries, today it does not cease to arouse reflections from very varied approaches, which makes it appear among the philosophical problems of more scope since its initial formulation. Even though, it has been tried to be annulled by being considered an incurrent subject or a concept pertaining to a long dead stage, it is clear that contemporary thinking cannot obviate its presence and treatment, whether by performing studies that gravitate around the historical aspects that outline the subject’s configuration as an irreplaceable element in the formation of the present; that the classical

figure of the metaphysical subject be debated and criticized as substrate and foundation of all knowable; that it is discussed about the perceptive subject facing a wide range of stimuli from the most succulent rudeness to the subtle expressions of avant-garde art, or the initiatives germinated in a moral and political being in moments of social disintegration and generalized crisis as those marks in the beginnings of the 21st century. In all the constellations, it is undeniable the relevance of a modernity paradigm like this, which has given rise to multiple questions about consciousness and its relationship with reality.

Even though it is not difficult to accept this obvious main role of the concept of subject, at the same time it is not easy to sketch in a few lines the reasons why this presence has originated and its treatment in this time, since there are many discursive aspects that originate from this platform. As a starting point for this analysis, is the conviction that modernity is identified with the spirit of free research that collides with the regulations of the power apparatus, an impossible struggle to carry out without the intervention of a being that exerts a principle of activity from itself.

But modernity is also a historical moment which in the dialectics of social forces inaugurates the protagonism of the state and the individualism that drives industrialization. Under the sign of a regulation of knowledge from an episteme validated by the new developments of the mathematical science, the concept of subject creates the conception of the universe which is structured beginning with a mechanistic scheme, which removes mysteries and reduces the explanation from nature to quantitative criteria. At the same time, with modernity emerges art as an autonomous sphere of culture and, at the level of practical reason, the idea of autonomy, freedom of belief and the right to private life as a safeguard to social controls set up a germination moment of values and senses for human existence. Modernity is also a rupture of traditions and beliefs, which brings with it the gradual abandonment of particular attitudes and the opening of the universalism of the age of reason, where the education of the subject has a link with the conceptualization of a world governed by rational laws that are fully intelligible to thought.

## Classical modernity

In the itinerary of modern philosophy it is feasible to distinguish the great themes that characterize it and the moment of its emergence in a plain and summarized division in two periods: *classical modernity*, which

corresponds to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and *late modernity*, spanning the nineteenth century, Friedman (1986). According to this concise characterization, modern classical philosophy poses an optimistic thought structured according to the idea of progress, which at the same time emerges as a basic category that explains the progress of civilization in history, as the Gradual maturation of the human race and the harmonious movement of the world

At this juncture of early modernity, philosophy formulates its conviction that reason governs the world; consequently, the civilization lies in the development of the reason, which has in the scientific investigation the device that discovers the natural laws that govern the nature, including the principles that make possible the social contract. Under this systemic universe, the place of the human being is another determining factor for the sense of reality that is being scarcely enunciated, since the propensity to take as a foundation a transcendent and mysterious entity is abandoned, originating the immanent humanism, which takes as reference the sense of the Earth. Israel (2012), in its deep study *The radical illustration*, realizes the tone that followed the political and intellectual revolutions that occurred in this general context called modernity, and it does so following the Spinoza philosophy:

Everything that happens necessarily happens; there is no “contingent thing” and nothing can be in a different way than it actually is. Therefore, there are no miracles or divine commandments. “Good” and “evil” are not absolute moral values and do not exist in nature, but are purely relative notions concerning humans. Spinoza promulgates his “geometric” doctrine of passions and exposes his theory that knowledge is based on sensations and builds upon perceptions of what is true and what is false, through proportions and mathematical relationships, so if we make mistakes and often believe things that are not true, we cannot believe so erroneously that the truth cannot be demonstrated [...] The eternal and unwavering link between ideas and reality is such that all our notions are true in some sense, so that they are adequate and inadequate rather than strictly true or false. Spinoza introduces the apparent paradox that human is necessarily determined, however, possesses freedom through reason, which is intrinsic to his/her *conatus*, or struggles to preserve his/her being. Finally, the existence of separate body spirits and apparitions, including Satan and demons, is categorically ruled out (p. 211).

As a free subject, human has the power to be in charge of himself/herself; according to this idea, the task of civilization is that human gets an age when he/she can drive his/her life rationally. Modernity is first and

foremost emancipation; here the concept of person came to specify the image of a subject who recognizes himself/herself as a future that faces freedom as his/her full realization. In the meantime, science education forms it in the learning of rational thinking, with the ability to resist or overcome the natural inclinations—as it cannot be nullified—and to the routine habit that often loses it in an abyss of disconcerts.

In the mentality of rupture is found one of the main channels that have given continuity to the subject as a matter of reflection that, over the time, registers renewed reaches, which come to circumscribe the character of what delimits the human experience in this context. A validity element is the esteemed faculty of self-management, since here lies the configuration of a subject in a world in which the subject is responsible for himself/herself and in front of society, which is not only seen for the human as the scenario of his/her personal fulfillment, but mainly as the framework in which objective reality becomes meaningful. Charles Taylor (1996), who has deeply studied the conformation of the self and his / her identity, says:

The idea that emerged at the end of the eighteenth century is that each individual is different and original, and that this originality determines how to live. Of course, the notion of the original difference is not new. Nothing is more obvious or more banal. The new thing is that it really makes a difference about how we are called to live. Differences are not simple variations without importance within the same basic human nature, nor do moral differences between good or bad individuals. Rather, they imply that each of us has an original path that must be lived; they impose on each one of us the obligation to live according to our originality (p. 396).

However, if in the volitional aspect the idea of originality in the subject is the one that gains ground, in terms of knowledge it is defined by the separation of the subject and the object and by a common trait that pervades the different positions in debate—beyond the way in which is raised the gnoseologic mechanism—rationality is the flagship faculty that articulates the problem of knowledge. Indeed, it could be say that the philosophy of the classical modernity is in principle rationalist, because an apparently position as discordant as empiricism maintains that same attitude because it considers history and culture as progressive developments of reason; power that has eradicated the subjugation of the human being to external forces that until then guided their destiny. The difference between rationalism and empiricism lies in its position on the source of knowledge and the role and importance played by intelligence

and sensitivity, respectively; but in both directions, the characteristic of modernity is concentrated in science as a paradigm of rationality, as a cultural formation that allows the material and moral liberation of human in the history, which is conceived no longer as a fall derived from error, but as an open project towards the future, in which the category of progress gives meaning to human life, where there is no place for the feeling of guilt for the supposed expulsion of paradise.

Science has shaped itself to be the progress paradigm of the reason and also the paradigm of the knowledge; this positioning is achieved because the modern science breaks with the medieval dichotomy of revealed truth and human discourse; as opposed to the metaphysical essentialism of the Aristotelian system that for centuries tried the hegemony of thinking, modern science is homogeneous, quantitative, it does not seek to know what is real, but how it behaves. There is a new logic in which the revealed truth is replaced by the discursive truth. The veracity of modern science does not base its congruence on the prestige and recognition of those who support it, it is not linked to the influence of the one who enunciates it; therefore, it is not a *dictum*, nor does it rely on the principle of authority as does medieval science. So the modern scientific discourse perceives as truth the method, not the power.

Thus, both Descartes (1981) and Hume (1994) agree by proposing that knowledge will only be true if it results from a method, that is, if statements can be controlled independently of the subject that formulates them. What makes knowledge scientific is that a set of rules is available to account for a certain outcome. Knowledge is *de-hierarchical*, rather it consists of a methodical proceeding where the reasonable is not the true, but what can justify its proceeding. There is a new subjectivity that is outside the medieval values that to access to revealed truth demanded certain qualities (high spirituality, exemplary moral life, etc.).

In the counterpart, the modern science universalizes the knowledge and delineates with all forcefulness the separation of subject and object in the cognitive explanation. Metaphysics Aristotelian-Thomistic, which linked the sense of reality and oriented knowledge, is replaced by a new paradigm: the prototypical discipline is now physics. This created a model of science that is going to extend to all areas of life. Reality consists of a set of phenomena explained by the laws of the movement. At this time the scientific reason is mechanistic, strengthened by the new developments of the mathematics that abandons the metaphysical essentialism of the preceding formation.

Due to this objectification device of reality, the representation of human as a developed being in the society consists in the certainty that any individual can represent the *Human* archetype, regardless of his/her particular circumstances. The discovery of a homogeneous dimension of reality means that the idea that human nature is universal is applied. With the disenchantment of the world, enlightened philosophers say that science is not the only safe path to knowledge, but, by virtue of this access potentiality to the truth that has been attributed to scientific knowledge, the emancipation path that allows human to constitute himself/herself as such is also there.

## Late modernity

68



But the modern time was not only defined by the success obtained in the instrumental reason, or by the increasing domination of the nature thanks to the rise of the science and the technique; parallel to those skills, the human subject emerged as a creation, as an existential initiative of a subjectivity that opens the horizon to understand history, whose moment of maturation takes place in the second stage of modernity, which is defined here as late modernity and which occurred during the nineteenth century. According to Eduardo Álvarez (2007), its profile can be described as:

[...] Modernity must be understood as a form of western culture that develops a new model of understanding the human beings: the model of the subject. Its fundamental philosophical principle, as stated by Hegel, is «the free thought that lies on itself»: the autonomy of the thought as activity of a subject which is not willing to accept another criterion of truth and another norm of validity other than those emanating from the sovereign power of his/her conscience. According to this idea, experience is a subject-object relationship in which modern philosophy has distinguished by the way —repeating the terms used by Habermas— two fundamental forms: on the one hand, the one that corresponds to the cognoscente subject (cognitive experience) and gives rise to the philosophy of reflection, which privileges knowledge according to the model of self-consciousness; and on the other, the one that corresponds to the agent subject (practical-technical experience) and originates the philosophy of praxis in a broad sense, which privileges the action that refers to the others and the world in general according to the model of externalization. In both cases the activity of the subject is assumed as an original principle that operates on the reality to own it or to recreate it (pp. 9-10).

Throughout the study, it is usually accepted that modern philosophy has different characteristics, but are attributed to a similar and complementary orientation. However, in the deployment of the subjectivity that distinguishes it, there is also a place for self-criticism that, beyond visible achievements, warns in modernity a bleak side, a background of barbarism marked by the eagerness of dominion that animates the enlightened breath.

In principle, late modernity opposes to the optimistic vision of enlightened thought, a pessimistic stance that emphasizes the negative effects of the development of reason and puts in the view the outcome of the French Revolution, terror, forms of exploitation and the new slavery, which are the jewels that crown a society inundated equally with gold and greed. Philosophical thinking cannot close human eyes to violence and the shock that permeates social life at a time in history in which, ironically, freedom, equality and fraternity are promoted, and the ideals of a seemingly fair cause. In the theoretical plane, there is a shift of perspective, as against the current of the philosophical systems of the previous stage, in the spirit that exposes Kant work (2013), philosophy is shown as a critical function, not as a founding knowledge of the principles, values and categories that systematize their discourse.

Kant modifies the philosophy task, leaves aside the foundation work and pointed out to itself as a critical function with regard to the knowledge and the specialized science, and also as valuation of the reason development in the social aspect. A new humanism arises, which explains the human as an entity that, by being natural and rational—that is, biological and cultural—has an ontological position that, while tying its corporeity to the laws of nature, places him/her in a specific condition of autonomy, as a being that can start from himself/herself a new causality and think life as an end, as a sense that crystallizes in time. In the late modernity is opened a new horizon of understanding of human reality, which has in history the stage of his/her realization and where rationality is conceived not only with an optimistic and edifying trait, but from the negativity that originates social life. Following the approaches of Theodor Adorno (1983), with the Kantian system a concept has derived from the reflection:

The theory of knowledge must be the theory of that unifying and active principle, in which subject and object separate and unite again, me and not me. That is why such a theory of knowledge does not have the pretense of simply ruling on the validity of isolated scientific judgments, but intends to be the doctrine of the absolute, precisely because everything is assumed and because it is the absolute identity, outside there

is nothing. In Kant this is intentional and negative, because the reason criticizes itself and, therefore, reflects on itself. This reflection is in the *criticism method of the pure reason...* (p. 67).

If it is accepted that the classical modern reason is mechanistic and deterministic, then in some sense it is also ahistorical, since the natural laws formulated by Newton (1997) are conceived as something constant that is verified in an absolute space and time. However, late modernity surpasses such reductionism. The German idealism transcends the mechanism illustrated and carries out the critique of the reason in front of itself, and does it by discerning that, in front of the natural reality, which is quantitative, there is a human reality that is irreducible to natural laws. The German idealism showed the nature of the subject by postulating that human should be understood as a historical being, as a concrete individual who has no universal certainty whatsoever; on the contrary, in the becoming of his/her existence all the convictions that abridges are created step by step, at every moment of his/her life. In the introspective analysis of this self that has declared the death of the gods and the disenchantment of the world, the subject does not have a given nature in advance, but it is formed from the negativity. History is no longer governed by the maxim of progress, which leads to metamorphosis, negativity and destruction. The principle of mutation that animates its course is problematic, here the transformation is not necessarily progress; therefore, the trace of continuous improvement has been diluted. Prosperity and upward impulse are no more the tendencies that once filled humans with optimism. In the course of history nothing is resolved or concluded, but neither unfinished or incomplete; in this aspect the being essentially is tendency, becoming. Similarly, if accepted that self-consciousness or reason is historical, it should be noted that it is dialectical, contradictory, in permanent transformation; this means that the subject is of his/her negativity and dynamism. But the negativity is not only referred to the history, it is also a quality of the conscience that Königsberg exposed in the *Critique of the pure reason*, specifically in the *synthetic judgement*, in which is given a peculiar relation between subject and object.

As known, the function of understanding is to carry out the mediation of the multiplicity of material that is given in sensible intuition, and then elevate it to the universality of the categories. Here negativity is nothing but the subject. The *I think that*, when accompanying each of the representations, is the possibility condition of the synthesis of all of them; thus, it is the transcendental unity of consciousness that thinks such diversity. In this way is seen the subjectivation process of the object, since

this is a representation in the subject as he/she intuitively and conceptualizes. The transcendental Kantian idealism is precisely this moment in which the *self* moves in the abstract element of thought and from there configures the cognitive map of the experience. The next moment consisted in showing the ontological display of consciousness in the world and not just its cognitive constitution. At this stage of its development, the German idealism proposed the abandonment of the abstract identity of the thought, since the idealism objective had to go through the phase of the non-identity and to overcome it, then to project the profiles of a categorical knowledge in the face of the thinking possibilities of absolute identity. However, before that result, the philosophical reason had to problematize the non-self and open the door of the history, which is the door to the intersubjectivity.

Fichte (1975) considers in principle that the previous philosophy—the one of the philosophical systems of classical modernity—had fallen into the illusion of basing science, making it the only model of rationality. With such guidance, philosophy became complicit in the objectification of human reality and, by overpowering natural science, made human life seen as a natural phenomenon and human as a more object of physics. To face this, philosophy would have to develop a science according to the human condition. That is precisely Fichte's intention in the doctrine of science, in which he affirms that the self is the absolute form of reflection, the foundation and root of all knowledge. So, if all knowledge is followed from this deep root which is the spirit, the absolute self or the self-consciousness do not develop the mechanistic rationality of the nature, but instead a rationality of the human. In Fichte's appreciation, human's knowledge is separated from the knowledge of nature by a radical ontological distinction; human is not in nature, but as an individual, he/she recognizes nature in him/her. A new humanism is created, characterized by assuming an anti-enlightenment posture. Fichte's thought penetrated the reaches and faculties of the active power of the self and, from there he proposed to carry out the logical-ontological deduction of the reality in the act of a subjectivity which transcends the objects of the experience, at the same time that makes this experience possible.

Late modernity is the period in which is formulated the profile that defines the human, the individual and the fully constituted subject. According to Touraine (1994) the semantic deployment of this concept begins its long journey here:

The individual is only the particular unit where life and thought, experience and consciousness are mixed. The subject means the passage

from it to the self, means the control exerted on the experience so that there is a personal sense, so that the individual becomes an actor that is inserted in social relations to which it transforms, but without identifying itself completely with some group, with some collectivity. Since the actor is not the one who works according to the place he/she occupies in the social organization, but the one that modifies the material and above all social environment, in which is placed when transforming the division of labor, the decision criteria, the domination relations or cultural orientations (pp. 207-208).

Within the conceptual constellation of German idealism, when Hegel (1988) considers negativity in the aspect of the inmanement of being, he carries out a resignification of the problem of the absolute and does so not from a petrified, positive identity, undifferentiated and immediate, but from a subject-object relationship that is a constant moving identity, which must be understood as differentiation, mediation and negativity. It is the self that has become in humans as unity of diversity in the plot of the moments lived. A new category and a new panorama of comprehension loom in the idealistic philosophy forged by Hegel by introducing the theme of the full overcoming of the subject-object duality as a result of an experimentation of moments depending on the implications that bring with it a new location: *life*. In fact, the certainty that the reality of consciousness cannot be placed beyond time is the assumption that its being is its experience, not its isolation. This introspective turn allows abandoning the dualism and the withdrawal of the subject in its abstract ideality; now it has turned to the world, its reality is not limited to what is structured in the limits of individuality, but self-consciousness is time as it has become what it *is* from its own potentiality. If human's ontological condition is different from that of any other being, this is due to his/her practical activity. The experience of the real has two moments: one alludes to the cyclical nature governed by the chronology; the other is linked to the spirit world, which is essentially temporality. The latter is the world of human reality, which is defined as a real, lived rationality, which is being formed historically. In the existence of the human race *nature* is made history. As a result, human reason also has a historical determination.

The elements of this coming reality —from this merger of subject and object— are found in the formative deployment of consciousness, whose stages, as Ernst Bloch suggests (1983) find their vanishing and returning points in that fascinating work of Hegel which is the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*.

Three reasons of social and ideological origin converge in phenomenology (published in 1807). The first is the *revolutionary self*, taken from the French Revolution, which emerged in measure of all things. The second, the reason for the *mathematical sovereign creation* of the content of knowledge; from Galileo, Hobbes and Descartes to Kant, this was the pride of a rigorous and methodologically pure scientificity. Finally —as opposed to the previous two— the reason for the incipient *historical school* (p. 60).

The Hegelian philosophy surpasses the division between subject and object once it has assimilated such caesura as a phase in the development of consciousness, as a necessary formative moment that allowed to deepen in the investigation on the natural world and, at the same time, it gave rise to the maturation of consciousness by raising the search for truth in the world, conceptualized as a *No-Self*. However, for Hegel, such division is unsustainable, since concept and world merge in the same reality called subject, self-awareness and spirit. Hegel rejects the postures that take the absolute as if it were an unknowable reality, an unquestionable starting point or a totality captured by intuition. Hegelian approach is a spiral that preserves the previous formative moments, but surpasses them by delineating the phases in the formation of the concept, from otherness to self-consciousness. Following Bloch (1983) approach, the truth of a thought, of a theory or of the whole science has a supraindividual nature:

Hegel, in phenomenology, remains constantly faithful to the subject's starting point: it is the individual consciousness, the historical consciousness of humanity and the spirit of the world at the same time. It develops in contact with the objects, makes them theirs, is alienated and rectified in them, and in them it manifests and reveals in the growth process. Where, in the end, the subject no longer behaves before the objective as something strange to him/her (p. 61).

The voyage of consciousness has reached the present time, but in the finding of its collective identity there is no room for isolation, the life of consciousness has to overturn itself on the materiality where the conditions of realization are found, that by being intersubjective, are also intercausal.

After Hegel's vast influence on the German philosophical culture, a reaction is aroused against him from different ways. This moment of the second half of the nineteenth century is crossed by currents of thought that assume the end of the metaphysical systems and channel the investigation from scientific criteria that emerge from disrupted societies by a nascent economic structure that ultimately left behind the bucolic world and is prepared to live the conflicts of the metropolis. The trans-

formations of the real go in escalation. It is now suggested that it is the concrete reality—not the absolute spirit—the dimension that summons the turning points for any theoretical elaboration or conception of praxis. Negativity and the development of subjectivity are placed on other bases; one of them is precisely in Marxism, which affirms the productive characteristic of the human being, the creative subject, the *homo faber*. According to this assessment, human does not adapt to the medium, but adapts the environment to himself/herself. In the subversion that Marx approach (1984) outlines in relation to idealistic thinking, human, as a generic being, self-produces from his/her own activity, transforms nature by transforming himself/herself. The concept of subject has released the entire string of its reel; the world that explains subjectivity comes to be the base on the explanatory basis of human behavior that is governed by the consciousness, generated in the exchange with nature that allows productive work. In fact, everything that the human being has achieved over the time in the deployment of his/her practical activity—which is essentially transformative—explains the development of the subject as the actor who occupies the center of the political scene, precisely because of the invocation to freedom and the impulse of rationality conceived for the flourishing of life itself. In this sense, Plamenatz (1986) groups the configuring lines of the subject that has reached certainty about his/her own reality and defines the human being as follows:

Human is his/her own instrument, and for this reason is also his/her own end. Because human knows he/she has skills and uses them deliberately, human has control of himself/herself, he/she is his/her own master. Not only does human use his /her skills but have also acquired skills deliberately; has made himself/herself the kind of person he/she needs and wants to achieve. Human is a producer of things in a sense that other animals are not, and is also a maker of himself/herself, as other animals are not (p. 104).

Marx can enunciate the materiality of a transformative and creative activity of new conditions, because the idealistic thinkers of the classical German philosophy had made of the self-consciousness the touchstone of their systems, but Marx formulates a radical demarcation to the conclusions of idealistic systems. In the context in which Marx lives, biology as emerging science, will situate things in parameters of unprecedented explanation, which accounts for the development of life as a core category in both nature and society. Darwin's systematic exposure of (1981) found in *The origin of the species by the natural selection*, was followed by

the acceptance of the evolution as a fact, both within the scientific community and in much of what is called public opinion. A complementary exhibition to the one undertaken by Darwin is found in the text of Engels (1977) on *the origin of the family, private property and the state*. With the new perspective on nature and society, the definition of the human and the subjectivity that has allowed him/her to make the story of his/her own history, they also had an important turn. In this way, the first thing to affirm is the existence of real human beings who develop the faculties of their spirituality thanks to the plasticity of their corporeal condition, which is extraordinarily expressive and unique in an individual, but as agents of this expressiveness, individuals have been formed into a large network of social implications in which they are also their creators, “The subject is the willingness of an individual to act and to be recognized as an actor” (Touraine, 1994, p. 207).

According to this, modern philosophy is the past and present of the subject category. It is throughout its classical texts in which it has raised and resolved its initial confrontation and subsequent synthesis with the object in the most winding edges of thought, from ontology to gnoseology, from logic to epistemology, from morality to art, from politics to culture, from nature to society in its details and in its more general concepts. The possibility of doing on all these aspects is given by the experienced Auriga, the transhuman form embodied in each individual, who in various fields works according to his/her will, and openly defines himself/herself as a subject, as a being formed in practice and in reflection, which is also the custodian of the talents forged by the various civilizations in its historical development, which has shown in the recount of its training phases in the world.

However, at the end of the nineteenth century the critical language of philosophy recognizes the costs to be paid for the effects of civilization processes. In late modernity philosophy opens a new facet that is closer to the human condition in its daily becoming, a barely explored dimension that coincides with the beginning of the social crises of capitalism. After dominating nature, science has been destined to dominate man. The new humanism of late modernity begins to see the dark side of rationalization that is intolerant and repressive in the face of everything that resists the “triumph of reason”, productivity, order and progress. Indeed, the work has undergone a radical transformation: it is not more the creative activity that would allow personal growth, but a highly profitable instrument of production that in turn has become merchandise. In the critical diagnosis of this reflective posture, a consumer society has emerged that



is indifferent to the deterioration that produces progress, both in nature and in society.

## The subject and the transformations of the real

There is an old illusion that is called good and evil. The wheel of that illusion has turned, until today, around soothsayers and astrologers.

In another time it *was believed* in soothsayers and astrologers: So it was believed that everything was fatality: «You must, since you cannot avoid it!» But then illusion distrusted with astrologers and soothsayers, and then it *was believed* that all was freedom: «You can do it because you want to do it!»

Oh, brothers! About what the stars are and the future, there have only been illusions, but not knowing! And *so on* good and evil there have been but illusions, but not knowing! (Nietzsche, 1983, p. 247).

76  


Philosophy in the twentieth century begins with a traumatic situation. All the currents and schools that arrive strengthened or shaky at the turn of the century face a limit situation: the Crisis of metaphysics and the reflective possibilities that philosophy has in the face of the descriptive power of science. In this scenario, the category of subject will receive interpretations, modifications and critiques of its definition and conceptual structure, to its historical-philosophical status. There is a system crisis, so philosophy has become incidental, contextual. To the extent that philosophy leaves metaphysics behind, it cannot continue to make systems. In the twentieth century, there are two main aspects that can be identified by the position they keep with respect to philosophy and their inheritance: the first one proposes to rethink the whole of the philosophical problems; the second is dedicated to dismantling all their problems. Depending on the direction chosen, philosophical thinking is located in two contexts: the anti-metaphysical twist in the first half of the twentieth century and the linguistic turn in the second half. In this scenario there is no philosophy but philosophical projects, its research trajectory is not unambiguous.

The anti-metaphysical twist is a widespread trend in which, from different positions, all the philosophy of the twentieth century is declared contrary to the philosophical system elaborated in the forging of the German idealism. But it should be pointed out that this does not necessarily mean that the whole perspective of reflection is renounced. Another important feature is the great diversity of currents of thought and research that converge here, and the incommensurability that keep the different

philosophical positions and languages with each other. For the phenomenologist, the neopositivism is a logical structural administration of science; thus, implanting a new absolute in the logic and the investigation lies in a metaphysical posture. For the neopositivists, phenomenology seeks in the background to vindicate metaphysics by retaking transcendental subjectivity and seeking access to essences. For its part, for Marxism, the antimetaphysical is praxis, an instance where the scope and consequences of a theory are verified. Positivism, Marxism and phenomenology are among the most outstanding currents of thought, as protagonists of the antimetaphysical turn of the second half of the nineteenth century, which extends until the first decades of the twentieth; movement that in principle questions the subject's proposal as an absolute entity.

Just as Marx did in reorienting research on human reality in times of scientific rationality, Husserl (1984), for his part, believes that philosophy has reached a dead end: it cannot remain metaphysical in the sense of developing a system of the absolute; on the other hand, the traits of scientificism are not a better alternative. Scientificism conceives Knowledge as the development of science based on causal and expressible quantitative explanations.

In the face of it, the phenomenological posture proposes that philosophy should not promote science, but to counteract the absolutization in which it has fallen. What is required is to develop a new discourse that allows understanding that philosophy must deal with discerning how the world is opened to human. Contemporary philosophy proposes to rethink the problem of the real, to replace the metaphysical by the ontological, to try a new monism that surpasses the series of dualistic proposals that have polarized, in the terms of subject and object, understanding the most urgent problem for the human race: the problem of sense and the lack of sense of its existence. This reflection cannot be done more from a conceptual framework that always prepares the escape towards the transcendence of the absolute. On the contrary, when returning to the things themselves, thought is immersed in the world of life as a whole. Phenomenology recovers philosophical problems from an immanent perspective. The posture that recovers the philosophical tradition is presented and proposes a resignification of concepts and categories, but with a different location; this is what creates phenomenology.

Indeed, for Husserl philosophy is ontology, comprehension of the real, unlike the proposal which is pronounced by dismantling the problems of philosophy reducing with a matter of language—which for phenomenologists it represents the end of philosophy—; for Husserl philosophy is reoriented and assumes a firm position, evaluating the historical

moment in which it is registered. While science provides knowledge, philosophy does not. Philosophy is strictly reflective, and this characteristic is the one that leads to make a distinction between the typical tasks of each one of the theoretical disciplines: an activity is to think and another work is to know. The work of philosophy is to think of the problem of the real. It is not about questioning: what is the world or what is human, what is the subject and the object; with such a question is being assumed that this or that is something, one thing. The question is what is reality? It is the following answer: Reality is... such a thing. For Husserl, this is a wrong question. For him, the problem of the real or human or the world cannot be taken as a thing. For the founder of phenomenology, in philosophy the question is not to define what are the subject and the object, but to reflect how the world opens to humans. The world of life is conceived as a multiple event, quite the opposite of what metaphysics has traditionally done by converting the problem of the real into the question about an entity, which is a mistake. When thinking about the real, the idea is not to turn this into a question about a thing, a substance or an entity. The world and humans do not exist as such; what exists, the real, is the event. The event consists in the fact that the world presents to the human, and the human and the world are elements of the event. The world is then the temporal event. This may seem new because reality is normally seen as if it were a combination of entities or things in the background or outcome of the world. Husserl seeks a transformation of philosophy which recovers its basic problems, but by placing them beyond metaphysics, that is, avoiding the postulation of absolutes or dualistic schemes. A trait of metaphysical conceptions is its dualism, since they pose bipolar and dichotomous relationship, in which a part is the founding element (subject) and the other part is conceived as a founded dimension (object). In the phenomenological proposal, philosophy is human perspective, it participates in the destiny of the human; therefore, it is immanent, not transcendent like religion, nor of facts like science. The work of philosophy is inscribed in the world of life; there is no need of administering the absolutes and embrace the earthy leaving aside metaphysics.

In the counterpart, from the second half of the twentieth century a different trend arose, another direction equally leading which was defined as a linguistic turn, consisting of a clear pronouncement favorable to the deconstructivism of the philosophical problems and its tradition. The inclination that characterizes this site is that it considers that the problem of the real, of the subject and the object is a false problem, because it derives from an inappropriate use of the language. What is conducive is

to dismantle the problem of the real and to show that metaphysics is only a symptom of the situation that human occupies in each case. Metaphysics does not provide truths and, however, has remained in the theoretical discussion over the centuries; Wittgenstein (1997) observes this voyage and formulates a question that is answered as follow:

Why is philosophy so complicated? After all, it should be *entirely simple*. Philosophy detangles the knots of our thinking that we have generated in an absurd way; but to achieve that, philosophy must make movements that are as complicated as knots. Therefore, although the *result* of philosophy is simple, its reaching method cannot be. The complexity of philosophy lies not in its theme, but in our tangled understanding (p. 42).

For Wittgenstein (1975) the task of philosophy is to undertake the logical analysis of all languages. Consequently, philosophy is not knowledge it is rather an activity whose function lies in examining in what logical conditions a statement makes or does not make sense. The problems faced by the theory are seen from language. Thus, in the language the problems of philosophy will be aired, since all of them are questions that in the background refer to the language. For Wittgenstein, the limits of the world are the limits of the language that seeks to access it. The problem of being can only be raised within the language. In a perspective defined as neopositivism — which sought to follow the line of the Tractatus author—, what it is all about is to base knowledge on rigorously empirical bases through a unified language. In the line of the typical verificationism of this guideline, a proposition is meaningful if it can be justified empirically or formally. There is in this position of discourse an open rejection of metaphysics as a set of meaningless propositions; the alternative proposal is, on the other hand, the use of analytical techniques from mathematical logic.

In the twentieth century, new logics emerge that are not Aristotelian, because they are not founded on reasoning, but in mathematical science. The monolithic definitions of subject and object have no longer fit. Language, like mathematics, is a set of signs that are articulated by certain rules. But this is not entirely new, in the seventeenth century Leibniz (1992) conceives a combinatorial art where he formulates a mathematical logic, arguing that the words can be applied in the same scheme as the numbers; it is not the scheme of reasoning, but the scheme of propositions. The assertion then is to accept that a statement is equal to a mathematical proposition; therefore, Leibniz exhorts to think of the statements as relationships between quantities to obtain an alphabet of



human thought that, through permutations and combinations, any word can be acquired and from simple concepts and fundamental to reach all the truths derived from those relationships. Following the same trajectory opened by Leibniz, another factor that propitiates this transformation in the contemporary thought is the development of the symbolic logic, which pursues a universal syntax, a unified language. All scientific statements could be understood and translated from this universal logical syntax. Language ceases to be an instrument of thought; it ceases to be a means, to occupy now the central position: the thought is linguistic.

According to this approach, the elaboration process of an idea is already linguistic. Therefore, language is the intelligibility condition of the real. Gestures and attitudes are language; even the genetic code is a structure that is read and interpreted as a linguistic dimension. Then, language is not a mere epiphenomenon, but a horizon of so broad significance that consists of multiple edges, one of them, which matters most to this analytical orientation is that of knowledge, for which a statement is cognitively significant if it has a method of empirical verification, or if it is analytical. Only the statements of empirical science meet the first requirement, and only the statements of logic and mathematics comply with the second. The typically philosophical statements do not meet either of the two requirements, so philosophy, must go from being a supposed body of propositions to a method of logical analysis of science enunciations.

But if the analysis of language radically modified the meaning attributed to the concepts of subject and object, the tangible and measurable world was also blurred in an abstract discourse that the knowledge of what *is*, of the real, does not drive to the threshold of what it should be. If philosophy requires a timely clarification of its concepts, such a measure could not be entirely conclusive. Wittgenstein also accepted that the meaning of some propositions can only be understood from the language games that refer to the most concrete: the forms of life that give them sustenance, because in the end the language is the space where the human is carried out. The objective knowledge of the real has its scopes, but also its limits, this makes philosophy a form of fundamental thinking for a culture and a time of crisis. No doubt science has allowed access to the objective knowledge for the achievement of certain ends, but in the words of Einstein (1983), the meaning of existence goes another way:

Objective knowledge gives us powerful tools to achieve certain ends, but the ultimate goal itself and the yearning to achieve it must come from another source. And I do not think it is necessary to even defend the thesis that our existence and our activity only acquire meaning by

the persecution of such a goal and corresponding values. Knowing the truth is wonderful, but its usefulness as a guide is so scarce that it cannot even prove the justification and the value of aspiration towards that very knowledge of the truth. We are confronted here, therefore, with the limits of the purely rational conception of our existence (pp. 230-231).

Seconding this perspective of a man like Einstein, who lived directly the devastating power of nuclear energy, it is clear that in understanding the social and political problems of this time, the scientific reason critique occupies a central place by signaling not only the limit of rational conception with regard to human becoming, but the irrational outcome of scientific knowledge as an aberrant mixture of understanding and oppression. This originated the expression of mistrust about the true contributions of scientific work, but also opened the door to summary trials that made it guilty of all the ills that humanity has suffered since the first decades of the twentieth century. However, in a position free from prejudice, it would not be a question of being against the science or the technique in themselves as if they were autonomous entities; on the contrary, in the questioning of the instrumentalization of the reason what is intended is to redefine its use and to take the discussion to the critique processes of the societies themselves.



## Conclusions

Beyond the asymmetric profiles seen in the debate between the conservation and resignification of the main questions of classical philosophy on the one hand, and the liquidationist opinion on the other -in which was either announced the end of all the ideals of culture, or it was proposed the analytical reduction of the statements to determine those that make or do not make any sense— humans are at a stage that stands above the so-announced end of history, the death of art or summary judgment about the cancellation of philosophy and its problems. To affirm the foregoing, an unmistakable signal is presented: after the dismantling of the metaphysics of the subject and the unsuccessful search for alternatives to replace it, the philosophical reflection is presented in its best forms than never, and this is obvious to the extent that the theoretical possibilities to represent the phenomena of the contemporary world have not been able to get rid of the conceptual device that philosophy has generated, and the prerogatives that a perspective of totality bestows. But philosophy is still current for

another reason, because it has not been realized, because the postulates for the emancipation of the human being are still a pending task.

The old dichotomies in which the understanding of the world has been outlined, namely: Subject-object, essence-existence, matter-spirit, or more recently, theory-praxis, require a kind of reasoning that can understand the tension and codependency involving each of these polarities. It is required a form of critical thinking that does not conform to proposing the transfer or subordination of one term to another and vice versa, but that can raise the qualitative leap both in the light of an idea that understands the complexity that the opposition represents in the dialectic development of philosophy. So the contradictions are conceived not as mere antagonism, but within a dynamic field of forces that transforms and nourishes the determinations of an intersubjective constellation that expands within the framework a certain historical moment.

In this line of analysis, the broad spectrum of scientific knowledge and technological development that has been achieved in today's societies, places humans on the fringes of opulence and extreme poverty, which evidences the limits of a purely rational existence, so that once again the ontology of the present demands the critical exercise of reasoning to thread the fragments of a life destroyed by the maelstrom of production and excessive consumption, by the devastation of nature and the obliteration of individual existence.

Instrumental rationality in imperial dominion has made science no longer seen as the source of truth as it was defined in modern thought, now it is something different: scientific research is essentially a dynamic event with high energies that have knocked down the ancient certainties and shown the destructive capacity they possess; the old science that studies matter and bodies is no longer able to formulate the most urgent questions to a possible experience and, for its part, nature is also not obliged to answer them. But there is also a basic questioning; science has neglected the most urgent problems of humanity, those who interrogate the sense of existence as such. Thus, to the extent that the critique of scientific knowledge and its devastating effects is developed, the idea that the error that has propitiated this civilizational drift is realized is to have enthroned knowledge as the aspect of greater cultural significance, marginalizing other spheres of human experience.

This means that knowledge is not alien to the interests that deprive at a certain time, the difference is that this phenomenon of interweaving between knowledge and power is seen as an outcome that can be traced genealogically throughout its different moments, and was done do from



a micrological device that at the same time unmasks it, Foucault (1992). Knowledge=Power is the new equation that finances scientific research on uranium, there is nothing more to say: In the monopoly on nuclear reactors, the scientific research at the end of the 21st century is encrypted. Who can obtain uranium and enrich it, has in their hands plutonium, perhaps the binomial that today makes that object of knowledge the most useful and dangerous of all. Pedro Bravo (2012) makes an interesting note on the subject:

Knowledge is not neutral to historical, political, and economic formations. Recognizing the possibility conditions that have been organized from the hegemonic power does not imply a relativistic or skeptical abandonment with respect to science, on the contrary, in the recognition of these limits are present the possibilities of elaborating subversions, resistances, and epistemic alternatives (p. 156).

The indisputable priority acquired by the theory of knowledge with its conceptual partner of subject and object, made gravitate around it all the expectations and successful results obtained in the material and spiritual planes, relegating to a second term the sphere of practical reason, based on the efficiency criteria and social profitability and political life; even the creative dimension was absorbed by an industry that produces cultural goods for mass consumption.

The loss became already the sign of this time, and it is because humans have accepted in all naturalness that they are not going anywhere, and even though there is no longer space for optimistic and edifying expectations that give cohesion to the everyday life, it is also true that reality must be assumed as a categorical fatality that cannot be transformed; it would be enough to remember that philosophy was born from astonishment, not from marasmus or discouragement, not apathy or fainting. If this is so, then it is time to liberate independent thinking from the historical continuum, it is time to warn against negative globalization and against this investment of values that has caused the transformation of technological reason on political grounds.

The topicality of the critical philosophy for a time of crisis like this would then find itself in the interstices of a praxis which makes its sense of resistance and, in its movement, can tense the dialectic of civilization to examine whether it can still reverse that propensity of the present society that has undergone a singular mutation: the personification of things and the objectification of people. This is a phenomenon that shows the metamorphosis of the subject in the object, and the object in subject. It is



not, of course, *the absolute spirit of Hegel*, but of a concrete mutation, the form of merchandise that has reified the lives of individuals. This cultural crisis accounts for the crumbling of the society representation and the subjectivity that was its access key.

If the subject is conceived not as a static category or as a concept reified over the centuries, but as a network of meanings that receives from the objective world the characters of the story that defines it, then, would it be possible to have a new community in which the link of coexistence without fear is restored? In other words, can humans accommodate the existence of a true society inhabited by emancipated people as something achievable? For Marcuse (1981) the answer is affirmative, since the line that critical philosophy has marked is that of social transformation and cultural creation. The philosophical objective of the background is to recover the echoes of Orpheus as the voice that does not order but sings, like the power of emancipation that gives the possibility of doing, without saying what to do.

84



## Bibliography

- ADORNO, Theodor  
1983 *Terminología filosófica*. Madrid: Taurus.
- ÁLVAREZ, Eduardo  
2007 *La cuestión del sujeto. El debate en torno a un paradigma de la modernidad*. Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. (Colección Cuaderno Gris, 8).
- BLOCH, Ernst  
1983 *Sujeto-Objeto. El pensamiento de Hegel*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- BRAVO REINOSO, Pedro  
2012 Los muros de la sociedad de control. *Revista Sophia: Colección de Filosofía de la Educación*, 13. Quito: Editorial Universitaria. Abya-Yala.
- CASTORIADIS, Cornelius  
2008 *Ventana al caos*. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- DESCARTES, René  
1981 *Discurso del método*. Madrid: Alianza.
- ENGELS, Friedrich  
1977 *El origen de la familia, de la propiedad privada y del Estado*. Madrid: Fundamentos.
- EINSTEIN, Albert  
1983 *Sobre la teoría de la relatividad*. Madrid: Sarpe.
- FICHTE, Johann Gottlieb  
1975 *Doctrina de la ciencia*. Buenos Aires: Aguilar.
- FOUCAULT, Michel  
1992 *Microfísica del poder*. Madrid: La Piqueta.
- FRIEDMAN, George  
1986 *La filosofía política de la Escuela de Frankfurt*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

- HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich  
1988 *Fenomenología del espíritu*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- HUME, David  
1994 *Investigación sobre el conocimiento humano*. Madrid: Alianza.
- HUSSERL, Edmund  
1984 *Crisis de las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología trascendental*. México: Folios.
- ISRAEL, Jonathan I.  
2012 *La Ilustración radical. La filosofía y la construcción de la modernidad 1650-1750*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- KANT, Immanuel  
2013 *Crítica de la razón pura*. Madrid: Taurus.
- LEIBNIZ, Gottfried  
1992 *Disertación acerca del arte combinatorio*. Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile.
- MARCUSE, Herbert  
1981 *El final de la utopía*. México: Planeta/Ariel.
- MARX, Karl  
1984 *Manuscritos economía y filosofía*. Madrid: Alianza.
- NEWTON, Isaac  
1997 *Principios matemáticos de la Filosofía Natural*. Madrid: Tecnos.
- NIETZSCHE, F.  
1983 *Así habló Zaratustra*. Barcelona: Bruguera.
- PLAMENATZ, John  
1986 *Karl Marx y su filosofía del hombre*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- TAYLOR, Charles  
1996 *Fuentes del yo*. Barcelona: Paidós.
- TOURAINÉ, Alain  
1994 *Crítica de la Modernidad*. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig  
1975 *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.  
1997 *Observaciones filosóficas*. México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.



Date of receipt of the document: December 15, 2017  
Date of document revision: February 15, 2018  
Date of acceptance of the document: May 15, 2018  
Date of publication of the document: July 15, 2018